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  III 
Guanxi Kapitalismus in China und die Rolle von  
Privatunternehmen und Netzwerken für die  
ökonomische Entwicklung  
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Diese Dissertation befasst sich mit der Analyse der Entwicklung des chinesischen Wirt-
schaftssystems seit 1978. Der Transformationsprozess verlief je nach Region und Sektor 
unterschiedlich, teilweise kam es schon sehr früh zur Entwicklung von privatwirtschaftli-
chen Strukturen, in anderen Teilen des Landes dominiert nach wie vor der Staat die wirt-
schaftliche Produktion. Abhängig von der lokalen Entwicklung folgen verschiedene Sekto-
ren bzw. Regionen unterschiedlichen Logiken, was zu der Vermutung führt, dass verschie-
dene Kapitalismustypen in China definiert werden können. Diese Dissertation vertritt hin-
gegen die Ansicht, dass die chinesische Wirtschaft eine spezielle Variante von Kapitalis-
mus entwickelt hat, die insbesondere von Netzwerkbeziehungen (Guanxi) und der Privat-
wirtschaft beeinflusst wird. Obwohl der Staatssektor natürlich ebenfalls keine zu unter-
schätzende Rolle spielt, konzentriert sich diese Arbeit auf die Rolle von Privatunterneh-
men. Zum einen, weil diese als die treibende Kraft hinter der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 
identifiziert wurden und zum anderen, weil dort das Phänomen Guanxi besonders stark 
ausgeprägt ist. 
Bedingt durch die ausgeprägte lokale Heterogenität Chinas ist es schwierig, das Land aus 
einer Makroperspektive zu betrachten. Diese Dissertation wird dennoch eine holistische 
Betrachtung der Entwicklung Chinas vorstellen, die sich aber auf einige spezielle soziale 
und kulturelle Charakteristika fokussieren wird, um grundlegende Gemeinsamkeiten des 
Prozesses aufzudecken, ohne dabei der Gefahr der Simplizität zu erliegen. Es wird daher 
noch einmal betont, dass obschon diese Arbeit keine erschöpfende und vollständige Be-
trachtung des chinesischen Wirtschaftssystems anbietet, dennoch die Synthese eines gro-
ßen Wissensgebietes zur Privatwirtschaft und der Rolle von Netzwerken präsentiert wird, 
indem neben ökonomischer auch soziologische, historische und politologische Literatur 
mit in die Betrachtung einbezogen wird. Dadurch soll Einsicht in die Funktionsweise eines 
chinesischen Kapitalismus gewonnen werden, dessen Erfolg vor allem auf Guanxi basiert. 
Die Arbeit ist zweigeteilt: Während im ersten Teil die theoretischen Grundlagen vorgestellt 
werden, bezieht sich der zweite Teil unter Hervorhebung von sozio-ökonomischen Institu- 
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tionen auf die Entwicklung  und eine Analyse  des chinesischen Wirtschaftssystems seit 
1978 und untersucht den Kapitalismustyp, der dort entsteht. 
Nach der Einleitung beginnt die Arbeit daher in Kapitel 2 mit den theoretischen Grundla-
gen. Das Kapitel wird mit einer Beschreibung und einem Vergleich der Methodologie von 
neuer und alter  – amerikanischer – Institutionenökonomik eingeleitet. Die neoklassische 
Grundlage der Neuen Institutionenökonomik und deren einschränkende Annahmen ma-
chen diesen Theoriezweig weniger geeignet als den methodisch breiter angelegten Ameri-
kanischen Institutionalismus, dessen Methoden im weiteren Verlauf des Kapitels noch ge-
nauer dargelegt werden. Im Anschluss daran nähert sich die Arbeit der Definition des viel-
schichtigen Begriffs „Institution“ an. Beginnend mit der Definition von Douglass North 
arbeitet sich die Arbeit nacheinander an verschiedenen Denkansätzen aus neuer und alter 
Institutionenökonomik an diesen Begriff ab, um danach genauer auf die Methodologie des 
Amerikanischen Institutionalismus einzugehen. Es wird festgestellt, dass hier eine holisti-
sche Herangehensweise vertreten wird, die in der Nutzung von Evolutionismus und sog. 
„Pattern Models“ zur Theoriebildung zum Ausdruck kommt. Auf diese Weise ist diese Art 
des Institutionalismus in der Lage, Wirtschaftssysteme auf narrative Weise holistisch dar-
zustellen. Es ermöglicht zudem die Darstellung verschiedener Kapitalismusvarianten, da 
das kulturelle und soziale Umfeld sowie geschichtliche Aspekte mit in die Analyse einbe-
zogen werden, die dadurch eine umfassende Betrachtung gestattet. Die Methodik des ame-
rikanischen Institutionalismus erlaubt so einen kritischen Einblick in die Dynamik sozialen 
Wandels und menschlicher Verhaltensweisen in ihrem institutionellen Kontext. Das Ziel 
von Institutionalismus ist nicht das Aufstellen von generellen, gesetzesähnlichen Aussagen 
und Prognosen, die besonders ‚robust„ oder streng sein müssen, sondern das Verstehen und 
Erklären einer spezifischen Situation.  
Ergänzend zu dieser Analyse beschreibt die Arbeit Theorien zum Wandel von Institutio-
nen, da das Ziel der Arbeit nicht die Betrachtung eines ‚fertigen„, und somit statischen, 
Systems ist, sondern eines Wirtschaftssystems, das sich weiterhin in Transformation befin-
det.  Nach  einer  kurzen  Zusammenfassung  der  Herangehensweise  der  alten 
Institutionenökonomik  fokussiert  sich  das  Unterkapitel  auf  die  Theorie  zum 
Institutionenwandel, die auf Kathleen Thelen und James Mahoney zurückgeht. Diese stellt 
eine Erweiterung der Neuen Institutionenökonomik dar, wird aber dennoch für diese Arbeit 
als fruchtbar empfunden, weil die Konzeption des Strukturwandels auch über den engen 
neoklassischen Theorierahmen hinaus verwendbar ist. Das Model nähert sich somit der 
Denkweise des alten Institutionalismus an, ist aber analytisch präziser formuliert. Die ver- 
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schiedenen Varianten des Institutionenwandels werden vorgestellt und im weiteren Verlauf 
der Arbeit immer wieder vergleichend herangezogen. 
Im anschließenden Kapitel 3 werden verschiedene Konzepte von Netzwerken und (soziale) 
Netzwerktheorie vorgestellt. Das Kapitel bezieht sich dabei aber eher auf qualitative als 
auf quantitative Methoden. Zudem sind es Modelle, die Netzwerke westlichen Typs zum 
Vorbild nehmen. Diese sind, kurz gefasst, zumeist eher eindimensionaler Natur und unter-
scheiden sich damit grundsätzlich von Chinas Guanxi-Netzwerken. Um aber dennoch eine 
solide Grundlage für die Analyse und Vergleich zu haben, ist eine Untersuchung der Theo-
rien dieses Typs unerlässlich, um neben den zahlreichen Unterschieden auch Gemeinsam-
keiten herauszuarbeiten.  
Als grundlegendes Element von Netzwerken wird zunächst der Begriff Sozialkapital in der 
Interpretation verschiedener Autoren vorgestellt und definiert. Dies ist darüber hinaus als 
Vergleich für das chinesische Guanxi wichtig, welches in Kapitel 6 dargestellt wird.  Im 
Anschluss wird der Begriff Netzwerk analysiert, erst auf allgemeinere Weise als Begriffs-
bestimmung, dann spezifischer in Bezug auf regionale und korporative – oder strategische 
– Netzwerke. Netzwerke stehen als Organisationsstruktur zwischen Markt und Hierarchie 
und sind dabei hochgradig personenbezogen, sowohl in ihren formalen als auch informel-
len  Varianten.  Verschiedene  Netzwerktypen  können  über  die  Merkmale  Reziprozität, 
wechselseitige  Abhängigkeit  und  Macht  definiert  werden.  Neben  Sozialkapital  spielen 
auch Vertrauen und ‚Embeddedness„ eine große Rolle für Netzwerke; diese Konzepte wer-
den in einem Exkurs in Kürze aus westlicher Sicht dargestellt.  
Nachdem die relevanten Eigenschaften  sowie generelle Organisationsformen von Netz-
werken vorgestellt wurden, geht der nächste Abschnitt auf verschiedene Typen von regio-
nalen Netzwerken ein. Diese sind im Allgemeinen nach dem Grundsatz der flexiblen Spe-
zialisierung organisiert und können in Form von innovativen Milieus, Clustern oder Indust-
riedistrikten auftreten. Die Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede der einzelnen Organisati-
onsformen  werden  aufgezeigt,  analysiert  und kritisch  diskutiert.  Auf diese  Evaluierung 
wird im sechsten Kapitel beim Vergleich verschiedener konkreter Netzwerktypen erneut 
Bezug genommen. 
Das vierte Kapitel widmet sich der Definition des Begriffs Kapitalismus. Kapitalismus war 
schon bei seiner Prägung im 19. Jahrhundert ein kontroverser Begriff, zumal bis heute kei-
ne eindeutige Begriffsbestimmung vorliegt. Es gibt zahlreiche Definitionen, basierend auf 
sehr unterschiedlichen Konzepten und Typologien, die aber in den meisten Fällen mit ideo- 
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logischen Konnotationen belastet sind.
1 In modernen Definitionen wird der Begriff häufig 
gleichgesetzt mit einem Wirtschaftssystem, in dem Kapital zentral für alle Tran saktionen 
ist, das über eine liberale Gesellschaftsordnung verfügt und in dem Land und Arbeiter frei 
auf dem Markt verfügbar sind.  
Diese Dissertation stützt sich vor allem auf die Ausführungen von Max Weber, der Kapita-
lismus als „da vorhanden, wo die erwerbswirtschaftliche Bedarfsdeckung einer Menschen-
gruppe auf dem Wege der Unternehmung stattfindet”, definierte, und ein „speziell rationa-
ler kapitalistischer Betrieb” einer „mit Kapitalrechnung” ist bzw. einer, „der seine Rentabi-
lität rechnerisch durch das Mittel der modernen Buchführung…kontrolliert”.
2 Der Geist 
des Kapitalismus beschreibt für ihn „diejenige Gesinnung, welche berufsmäßig systema-
tisch und rational legitimen Gewinn…erstrebt”.
3 Er beschreibt sehr bildhaft die unumkehr-
baren Folgen dieses Systems: Sein Auftreten führt dazu, dass der Alltag und das Leben der 
Menschen fundamental und für immer verändert werden und sie sich in einem „stahlharten 
Gehäuse” wiederfinden.
4 Er stellt dies als Trennungsprozess von vormalig verschmolzenen 
Einheiten dar, der die alte Wirtschaftsordnung zerbricht und die bestehenden traditionellen 
Institutionen überformt. Max Weber bezeichnete dies als die Natur des modernen Kapit a-
lismus. In dieser Sichtweise spielen persönliche Beziehungen zunehmend keine Rolle mehr 
für Geschäftstransaktionen, sondern werden von Vertragsbeziehungen ersetzt. Insbesonde-
re der Haushalt als Einheit von Privatem und Betrieb ging verloren und damit auch seine 
Bedeutung als Wirtschaftseinheit  - für Weber eine unabdingbare Vorbedingung des m o-
dernen Kapitalismus, unabhängig von der Gesellschaft und ihrer institutionellen Ausgestal-
tung.
5 Die jeweiligen Ökonomien werden unter der Doktrin der individuellen Nutzenm a-
ximierung, rationalistischen Rechtsprinzipien und privaten Akkumulation vereinheitlicht. 
Traditionelle Institutionen können der allumfassenden, alles überlagernden Logik des Ka-
pitalismus, dessen Entwicklung klar vorgezeichnet erscheint, wenig entgegensetzen .
6 Ob-
wohl auch in früheren Wirtschaftssystemen Gier und „die universale Herrschaft absoluter 
Skrupellosigkeit  der  Geltendmachung  des  Eigeninteresses  beim  Gelderwerb“  existierte, 
waren diese von einem „undisziplinierten ‚liberum arbitrium„“ der „bewussten Rücksichts-
                                                 
1 Brunner; Conze and Koselleck, 1982, „Kapital, Kapitalist und Kapitalismus‟. Der Begriff “Kapitalismus” 
entstammt dem Französischen und wurde in Deutschland meist im Zusammenhang mit kritischen Beschrei-
bungen der Veränderungen in der Gesellschaft genutzt. Siehe auch Köster and Plumpe, 2007, p. 4, Pohle, 
1910, p. 6. 
2 Weber, 1958 [1923], S. 238. 
3 Weber, 2007 [1904], S. 53. 
4 Weber, 2007 [1904], S. 160. 
5 Weber, 1958 [1923], S. 7.. 
6 Yang, 2000, S. 481.  
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losigkeit des Gewinnstrebens“ getrieben, der die Disziplin und Rationalität des bürgerli-
chen Kapitalismus fehlte.
7  
In ähnlicher Weise argumentiert Werner Sombart, der für seine Ausführungen zum moder-
nen Kapitalismus auch die Wichtigkeit eines bestimmten Geistes betont, der neben Organi-
sation des Wirtschaftsleben und der verwendeten Technik die größte Rolle spielt.  Dieser 
Geist setzt sich für ihn aus einer Mischung von wagemutigem Entrepreneur und ration a-
lem, rechtschaffenem Bourgeois zusammen, der zugleich Eroberer, Erfinder, Organisator 
und Kaufmann ist. Ein dynamischer Kapitalismus kann nur entstehen, wenn die Elemente 
von rationalem Entrepreneur, Staatsintervention und Bürokratisierung zusammenkommen.   
Beide Autoren stimmen darin überein, dass Kapitalismus mit der „Gliederung des Produk-
tionsprozesses unter wissenschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten dessen Gebundenheit an die na-
türlich gegebenen ‚organischen‟ Schranken der menschlichen Person beseitigt“ hat.
8 Men-
schen wurden zu „fiktiven Waren”, die ihre Arbeitskraft auf Arbeitsmärkten anboten und 
nicht in der Lage waren dem „stahlharten Gehäuse” zu entrinnen.
9 Weber - und in ähnli-
cher Weise auch Sombart - konstruiert damit einen idealtypischen Kapitalismus, der mit 
wachsender  Rationalisierung,  Bürokratisierung  und  Professionalisierung  innerhalb  eines 
homogenen institutionellen Umfelds einhergeht. Ein Wirtschaftssystem entstand, bei dem 
die Wirtschaft nicht mehr in die Gesellschaft eingebettet ist, sondern umgekehrt die Ge-
sellschaft nur noch ein bloßes Anhängsel der Wirtschaftsordnung ist. Die Wirtschaft wurde 
zu einem von Effizienz und Gewinnstreben dominierten selbständigen System. Kapitalis-
mus führt in dieser Sichtweise immer und unausweichlich zu steigender Bürokratisierung 
und Rationalisierung. Unternehmen werden zu Großunternehmen, die in Massenprodukti-
on mit Hilfe eines rationalen Managements produzieren und daher maximal unabhängig 
von einzelnen Individuen werden. Unpersönliche bürokratische Leitung ersetzt die traditi-
onelle, persönliche.
10 Im Gegensatz dazu wird sich im Verlauf der Arbeit zeigen, dass die 
These der unabwendbaren Bürokratisierung und  „rationalen Versachlichung“
11 nicht auf-
recht zu erhalten ist. Die flexible Produktion des 21. Jahrhunderts hängt nicht mehr aus-
schließlich von multinationalen Unternehmen ab, sondern zunehmend auch von kleinen 
Zulieferbetrieben.
12 
                                                 
7 Weber, 2007 [1904], S. 44f. 
8 Weber, 2007 [1904], S. 63.  
9 Polanyi, 1995, S. 102ff. 
10 Weber, 1976 [1922], S. 126. 
11 Weber, 1963 [1924], S. 374. 
12 Yang, 2000, S. 481.  
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Bezugnehmend auf Webers Betonung des Protestantismus fü r den Kapitalismus und die 
„Spirit of Capitalism“-Diskussion der 1980er Jahre, beschäftigt sich der nächste Abschnitt 
mit  dem  Zusammenhang  von  Konfuzianismus  und  Kapitalismus.  Zunächst  werden  die 
Grundprinzipien des Konfuzianismus überblicksartig behandelt, danach Webers Einschät-
zung der Betonung von konfuzianischen Werten auf die Entwicklung eines kapitalistischen 
Wirtschaftssystems in China dargestellt. Diese wird einer aktuelleren Evaluierung gegen-
übergestellt,  die  auch  eine  Genderperspektive  in  die  Analyse  mit  einbezieht.  Die 
Konfuzianismusdebatte  wurde  im  Laufe  der  1990er  Jahre  durch  eine  netzwerkbasierte 
Sichtweise auf den chinesischen Kapitalismus abgelöst.  
Im Anschluss daran werden verschiedene Ansätze der komparativen Kapitalismusanalyse 
vorgestellt. Der aktuell viel diskutierte Varieties of Capitalism-Ansatz macht den Anfang. 
Es wird festgestellt, dass dieser sich weniger eignet, die Entwicklung eines chinesischen 
Kapitalismustyps nachzuvollziehen, da er zum einen von demokratischen Staaten ausgeht, 
zum anderen nur in der Lage ist, eine statische Beschreibung von Kapitalismus zu geben. 
Dies ist für das sich in Transformation befindliche China nicht ideal, zudem sind Beschrei-
bungskriterien, die das Unternehmen, insbesondere die Organisation der Produktion, in den 
Mittelpunkt stellen, eher auf entwickelte post-industrielle Ländern zugeschnitten. In der 
Erweiterung von Amable wird ein asiatischer Kapitalismus definiert, der aber Privatunter-
nehmen nicht beachtet.
13 
Anschliessend werden Euckens Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Ordnung sowie das Wir t-
schaftsstilkonzept vorgestellt. Insbesondere letzeres wird als Ergänzung und Kompleme n-
tierung des holistischen ‚Pattern Models„ verwendet. Auch der Wirtschaftsstil ist ein quali-
tatives Instrument, welches charakteristische Verhaltensstrukturen und historisch gewach-
sene  Lebensbedingungen  und  Institutionen  in  die  Betrachtung  mit  einbezieht.  Wie  das 
‚Pattern Model„ ist auch der Wirtschaftsstil hochgradig subjektiv und relativistisch, aber 
gerade dadurch in der Lage, ein Gemälde einer wirtschaftlichen Epoche zu entwerfen, an-
statt eines einfachen Schnappschusses wie im Falle des Varieties of Capitalism-Ansatzes. 
Mit dem anschließenden fünften Kapitel beginnt der zweite Teil der Dissertation. Es be-
schäftigt sich mit dem Phänomen der Entwicklung und Transformation, zunächst theore-
tisch, danach bezogen auf China. Es wird dargestellt, dass sich Transformation graduell 
oder schockartig vollziehen kann, gleichzeitig wird festgestellt, dass China in keine der 
beiden Kategorien passt, da ein eigener - sehr pragmatischer - Weg der Transformation 
gegangen wurde. Zur Veranschaulichung der Thesen wird vergleichend der westliche Ent-
                                                 
13 Hall and Soskice, 2004, Amable, 2003, Jackson and Deeg, 2006, Lane, 2005.  
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wicklungsprozess während der industriellen Revolution als Vergleich herangezogen und 
entsprechend in aller Kürze beschrieben; dabei beschränkt sich die Arbeit aber auf eine 
Betrachtung des englischen und deutschen Falls. Anschließend werden der Ablauf und die 
wichtigsten Merkmale der chinesischen Transformation seit 1978 unter Hervorhebung von 
Besonderheiten in groben Zügen beschrieben und mit Daten zum aktuellen Stand der chi-
nesischen Entwicklung unterlegt. Nach der Darlegung des historischen Ablaufs und seiner 
Fakten wird die chinesische Transformation kritisch analysiert. Sie war – und ist – ein sehr 
pragmatischer Prozess, der allgemeinhin als ‚gegen jede Regel„ beschrieben und wahrge-
nommen wird. Dezentralisiertes soziales Lernen und lokale Experimente der Lokalregie-
rungen führten zu unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen in verschiedenen chinesischen Provinzen. 
Die Zentralregierung dient dabei mehrheitlich nur als Vermittler und überträgt erfolgreiche 
Experimente in einer ex-post Sanktionierung von bis dahin allenfalls halblegalen Aktivitä-
ten der Privatwirtschaft auf den Rest des Landes. Dies und die Akzeptanz eines relativ ho-
hen Levels an Unsicherheit ermöglichen dem Privatsektor und seinen pragmatischen Un-
ternehmern auch ohne klar definierte Verfügungsrechte sehr erfolgreich zu sein. 
Diese theoretische Analyse wird im weiteren Verlauf des Kapitels um eine Betrachtung der 
Rolle der Familie für den Entwicklungsprozess bereichert. Aus westlicher Sicht wird die 
Familie bzw. das Familienunternehmen als veraltete Produktionseinheit bzw. -form für den 
Kapitalismus betrachtet, die eigentlich dem Privatleben zuzurechnen ist. Konsequenterwei-
se war der westliche Industrialisierungsprozess auch begleitet von einer Veränderung und 
Anpassung von traditionellen Familienstrukturen und Institutionen an die Gegebenheiten 
des neuen wirtschaftlichen Systems, das auf Fabrikarbeit basierte. Dies führte letztendlich 
zur  Verwandlung  des  ländlichen  traditionellen  ‚ganzen  Hauses„  hin  zum  individuellen, 
städtischen Haushalt des Fabrikarbeiters. Dieser Prozess ist zudem mit einer Wandlung der 
Geschlechterwahrnehmung,  der  Arbeitsteilung  und  des  Lebensstils  verbunden,  die  aber 
zunächst für Arbeiter- und Bürgerhaushalte unterschiedlich verlief. Der Zusammenhang 
von Sozialstruktur und wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung wird im achten Kapitel wieder aufge-
griffen, wenn die Rolle des bourgeoisen Unternehmers analysiert wird. 
Diese westliche Entwicklung wird der chinesischen gegenübergestellt und insbesondere 
die Wichtigkeit der chinesischen Familie für den kapitalistischen Transformationsprozess 
betrachtet. Während Weber und später die Modernisierungstheorie die Familie als eine 
Institution wahrgenommen hat, die der kapitalistischen Entwicklung eher hinderlich ist, 
verkehrte sich diese Beurteilung später ins Gegenteil. Während man beim Kapitalismus 
Weberscher Lesart davon ausgeht, dass für eine erfolgreiche kapitalistische Entwicklung  
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zwingend traditionelle Institutionen durch ‚moderne‟ ersetzt werden müssen und dass vor 
allem die Familie als Wirtschaftseinheit ihre Bedeutung verlieren muss, scheint dies für 
China anders zu sein. Die Bewertung der chinesischen Familie hatte bis in die 1960er Jahre 
hinein Bestand, als auch die Modernisierungstheorie in der personalistischen chinesischen 
Kultur den Grund sah, den China von der Einführung des Kapitalismus abhielt. Seitdem 
hat sich diese Einschätzung drastisch zugunsten der chinesischen Familie entwickelt. Wäh-
rend der Wirtschaftsreformen nach 1978 griff die chinesische Bevölkerung auf Institutio-
nen aus ihrer Vergangenheit zurück, vor allem auf persönliche Netzwerke. Die Familie 
dient oftmals als organisatorischer Mittel- und finanzieller Startpunkt für kleine Privatun-
ternehmen und behielt somit ihre Bedeutung für den Produktionsprozess. Dies führte China 
zu einem wirtschaftlichen Erfolg, der in der Geschichte seinesgleichen sucht. Im Gegen-
satz zu Ost- und Mitteleuropa verlief hier die Transformation von Plan- zu Marktwirtschaft 
erstaunlich glatt.
14 Der chinesische Familismus wird jetzt als vorteilhaft und sogar als ‚Mo-
tor der Entwicklung„ bewertet, da Guanxi-Beziehungen der Familie oftmals der Ausgangs-
punkt für erfolgreiche Familienunternehmen wurden, die mit Erfolg in einem zunehmend 
kapitalistischen System agierten.
15 Die chinesische Familie konnte Tradition mit modernen 
Elementen verbinden und schuf so dem westlichen Modell komplementäre Inst itutionen, 
die zum Erfolg der privaten Firmen beitrugen.  
Dies führt die Arbeit weiter zum Thema Guanxi und damit zum sechsten Kapitel. Es be-
ginnt  mit  einer  allgemeinen  Definition  d ieses  chinesischen  Ausdrucks  für  Netzwerk. 
Guanxi beschreibt die Dynamik der Konstruktion von persönlichen Beziehungen  und ist 
ein zentraler Bestandteil chinesischer Kultur. Persönliche Beziehungen zwischen Individu-
en können durch gegenseitige Geschenke oder andere Gefälligkeiten ausgedrückt werden. 
Bestandteil von Guanxi sind daher langfristige, teilweise sogar generationenüberschreiten-
de, ‚Schulden‟, die durch ‚Gaben‟ bzw. Geschenke entstehen. Als Teil von persönlichen 
Beziehungen ist die Vorstellung von Reziprozität, Obligation und Verpflichtung zentral, 
obwohl durchaus auch eine taktische Dimension von Guanxi existiert.
16 Guanxi baut auf 
bereits bestehenden Verbindungen zu Leuten auf, mit denen eine gemeinsame Identität  
besteht, z.B. aus gemeinsamer Schul- oder Militärzeit, der gleichen regionalen Herkunft 
oder zwischen Kollegen, und schafft so fiktive Quasi -Verwandtschaftsbeziehungen, die 
ebenfalls dauerhafter Natur und daher vertrauenswürdig sind.
17 
                                                 
14 Dirlik, 1997, p. 304. 
15 Wong, 1988, p. 146. 
16 Yang, 1994, S. 63, 67, 122. 
17 Yang, 1988, S. 409-411, Krug, 2002, S. 139f., Whyte, 1996, S. 12.  
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     Guanxi ist in den meisten Bereichen des Privat- und Geschäftslebens zu finden. Aller-
dings werden diese Bereiche nicht so strikt getrennt wie in der westlichen Kultur. Es gibt 
daher auch in den meisten Fällen keine vom privaten Leben getrennten Netzwerke für Ge-
schäftsbeziehungen.  Traditionell empfindet sich das Individuum als Teil eines Ganzen 
bzw. eines Netzwerkes, das von gegenseitiger Unterstützung und Rücksichtnahme lebt.
18 
Im Gegensatz zum Westen gibt  es also  keine getrennte Moralität oder Regeln für G e-
schäftsbeziehungen in China.  Diese werden nicht losgelöst vom Privatleben gedacht. 
Guanxi berücksichtigt gleichzeitig gesellschaftliche Moral und individuellen Nutzen, wie 
gegensätzlich dies auch erscheinen mag.  Verhandlungspartner bewegen sich immer auf 
Messers Schneide zwischen Freundschaft und Profit, Altruismus und Rivalität, sozialer 
Harmonie und  Wettbewerbsvorteil.
19 Es  wurde vermutet, dass Guanxi   als vermeintlich 
weniger effiziente Institution zugunsten von Vertragsbeziehungen  in einer vollständigen 
kapitalistischen Marktwirtschaft im Laufe der Reformen verschwinden würde. Stattdessen 
beobachtete man genau das Gegenteil: Gua nxi passte sich den neuen Gegebenheiten der 
kapitalistischen Wirtschaft an.  
Im Verlauf des Kapitels wird eine traditionellere, eher ländliche, sowie eine moderne, eher 
städtische, Variante von Guanxi beschrieben und Guanxi somit als sich ständig wandelnde 
Institution dargestellt. Es wird auch nicht versäumt, Guanxi mit Korruption zu vergleichen. 
Als weiterer Aspekt wird eine Genderperspektive mit in die Betrachtung einbezogen. 
Guanxi ist nicht nur ein Mechanismus, der Frauen systematisch benachteiligt, er wird auch 
instrumentalisiert, indem Geschlechtsstereotypen in den Prozess integriert und so z.B.  in 
Geschäftsverhandlungen geschickt ausgenutzt werden. Im letzten Abschnitt des Kapitels 
wird die Spezifizität von Guanxi-Netzwerken hervorgehoben. Hierfür werden sie Beispie-
len aus Deutschland, Italien und Russland gegenübergestellt.  Neben den Unterschieden 
werden aber insbesondere auch Gemeinsamkeiten betont und die Konzepte von Guanxi mit 
dem russischen Blat verglichen.  
Das nächste, siebte, Kapitel greift das Thema Privatwirtschaft und somit private Unter-
nehmer erneut auf. Als nach 1978 allmählich eine Marktwirtschaft entstand, spielten tradi-
tionelle Institutionen wie z.B. kleine Familienunternehmen mitsamt ihrer Netzwerke im 
globalen Kapitalismus des 21. Jahrhunderts mit seiner flexiblen, transnationalen Produkti-
onsweise eine mindestens genauso große Rolle wie große multinationale Firmen.
20 Unter-
nehmerische Bestrebungen haben sich über die sozialistische Zeit hinweg erhalten und 
                                                 
18 Pohl, 2002, S. 114f., Mauss, 1966, S. 1-3, 36f., 76-78., Yan, 1996, S. 8f. 
19 Souchou, 2002, S. 238. 
20 Dirlik, 1997, S. 310.  
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konnten sich während der Reformen  mit Hilfe ihrer Netzwerke  relativ ungestört entwi-
ckeln. Unternehmertum wurde als Chance wahrgenommen.
21  
Es wird argumentiert, dass chinesische Unternehmer e ine spezifische, sehr pragmatische 
Haltung einnehmen und geschickt Guanxi im Geschäftsleben einsetzen.  Mehr als das, es 
scheint gar keine klare Tren nung von Geschäftlichem und Privatem zu existieren. Wie 
auch im achten Kapitel noch einmal hervorgehoben werden wird, gehören chinesische Un-
ternehmer oftmals zwar der Kategorie der ‚neuen Reichen‟ an, sie sind aber nicht auf dem 
Weg, eine Bürgergesellschaft im westlichen Sinne zu schaffen. Im Gegensatz zum westli-
chen Bourgeois, der sich als Teil des Wirtschaftsbürgertums verstand, das gemeinsame 
Werte teilte, streben chinesische Unternehmer nicht nach strategischen Verbindungen, die 
im Westen typischerweise über Industrieverbände oder Vereine hergestellt werden. Die 
chinesische Unternehmermoral ist zukunftsorientiert und auf die Bedürfnisse der Familie 
hin ausgerichtet, die Motivation für Unternehmensgründungen kommt vor allem aus dem 
Antrieb, langfristige Sicherheit für die Familie zu schaffen. Es wird dargelegt, dass diese 
Strukturen langfristiger Natur sind, da  über Guanxi verbundene  Kleinunternehmen  und 
flexible Produktion einen Vorteil in der heutigen globalisierten Wirtschaft darstellen. Diese 
Faktoren beeinflussen die weitere Entwicklung des chinesischen Wirtschaftssystems und 
somit auch den Kapitalismustyp, der dort entsteht.  
Nach der Analyse der Bedeutung des chinesischen Unternehmers für den Transformations-
prozess werden die verschiedenen chinesischen Unternehmenstypen untersucht. Um die 
Komplexität und die Verschiedenheit der Unternehmensstrukturen abzubilden, ist es not-
wendig, hier sowohl Privat- als auch Staatssektor mit in die Analyse einzubeziehen. Die 
definitorische Abgrenzung des Privatsektors ist nicht einfach, was sich auch im nächsten 
Abschnitt zeigt, der einen Überblick über Wirtschaftsdaten zum Privatsektor gibt. 
Es wurde bereits betont, dass die chinesische Privatwirtschaft nicht homogen ist, sondern 
sich je nach Region bzw. Sektor unterschiedlich entwickelt. Dies wird durch ein Fallbe-
spiel der Region Wenzhou verdeutlicht. Wenzhou war eine der Gegenden, die sehr früh 
privatisiert hat, und auch eine Provinz, die sehr stark von der Wirtschaftskrise 2008 betrof-
fen war. Die Erfolgs- und Überlebensstrategien des dortigen Privatsektors werden vorge-
stellt. Diese beruhen zum einen auf der hohen Bedeutung von Guanxi und damit zusam-
menhängend den symbiotischen Beziehungen zur Lokalregierung, die einen starken Ein-
fluss auf die Entwicklung ausgeübt hat. 
                                                 
21 Whyte, 1995, S. 1015, sowie Krug, 2002, S. 133, Yang, 2002, S. 466ff. und Peng, 2004, S. 1059.  
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Unter Geschäftsleuten werden Netzwerke als langfristige strategische Allianzen gesehen, 
um Informationen, Bankkredite oder  Ressourcen  zu beschaffen.  Netzwerke  verhindern 
oder verzögern durch ihre Unterstützungsleistungen aber auch Insolvenzen. Wenn ein Un-
ternehmer scheitert, wird er bei einem Neuanfang unterstützt. Das Netzwerk ‚speichert‟ die 
gemachten Fehler und macht so aus dem individuellen Verlust ein Lernexperiment für alle. 
Zu diesem Zwecke werden auch Beziehungen zur lokalen Regierung gepflegt.
22 
Dies führt uns zum achten Kapitel, das den Zusammenhang von politischen und ökonomi-
schen Akteuren genauer analysiert.  Zum Vergleich werden die Selbstwahrnehmung und 
der Diskurs über den deutschen bourgeoisen Unternehmer herangezogen. Die europäischen 
Unternehmer des 19. Jahrhunderts  sind nach Webers Definition  „in harter Lebensschule 
aufgewachsene, wägend und wagend zugleich, vor allem aber nüchtern und stetig, scharf 
und völlig der Sache hingegebene Männer mit streng bürgerlichen Anschauungen“, die 
dem „traditionalistischen Schlendrian“ hinter sich gelassen haben.
23 Der Unternehmer war 
daher wichtig, um den Kapitalismus in Gang zu bringen. Der idealtypische Unternehmer 
entstammte einer bestimmten Schicht, dem Bürgertum, was ihm wiederum erleichterte, 
seinen Geschäften nachzugehen, weil er sich sozusagen unter ‚seinesgleichen‟ wähnte. Mit 
diesen pflegte er persönliche Vertrauensbeziehungen; man begegnete sich aber nicht nur 
auf geschäftlicher, sondern auch auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene.
24 Auch politisch spielte der 
Unternehmer, vor allem auf lokaler Ebene, eine nicht  zu unterschätzende Rolle bei der 
Schaffung eines einem kapitalistischen System zuträglichen politischen und gesetzlichen 
Umfelds. 
Es wird zudem argumentiert, dass die Figur des Unternehmers sowohl in Deutschland des 
19. Jahrhunderts als auch im heutigen China eine tragende Rolle bei der Formierung eines 
spezifischen Kapitalismus spielte. In beiden Systemen führte seine Einbettung in Familie 
und Gesellschaft  aber zu Ausformungen verschiedener Wirtschaftskulturen. In Deutsc h-
land verstand sich der Unternehmer als Teil einer Sch icht – dem Wirtschaftsbürgertum – 
und agierte weitgehend in einer von der Familie separaten Sphäre. Obwohl auch in Europa 
besonders  in  der  Frühphase  der  Industrialisierung  Netzwerke  eine  nicht  geringe  Rolle 
spielten, entwickelte sich die Wirtschaft zugunsten einer rationalisierten, bürokratisierten 
Massenproduktion  in  hierarchisch  strukturierten  Konzernen.  Persönliche  Verbindungen 
ebenso wie die Familie traten zugunsten stetiger Bürokratisierung und Rationalisierung in 
den Hintergrund des Wirtschaftslebens. Erfolg und Profitabilität hingen nicht mehr in ers-
                                                 
22 Krug and Mehta, 2004, p. 60f. 
23 Weber, 2007 [1904], S. 51+57. 
24 Lesger, 1997, S. 266.  
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ter Linie mit dem Charakter und den Beziehungen des Unternehmers zusammen, wie dies 
z.B. Sombart in seinen Werken darstellte. Im Zuge der Weiterentwicklung des kapitalisti-
schen Systems trat der Unternehmer und mit ihm auch die Bedeutung seines Beziehungs-
geflechtes hinter den Einfluss von Rationalität und Bürokratisierung zurück. 
Dies änderte sich erst unter der den Bedingungen der globalisierten Wirtschaft des späten 
20. Jahrhunderts, da hier neben den multinationalen Großunternehmen kleine Zulieferbe-
triebe als ‚global player‟ in Erscheinung traten. In diesen oftmals als Familienbetriebe or-
ganisierten, zu  Clustern zusammengefassten  Kleinunternehmen  dominiert  die Figur  des 
Unternehmers, der durch seine Einbettung in dichte Netzwerkbeziehungen extrem flexibel 
zu agieren in der Lage ist und auch die nötige (Risiko-)Bereitschaft hierfür mitbringt. Bei 
bestimmten Produktgruppen des Privatsektors, wie Textilien oder Spielzeuge, die arbeits-
intensiv hergestellt werden und keine komplizierten Produktionsprozesse benötigen, agie-
ren diese Unternehmen äußerst erfolgreich.
25  
Trotz Ausnutzung von persönlichen Beziehungen, gerade auch zu lokalen Behörden, bi l-
den aber chinesische Unternehmer  keine eigene Klasse oder  Bourgeoisie heraus. Gesell-
schaftlich stammen Chinas Unternehmer aus völlig verschiedenen Schichten und wü rden 
sich, wenn überhaupt, eher einer Arbeiterklasse zugehörig fühlen.  Obwohl chinesische 
Unternehmer ähnlich zum europäischen Bürgertum durchaus einem gemeinsamen kulturel-
len Kodex folgen, in ihrem Fall den Gesetzmäßigkeiten des Guanxi, fühlen sie sich eina n-
der nicht prinzipiell als Unternehmer  – oder Bürger – verbunden, da Guanxi kein unter-
nehmerspezifisches Instrument darstellt, sondern von ihnen nur sehr erfolgreich im Ge-
schäftsleben angewendet wird. Solange die Beziehungen zur Lokalregierung keinen nega-
tiven Einfluss auf ihre Geschäfte haben, sehen sie auch keine Notwendigkeit auf politische 
Reformen hinzuwirken, außer in sehr eng begrenztem, konkreten Rahmen.
26 Private Un-
ternehmer wurden von der zentralen Regierung dennoch al s wichtige (wirtschaftliche) 
Kraft identifiziert. Um der Entstehung von oppositi onellen Kräften vorzubeugen, wurde 
u.a. die Partei für den Eintritt von privaten Unternehmern geöffnet.  
Lokale Verwaltungsbeamte  werden in bestehende Netzwerke integriert, um Zugang zu 
Krediten und Produktionsmitteln zu erlangen . Diese Verbindungen sind allerdings nicht 
durchweg positiv zu bewerten.  Die Lokalregierungen unterstützen die Privatunternehmer 
nicht nur, sondern diskriminieren sie auch, indem sie z.B. Anteile an ihrem Unternehmen 
                                                 
25 Fukuyama, 1995, S. 104ff. 
26 Wank, 1995, S. 63f., Tsai, 2005, S. 1150ff.  
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verlangen.
27 Ist ein Unternehmer nicht kooperativ, riskiert er, die Unterstützung der Behör-
den zu verlieren. Ein Mittel dem entgegenzuwirken war, Unternehmen als Kollektivunte r-
nehmen anzumelden, es aber als Privatunternehmen bzw. sog.  ‚red hat enterprise‟ zu füh-
ren.  Weiterhin  werden  Produktportfolios  und  -standorte  diversifiziert,  um  eine  größere 
Variation von Produktionsmöglichkeiten zu erhalten.
28 Man lässt zudem Firmen nicht über 
eine bestimmte Größe wachsen, sondern gründet lieber ein Subunternehmen in einem a n-
deren Sektor, in einer anderen Provinz oder unter der Leitung eines anderen Familienmi t-
glieds. Dies schafft eine Art Handelskonzern in Form eines organisatorisch diffusen, über 
Verwandtschaftsbeziehungen verknüpften Unternehmensclusters, der eine beachtliche Ge-
samtgröße erreichen kann, auch wenn die einzelnen beteiligten Firmen eher klein bleiben . 
Dies hilft, die Besitzstrukturen nach außen zu verschleiern und so der Diskriminierung und 
Verfolgung durch die Behörden zu entkommen.
29 Jede der kleinen Firmen hat dadurch die 
Möglichkeit an  Skaleneffekten teilzuhaben und Zugriff auf ein größ eres Netzwerk und 
damit Ressourcen zu erhalten. Statt westlichen Wachstumsstrategien  zu folgen und sich 
eine Kernkompetenz anzueignen, vergrößern chinesische Unternehmer  lieber ihre Netz-
werke und investieren in ein breites Produktportfolio, statt alles auf eine Karte zu setzen. 
Dies hat auch den Vorteil, dass man flexibel auf Lieferengpässe oder einen Mangel an 
Produktionsmittel reagieren kann, ohne direkt Verluste zu generieren, sondern im Gege n-
teil neue Investitionsmöglichkeiten erkundet, was gerade in hochkompetitiven Märkten mit 
großen Nachfrageschwankungen extrem effizient ist. Auch die Entstehung von Ni schen-
märkten und Spezialisierung bevorteilt kleine Produktionseinheiten. Effizienz hat hier eine 
umfassendere  Bedeutung,  ist  weniger  rationalistisch,  so ndern  erfasst  auch  nicht -
ökonomische Faktoren.
30 Das Konzept der Kernkompetenz macht  auch aus dem Grund 
keinen Sinn, da eine Firma nicht dafür b ekannt ist, was sie produziert, sondern von w em 
sie geleitet wird.
31 Es entspricht der Logik dieses Systems, dass Verträge weniger nützlich 
sind, da sie auf einem „discrete transaction paradigm” basieren, das einen klar definierten 
Anfang durch die getroffene Vereinbarung hat und ein durch die erbrachte Leistung be-
gründetes Ende. Wer die ausführenden Parteien der Transaktion sind, spielt dort im Grunde 
keine Rolle.
32 
                                                 
27 Liu, 1992, S. 305f. 
28 Krug and Mehta, 2004, p. 55. 
29 Wank, 1999, S. 254, 267, Wank, 1996, S. 837. 
30 McNally, 2006, S. 41, Kiong and Kee, 1998, S. 93. 
31 Krug and Mehta, 2004, S. 58f., Lever-Tracy, 2002, S. 519. 
32 Lovett; Simmons and Kali, 1999, S. 236.  
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Im Westen ist das Wirtschaftssystem mit einem elaborierten Rechtssystem verbunden, das 
in der Lage ist, Verträge durchzusetzen, wohingegen man in China auf Ruf und Vertrauen 
setzt. Die Vertrauensbasis von Netzwerkbeziehungen trägt zur Beschleunigung und Ve r-
einfachung des Geschäftsverkehrs bei und verhindert Betrug oder anderes opportunist i-
sches Verhalten, da dies u.U. den Ausschluss aus dem Netzwerk zur Folge hätte.
33 Netz-
werke erleichtern den Geschäftspartnern auch, Interessenskonflikte zu umgehen und funk-
tionieren besser in kleinen Gruppen als in komplexen Unternehmensstrukturen:  Dieser 
Pragmatismus und die Akzeptanz  von Unsicherheit und Ambiguität stehen im Gegensatz 
zum westlichen Drang, alles im Detail zu regeln.  
Auch das chinesische Rechtssystem ist von politischen Experimenten charakterisiert,  Re-
gulierungen und Steuergesetze änderten sich unentwegt, und dies auch noch regional ver-
schieden. Waren die lokalen Versuche er folgreich, wurden sie in vielen Fällen ex post 
durch die Zentralregierung kodifiziert und auf ganz China angewandt.
 34 Die chinesische 
Gesetzgebung  geht  bei  der  Entwicklung  von  Gesetzen  bzgl.  der  Privatwirtschaft  sehr 
pragmatisch vor. Das Gesetz zum Privateigentum wurde beispielsweise anlehnend an loka-
le Experimente immer wieder angepasst und revidiert. Dies kann daher als ein besonders 
illustratives Beispiel für institutionellen Wandel verstanden werden, wie er im Theorieteil 
der Arbeit vorgestellt wurde. Andere Gesetze, wie z.B. zum Insiderhandel, wurden aus 
westlichen Ländern übernommen.  
Obwohl  China  damit  ein  nahezu  vollständiges  Gesetzeswerk  geschaffen  hat,  ist  das 
Rechtssystem  weiterhin  unvollständig.  Zwar  wurden  unabhängige  Gerichte  geschaffen, 
diese werden aber als manipulierbar und korrupt wahrgenommen und daher nur in seltenen 
Fällen, z.B. wenn es um überregionale oder internationale Rechtsstreitigkeiten geht bzw. 
das eigene Netzwerk nicht involviert ist, angerufen. Die Konzepte von universalem Recht 
und individueller Rechtsprechung sind dem eher partikularistischen chinesischen Denken 
fremd und werden als aus dem Westen importiert wahrgenommen. In der chinesischen 
Tradition wird der Umgang miteinander eher durch Beziehungen und über die ungeschrie-
benen Gesetze des Guanxi geregelt, eine solche Problemlösungsstrategie wird als effekti-
ver empfunden.
35 Dies macht die Durchsetzung eines bürgerlichen Freiheitsbegriffs und 
eine Verrechtlichung menschlicher Beziehungen schwer vorstellbar, da menschliches Mit-
einander mehr gilt als kategorisches Gesetz.  Die westliche, aus der Zeit der Aufklärung 
                                                 
33 Lesger, 1997, S. 269ff., Smart, 1993, S. 398. 
34 Zhu, 2007, S. 1507f., Holbig, 2002, S. 41, McNally, 2006, S. 27ff. 
35 Peng, 2004, S. 1050: “A noble man would sacrifice self-interest to honor his obligations, whereas a com-
moner would forsake his obligation to serve his self-interest.”  
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stammende  Vorstellung  von  Idealen  wie  demokratische  Prinzipien,  Bürgerfreiheiten, 
Gleichheit und unabhängige Justiz, also eher universalistische Werte, hat in China keine 
entsprechende Tradition.
36 Netzwerke haben daher nicht nur eine Unterstützungs-, sondern 
auch eine Schutz- und Sanktionsfunktion, weil niemand das Gesicht und damit seinen Ruf 
verlieren will. Sie dienen so quasi der Schaffung von Vertragssicherheit . Dies wird nicht 
nur als effektiver wahrgenommen, die Anrufung von Gerichten wird auch als Vers agen 
interpretiert, Probleme innerhalb des Netzwerkes zu lösen.
37 
Im anschließenden Schlusskapitel werden die Ergebnisse der Arbeit zusammengefasst. Der 
Erfolg der chinesischen Wirtschaft basiert zu einem nicht geringen Grad auf der Rolle des 
Unternehmers und seinen Netzwerken. Diese familienbasierten Beziehungen helfe n, den 
Anforderungen einer von plötzlichen Nachfrageänderungen geprägten Produktion für den 
Weltmarkt gerecht zu werden und dabei extrem erfolgreich zu sein. Es wird eine Form des 
Kapitalismus ermöglicht, die sich weitaus besser mit traditionellen Sozialformationen ver-
bindet, als dies der Kapitalismus des 19. Jahrhunderts vermochte, ohne dass aber ein spezi-
fisches Wirtschaftsbürgertum entstünde. Das chinesische Wirtschaftssystem scheint zu 
beweisen, dass der Kapitalismus nicht notwendigerweise traditionelle  Sozialformationen 
überformen muss, um sie durch (im westlichen Sinne) rationalere zu ersetzen. Dies stellt 
die auf Weber zurückgehende Abgrenzung von traditionellem und rationalem Ha ndeln in 
Frage. Es zeigt sich, dass auch diese Institutionen durchaus in der Lage sind, in einem mo-
dernen kapitalistischen System effizient zu funktionieren und stellen somit unter Beweis, 
dass ihr Wiederaufleben durchaus als rational zu bezeichnen ist. Statt den Unternehmer in 
althergebrachten Verhaltensweisen verharren zu lassen, dienen Netzwerke auch als Schutz-
schild, das den Unternehmer nicht von den Bedingungen einer globalen Wirtschaft a b-
schirmt, sondern ihm im Gegenteil ermöglicht, diesen zu trotzen und mit dem Wissen um 
diesen Rückhalt extrem erfolgreich zu handeln. In C hina scheint ein moderner Kapitalis-
mus basierend auf traditioneller Kultur hoher Persistenz zu entstehen und das Verhältnis 
von Wirtschaft und Kultur auf neue Weise zu definieren. Guanxi ermöglicht also eine an-
dere Art des Kapitalismus, der sich auf weit bessere Weise mit traditionellen sozioökono-
mischen Institutionen zu verbinden bzw. diese aktiv wiederzubeleben und zu nutzen ve r-
mag. 
 
                                                 
36 Pohl, 2002, S. 115f. 
37 Wank, 1999, S. 264ff. XVIII 
 
Content 
 
List of Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... XXII 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Aim and framework .................................................................................................... 1 
1.3. Methodology and structure ......................................................................................... 8 
2. Institutions and Institutionalism ...................................................................................... 15 
2.1. Institutionalism as a framework for an analysis of Capitalism ................................ 15 
2.2. Institutions: a definition ............................................................................................ 20 
2.3. American Institutionalism ........................................................................................ 27 
2.3.1. The methodology of American Institutionalism  ................................................ 27 
2.3.2. The analytical tools of American Institutionalism ............................................ 29 
2.3.2.1. Evolutionism and holism ............................................................................ 29 
2.3.2.2. Pattern models ............................................................................................ 33 
2.4. Institutional change .................................................................................................. 38 
3. Network theory ................................................................................................................ 45 
3.1. Social network theory ............................................................................................... 45 
3.1.1. Social capital ..................................................................................................... 45 
3.1.2. Networks  ............................................................................................................ 49 
3.1.2.1. Corporate networks..................................................................................... 55 
3.1.2.1. Regional networks ...................................................................................... 56 
Excursus: embeddedness and trust .......................................................................... 58 
3.2. Network organization ............................................................................................... 60 
3.2.1. Flexible specialization ....................................................................................... 60 
3.2.2. Concepts of regional networks .......................................................................... 63 
3.2.2.1. Neo-regionalism ......................................................................................... 63 
3.2.2.2. Innovative milieus ...................................................................................... 65 
3.2.2.3. Cluster  ......................................................................................................... 67 
3.2.2.4. Industrial districts ....................................................................................... 69 
4. Capitalism: definition, history, typology ......................................................................... 75 XIX 
 
4.1. Capitalism since the 19
th century – derivation and rapprochement  .......................... 75 
4.2. Max Weber‘s definition of Capitalism ..................................................................... 83 
4.3. Werner Sombart‘s approach to ―Modern Capitalism‖ ............................................. 91 
4.4. Confucian Capitalism? ............................................................................................. 98 
4.4.1. A brief summary of the main principles of Confucianism ................................ 98 
4.4.2. Max Weber‘s assessment of the relation between Confucianism and Capitalism
 ................................................................................................................................... 100 
4.4.3. The significance of Confucianism for Chinese Capitalism ............................. 105 
4.5. Varieties of Capitalism and China .......................................................................... 109 
4.5.1. The Varieties of Capitalism approach and China ............................................ 109 
4.5.2. Other typologies of economic systems ............................................................ 113 
4.5.3. The economic style approach .......................................................................... 118 
5. Chinese development since 1978 .................................................................................. 123 
5.1. The Chinese notion of development ....................................................................... 123 
5.1.1. Development – a definition ............................................................................. 123 
5.1.2. Transformation: big bang versus gradualism .................................................. 126 
5.1.3. A brief recapitulation of the Western industrial revolution  ............................. 128 
5.1.4. History and current state of China‘s economic development since 1978  ........ 135 
5.1.4.1. Economic reforms since 1978 .................................................................. 135 
5.1.4.2. Current state of economic development ................................................... 141 
5.1.5. Reform without a theory .................................................................................. 144 
5.2. The role of the family for economic development in Europe................................. 147 
5.2.1. A short outline of the traditional household before the industrial revolution
 ............................................................................................................................... 147 
5.2.2. The transformation from traditional household to capitalist economy............ 152 
5.2.3. New institutions as precondition for economic development ......................... 159 
5.3. The role of the family for economic development in China since 1978 ................ 162 
5.3.1. Chinese family structures before the Cultural Revolution: the ‗obstacle view‘
 ................................................................................................................................... 162 
5.3.2. Chinese family structures since 1978: motor of economic development? ...... 168 
6. Chinese Capitalism: Guanxixue .................................................................................... 174 XX 
 
6.1. A definition of Guanxi  ............................................................................................ 174 
6.1.1. A general definition ......................................................................................... 174 
6.1.2. Traditional Guanxi: the rural Rénqíng gift economy....................................... 180 
6.1.3. Guanxi as evolving institution ......................................................................... 184 
6.1.4. Modern type Guanxi: the urban art of Guanxi and business practice ............. 189 
6.2. Guanxi versus corruption ....................................................................................... 194 
6.3. Guanxi from a gender perspective .......................................................................... 196 
6.4. The specificity of Guanxi networks........................................................................ 203 
6.4.1. Networks and the German Mittelstand ............................................................ 203 
6.4.2. The Third Italy ................................................................................................. 208 
6.4.3. The blat of Russia ............................................................................................ 212 
6.4.4. Guanxi networks versus Western forms of networks ...................................... 217 
7. Capitalism, the private sector and Guanxi in the 20
th century  ....................................... 222 
7.1.  The development of the private sector since 1978.............................................. 222 
7.1.1.  The development of the Chinese private sector and the role of entrepreneurs  .. 
   ..................................................................................................................... 222 
7.1.2. Types of Chinese enterprises ........................................................................... 235 
7.1.2.1. Public sector ............................................................................................. 235 
7.1.2.2. Private sector ............................................................................................ 238 
7.1.3. The Chinese private sector: definition and some data ..................................... 240 
7.2.  Case Study: Wenzhou ......................................................................................... 244 
7.2.1. A short summary on Wenzhou‘s location and history .................................... 244 
7.2.2. Wenzhou‘s rise after 1978 ............................................................................... 245 
7.2.3. Wenzhou‘s performance since 2008................................................................ 249 
8. Guanxi, entrepreneurs and the state  ............................................................................... 255 
8.1. The bourgeois entrepreneur, networks and the state .............................................. 255 
8.2. Entrepreneurs and the state in China ...................................................................... 261 
8.2.1. Entrepreneurs and the state .............................................................................. 261 
8.2.2. Role of jurisdiction in China ........................................................................... 275 
9. Concluding remarks and main findings ......................................................................... 282 
9.1. China‘s development process and institutional change .......................................... 282 XXI 
 
9.2. The Chinese notion of development: future and perspectives  ................................ 289 
9.2.1. The role of family and networks ..................................................................... 289 
9.2.2. The private sector and the state ....................................................................... 292 
9.3. A new type of Capitalism? Towards a definition of Guanxi Capitalism ............... 297 
References ......................................................................................................................... 306 
 
   XXII 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
ABC          Agricultural Bank of China 
ACFIC          All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce 
ACWF         All-China Women‘s Federation 
ADB          Asian Development Bank 
BOC          Bank of China 
CASS          Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
CCB          Construction Bank 
CCP          Chinese Communist Party 
CME           Coordinated Market Economy 
est.          estimated 
EU          European Union 
FDI          Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP          Gross Domestic Product 
GNI          Gross National Income 
HDI          Human Development Index 
HRS          Household-responsibility system 
ICB          Industrial and Commercial Bureau 
ICBC          Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
IMF          International Monetary Fund 
LME          Liberal Market Economy 
NBS          National Bureau of Statistics 
NGO          Non-Governmental Organization 
NIE          New Institutional Economics 
NPC          National People's Congress 
ODA          Official Development Assistance 
P2P          Peer-to-Peer (sometimes also Person-to-Person) 
PC          People's Congress 
PCC          Political Consultative Conferences 
PEA          Private Enterprise Association 
PPP          Purchasing Price Parity 
PRC          People's Republic of China 
RMB          Renminbi XXIII 
 
SELA          Self-employed Laborers‘ Association 
SEZ          Special Economic Zone 
SME          Small- and medium enterprise 
SOE          State-owned enterprise 
TVE           Town- and Village enterprise 
UN          United Nations 
UNDP         United Nations Development Programme 
VoC          Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
WTO          World Trade Organization 
WWII         Second World War 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
1. Introduction  
1.1. Aim and framework 
 
“The history of a thing, in general, is the succession of forces which take possession 
of it and the co-existence of the forces which struggle for possession. The same ob-
ject, the same phenomenon, changes sense depending on the force  
which appropriates it”.
1 
 
     China‘s development has been very impressive over the last decades. However, it has 
been a process that occurred unevenly in different regions and sectors in terms of progress, 
but also in terms of the importance of the private sector and hence, Guanxi. As regions and 
sectors that are more influenced by the state sector operate differently than those that are 
more privately organized, it can be argued that this points towards the existence of differ-
ent varieties of Capitalism within China. It is possible that there is one variety that domi-
nates but it is also possible that there is just a ―patchwork of local political economies‖.
2 
On the other hand, it can be argued that for that reason it is impossible to describe a homo-
genous Chinese system from a macro perspective. A more promising way might be to take 
on a micro perspective and describe economic development on the village level. Hence, 
numerous empirical case studies exist, but although their results delivered many new in-
sights, they are limited to the local level and are difficult to aggregate. This stands in stark 
contrast to studies conducted before reforms, when the political atmosphere only allowed 
for ―outside and high-level view of the country‖.
3 ―Yet none of the standard models of 
economic and political theory  can explain China.  […]  China still does  not  have  well-
specified property rights, town-village enterprises hardly resembled the standard firm of 
economics, and it remains to this day a communist dictatorship‖.
4  
     Presenting a holistic picture of the development path of post -reform China can only 
focus on a few specific characteristics to discover some underlying fundamentals of the 
process, to escape the risk of appearing overly simplistic. It has to be emphasized that  al-
though this dissertation does not claim to present an exhaustive picture of the Chinese eco-
nomic system, it still provides a synthesis of a large body of knowledge on the private sec-
tor and the role of networks. However, although this analysis is limited to certain societal 
and cultural aspects, it still aims at giving some insights towards the workings of a Chinese 
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Capitalism that seems to use Guanxi as one main factor for its success. This work strives to 
get one step closer by stepping back, so that we might see the forest rather than just the 
trees 
     Hence, this dissertation strives to discover possible underlying fundamentals that cha-
racterize  the  Chinese  economic  system  and  its  development.  This  work  assumes  that 
―while producer goods sectors, transportation and finance are in the state‘s hands, the vi-
brancy and outward orientation of the economy is being driven by ‗network capitalism‘‖; 
thus the driving force of development is the private sector and a mode of operation that 
includes Guanxi.
5 This work therefore focuses on the private sector , and the relevance of 
Guanxi within it. It is assumed, however, that Guanxi is employed in the entire Chinese 
economic system, even if it is most significant for private enterprises. Since the private 
sector itself is not homogenous, it works differently in different regions and/or sectors. It is 
however important to note that the Chinese economic system is not bifurcated into a state-
controlled economy and a private economy, each obeying their own sets of rules, but rather 
that there is a continuum of varieties that together result in a specific Chinese type of Capi-
talism. However, as it is the driving force for the development process, this work f ocuses 
only on the private sector.
6 To illustrate regional differences, a case study of Wenzhou will 
be provided as example how Guanxi  can influence regional business patterns. It will also 
demonstrate that some basic essentials exist.
7  
     However, this dissertation is not only interested in the differences, but even more so in 
common factors – within China, but also compared to other regions that also implemented 
successful industrial districts. In general, the global economic system has seen the increas-
ing importance of so-called flexible production, and hence small firms, often organized in 
clusters or networks. In addition, this work is particularly concerned with the differing im-
portance of networks, as well as with the role the state plays for each economic system.  
     The theoretical definition of Capitalism within this work is mainly based on Weber and 
Sombart, their ideal-typical notion of Capitalism and the role of the entrepreneur therein. 
This ideal-type framework will be contrasted with the reality of China, particularly the role 
of the private sector, entrepreneurs and their networks with a particular emphasis of how 
their co-operation (and interaction with the state) works. 
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     The emergence of Capitalism is said to always lead to extreme changes in the structure 
of a society. Modern Capitalism developed during the 18
th century in Europe, in the wake 
of the industrial revolution, with severe consequences for the traditional societies. It gradu-
ally eliminated many of the existing socio-cultural structures, which had been specifically 
developed for a feudal economy and were only able to function in the framework of this 
social environment. New institutions had to evolve before capitalistic production based on 
factory work could be prosperous. Authors like Max Weber assumed that it is the nature - 
or spirit - of modern Capitalism to impose a unique institutional structure on the existing 
traditional society. Gradually, but compared to the pace of economic change of the centu-
ries before, still very rapidly, it replaced obsolescent traditional socio-cultural institutions 
to create a system of large-scale enterprises under rational, bureaucratic management, af-
fecting family structures in particular. As a result, in the course of the evolution of Capital-
ism the old institutions gradually vanished and human beings became ―fictitious commodi-
ties‖ traded on (labor) markets, thus obliterating the old ‗oikos‟, rendering the family as 
economic  unit  obsolete.
8  The traditional rural self -sufficient household had integrated 
business and personal life, but in the capitalistic economy the rationality of companies and 
business contrasted the ―sentimentality of the family‖.
9 Capitalism in the Weberian sense 
with a separation of business and house was created and the family as production unit more 
and more disappeared from working life and retreated to the privacy of the home. 
     Industrialization fuelled its own development and propelled  European societies from 
feudalism to Capitalism. Within this process, a market economy emerged where, instead of 
economic life being embedded in society, social institutions served as mere accessories to 
the economic system. Industrialization introduced a new institutional mechanism to a h i-
therto feudal society based on autarkic households, replacing these structures with capit a-
listic production dependent on wage labor. The economy became an autonomous system 
that was dominated by a rational spirit based on efficiency, profitability and similar institu-
tional structures. In this environment, the family lost its influence, not only over its me m-
bers, but also over how one‘s living was earned. Even more than that, Capitalism not only 
forms a uniform institutional framework, overriding traditional structures; it also separates 
private and business; not only in a spatial sense, but also creating a separate form of beha-
vior with its own set of rules and morality for doing business. This phenomenon is consi-
dered to be independent of individual institutional frameworks. Local economies are re-
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garded as being standardized according to the doctrine of ―individual maximization, ra-
tional-legal principles and private accumulation. […] Older forms are seen to present no 
challenge to the all-encompassing and overriding logic of Capitalism, whose development 
is predetermined‖.
10 By contrast, this work argues that Capitalism is not a concept that 
necessarily shapes a uniform institutional framework within every society, constructing a 
specific economic system. Although shared characteristics exist, there can be an alternate 
embodiment of Capitalism in different regions with diverse cultures and history. 
     Since China opened up to the global market in 1978 it has formed an economic system 
that in the literature is often called Guanxi or network Capitalism. It presents a specific 
type of Capitalism, and is embedded in the cultural environment of post-1978 China. Its 
appearance coincided with an increasingly flexible global production, both probably mu-
tually influencing each other.
11 It is described as being constituted of a different set of i n-
stitutions than Western-type Capitalism, especially relying on personal connections to faci-
litate business, comprising a way of doing business ‗Chinese style‘. During the 1980s the 
explanation for the existence of Chinese Capitalism was ascribed to Confucian values as 
the main element; later this was dismissed and replaced by the notion of a network - Guan-
xi - Capitalism.  
     Following Weber‘s conception, a unique type of Capitalism would imply an explicit 
institutional  framework  that  evens  out  the  differences  between  countries  and  different 
forms of Capitalism. Weber believed that, over time, the destruction of traditional struc-
tures will always lead to large-scale enterprises under rational, bureaucratic management. 
The subsequent requirements of mass production cannot be fulfilled by small family busi-
nesses. The institutionalized instrumental rationality does not leave space for outdated so-
cio-cultural structures like family businesses. It is thus often doubted that this version of 
Capitalism will be sustainable, and many believe that over time it will transform into a 
system that converges to the usual contractual market institutions found in the West. Once 
the economy develops into a mature capitalistic society with its own functioning set of 
legal institutions and secured property rights, the necessity of maintaining Guanxi connec-
tions for business success will come to an end. This line of argument also perceives Guanxi 
as less efficient and more time- and money-consuming than Western contractual institu-
tions. Western Capitalism is conceived as inevitably leading to a system with large-scale 
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enterprises under efficient rational management, independent of specific individuals and 
their personal connections. 
     In contrast, this dissertation argues that it is possible to achieve economic success with a 
variety of Capitalism that is based on a different set of institutions derived from a specific 
history and culture. In particular, Chinese Guanxi-Capitalism strongly depends on personal 
connections between individuals. It will be shown that it is the persona of the entrepreneur 
with her network of connections that will help her company survive. Guanxi is not only a 
powerful instrument in overcoming the challenges of an economy in transformation; it also 
proves to be extremely adaptable and powerful in situations of crises, as networks are often 
more durable than actual enterprises. 
     This work will also analyze the link between a capitalist economy and a democratic 
political system. In theory, entrepreneurs with increasing wealth will seek political influ-
ence. In practice, Chinese entrepreneurs are more interested in connections with the local 
government  than  with  the  central  government,  since  they  are  not  interested  in  system 
change, so long as it does not interfere with business activities. China‘s so-called ‗new 
rich‘ do not form a class, let alone a bourgeoisie. 
     During the emergence of Capitalism, entrepreneurs and their networks played a signifi-
cant role in transforming traditional societies to modern, rational economies. This has been 
true for the emergence of a capitalist system in Europe in the 19
th century as well as for the 
China of today. In both countries, the entrepreneur was embedded in socio-economic insti-
tutions, particularly in family and networks; but this did not lead to the same form of eco-
nomic culture. In Europe, the economy was converted into a structure with a separated 
economic and private sphere and the relative irrelevance of personal relations for business 
transactions. It brought about the gradual transformation and growth of (family) firms into 
mass-producing multinational corporations as ‗best practice‘ for economic success.  
     According to Max Weber and Werner Sombart, but also mainstream economic theory, 
bureaucratic, hierarchically organized large-scale enterprises are the only rational, hence 
cost-minimizing and efficient, way of building an ideal-type modern Capitalism. These 
large corporations were not connected through personal relations but through contracts, 
made possible by the emergence of the state as a regulatory authority that ensured contract 
security through impartial courts and commercial law. The emphasis on formal business 
relations led also to a specific form of collaboration consisting mainly of strategic net-
works or organization in formal associations with set rules, often with government partici-
pation and support. A negative aspect of the co-operation between large-scale corporations 6 
 
is their tendency towards trusts and syndicates. This problem was faced by anti-trust and 
competition legislation. The tie to the state also manifested itself in lobbying as a legal 
possibility for influencing political decisions in favor of certain economic transactions. 
Hence, from a Western perspective, the spheres of politics and economics are clearly sepa-
rated. 
     Yet against ‗accepted wisdom‘, the economic conditions of the second half of the 20
th 
century produced a new type of rational and efficient economic system that once again 
based its comparative advantage on the entrepreneur and his networks, and sometimes 
even on the family. Industrial districts in some areas in Europe, most famously in Italy, 
became extremely successful in relying on small family businesses that formed clusters 
connected by personal networks. This is even more true for China: after 1978 it was mainly 
the private sector that transformed the economic system into a market economy, hence 
Capitalism. The newly established, privately-owned family businesses resorted to tradi-
tional institutions that once more became competitive in a changed global environment 
with rapidly changing demand. The reality of an increasingly flexible global economy fa-
vors not only mass production, but even more so subcontracting and small-business pro-
duction, which is most effectively done in cities that created clusters for production and 
particular products. Small private firms are able to respond promptly to rapidly changing 
market conditions, representing a comparative advantage compared to large-scale multi-
national corporations. Networks not only serve as a shelter to protect private property, but 
also as a monitoring and sanctioning power which secures (informal) contracts, additional-
ly providing information on supplies or business opportunities. 
     In the Chinese economic environment, with its unique culture and history, networks 
among private firms and the state form a specific type of economic system, a Chinese Ca-
pitalism that bases its success in no small part on an institutional setting that differs signifi-
cantly from its European counterpart. It led to an economic style that emphasizes personal 
relations and the role of the entrepreneur, implementing existing social formations without 
overriding them, and melding Western business practices with Chinese traditions. Guanxi 
(i.e. personal relations), trust, social capital and a certain political framing of entrepre-
neurial action constitute a specific form of ‗traditional‘ network capitalism in which the 
actions of private and state actors overlap. Networks play a more prominent role for the 
Chinese economic system than elsewhere. Here personal relations are not separated into a 
private and a business sphere, nor replaced by other, in Western thinking more rational, 
means of doing business. Personal relations display comparative efficiency, chosen as the 7 
 
most capable instrument for the private sector in China, making the system as successful as 
we can observe today. They are also fundamentally different in their structure, less formal 
and less strategic than their European counterparts. The structure of the Chinese family 
proved to be very persistent over time and able to accommodate diverse economic and po-
litical environments while maintaining its core identity. 
     This dissertation sets out to explore these differences, particularly the relations of state 
authorities and the private sector, emphasizing the importance of the entrepreneur and the 
specific meaning, significance and essence of Chinese networks (Guanxi) together with the 
difference of Chinese networks to their European counterparts, thereby dissecting a new 
form of Capitalism that extrapolates traditional institutions for its economic success and 
survival, instead of supplanting and overwriting traditional socio-economic structures. This 
challenges Weber‘s distinction between rational and traditional behavior, and redefines the 
boundaries of economy, politics, society and culture in a new way. The socio-economic 
structures behind a variety of capitalism that relies heavily on traditional (and insofar out-
dated) institutions, especially networks, will be analyzed. Instead of constructing ―Capital-
ism as a monolithic, all-encompassing, penetrating, seamless, and integrated total system 
with a predetermined and knowable teleology‖, this dissertation rather assumes that a Chi-
nese variety of Capitalism exists that requires a modified set of institutions. It thus consists 
of its own characteristic institutions, complemented by more ‗typical‘ capitalist institu-
tions.
12  
     The aim of Guanxi Capitalism is not only to obtain merely material but, equally impor-
tant, also symbolic capital.
13 Contrary to Western capitalistic thinking, there is a gain  in 
giving away. The more generous businessmen prove to be, the more symbolic capital  - 
social status and face - they gain. This type of Capitalism is thus not as purposive-rational 
as Western Capitalism; it combines it with a different set of socio-economic rules. Guanxi 
represents a different framework for a capitalist sys tem. In contrast to the 19
th century 
ideal-type of Capitalism which superimposed itself upon existing traditional institutions, 
family  structures  in  particular,  to  create  an  environment  better  suiting  for  its  purpose, 
Guanxi shows that instead of supplanting traditional structures, it needs to revive them.
14 
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1.3. Methodology and structure 
     This dissertation is separated into two parts. The first presents the theoretical foundation 
of my reasoning, whereas the second analyzes the Chinese economic transformation since 
1978 and the type of Capitalism developing. 
     Therefore in chapter 2, following a definition of the meaning of ‗institution‘ within this 
work, the methodology of American Institutionalism will be presented. In building holistic 
pattern models that describe an economic system in a narrative way, this is conceived as a 
fruitful approach for a complex, multifaceted economic order such as China. American 
Institutionalism supports the view that different sets of institutions can lead to different 
forms of Capitalism, depending on the history and cultural environment. It is a tool to pro-
vide critical insight into the dynamics of social change and to explain human behavior 
within its institutional and cultural context. Hence the aim of institutionalism is not to be 
especially rigorous, or to be applicable on a general level, forming law-like statements; but 
instead being capable of understanding and explanation, rather than prediction, a specific 
situation. It will be briefly contrasted with the theoretical foundation of New Institutional 
Economics, which, since it is mainly based on neoclassical economics, is deemed less use-
ful than American Institutionalism. The ―comparative advantages of institutionalism are 
the breadth of factors and forces it is willing to consider, including institutional and histor-
ical details; its evolutionary paradigm; and its emphasis on adjustment processes in a non-
judgmental manner, in contrast to the neoclassical fixation on determinate optimal equili-
brium solutions‖.
15 However, since this work seeks to analyze an economic system that is 
still in flux, it is also necessary to discuss institutional change, more specifically the theory 
of Kathleen Thelen and James Mahoney. Even though their theory originates in New Insti-
tutional Economics, it is  still close to  the  methodology  of American Institutionalism, 
which, however, did not formulate their arguments with such analytical clarity. However, 
the theoretical foundation of both new and old institutionalism, especially the concept of 
path-dependence, will be critically reviewed. 
     Following the theoretical elaboration on institutions and institutionalism, in chapter 3 
this dissertation approaches the concept of networks and network theory. However, these 
theories are designed from a Western point of view with Western -type networks in mind. 
These kinds of networks are mostly rather one-dimensional in nature and thus differ from 
the Guanxi networks of China. However, to have a solid foundation upon which both con-
cepts can be compared, it is necessary to analyze these theories in depth. Among much 
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dissimilarity also some common ground will be found. Therefore the chapter starts with a 
more general definition of the concepts of social capital and networks, after which it be-
comes more specific by describing the concepts of regional and corporate networks. This 
discussion will be enhanced by an excursus on embeddedness and trust, both also present-
ing the Western view of those concepts. 
     In the following section the issue of network organization will be raised, and thus the 
theoretical foundation of flexible specialization together with several concepts of regional 
networks: neo-regionalism for a more general approach, innovative milieus, clusters and 
industrial districts, the last going back to Alfred Marshall. The chapter ends with a brief 
evaluation and comparison of the concepts. They will be taken up again in chapter 6, when 
concrete types of networks are compared. 
     Chapter 4 discusses the concept of Capitalism. Starting with a brief overview over the 
history and complexity of the phenomenon, a variety of definitions will be presented that 
seek to capture the core of Capitalism, before focusing on the works of Weber and Som-
bart. In presenting the definition of these two selected authors this work does not strive to 
present an unambiguous, ultimate definition of Capitalism. Instead, it presents a view that 
creates an ideal-type of Capitalism, assuming a certain attitude towards the economy that 
includes increasing rationalization, bureaucratization and professionalization within a ho-
mogenous institutional framework, based on a certain spirit. In this setting, personal con-
nections play a decreasing role in doing business, and are replaced by contractual relations. 
     After that, in relation to Weber‘s emphasis on the importance of Protestantism, a dis-
cussion on the significance of Confucianism for Capitalism follows. For that, the principles 
of Confucianism will be summarized first, after which Max Weber‘s assessment of the 
meaning of Confucianism for Capitalism will be presented. This will be contrasted with a 
more recent evaluation of the relationship between Confucianism and Chinese Capitalism 
that includes a gender perspective. The significance of Confucian values for Chinese Capi-
talism will also be discussed. This work will only briefly touch on the subject of the ‗spirit 
of Capitalism‘-line of research of the 1980s that defined Chinese Capitalism as a unique 
purposive-rational action, and implying that ‗modernity‘ was seen as an ahistorical identity 
and a yardstick against which a society could be measured. This approach was superseded 
during the 1990s and replaced by a network-based view of the Chinese capitalist system. 
     This perspective on Capitalism is complemented by a critical discussion of several ap-
proaches to the comparative analysis of Capitalism. In recent years a vast amount of litera-
ture and much discussion has been spurred by the Variety of Capitalism-approach. Its theo-10 
 
ries and models are based on New Institutional Economics, underscoring the effect of dis-
tinct institutional arrangements for economic performance, thereby painting a static picture 
of Capitalism, relying "on rather ad hoc-descriptions of actual institutions and institutional 
forms", looking for equilibrium outcomes.
16 The Varieties of Capitalism literature is con-
centrating on the firm as a unit of inquiry, thereby largely ignoring socio-cultural institu-
tions. It is also primarily focused on Western Europe, North America and Japan - thus 
post-industrial, already developed economies. First and foremost, a critical discussion of 
the Varieties of Capitalism-approach will be provided. It will also elaborate Bruno Ama-
ble‘s five types of Capitalism. 
     This approach will be compared to Eucken‘s theory of economic orders and the eco-
nomic style concept. The latter is complementary to the holistic pattern model- approach of 
American  Institutionalism  as  presented  in  this  work.  Economic  styles  differentiate  the 
broader concept of economic systems into various types of real economies. A specific style 
is distinguished by characteristic behavioral patterns, organically evolved living conditions 
and activities as well as institutions, and is thus a qualitative instrument and explicitly not a 
quantitative one.
17 It is a concept that is both highly subjective and relativistic: it creates a 
painting, rather than a photograph, of an economic era. 
     The fifth chapter is the beginning of the second part of the dissertation and is directed to 
the actual process of transformation and economic development in China. However, it first 
provides general definitions of development and transformation, the latter especially focus-
ing on the gradual approach versus ‗shock therapy‘. Before demonstrating that the Chinese 
transformation and development process does not fit into these categories, Western devel-
opment during the industrial revolution will be analyzed. This of course is only a very 
rough outline and focuses on Great Britain and Germany as illustrative examples. It will be 
contrasted to a short outline of the main features of the reform process since 1978, includ-
ing related data concerning Chinese economic development. 
     After analyzing these historical events and facts the process of transformation will be 
evaluated. It is widely conceived as development defying all rules, and as a very pragmatic 
approach. It has been - and still is - a process of decentralized social learning in which lo-
cal governments experiment with different solutions. The central government is merely the 
facilitator of this process, adopting the best experiments ex post and applying them to the 
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entire country. Even without clearly defined property rights, the Chinese private sector 
thrived, pragmatic entrepreneurs accepting a relatively high level of uncertainty. 
     Complementing this theoretical analysis, closer attention will be given to the role of the 
family as the main driving force of economic development within the private sector. From 
a Western perspective, the family, and hence family firms, are conceived as an outdated 
mode of production for Capitalism, merely belonging to the private sphere. Consequently, 
the Western industrialization process was accompanied by the change and adaptation of 
family structures up to the point where traditional institutions were replaced to better fit the 
conditions of a capitalist economy heavily based on factory work. This is exemplified by 
the  description  of  the  transformation  of  traditional  peasant  households  towards  urban 
worker models, accompanied by a change in gender conception, division of labor and in 
lifestyle. This demonstrates the manner in which Capitalism is characterized by constant 
conflict and struggle, creating an ‗iron cage‘, as Weber and also Sombart argued. The sub-
ject of the link between social structure and economic development will be taken up again 
in chapter 8, when the implications of the industrial revolution for bourgeois families are 
analyzed. 
     This is contrasted with the role that the Chinese family assumed during the transforma-
tion process. Interestingly, the theoretical evaluation of the relation between Chinese fami-
ly structures and the development of Capitalism changed enormously over time. From We-
ber to modernization theory the family has been conceived as an institution that is opposed 
to capitalistic development. Weber argued that Protestantism was able to shatter the ‗fetters 
of the sib‘ in contrast to the Chinese family whose values are based on Confucianism, and 
thus  are  not  able  to  establish  rational,  bureaucratic  companies  and  compete  with  the 
West.
18 This evaluation of the family  prevailed up until the 1960s within modernization 
theory, which argued that a personalistic culture is the cause of China's failure to develop 
capitalistic structures. 
     Since then, the assessment of the Chinese family has changed dramatically.  Chinese 
familism is now conceived as ―motor of development‖, since their Guanxi relations were 
the starting point for many family businesses.
19 The collective era seems to have created a 
desire for more autonomy, which then  resulted in substantial entrepreneurial  activities, 
especially in rural areas. Entrepreneurial instincts were preserved and could flourish within 
the institutions provided by economic reforms. The Chinese family combined tradition 
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with  the  features  of  a  capitalist  society,  and  provided  complementing  institutions  that 
helped private firms thrive.  
     This brings us to the subject of Guanxi, covered in the next chapter. Chapter 6 therefore 
starts with a definition of Guanxi and an extensive analysis of the concept from a cultural, 
sociological and economic perspective. It is broadly divided into a rural, more traditional, 
and an urban, more modern, version of Guanxi that is especially important for business 
practices. Guanxi is thereby presented as an evolving institution that adapts over time. 
Since Guanxi is also often compared to corruption, one section of the chapter has been 
dedicated to this subject. It can also be analyzed from a gender perspective, which is done 
in the next part of the chapter. Not only does Guanxi disadvantage women, it is also in-
strumentalized to incorporate gender stereotypes for successful business negotiations. The 
last segment of the chapter is concerned with the specificity of Guanxi networks, but also 
with exploring commonalities with similar networks found in Germany, Italy and Russia. 
Specifically, the concepts of Russian blat and Guanxi are compared. 
     The next chapter picks up the issue of the private sector and hence, private entrepre-
neurs. It argues that Chinese entrepreneurs have a specific, very pragmatic mindset, includ-
ing Guanxi networks in their business practices. More than that, it will be shown that the 
boundaries between the private and the business sphere are not as clear-cut as is usual in 
the West. As will be again emphasized in chapter 8, except for all belonging to the ‗new 
rich‘, Chinese entrepreneurs do not form a bourgeois class and thus are not connected stra-
tegically through horizontal ties, nor are they organized within business organizations. Ad-
ditionally, the Chinese entrepreneurial ethic is future-oriented and directed towards the 
family and close relations, since setting up an enterprise meant securing long-term benefits 
to the network. Social institutions were adapted and revived, also bridging the gap left by 
the breakdown of social order caused after the Cultural Revolution. It is argued that per-
sonal connections based on family structures prevail, and that small-scale production has a 
comparative advantage in the globalized economy of today. These key-factors determine 
the further development and success of the Chinese economy and the type of Capitalism 
arising. Small Chinese firms connected through Guanxi networks are able to respond to 
rapidly changing demand and motivate maximum efforts for modest pay. 
     After the analysis of Chinese private entrepreneurs the differing types of enterprises in 
the private sector are described; and to present a more complete picture the collective sec-
tor is also briefly described. This illuminates the huge variety of ownership structures and 
the difficulties of defining private (or rather non-state) and collective enterprises. This is 13 
 
again emphasized in the next section that gives an overview of the size and other data on 
the private sector.  
      The private sector is not a homogenous formation but varies across sectors and regions; 
this will be shown in the case of Wenzhou. This was one of the first provinces to heavily 
privatize and also one of the regions most severely hit by the economic crisis of 2008. Sta-
tistical data will be complemented with more anecdotal evidence from newspapers, to give 
more in-depth insight into the economic development in Wenzhou in particular, and China 
in general, showing how Guanxi is used as an instrument to enhance economic success. It 
will be shown that in China it is not the corporation that survives, but rather Guanxi, and 
thus the Chinese variety of Capitalism proves to be more sustainable than is believed by 
the conventional view. 
     One issue that has been raised in the section on Wenzhou is the relationship between 
private entrepreneurs and the state. This subject is further scrutinized in chapter 8. For 
comparison, the self-conception and discourse on the image of German bourgeois entre-
preneurs will be briefly analyzed, as well as their relation to the state. In contrast to West-
ern development, where the middle class was the driving force for democratization and the 
formation of a civil society, a similar trend cannot be detected in China. Chinese entrepre-
neurs seem not to be on their way to forming a bourgeois class, and they do not seek politi-
cal participation. Hence, they only negotiate with local – not central - governments for 
beneficial business conditions. Guanxi include also local officials and, depending on the 
local scheme of development – which itself is strongly based on cadre behavior – the pri-
vate sector is either promoted or discriminated against. The strategies of Guanxi that pro-
tect against predatory government action are described in detail.  
     However, as powerful economic actors, private entrepreneurs are also wooed by the 
central government. To this end entrepreneurs have been invited to join the CCP, among 
other measures a move aimed at preventing the formation of a power outside state control. 
Chinese private entrepreneurs consider being part of the political system, and thus enhanc-
ing their social status, as contributory to the success, growth and reputation of their com-
panies, facilitating access to bank loans and obtaining vital information. However, their 
interest ends when the benefits for business are satisfied.  
     In turn, the pragmatic attitude toward the transformation process is also apparent in the 
development of laws concerning the private sector. Issues such as private property rights 
were designed following local experiments, for example in Wenzhou, and the state turning 
a blind eye towards virtually illegal activities and gradually adjusting the existing laws 14 
 
(and, if necessary, also ideologies). It is therefore presented as an example of institutional 
change by layering and converting. Other laws were adopted from the USA or Europe, 
such as of laws regulating insider trading, or labor law. Although the central government 
enacted comprehensive, complete laws, the legal system is still far from complete, not only 
because of the lack of an independent jurisdiction. On the one hand, this is caused by the 
distrust of Chinese people against top-down formal institutions and their preference for 
informal solutions such as Guanxi; on the other hand, this is caused by the lack of the cul-
tural and social adjustment of these laws to a Chinese socio-economic environment that 
also needs to incorporate unwritten rules. Networks are capable of supporting and sanc-
tioning their members by the threat of shame and loss of reputation. Guanxi is thus consi-
dered more effective than formal law. Additionally, the Western ideals of democratic prin-
ciples, civil liberty, equality and independent justice, all universal values coming from the 
Age of Enlightenment, have no corresponding tradition in China. As contracts are con-
ceived as a means of dealing with people who are not trusted, laws are only necessary 
when a relationship is not based on mutual trust. However, it might be misleading to regard 
Guanxi as an exact opposite of a formal legal system since it is rather part of the legal sys-
tem, completing and complementing Chinese legal culture. China manages to combine the 
new laws with old traditions and in accepting local differentiations; it constructed a legal 
system that in no small part relies on Guanxi to be effective. 
The final chapter presents conclusions, arguing that it is possible to achieve economic 
success with a variety of Capitalism based on a different set of institutions. There is not 
one ‗best practice‘ for a country to follow regarding the dynamics and regulations of a ca-
pitalistic economy, but this depends on the specifics of the institutional background. There 
are diverse ways to develop efficiently. Guanxi is an essential part of the Chinese type of 
Capitalism. Guanxi Capitalism revived authoritarian traditional institutions and made Chi-
na a competitive force in the global market. Instead of regarding small family businesses as 
an outdated mode of production, Chinese economic success relies on the flexibility and 
personal networks of privately-owned firms. Thus it is argued that the rationality of Guanxi 
Capitalism is based on the unique framework of China‘s culture and history. It has been 
shown that personal relations were always of importance throughout the Chinese history 
and are deeply ingrained in Chinese culture. So even though from a Western thinking this 
might be deemed inefficient, from a Chinese point of view Guanxi not only includes eco-
nomic considerations, but also factors like reputation and long-term benefits for the family.  
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2. Institutions and Institutionalism 
 
“Another hidden source of error in historical writing is the ignoring of the  
transformations that occur in the condition of epochs and peoples with the passage of 
time and the changes of periods. Such changes occur in such an unnoticeable way and 
take so long to make themselves felt, that they are very difficult to discern and  
are observed only by a small number of men“.
20 
   
2.1. Institutionalism as a framework for an analysis of Capitalism
21  
      Economics as a scientific discipline can be characterized methodologically as com-
posed by the opposition of two differing schools of thought; the so-called orthodox ap-
proach and the heterodox approach. Orthodox theory is primarily represented by neoclas-
sical economics, which stands for standard or mainstream economics that particularly is 
made up of neoclassical economics including its newer augmentations.
22 The heterodox 
approach is distinguished by a pluralist attitude towards economics, with  (Old or Ameri-
can) Institutionalism
23 as one of its strands. The methodology of American Institutionalism 
will be described below, but the axioms of neoclassical economics will be assumed to be 
known. In general, this  dissertation adheres to the assessment of neoclassical economics 
made by Blaug and Hodgson,
24 who argue that in orthodox theory, formalism overshadows 
                                                 
20 Issawi, 1950 [1377], p. 29f. 
21 This analysis concentrates on the American version of Institutionalism. The insights of the German Histor-
ical School will be briefly covered in chapter 4. However, American Institutionalism shares with the German 
school a rejection of Ricardian economics and of laissez-faire policies derived from it. Veblen, for example, 
largely disagreed with German historical economists. He did not think the German School to be a modern 
science as in his view its members failed to develop a more general theory of the process of economic 
change, although recognizing its significance. In contrast to Veblen, John R. Commons felt closer to the 
German historical school. He said that the "so -called historical school ... brought into the science the co n-
cepts of custom, property, and conflicts of interest.... The historical school led to the ethical and institutional 
schools....". Commons, 1934, p. 115, Mayhew, 1987, p. 908ff. 
22 Gunnar Myrdal also calls it ―ordinary economics‖. Myrdal, 1978, p. 775. Within this dissertation, main-
stream economics is defined as being primarily neoclassical economics together with its newer augmenta-
tions. The so-called neoclassical synthesis combines neoclassical methods and a Keynesian approach to ma-
croeconomics. Mainstream economics is divided into micro- and macroeconomics, and typically includes 
rational choice theory, a representative agent and rational expectations. It employs induction as its methodol-
ogy assuming axioms such as the rationality of individuals seeking to maximize their utility. The individual 
lives  in a world of perfect and symmetric  information, complete  markets,  perfect competition and non-
existing transaction costs. Mathematical models are used that include calculus, optimization, and comparative 
statics. See, for example, Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2010 or Blaug, 2002: ―[A]ny unemployment we see is 
still voluntary unemployment because the labor market, like all other markets, is always said to be in equili-
brium. Money is ‗neutral‘ or, alternatively expressed, there is always a long-run vertical Phillips curve, and 
business cycles would never occur were it not for the fact that there are unpredictable shocks of one kind or 
another that, for a while, surprise us until we adjust to them‖, p. 43. However, relatively recent developments 
such as evolutionary, neo-Schumpetarian or behavioral economics make any distinction between orthodox 
and heterodox theory far less unambiguous. 
23 The origin of the term ‗institutional economics‘ is commonly associated with Walton Hamilton who coined 
it in a paper presented at the Meetings of the American Economics Association in 1919. Lawson, 2005, p. 8, 
fn 1. 
24 Hodgson, 2007 and Blaug, 2002. 16 
 
substance  and  that  technical  specialization  prevents  the  researcher  from  developing  a 
broader methodological inquiry.
25 Institutionalists object to the use of formalism in their 
models, for them mathematical techniques ―are recognized as the servants of, rather than 
the essence of, economic theory―.
26 
     However, New Institutional Economics (NIE) can be considered to be an elaboration of 
mainstream economics. It can thus be regarded to distinct from the older American Institu-
tionalism emphasized in this work. NIE is usually associated with the research of Ronald 
Coase and Oliver Williamson, the latter having given it the name  New Institutional Eco-
nomics. Other Nobel laureates such as Douglass North and most recently, Elinor Ostrom, 
are associated with this approach. It originated with two articles by Ronald Coase The Na-
ture of the Firm of 1937 and The Problem of Social Cost of 1960, the latter being the 
source of what later came to be called the Coase Theorem.
27 Its basic insights consist of the 
recognition of the importance of property rights , transaction costs, asymmetric informa-
tion, moral hazard, adverse selection and principal-agent relations. This school of thought 
will be discussed briefly in chapter 3 and 4 in connection with the Varieties of Capitalism 
approach (VoC).
28   
                                                 
25 Wilber, 1978, p. 62-64. Formalism in this view is defined as a ―method that consists of a formal system of 
logical relationships abstracted from any empirical content it might have in the real world… It is characte-
rized by the use of mathematics (at least implicitly) and by the development of an axiomatic, deductive struc-
ture‖. It starts with the construction of a model that specifies assumptions and definitions including relations 
within the model. After creating the basic structure of the model its dynamics are deduced. In the case of 
microeconomic equilibrium models these dynamics lead to a steady state. This kind of model is thus also able 
to produce law-like statements and describes not real economic actors but ideal, rational actors whose beha-
vior is not deduced from actual observations but from logic. Hence, the law-like statements derived from 
these models are nearly impossible to falsify empirically as the ceteris paribus conditions are changing. How-
ever, of course also mainstream economics evolved and for example introduced more sophisticated methods 
such as econometrics in order to empirically test the now even more mathematically complicated models, 
turning economics into a positivist science that emphasizes empirical verification. Mainstream economists 
are said to ―prepare econometric studies, ‗massage‘ the data on the basis of other information, vary the aux-
iliary hypotheses to paribus the ceteris, develop ad hoc explanations, and thus make up a story about what 
happened‖. Wilber, 1978, p. 70. Unquestionably, neoclassical models are very tidy and neat – ―Occam‘s 
Razor‖ cutting them down to their ―bare logical bone‖, so nothing of the institutionalists‘ ―messy details‖ is 
left. Dugger, 1979, p. 902.Trying to escape this type of economic methods, Veblen and others developed 
institutional economics as an alternative approach. Stinchcombe notes that for the old institutionalist theory 
―reason and good sense are values, and formality a means to reason and good sense‖. Stinchcombe, 1997, p. 
8. 
26 Hodgson, 1998, p. 173. 
27 The Coase Theorem describes the economic efficiency of an economic allocation in the presence of exter-
nalities. The theorem states that so long as bargaining is costless and contracts can be costlessly enforced - if 
there are therefore no transaction costs - markets will generate an efficient outcome regardless of the initial 
allocation of property rights. Economic theory analyzes different property right regimes, comparing their 
efficiency in internalizing externalities and different institutional designs. See also Varian, 2010. It is of in-
terest to note that George Akerlof‘s article Market for „Lemons‟ was rejected three times and took four years 
to be published while Coase‘s Theory of the Firm was ignored by the profession for more than two decades. 
Blaug, 2002, p. 45. 
28 This work will not rehearse the principles of NIE. For a detailed analysis please refer to Edeling, 1999 and 
Richter; Furubotn and Streissler, 2010. Paul A. David notes that new institutional economists assume "that 17 
 
     There are in fact several tendencies in new institutionalism: rational-choice institutio-
nalism, which is basically the NIE described above; historical institutionalism and socio-
logical institutionalism. They all treat institutions as means for continuity rather than for 
change. If change is analyzed, then principally as brought about by exogenous shocks ra-
ther than by endogenous transformation; and such change is mostly conceived as a move 
towards one best practice.
29 As will be elaborated in more detail below, institutions are 
regarded from this point of view as constraints on human behavior. Historical institutional-
ism  emphasizes  the  deve lopment  of  political  institutions,  which  are  treated as  path -
dependent regularized practices. It recognizes cultural elements and the coordinating func-
tions  of  institutions,  but  concentrates  on  their  ―political  legacies  of  concrete  historical 
struggles‖, hence emphasizing their functioning as distributional instruments. In this view, 
continuity is created by increasing returns to power.
30 Sociological institutionalism analyz-
es social agents that act within political institutions. It focuses on ―non-codified, informal 
conventions and collective scripts that regulate human behavior‖.
31 The boundaries be-
tween sociological and historical institutionalism are not clear cut.
32 Scholars like Wolf-
gang Streeck or Kathleen Thelen went beyond this dicho tomy and developed their own 
theories of institutional change, drawing on both political and sociological institutions in a 
historical perspective. Their approach, among others, will be analyzed in more depth b e-
low.
  
     (American) Institutionalists have certainly written about their methodology at length, 
but are mostly concerned with what institutional economics is not, or what it should be, 
rather than what it actually is. Their position is often established merely through criticism 
of the methodology of mainstream economics. This dissertation will give an overview of a 
possible  common  basis  for  institutional  methodological  techniques,  together  with  their 
general principles as this work understands them. Thus, the underlying fundamentals of 
American Institutionalism without focusing on specific authors are examined. The cohe-
                                                                                                                                                    
the present shape of things can best be explained by considering their function and particularly their function 
in some future state of the world…the so-called "new institutional economics" proposed to explain many 
current features of organizations and economic institutions in a thoroughly neoclassical fashion, by citing the 
respects in which these represented presently efficient solutions to resource allocation problems". David, 
1994, p. 206. Chang points out that the proposed relationship between well-defined private property rights 
and their positive impact on economic development often is overly simplistic because the theory ignores 
certain forms of ownership structures (he names the Chinese Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs) as one 
example, see also chapter 7). Chang, 2010, p. 7-9. 
29 Amable and Palombarini, 2009, p. 124. 
30 Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 8-10. The concept of path dependence will be briefly discussed  in chapter 
2.4. 
31 Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 6. 
32 Schmidt, 2010, p. 2. 18 
 
rence  within  this  school  of  thought  seems  relatively  undeveloped,  Geoffrey  Hodgson 
among others admitting that ―institutionalism may attract those economists of lesser gener-
al ability, as well as the first-rate and original minds who are willing to pay the high costs 
of  professional  isolation  from  the  mainstream‖.
33  In  addition,  institutional  publications 
today  ―are  notoriously  varied  in  overall  quality  and  often  lacking  in  theoretical  preci-
sion‖.
34 What unifies institutional economics seems not to be a theoretical core but rather a 
shared ideological viewpoint, and thus ―the support for heterodoxy comes from those who 
eschew orthodox policy conclusions rather than the core assumptions of the neoclassical 
theory‖.
35 In this context, institutionalists are often accused of being atheoretical. David 
Hamilton notes that ―to many students of economics the suggestion that institutional or 
evolutionary economics might make some contributions to theory may seem a bit presump-
tuous, if not preposterous.…In the popular myths concerning the institutionalists, the latter 
are composed of individuals who once long ago objected to the rationalism of the classic-
ists, especially that of David Ricardo….They were…verbal virtuosos who wished to add a 
descriptive element to economics. They were ‗literary economists‘‖.
36 It is often forgotten 
that economists such as Veblen or Commons made important contributions to economic 
thinking, although it has to be admitted that institutionalism has not yet succeeded in build-
ing a complex model. However, Veblen was the first to develop a theory of economic and 
institutional  change  along  ―Darwinian  lines‖.
37  Hamilton points  to  Veblen‘s  consumer 
theory, as exposed in his book The Theory of the Leisure Class, as an alternative to stan-
dard consumer theory and one of the first theoretical contributions made by Institutiona-
listm.
38 Veblen always argued for systematic theory, but never succeeded  in developing 
such a theory himself. 
     Unquestionably the institutional method has the severe limitation that it often lacks pre-
cision, and also has to be continuously updated with new data from surveys or case studies. 
If it is not  supported by empirical data it easily turns into ―uncontrolled speculation‖.
39 
Unfortunately, many articles elaborate the writer‘s own preferences rather than present 
actual analysis backed up by solid research. Part of the problem lies in the great difficulty 
of verifying hypotheses, rendering the holistic principle of institutionalism difficult to re-
concile with the demands of analysis (see below). It is also important to remember that so-
                                                 
33 Hodgson, 1994, p. 59. 
34 Hodgson, 1994, p. 59. 
35 Hodgson, 1994, p. 60, Wilber, 1978 , p. 72. 
36 Hamilton, 1973, p. 197. 
37 Hodgson, 1998, p. 166f. 
38 Hamilton, 1973, p. 201f., Veblen, 1964 [1899]. 
39 Wilber, 1978, p. 83. 19 
 
called pattern models employed by institutionalists are always ―tentative and subject to 
change‖ (see also below).
40 Since the construction of a pattern model is a lengthy business 
many economists end up making compromises, because of  pressures of time or other ob-
stacles. Institutionalism is consequently often too vague, diffuse and uncontrolled.  
     However, institutionalists look for patterns and therefore are open to a range of possible 
solutions. By contrast, mainstream economics is able to produce more rigorous,  precise 
models and to make relatively precise and realistic predictions. But even so, ―[w]ithin in-
stitutional economics, indeed, there is no one theory, no one definition, no one concept, no 
one model, no one paradigm, no one sense of what constitutes the discipline that can an-
swer every question we have all the time. Most importantly, there is no one answer, con-
clusive for all purposes and for all time, to any question‖.
41 
     A  definite  advantage  of  American  Institutionalism  is  its  practical  relevance,  even 
though it is not defined in terms of policy proposals. It is also highly interdisciplinary, and 
therefore able to treat the economy as an evolving system that is embedded in an institu-
tional environment of cultural, social and political relationships which shape individuals.
42 
By contrast, mainstream economic science ―has tended to become isolated from the other 
social sciences, and this isolation has hardened in the postwar period. In our journals and at 
our universities economists have worked in a purified model world, and even their empiri-
cal studies have borne the mark of self-sufficiency and sometimes sectarian arrogance‖.
43 
     Institutionalists can be said to have the more honest approach to economics, but face a 
more or less irresolvable problem. In contrast to the general laws presented by mainstream, 
especially neoclassical, economics, they can only concentrate on very specific cases, treat-
ing specific institutions in specific environments  during specific periods of time. Their 
findings thus cannot be generalized, but if one is more interested in understanding how the 
real world works, this approach  provides more insight than mainstream economics. Fur-
thermore, institutional economics seeks to overcome disciplinary boundaries between so-
cial sciences. It strives to establish a dialogue between disciplines like sociology, politics 
and even biology, since each of these subjects can make valuable contributions to the un-
derstanding of economic phenomena and the nature, evolution  and economic effects of 
institutions. However, it can be argued that institutionalism is more a part of sociology than 
                                                 
40 Wilber, 1978, p. 84. 
41 Samuels, 2000, p. 310. 
42 Lawson, 2005, p. 8, Hodgson, 2000, p. 318. 
43 Myrdal, 1978, p. 783. Even when collaborating with other sciences like psychology in areas such as beha-
vioral or experimental economics, it does so in a very formalistic and limited manner that, for example, treats 
an individual as a rationally-bounded homo economicus. 20 
 
of economics; and indeed economic sociology assumes an institutional perspective which 
is, however, based on NIE.
44 Thus, if a science is defined by the type of method or analysis 
it applies, and if this were the assumption of individual utility maximization, then it is un-
deniable that institutional economics cannot be called economics. If however a science is 
defined as the study of a real object, which in case of economics would obviously be the 
economy, then there is no doubt that institutionalism is economics, since it analyzes as-
pects of the economic system. ―The strength of institutional economics lies in the explana-
tory power of its ideas, not the force of its numbers‖.
45 However, this is not to deny that 
mainstream economics, and neoclassicism in particular, is sometimes great use in describ-
ing certain economic processes; but it is less useful than institutional economics in pictur-
ing the complexity of the transformation of an economic system. The ―comparative advan-
tages of institutionalism are the breadth of factors and forces it is willing to consider, in-
cluding institutional and historical details; its evolutionary paradigm; and its emphasis on 
adjustment processes in a nonjudgmental manner, in contrast to the neoclassical fixation on 
determinate optimal equilibrium solutions‖.
46 
     Despite the methodological difficulties this dissertation treats institutional economics as 
a more valuable theoretical background for my anal ysis of Capitalism  and the Chinese 
economic system than mainstream economics. However, the chapter on Capitalism (chap-
ter 4) will also cover the so-called Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach, based on neoc-
lassical economics. In the following the methodological advantages of institutionalism will 
be dealt with in detail. Together with the theoretical frameworks outlined in chapter 3 and 
4 it will become clearer why it  has been chosen as the instrument to analyze the Chinese 
economic system, and the form of Capitalism there developing.  
 
2.2. Institutions: a definition  
     Definitions of institutions are manifold.
47 There is no single agreed characterization of 
the term, although a definition as building -blocks of social order would be widely ac-
cepted. As such they are socially sanctioned, collectively enforced expectations of a certain 
behavior of actors. This behavior can be categorized as appropriate  and inappropriate, or 
                                                 
44 Besides economic sociology, the American Institutional School can also be considered as the origin of 
evolutionary economics, and ultimately also as part of the Neo-Schumpeterian School. However useful the 
insights of those schools may be, their theoretical insights will not be covered in depth within this thesis. 
They will only be briefly touched in chapter 4 (particularly in fn 588). 
45 Miller, 2003, p. 51. 
46 Samuels, 1995, p. 580. 
47 Summary for example in Djelic, 2010, p. 25ff. 21 
 
even ‗right‘ or ‗wrong‘, resulting in reliable, stable patterns of behavior. To put it different-
ly, institutions are legitimate rules for behavior. Institutions can also be corporate actors or 
organizations, to the extent that their existence is publicly guaranteed and backed by so-
cietal norms and enforcement capacities. An institution is then seen as the equivalent of a 
social regime.
48 In Douglass C. North terms  ―[i]nstitutions provide the framework within 
which human beings interact. They establish the cooperative and competitive relationships 
which constitute a society and more specifically an economic order‖.
49 Hence, they can 
also be interpreted as ―rules of the game of society‖ or ―humanly devised constraints im-
posed on human interaction‖.
50 An institutional formation defines the incentive structure of 
society as well as the interactions of human beings in reducing ubiquitous uncertainty, such 
that the intentions of individuals linked to the institutional rules are realized.
51 Institutions 
are incentive systems, but imperfect ones. The resultant institutional matrix is a combina-
tion of formal rules, informal co nstraints and their enforcement characteristics. Formal 
rules include constitutions, laws and regulations whereas informal constraints would be 
norms of behavior, conventions or codes of conduct. Informal rules are regarded as more 
important than formal ones. Over time, institutional constraints accumulate and the culture 
of a society is nothing else than the ―cumulative structure of rules, norms and beliefs that 
we inherit from the past, that shape our present and that influence our future‖. Culture tells 
us ‗how to play the game‘ and incentives vary with the institutional environment. A change 
of institutional structures can occur by an alteration of one of the three elements from 
which institutions are constituted: formal rules, informal norms or their enforcement me-
chanisms.  
     North here emphasizes the significance of path dependence, which constantly constrains 
the gradual changes of institutions and thus the choices of society (see also below).
52 Polit-
ical and economic actors (or ‗entrepreneurs‘ in North‘s terms) with the power of changing 
policies have a certain belief structure that strongly influences the resultant institutional 
structure of society and its performance. It limits the freedom of choice of actors who aim 
to alter existing institutions, or create new ones. Therefore it proves difficult to change 
existing political and economic environments. North argues that path dependence necessar-
ily leads to incremental, but at the same time continuous, change. Consequently, North is 
                                                 
48 Streeck and Thelen, 2005a, p. 9f. 
49 North, 1981, p. 201. 
50 North, 1990, p. 3. This is also the most common definition of institutions in neo-institutional economics in 
general. 
51 North, 1999, p. 9f. 
52 North, 1999, p. 14f., North, 2005b, p. 129, 131, 137. 22 
 
also critical of the concept of ‗social engineering‘, which implies that the same set of insti-
tutions can in principle be realized anywhere de novo (please refer also to chapter 5.1.). He 
also maintains that this is especially true for economic orders, in the sense that the same 
economic order cannot be implemented in all places. Institutions form a specific incentive 
structure and construct specific organizations. Within this distinctive matrix political actors 
decide on the economic rules of the game. The actual rate of change may ―depend on the 
degree of competition among organizations and their entrepreneurs‖. Actors within an or-
ganization react like players in a game who obey its rules, therefore its institutional con-
straints.
53  
     North argues in accordance with NIE, hence  with the aid of neoclassical economics.
54 
In this context institutions are also considered as ―not only endogenous equilibrium strate-
gies, but more specifically as political-economy equilibriums, i.e. as the outcome of stra-
tegic interactions among agents in a specific power structure‖.
55  
     Another recent development within institutionalist political economy employs the con-
cept of institutions as ―Weberian Herrschaftsverbände‖ that connect rule makers and rule 
takers who interact within a society defined as a surrounding environment of ―third par-
ties‖. This approach thus defines institutions as regimes.
56 The distinction of rule makers 
governing the behavior of rules takers is often merely analytical since in reality both may 
be identical, especially in democratic orders. Rule makers create and enforce ―a normative 
order that is sanctioned by the society at large‖.
57 Weber‘s concept differentiates between 
on the one hand rule makers and rule takers; and on the other between institutions defined 
as social structures linked to actors whom they at once constrain and enable, in combina-
tion with norms of behavior and actors‘ obedience to them. Ideally, institutions constrain 
the behavior of actors through their rules. This can only occur if actors internalize and obey 
these rules ―voluntarily out of self-interest". However, actors in the role of rule takers may 
object to certain rules or strategically counteract specific institutions. This system of gov-
ernors and governed produces a unique institutional formation, requiring creative under-
standing of the meaning and relevance of its rules in specific situations.
58  
     It is a perspective that is also particularly useful for analyzing institutional change (see 
2.4.) Even when rules are perfectly and completely followed, the need to adapt existin g 
                                                 
53 North, 1999, p. 11, North, 2005b, p. 138f. 
54 Especially in North, 1981. 
55 Amable, 2003, p. 35. 
56 Streeck, 2010a, p. 5. 
57 Streeck, 2010a, p. 5. 
58 Streeck, 2010a, p. 5. 23 
 
institutions innovatively to fit specific situations and changing environments arises over 
time, which means that institutions are necessarily continuously reinvented. Institutions 
and their rules are constantly interpreted and bent by rule takers in ways that were ex ante 
impossible to foresee for the rule makers. Thus, certain rules create outcomes that may 
have not been intended by the rule makers and over time these need to be adjusted either to 
meet the new circumstances, or to be revised to fit to the original purpose. ―Thus, not only 
rule-breaking, but also rule-following tends to set in motion interactive processes between 
rule  makers  and  rule  takers  which  make  the  institution  and  its  meaning  evolve  over 
time….[T]he reproduction of any social order can only be an imperfect one;…all social-
institutional orders are always in flux; and…slow and gradual change is an ever-present 
condition in institutional structures‖.
59 This again also means that a social order can never 
be perfectly reproduced elsewhere. In the case of capitalist orders, actors ―are socially con-
structed as constitutively devious by the institutions designed to govern them. The typical 
rule taker that capitalist institutions must reckon with as the normal case is a rule bender: 
She reads rules entrepreneurially, untiringly looking for ways of twisting them in her fa-
vor‖.
60 Analytically, it can be differentiated between the rule itself and its implementation. 
The friction between these two, and hence between the ideal and the real pattern of a rule, 
gives actors the possibility of gradually and endogenously changing existing instit utions 
via direct feedback between rule takers and rule makers.
61 
     Streeck divides institutions into so-called Durkheimian
62 institutions of classical sociol-
ogy and the Williamsonian
63 institutions of modern institutional economics. He regards the 
transformation towards more liberal forms of Capitalism in advanced industrial countries 
as one from Durkheimian to Williamsonian institutions, hence a ―transition from organized 
to disorganized, from nonliberal to liberalized capitalism‖. He defines Durkheimian institu-
tions as authoritative organizations that ensure a public order of obligation, enforced by 
third parties (the society as a whole), and hence imposed exogenously.
64 Institutions in 
Durkheim‘s sense are normative social structures which regulate and limit the behavior and 
pursuit of the material interests of actors based on legitimate authority and arising from 
collective action. While this kind of institution may also contain markets, they do not ori-
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ginate in markets. Durkheim defined economic institutions in relation to the production of 
wealth from serfdom through tenant farming to corporate organization and factory produc-
tion, in relation to exchange in markets or stock markets, and in relation to the distribution 
of rent, interest and salaries which together form the content of economic sociology.
65 In-
stitutions are social facts that exist ―apart from and beyond the choosing of those subject to 
it‖ as such ―constraining external reality that they are not in principle free to adopt, reject, 
or change‖. Consequently, Arthur Stinchcombe conceives this definition as being in con-
trast with the Old Institutionalism in which people built and ran institutions. In what he 
calls ―the new Durkheimian Institutionalism‖ collective representations operate on their 
own.
66 It is in the public interest that actors abide by institutionalized obligations, that 
sanctions are imposed, and that order is established by a third party, hence providing go v-
ernment.
67 Durkheim was interested in the non-contractual elements of private contracts, 
which he considered to be the indispensable obligatory  fundamentals of liberal voluntar-
ism.
68 Markets are constituted by contracts, and these usually consist of  agreements about 
future performance. This means that the  non-contractual components of contracts are es-
sential, since expectations of the other party‘s future behavior depend on predictions about 
both parties‘ future morality.
69 Durkheim also conceived symbolic systems, such as those 
of belief, knowledge and moral authority, to be social institutions.
70 He therefore consi-
dered society to be a precondition for the conclusion of competitive co ntracts, not as their 
product.
71 
     In contrast, Williamsonian institutions are based on voluntary private contracts between 
partners, not on public constitutional processes. These rational contracts are designed to 
make transactions optimally efficient, and are thus economic in nature. They  are devices 
that develop out of private market relations and hence create ―nonmarket though market-
responsive and indeed market-driven coordination of economic behavior‖. They consist of 
―private hierarchies of Coasian firms‖ such as trade associations, subcontracting networks 
and cartels and aim to lower transaction costs below market exchange costs, offering go-
vernance through self-enforcement.
72 
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     Durkheimian and Williamsonian institutions are in dialectical conflict since they are 
respectively obligatory and voluntaristic, or historically inherited and freely contracted; 
they represent two types of social order, one public and one private.
73 
     Yet another approach to institutions comes from ‗old‘ American Institutionalism for 
which institutions also play a vital role in the everyday life of human beings. Institutions 
are here defined not only as formal organizations, but also as ―socially habituated beha-
vior‖ similar to North‘s definition of informal constraints.
74 A ‗society‘ within this line of 
thought can be defined as a set of institutional systems which themselves can be thought of 
as sets of institutions. An institution in this sense can be characterized as ―a set of socially 
prescribed patterns of correlated behavior‖.
75 Thus, an institution is what Commons calls 
―collective action‖ in control, liberation and expansion of individual action.
76 It is a way of 
thought with a permanent character, embedded in the habits of a group. Institutions guide, 
but at the same time constrain, individual behavior. Decisions are always made in the con-
text of a specific institutional environment. In other words, institutions are always linked to 
specific cultural values. Therefore it is important to study institutions as an explanation of 
economic development.  American Institutionalism ―focus(es) on the institutions of eco-
nomic and social life and promote(s) modes of analysis that center on the structured rela-
tions and transactions between individuals‖.
77 The main task of institutionalism is its con-
tribution to a better understanding of the role of institutions for economic decisions, and 
through this to understand economic environments. 
     Additionally, institutionalists claim that individuals are only part of a greater whole, and 
this whole is more than the sum of its parts. Institutions are defined as a ‗going concern‘ 
―which  engages  in  a  series  of  transactions  within  the  guidelines  of  a  set  of  working 
rules‖.
78 Individuals are at the same time part and product of those going concerns. They 
are situated in a specific cultural environment without given but constantly changing and 
adapting preference functions. That does not mean that the individual is not considered to 
be important, but she has to act within an institutional context, which in turn is part of a 
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specific cultural environment. Another important point is that individuals do not merely 
create institutions but are also affected by them, since both are in a relationship of mutual 
feedback.
79 Hence for an American Institutionalist  the individual cannot  be the starting 
point of theoretical reflection, because an institution guides individual behavior, forming 
the habits of individuals, and is also changed by succeeding generations of individuals.  
     For Thorstein Veblen, one of the major founders and protagonists of American Institu-
tionalism, an institution is a set of norms and ideals which is imperfectly reproduced or 
internalized through habituation.
80 Veblen defines institutions as ―cultural products‖ and 
―element of the cultural fabric‖.
81 Also ―[t]hey are principles of action which underlie the 
current, business-like scheme of economic life, and as such, as practical grounds of con-
duct, they are not to be called in question without questioning the existing law and or-
der….[M]en order their lives by these principles and, practically, entertain no question of 
their stability and finality. That is what is meant by calling them institutions; they are set-
tled habits of thought common to the generality of men‖.
82 Individuals cannot choose free-
ly, but are confronted with certain constraints imposed upon them by their institutional 
environment, limiting their available alternatives. Institutions are also supposed to be sta-
ble over a period of time, and therefore contribute to the stabilization of individual beha-
vior.  
     However, the ‗idle curiosity‘ of the individual still creates diversity and variation.
83 
Veblen connects this to the concept of culture. Culture is for him based on an institutional 
structure that develops and grows and is the product of habituation. The development of 
culture for Veblen is equal to a cumulation of, and accustomization to, habits that vary 
according to different environments. This is a continuous process that is never complete, 
because each change creates new situations requiring the adaptation of behavior and habits; 
an argument which recalls the more modern theoretical analyses of institutional change 
described in 2.4. However, Veblen argues for path-dependent development as the past in-
fluences future variations, although of course he does not use this expression. He also a r-
gues that there are some underlying fundamentals of human nature which, despite constant 
gradual change,  never alter.
84 ―The wants and desires, the end and aim, the ways and 
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means, the amplitude and drift of the individual's conduct are functions of an institutional 
variable that is of a highly complex and wholly unstable character‖.
85 Economic institu-
tions as specific type of institutions are the result of certain conventions and methods faci-
litating economic growth that develop over time.
86 
     A degree of invariance is important if institutions are to be treated as units of analysis, 
but they of course cannot be immutable.  Institutions display relative stability, but periods 
of continuity are disrupted by periods of crisis and rapid change.  NIE treats such institu-
tional change as mostly caused by external shocks. Change can also be caused by conflicts 
between institutions and routines. Due to the ‗idle curiosity‘ of men, technological change 
can come about. Technological change is treated as evolving and as a major force for eco-
nomic development –contrasting with mainstream economics which takes technology as 
given. Individuals have a tendency toward experimentation and innovations, both of which 
constantly generate novelty. Changing habits cause frictions between old institutions, rou-
tines and the new customs, which in the end causes institutions to change to accommodate 
new conditions.
87 
 
2.3. American Institutionalism  
2.3.1. The methodology of American Institutionalism 
      As has already been indicated above, the major differences between institutionalism 
and mainstream economics turns on model-building, the unit of analysis and psychological 
perspective. As far as model building is concerned, institutionalism looks for pattern, holis-
tic  models,  whereas  mainstream  economics  takes  a  positivistic  approach  and  therefore 
seeks to build predictive models. The two approaches differ also in their unit of analysis. 
Mainstream economics assumes the maximizing individual consumer, whereas institutio-
nalists look to institutions as the basis of their theories. 
     The third point of difference is the psychological perspective of the two approaches, 
namely behaviorism versus individualism. Institutionalists adhere to behaviorism because 
it is rooted in institutional structures for the explanation of human behavior. Institutional 
structures in this case are defined as norms, working rules or habits. There are no precon-
ceptions or assumptions, and so individual preferences are seen to rely on the cultural and 
institutional environment  of the individual. Individual preferences are considered  to be 
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unreliable and of a highly subjective nature, and hence the milieu influencing the individu-
al is thought to be the better starting point for analysis.
88 Behaviorism relies on the obser-
vation of actual behavior within a specific institutional context.  Analysis of human action 
has therefore always to start with scrutiny of this milieu. Individuals are not  discounted, 
but are considered to be important since they are not only guided by their institutional en-
vironment, but they also continuously change the institutions surrounding them. This also 
places emphasis on different reactions under different conditions, dependent on time, space 
and history. Individuals are thus  more than just the ―missing middle term in stimulus-
response psychology‖, and the explanation does not stop at a static description of observed 
behavior.
89  
     But apart from these common points in explaining economic phenomena, there is hardly 
any shared body of theory found within institutional economics. Instead, it is more a way 
of investigation than a ―corpus of knowledge‖ which ties it together.
90 Institutional eco-
nomics is however in general based on evolutionary and holistic principles. It rejects for-
malism, rationalism and the positive/normative distinction used in mainstream economics 
because institutionalists regard these methods as failure to e lucidate the nature of social 
reality. Reality is changed by economic processes which include power and conflict as 
central causalities. Conflict is caused by the technological change of social institutions (see 
also 2.4.). Humans act non-rationally and exhibit an appetite for power, adventure and in-
dependence, guided by altruism, custom, habit  together with what, as mentioned before, 
Veblen calls ―idle curiosity‖, which contributes to technological change. These ‗variables‘ 
cannot be handled within formal models, but call for a different approach. For Veblen, 
institutionalists ―take as an (unavowed) postulate the fact of consecutive change. Their 
inquiry always centers upon some manner of process‖, and so Veblen‘s approach to eco-
nomics is a narrative one.
91 He and many of his  successors focus on institutional change 
and the impact of institutions on the economy; he considers conceptualism rather than for-
malism which to be the best approach. Institutionalism provides a ―spectrum of acceptable 
alternatives from which individuals can choose‖.
92  
     (American)  Institutionalism  argues  that  ―what  survives  organizationally  may  not  be 
most efficient or effective, but it survives anyway because it has come to be instilled with 
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value in that specific institutional context‖.
93 This challenges the view that institutions are 
designed and adopted for reasons of efficiency; instead "institutions are the expression of a 
political compromise".
94  
      
2.3.2. The analytical tools of American Institutionalism 
2.3.2.1. Evolutionism and holism 
     A leading principle of American Institutionalism is to treat economic processes as evo-
lutionary. Thorstein Veblen was a main protagonist of this approach. He regards actors as 
part of an evolutionary process and as such not as fixed or given but institutionally and 
socially shaped.
95 Also, he considers changes in the relation between individuals and insti-
tutions as essential for social reality. Social change is not purely mechanical, but a product 
of human action which is formed and guided by the society and the institutions within. 
Institutionalism for Veblen is therefore founded upon an evolutionary conception of ec o-
nomics in making a distinction between the pre-Darwinian, Newtonian mechanistic charac-
ter of economics and a post-Darwinian one based on causation. Veblen uses evolutionary 
concepts from biology to describe economic phenomena. He also  introduced the idea of 
―cumulative causation‖, rejecting the assumption of a static equilibrium and focusing on 
continuous economic change as a causal process. He defines it as follows: ―The economic 
life history of the individual is a cumulative process of adaptation of means to ends that 
cumulatively change as the process goes on, both the agent and his environment being at 
any point the outcome of the past process".
96 Veblen aimed to rebuild ―economics by use 
of evolutionary concepts and metaphors taken from biology‖.
97 He defines evolutionary 
science as an analysis of (non-teleological) processes of cultural growth and the cumulative 
change of economic institutions. It is thus a theory of an economic life process.
98 For him, 
economics should be a science of constant change, having no final term and without a self-
balancing mechanism. 
     For Veblen, orthodox economics considers an individual as having ―neither antecedent 
nor consequent. He is an isolated definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium except for 
the buffets of the impinging forces that displace him in one direction or another….When 
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the force of the impact is spent, he comes to rest, a self-contained globule of desire as be-
fore‖.
99 
     In evolutionism, individuals are treated as being embedded in their institutional su r-
rounding; they therefore take their objectives from the institutions they find in their envi-
ronment. But although these institutions are relatively stable, they are also subject to conti-
nuous changes, because they are displaced by new ones that better fulfill their purpose.
100 
Institutions are seen as cumulatively self-reinforcing and are therefore regarded as analog 
to the gene, for both are subject to the forces of mutation and selection. Institutions expe-
rience positive feedback because, by virtue of  their ability  to self-reinforce they create 
locked-in situations (to use a modern term) which make them sufficiently stable units of 
selection in the evolutionary process. Institutional change happens not as a result of choice, 
but because of a development that leads to new patterns and ways of thinking replacing the 
old ones. It is therefore gradual and adaptive. ―The capabilities and attitudes of an individ-
ual were congealed in his or her habits, acquired in activity and social interaction with oth-
ers. Human behavior is largely a matter of institutional coercion and constraint‖.
101 Veblen 
is thus mainly concerned with the way in which human beings in certain societies and cul-
tural surroundings develop and change over time.
102 Hence, institutional economics can 
have the capacity to explain the phenomenon of institutional change (see also in 2.4.).
103 
     In contrast to the above analysis, many institutionalists also use an instrumentalist a p-
proach, claiming that processes are intentional more than unintentional, and that they play 
an important role for society. This approach was mainly developed by John Dewey, who 
treated theories as instruments or tools  capable of modifying the social environment of 
human beings.
104 These tools are evaluated with respect to the consequences of their im-
plementation; instruments are valued by their effectiveness  in solving social problems. 
Instrumentalism removes the difference between science and metaphysics insofar  as it de-
fines a set of values as the goal to be reached, and as in science assesses theories by their 
ability to fulfill these goals.
105 Dewey‘s instrumentalism can be defined in the following 
way: It ―is an attempt to constitute a precise logical theory of concepts, of judgments and 
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inferences in their various forms, by considering primarily how thought functions in the 
experimental determinations of future consequences ... it attempts to establish universally 
recognized distinctions and rules of logic by deriving them from the reconstructive or me-
ditative function ascribed to reason‖.
106  
     J.R. Commons, one of the founders of American Institutionalism, calls this process an 
―artificial selection of the plant or animal breeder rather than that of natural selection‖.
107 
Intended, and thus purposeful, changes of artificial selection help to control evolution ac-
cording to society‘s ideas of fitness.
108 In his view, institutional change also helps to solve 
conflicts and guarantees the sustainability of the whole system over time.  
     Veblen was more influenced by Charles Peirce,
109 and in contrast to  Dewey regards 
science not as a tool to control the dynamics of social change, but rather as something that 
provides critical insight into it. For him, an idea has to be analyzed for its meaning , not 
tested for its validity. He suggests that institutional change is an unintentional process.
110  
     Another major element of American i nstitutional economics is to focus on pattern of 
relations between part and whole, therefore striving for a holistic approach to models and 
theories. Holism as a concept originates from the book Holism and Evolution by Jan Chris-
tiaan Smuts of 1926, who derived it from the Greek word holos meaning ‗whole‘.
111 He 
applied it to categorize a new type of evolutionary or dynamic theor y  in the  natural 
sciences, for example Darwin‘s theory of evolution of 1859. This kind of theory replaced 
the mechanistic scientific theories à la Newton, which are static and deterministic. 
     Holism implies that the physical world be seen as an evolving dynamic whole. This 
whole is supposed to be greater than the sum of its parts, and the relations among the parts 
condition their functioning. A holistic model ―emphasizes the interconnectedness or unity 
of the system‖ and the ―primacy of subject matter over method‖, in the sense that whatever 
method is being used, it should be an adequate description of what is analyzed.
112 
     For holists, reality cannot be explained using universal law-like statements, and so insti-
tutionalists favored the introduction of the holist philosophical orientation to economics. 
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For institutionalists reality is a process of evolutionary change driven by the interaction 
between the parts of a system and its whole, meaning that one certain aspect cannot be 
isolated from its social surrounding. Social reality is seen as an organic unity, where the 
parts cannot be explained without referring to the larger whole to which it belongs.  
   To illustrate this Wilber and Harrison quote an example from Robert Heilbroner regard-
ing the functioning of markets in an unnamed developing country.
113 He demonstrates that 
two superficially similar parts of different systems  –markets – can in fact vary quite mar-
kedly. To improve living conditions in a developing economy and to make its markets 
more efficient experts in economic development replaced the traditional peasant market, 
where prices are set by bargaining, with a fixed-price supermarket. This new type of mar-
ket was not accepted by the population, because this supermarket could not satisfy con-
sumer needs that included haggling as significant part of the social interaction provided by 
the institutional environment. This illustrates that supposedly similar elements, in this case 
markets, exhibit very different functions in different systems. However, this example does 
not only apply to developing countries. Phenomena of this kind have to be reproduced in a 
more complex model that places strong emphasis on habits. 
     Holism tries to capture these differences in its models. It stresses the importance of 
comparative institutional analysis including a broad variety of factors in its models. It con-
firms that prediction cannot be seen as the only form of verification for economic theories 
as is the case in mainstream economics, but rather looks for an adequate causal explana-
tion. Thus, institutionalists carefully locate human behavior in a pattern that explains the 
processes of change in a whole system. For them, society is more than ―just a group of 
independent actors‖; rather they act within ―sets of social conventions and norms‖ defining 
objectives and roles.
114 This cannot be explained solely from an individualistic  point of 
view. For holists, economics is seen as an evolving system,  characterized by a general in-
terdependence of ―cumulative causation‖.
115 Holism is therefore about understanding and 
explaining, not predicting. 
     To construct holistic explanations, institutionalists use the participant-observer method. 
The subject matter is a particular social system of any scale, but which has to be a unique 
unified whole. The system can be a family, a society, a formal organization or even a 
whole historical epoch. First of all, the theorist has to socialize herself with the system so 
that she might become a participant and hence to be as close as possible to it. In this posi-
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tion the researcher can obtain a wide variety of information about interrelations of themes 
that matter to the system. These themes addressed can be an accepted practice, for example 
a ceremony, a cultural norm such as the importance of consumption, or a particular mode 
of production, like Capitalism. 
     As an observer, the researcher looks for themes that illuminate the whole system and 
demonstrate its unity. Universal statements are consequently unsuited for describing such a 
specific system. Instead the theorist has to construct hypotheses from the information she 
has obtained as participant. This is a somewhat arbitrary process, since it depends strongly 
on the themes the researcher encountered while undergoing socialization. The hypotheses 
are tested with as much data as possible, gained from previous case studies or other survey 
data. The evidence is cross-checked to evaluate the plausibility of the initial interpretations. 
The hypothesis is valid as long the evidence does not call its validity into question. During 
that process the interpretation becomes increasingly accurate, and a complex picture of the 
subject matter is built up. 
     The shortcoming of this process is that it can only produce varying degrees of plausibil-
ity; instead of being rigorous and delivering a precise prediction as a model in mainstream 
economics. The final stage of the process is actually building the model, taking the form of 
pattern models. "The institutionalist paradigm focuses upon...a holistic and evolutionary 
view of the structure-behavior-performance of the economy…in a system of general inter-
dependence or cumulative causation". This definition could also serve as a summary of 
holism.
116 
 
2.3.2.2. Pattern models 
     Pattern models seek to explain human behavior within its institutional and cultural con-
text. This type of model is sometimes also called ―concatenated‖, in contrast to hierarchic-
al, formal models.
117 Abraham Kaplan defines a concatenated theory as one ―whose com-
ponent laws enter into a network of relations so as to constitute an identifiable configura-
tion or pattern‖.
118 A pattern model consists of components forming a particular pattern, 
which in this context means it shapes a social reality described in its natural setting. A spe-
cific pattern can also be conceived as a culture whose components tend towards some cen-
tral point, namely an institution. Emphasis is placed on interrelationships within a system. 
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Systems develop a characteristic ‗wholeness‘ or unity that includes a specific set of values 
and a particular socio-economic structure. The nature of the unity is quite varied; it can 
stem from diverse sources, such as religion or technology that often are also combined.
119 
―Individual behavior is explained when it is shown to fit into an institutional structure of 
behavioral norms, and institutional structure is explained when it is shown to fit into a cul-
tural context‖.
120 
     A theory is then formed from a set of patterns fitting together. The theorist takes the 
validated hypotheses derived from the holistic research process and links them to form a 
pattern. The institutional structure of the model is embedded in a specific cultural context 
with certain behavioral norms, showing a multiplicity of connections between the parts and 
the whole of the described system. Abraham Kaplan describes this type of model as a py-
ramid, with basic principles at the top of the hierarchic theory and deductions derived from 
them at the bottom. He claims that human behavior can be ―explained when it is deduced 
from basic postulates and initial conditions‖ and refers to pattern models as a form of sto-
rytelling.
121 Generally, prediction is not considered  to be important for this method and 
therefore ―the accuracy of predictions cannot be the main form of verification in the pattern 
model‖.
122 Nevertheless, the model can be tested empirically.  
     In order to do so, hypothesized institutional structures, serving as qualitative patterns, 
are compared with observations. In this process, the model is fine-tuned with respect to its 
coherence and the interconnections between parts and whole. For institutional economics it 
is of major importance that these institutional structures are as realistic as possible, and 
therefore institutionalists look for structural evidence to prove their theories, which in-
cludes norms of behavior and power relations. The individual has to fit into this structure, 
which in turn has to fit into a bigger cultural context. 
     Hence, institutional economics bases its models on case studies of specific historical 
conditions, each possessing a unique set of institutions. If we take a basic type of theory for 
illustrative purposes, for the creation of a consumption theory an institutionalist examines 
the cultural and social structure surrounding an individual to construct a pattern of con-
sumer behavior. This theoretical analysis is followed by an empirical test that compares the 
interpretations of the researcher with data from other case studies and further data sources 
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so that the structure of the model can be compared with the concrete real types in the 
world.
123 
     This kind of investigative technique was used by Veblen in his narrative description of 
institutional change, especially in his study  The Theory of the Leisure Class, where he 
creates a theory of consumption using the procedure described before.
124 First, he con-
structed a basic pattern model, which was extended by some case studies that he conducted 
himself and in which he attempted to find structural evidence. He used this to understand 
economic problems, not predict certain outcomes.
125 
     A multitude of similar studies can be found in the Journal of Economic Issues as well as 
in the Journal of Institutional Economics, where also more recent examples of consump-
tion theories are included using the same technique for developing theories based on case 
studies.
126 The abstract to  one of those articles states: ―This article presents several case 
studies of the dimensions of behavioral lock-in or lock-ins emanating from learning and 
habituation. […] Once a product has become established as an industry standard and once 
consumers or users have invested time or money in learning a particular system or becom-
ing comfortable with a traditional practice, they will be less likely to try a rival process, 
even if over time it proves superior….Institutional influence can habituate economic actors 
over time into particular behavior…―.
127 Even while using terminology that is more closely 
associated with NIE, and even employing the QWERTY example introduced below, the 
authors‘ methodology is that of the old institutionalism.
128  
     However, for institutionalists it is important to scrutinize as many sources of eviden ce 
as possible to evaluate hypotheses and test the plausibility of the initial interpretation. For 
institutionalists, modeling is a continuous p rocess which never ends, since institutional 
change requires new case studies and the need to constantly update and revise theories i n-
cluding their hypotheses according to the  new data. This type of model is continuously  
augmented with new details, and is therefore never completed.
129  
     Institutional models are therefore constructed according to descriptive realism, which 
means they are very detailed. In the case of consumption theories this implies that individ-
uals are based on real consumers. Hence, the aim of pattern models is not to form law-like 
statements, or to be especially rigorous with respect to general applicability, but instead to 
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understand and explain, rather than to predict, a specific situation. As a result it does not 
determine the precise behavior of individuals, but defines a range of possible solutions. 
Due to its characteristics, a pattern model determines a ―spectrum of acceptable alterna-
tives from which individuals can choose‖, which is of a qualitative, not quantitative, cha-
racter.
130 A pattern model provides understanding, not predictions and has therefore much 
in common with anthropology, which uses cultural patterns as its unit of analysis.
131 
     This can be demonstrated with a trivial example taken from Dugger: ―Knowing the 
norms of dress established in a particular organization does not give […] the power to pre-
dict exactly what Mr. Jones will wear on Monday. Nevertheless, an institutionalist would 
argue that although his coat might be either dark gray or pale brown, if Jones is an IBM 
executive, he will wear a suit and tie. Also, he will live in a particular kind of house […], 
even though his exact address is problematic. Jones will drink scotch, not beer; he will 
marry a thin woman, not a fat one…‖.
132 This rather trifling example illustrates that institu-
tionalism aims at making qualitative statements, not specific, quantitative ones. 
     Additionally, it is thus possible to detect Kuhn‘s distinction between normal and revolu-
tionary science
133 within institutional economics: the former in conducting case studies and 
constructing pattern out of them ; the latter  in the replacement of old patterns with new 
ones, better fitted to the ‗real‘ world.
134 
     Although not creating a general model, the process of comparison can reveal a typolo-
gy. A type is defined as an abstract description of situations or phenomena, indicat ing the 
characteristics of particular importance to a system. A type summarizes the analyzed cases, 
and in this respect gains reality in the sense that it describes the concrete reality of the sys-
tem. It is therefore not the type itself which is real, but the cases. Typologies reduce overly 
complex features and deliver some level of abstraction. They guide the researcher towards 
relevant questions connected to the cases, but they are also dangerous because they invite 
the creation of stereotypes. This is especially dangerous in a situation where a theorist has 
a great deal of theory but not enough empirical case studies.
135 
This approach enables this dissertation to define different types of Capitalism, each de-
pendent on the specific cultural and institutional environment of a country. The individual 
itself does not play a central role in those scenarios; it is rather the nature of its embedded-
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ness in institutional structures which is of central interest.
 Institutionalism is a means of 
providing critical insight into the dynamics of social change and explaining human beha-
vior within its institutional and cultural context in a narrative way. Institutionalism em-
ploys pattern models to explain human behavior within its institutional and cultural context 
in a narrative way. These models are based on case studies of special or historical envi-
ronments each coming with their own set of institutions. For example, to create a theory of 
Chinese Capitalism, an institutionalist looks at the cultural setting surrounding the individ-
ual to construct a pattern of economic behavior. Ideally, the model is then followed by an 
empirical test that compares the interpretations with data from case studies and other data 
sources to see if the structure of the model coincides with that of the concrete reality of the 
world. For institutionalists, modeling is a continuous process which never ends, because 
there are always new case studies or changes in institutions; and so the theory has to be 
constantly updated and evaluated against the new data. This means the model is constantly 
revised and filled with new details, and is therefore never completed. Hence, the aim of 
institutionalism is not to be especially rigorous, or to be applicable on a general level by 
forming law-like statements, but to be able to understand and explain, rather than predict, a 
specific situation.
136  
     Within this structure, the Chinese type of capitalist economy can be analyzed and d e-
fined as a distinct form of economic system. It supports the view that different sets of insti-
tutions can lead to different forms of Capitalism, depending on the cultural and institution-
al environment. ―The point is that the attainment of acceptable explanations is not the ac-
cumulation of eternal and absolute truths; we have not, in attaining them, laid another brick 
on the edifice, not fitted another piece into the mosaic. What has happened is that we have 
found something which serves the ends of inquiry at a particular time and place; we have 
gotten hold of an idea which we can do something with-not to set our minds at rest but to 
turn their restlessness into productive channels. Explanations do not provide us with some-
thing over and above what we can put to some use, and this statement is as true of under-
standing as it is of prediction‖.
137 
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2.4. Institutional change 
 
“It is a time-honored Japanese gardening technique to prepare a tree for transplanting by 
slowly and carefully binding the roots over a period of time, bit by bit,  
to prepare the tree for the shock of the change it is about to experience.  
This process, called nemawashi, takes time and patience, but it rewards you,  
if done properly, with a healthy transplanted tree”.
138 
 
     All theories of institutional change, independent of their theoretical provenance, shed 
light on institutions and their development over time. So although the theory of institution-
al change emphasized in this chapter has its background in NIE, it nevertheless is surpri-
singly similar to the analyses of the Older Institutional School, which used different terms 
and less clear structures to describe the same basic elements of institutional change. How-
ever, American Institutionalists also sought to explain institutional change, and even con-
ceived it as their most important task.
139 ―Institutionalists use the ‗going concern‘ or the 
‗institution‘ as their unit of analysis, not because the choice behavior of individuals does 
not matter, but because institutionalists are concerned primarily with the very long-run 
process of institutional change….[I]nstitutionalists are more interested in explaining the 
evolution  of  institutions  or  of  going  concerns  than  they  are  in  explaining  individual 
choice‖.
140  As  described  above,  they  developed  certain  analytical  tools  to  describe the 
change in institutions over time, mostly understood as technological progress.
141 Veblen 
for example conceived every culture as consisting of both dynamic and static elements. He 
defined the dynamic component as technology, and the static one as institutions that exist 
―simultaneously and in symbiotic relationships in all cultures. It is important to understand, 
and it frequently is misunderstood, that technology does not refer to artifacts or institutions 
to social structures. Technology and institutions are patterns of behavior; they are social 
processes. The test of truth and validity for institutional patterns is authority, for example, 
law, religion, custom, magic and myth. The test for technology is its ability to achieve a 
specific end-in-view. Technological patterns are developmental; institutional patterns are 
inhibitory or, at best, permissive‖.
142 This dichotomy between technology and institutions 
can be said to be the foundation of Veblen‘s theoretical writing.
143 Hence, institutionalists 
stress the importance of technology as a major component in the transformation of eco-
nomic systems. ―While generally not monistically deterministic with regard to technology 
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or the state of the industrial arts, institutionalists have found that the logic of industrializa-
tion has profound effects on social, economic and political organization and on the nature 
of culture, just as culture has profound effects on the adoption and operation of technolo-
gy‖.
144 This work regards the emphasis on technology for the explanation of instit utional 
change as less fruitful for a description of the transformation of the Chinese economic sys-
tem. Although technology should not be neglected as a significant component, the dicho t-
omy of static institutions versus dynamic institutions has to be overco me if we are to de-
velop an explanation that includes the social, cultural and political elements in gradual i n-
stitutional change.
145 However, American Institutionalism also emphasizes the role of cul-
ture for determining social structures. Cultural change is caused by the behavior of ind i-
viduals, but the connection is not made between this kind of evolutionary process and 
technological change conceived as the sole dynamic element and cause of progress; a l-
though ―[f]or the institutionalists the economic system not only comprises more than the 
market, it is an ongoing cultural process with elements which co-evolve through complex 
processes of cumulative causation‖.
146 This kind of institutional change is analyze d and 
systematically structured in the modern version of institutionalism described below. 
     The more modern versions of theories of institutional change are mostly specifically 
targeted towards the changes in the institutional structure of advanced cap italist societies 
―associated with a significant renegotiation of the politically regulated social market econ-
omy of the postwar period‖.
147 The concept is also used to describe the transformation 
processes in Eastern European countries. It has often been associated with the notion of 
path dependence, which suggests that transformation can only occur in two forms; gradual-
ly, or suddenly and discontinuously. To characterize change as path-dependent also implies 
that the notion of the rational design of institutional arrangements from scratch is rejected, 
complete with efficient incentive structures (see also chapter 5 for an analysis of the differ-
ent forms of transformation).
148  
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     Path dependence can also be interpreted as a punctuated equilibrium model that com-
bines long periods of continuity with abrupt radical changes.
149 ―Institutional analysis of 
capitalism must expect, therefore, not order in equilibrium, but what Beckert has called a 
‗dynamic disequilibrium‘: a continuous contest between creative destruction of social rules 
by enterprising innovators interested, at best, in expedient voluntary arrangements for effi-
cient coordination from below, and political projects to defend or regain a modicum of 
social stability‖. Streeck claims that in contrast to the accepted wisdom that with the help 
of institutional change institutions per definition tend towards stability and order, they ra-
ther have a tendency toward ―public disorder‖.
150 Economic systems are considered to be 
―merely moments in continuous processes of change‖ and hence stability is only a ―tempo-
rary product of social and political construction‖.
151 Although change can be triggered by 
external events (shocks), it is more often generated endogenously, even involving a ―‗di-
alectical‘ self-undermining of institutions and social orders in the course of their normal 
operation‖. In his view, complementary institutional arrangements, either (politically) de-
signed or developed accidentally, are only temporary.
152 The notion of path dependence 
merely confirms that institutions matter in so far as ―different institutional arrangements 
are likely to remain different and will in particular not converge on a universal model‖. 
Although institutions are restricted by their past or by other institutions, the evolution of 
institutions cannot be ascribed to an ―unfolding historical process‖ that results in a capital-
                                                                                                                                                    
development itself can be defined as a contingent design of a process that has been chosen from a variety of 
alternative possibilities, which are also called trajectories or development paths. Lehmann-Waffenschmidt 
and Reichel, 1999, p. 4. The concept of path dependence is based on the notion that the range of alternative 
possibilities of the future development of a variable is influenced by the past and present. Certain trajectories 
are excluded due to the evolution of past events. Friedrich, 2000, p. 2. Thus, path dependence is often con-
nected to the notion of institutional lock-in, which implies that divergences from and changes to a path are 
the exception or even impossible. Beyer, 2005, p. 6. One of the most famous studies related to the concept of 
path dependence has been produced by Avner Greif who states that ―…my findings suggest the theoretical 
and historical importance of culture in determining societal organizations, in leading to path dependence of 
institutional frameworks, and forestalling successful intersociety adoption of institutions‖. Greif, 1994, p. 
914. Path dependence in Greif‘s view is caused by the complementary interaction of institutions and the 
positive feedback mechanism triggered by them. Ackermann, 1999, p. 107. Often, the concept of path depen-
dence is used on a very general level that emphasizes the significance of the past in the sense that ‗history 
matters‘. Beyer, 2005, p. 10 However, especially Veblen‘s arguments of institutional change are reminiscent 
of the concept of path dependence. The concept of ―cumulative causation‖, often used by Veblen, but also 
other authors of American Institutionalism such as Myrdal, is by some authors compared to that of path de-
pendence,  although the first is a  much broader  concept than  the latter. However, in arguing  for a self-
reinforcing process both concepts resemble each other, although Veblen does not argue that past events can 
prevent a certain development from happening. Cumulative causation is also not regarded as a series of static 
equilibria. Hayter, 2004 , p. 104f. Path dependence, path creation and path plasticity became an autonomous 
field of research that includes researchers such as Thelen, 2004, Dimaggio and Powell, 1991. Storz, 2009, 
Storz and Pascha, 2005. 
149 Pempel, 1998, p. 1, 3. 
150 Streeck, 2009a, p. 246, referring to Beckert, 2007a. 
151 Streeck, 2009a, p. 2. 
152 Streeck, 2009a, p. 2. 41 
 
ist economic system. The process of capitalist development is often associated with an un-
dermining of collective institutions that traditionally, hence in pre-capitalist times, imposed 
social obligations upon individuals to constrain their behavior. These ‗traditional‘ institu-
tions  are  replaced  by  contractual  ones  ―that  are  voluntary  rather  than  obligato-
ry….[C]apitalist development is fundamentally misconstrued as a collective and consen-
sual quest for ever higher levels of efficiency – as historical progress, or a contingent lack 
of such, in a collective effort at ‗economizing‘ transaction costs‖.
153  
     Streeck argues that the development of institutions follows no particular direction and is 
thus not influenced by ―a historical mode of production and social order‖.
154 What is even 
more definite than the flexibilities of structures is general uncertainty, as societies are his-
torical processes and their social systems can already be regarded as outdated as soon as 
they are fully developed. Theories of institutional change in claiming that dynamics are 
more prevalent than statics, therefore overturned the accepted wisdom.
155  
     From this point of view gradual change, although mostly regarded as non-disruptive, is 
also transformative. Therefore, as slow change is easily overlooked, the time horizon of 
analysis has to be broadened to be more detailed.
156 Correlational analysis assumes ―that 
cause produces effect essentially immediately without delay and friction; that the time that 
passes between cause and effect is short enough to be negligible; and that ‗independent‘ 
and ‗dependent‘ variables are tightly coupled when in fact their relationship may realize 
itself only with time‖. Thus, it is necessary to discard ―the correlational machine model of 
society…, which, just like neo-classical economics, tend to treat time, and transitions in 
time,  as  too  short  to  be  worth  attention  or  make  a  difference‖  to  understand  gradual 
change.
157 
     The description of the actual process of institutional change mostly remains vague and 
not very concrete, except for one approach that has been conceptualized by Thelen and 
Mahoney and later also employed by Streeck.
158 Thelen originally defined two ideal-type 
stylized modes of endogenous institutional change, namely ‗conversion‘ and ‗layering‘.
159 
This approach was later augmented to five types of gradual change that added displace-
ment, drift and exhaustion.
160 Conversion and layering are ―stylized representations of in-
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stitution-building practices of policymakers who are prevented by the existing social order 
and the interests embodied in it from creating entirely new institutions from scratch‖. Try-
ing to introduce a new institutional framework will most likely not succeed and result in 
defeat of the actors in power. One alternative strategy for real change is thus to leave exist-
ing institutions intact, while attaching new elements to the old institutional structure that 
will gradually change the overall status and behavior of the existing institutional environ-
ment. Another way is to ―undertake stepwise to devote old institutions to new purposes, 
instead of trying to undo them and create new institutions in their place‖. The first would 
be institutional change by layering, the latter by conversion.
161 Layering sets path-altering 
dynamics in motion by amendments, additions or revisions to existing institutions, mea n-
ing that new rules are attached to existing ones, thereby changing the structure of behavior. 
The creation of new layers does not directly unde rmine already existing institutions, but 
they can alter the overall trajectory of development in su pplanting or crowding-out the 
older set of institutions. The compromise between old and new institutions causes the older 
ones to stagnate and finally being defeated.
162 ―Due to this friction among various institu-
tional layers, actors may establish adaptive patterns that are simultaneously new, yet famil-
iar‖.
163  
     In contrast to layering (and drift, see below), conversion means that existing institutions 
are ―redirected to new goals, function, or purposes‖.
164 Although the formal characteristics 
of an institution remain unchanged, their purpose can change drastically. Subtle and small 
changes in relatively stable times and environments can be of great importance, since over 
time they accumulate into substantial transformations. It is not a result of neglect, but is 
instead produced by actors that actively exploit the ambiguities of the gap between rules 
and  their  application.  This  can  occur  when  the  original  rules  were  already  ambiguous 
enough to allow for differing interpretations.
165 
     The third mode, drift, occurs ―when a changing environment distorts the intended ef-
fects of an institution in a way that fits the interests or intentions of agents with power over 
its design‖.
166 Institutional change happens when no measures are taken to readjust the 
institutions to fit their original purpose, and thus when rules are not enforced. In the case of 
drift and conversion, the weakness of administrative capacities plays an important role in 
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altering existing institutions. Drift in particular is the ―result of deliberate, strategic neglect 
of institutional maintenance when external change produces slippage in institutional prac-
tice‖. This also suggests stability, because rules remain unchanged despite the fact that 
external conditions have changed.
167    
     Displacement stands for the exchange of existing rules for new ones. It happens through 
rediscovery, or the activation of alternative or  hitherto dormant institutional forms which 
were possibly previously suppressed or suspended, that then replace traditional institution-
al forms and behavior. Displacement may also occur by the invasion of foreign practices 
which supplant indigenous institutions. It can be an abrupt, radical change, but it also can 
be a slow process. Displacement and layering are modes of change neither of which rely on 
the exploitation of gaps between rules and their enforcement, which remains intact.
168 
     The difference between rule makers and rule takers can most clearly be found in institu-
tional change through the fifth mode of institutional change:  exhaustion. Exhaustion ―re-
fers  to  a  process  by  which  an  institution  ‗withers  away‘  through  ‗self-consumption‘‖, 
meaning that the normal functioning of an institutions leads to ―the undermin[ing of] its 
external preconditions‖.
169 This type of institutional change is truly endogenous, in that it 
cannot be caused by externalities. It is a gradual breakdown of institutions over time.
170 
     Common to all these processes of institutional change is the idea that time plays a criti-
cal role. They evolve over time, and the effect of this adds up over time. This is a constant, 
never-ending development that not only matters in certain periods of change, but cont i-
nuously. This follows logically from the assumption that institutiona l change is a process 
of learning about ―the inevitably imperfect enactment of social rules in interaction with a 
complex and unpredictable environment‖ as the world constantly changes. It also means 
that institutions age. The probability of an institution being changed by one or the other 
mode of institutional change increases with chronological time, but also with the location 
of the institution in historical time, implying a sequence of ―historically unique, contingent 
conditions and events‖.
171 
     These types of institutional change are similar to Veblen‘s notion evolutionary change 
(see above), as in the case of drift. Dewey‘s instrumentalism, in contrast, which features 
active and purposeful selection of specific institutions, has little in common with this ap-
proach to institutional change.  
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     To a certain extent institutional change is irreversible; what historically happened can-
not be undone. Institutional change occurs over time, and is always conditioned by past 
experiences and preconditions. ―The idea that one cannot step in the same river twice 
would have to be translated to mean that the historical process alters not just the properties 
but the property space of institutions and social orders, by turning variables into constants 
and constants into variables, redefining variable ranges, resetting parameters, introducing 
new kinds of units, and undoing or reversing causal links between properties as well as 
creating new ones. What happens changes the rules that govern what happens next, con-
fronting actors at any given time with a world that is in part unexplored and will have 
changed further by the time it could, perhaps, be understood‖.
172 
     As will be outlined in more detail throughout this work, transformation in China did not 
lead to the replacement of the existing institutional framework, but rather to new arrange-
ments, by layering and conversion.
173  
    In the words of Joseph A. Schumpeter: ―Capitalism…is by nature a form or method of 
economic change and not only never is but never can be stationary. And this evolutionary 
character of the capitalist process is not merely due to the fact that economic life goes on in 
a social and natural environment which changes and by its change alters the date of eco-
nomic action…Nor is this evolutionary character due to a quasi-automatic increase in pop-
ulation or capital or to the vagaries of monetary systems…The fundamental impulse that 
sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers‘ goods, the 
new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial 
organization  that  capitalist  enterprise  creates‖.
174  Streeck summarizes this as follows: 
―Change...is the only thing that is constant about capitalism‖.
175 
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3. Network theory 
3.1. Social network theory 
3.1.1. Social capital 
     Social capital as a term has been made known by Pierre Bourdieu in 1980.
176 According 
to Bourdieu, capital can be categorized in several forms, namely cultural capital in the 
form of the objectified state, the embodied state and the institutionalized state,  as well as 
economic, symbolic and social capital.
177 The latter Bourdieu defines as ―the aggregate of 
the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of 
more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition…which 
provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‗creden-
tial‘ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word…[T]he volume of the 
social capital…depends on the size of the network of connections he can effectively mobil-
ize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own 
right by each of those to whom he is connected‖.
178 The network, defined as the structural 
foundation of social capital, is a dynamic structure that permanently changes and needs 
continuing efforts to be maintained. The denser a networks is, the more social capital can 
be accumulated.
179 Social capital is thus an immaterial resource and a means that helps 
individuals reaching certain ends.  
     One form of capital can principally be transformed into other forms of capital, but often 
not instantaneously as in the case of social  capital ―the ambiguity of social exchange‖ 
needs a ―much more subtle economy of time‖ as for example economic capital. However, 
economic capital is ―at the root of all other types of capital‖.
180 Social capital can explain 
how individuals, even when endowed with the same amount of cultural and economic capi-
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tal, can reach different positions in society by mobilizing their social capital.
181 It results in 
a network of relations that is the product of indi vidual or collective investment strategies 
which is – consciously or not – oriented towards immediate utility in the present or future. 
Random and coincidental acquaintances (what Granovetter terms ‗weak ties‘, see below) 
can be transformed into durable relations that also include obligations. However, social 
capital entails not only utilitarian connections and in so far is virtual capital, still, it can be 
transferred into economic capital.
182 Granovetter defines the link between the  structure of 
social relations and economic action as embeddedness (see below, the excursus on embed-
dedness and trust). 
     A different definition of social capital has been developed by  Putnam. He  defines it 
related to the notion of social organization,  which means trust, norms and ne tworks that 
support the cohesion of society ―by facilitating coordinated actions‖ for mutual benefit.
183 
Social capital is not only dependent on the individual, but even more on the social context 
and what Putnam calls the culture of ‗civicness‘. Norms, values and institutions are the 
base of a community that is shaped by trust, solidarity and tolerance. The totality of these 
values result in social capital that is expressed in generalized trust and spontaneous co-
operation of the members of the community. A community possessing a high level of so-
cial capital is assumed to be ―safer, cleaner, wealthier, more literate, better governed, and 
generally ‗happier‘‖ because its members ―find and keep goods jobs, initiate projects serv-
ing public interests, costlessly monitor one another‘s behavior, enforce contractual agree-
ments, use existing resource more efficiently, resolve disputes more amicably, and respond 
to citizens‘ concerns more promptly‖.
184 However, this kind of social capital and its net-
works are more based on system trust than personal trust as well as on formal than on in-
formal social capital. The latter means that formal connections like the membership in (vo-
luntary) associations, like sport clubs or political parties, are essential for the type of social 
capital Putnam describes.
185 Historically developed social capital like that can explain the 
economic success of certain regions, such as the Third Italy (see chapter 6.4.2.). Elsewhere 
Putnam adds that social capital is a feature of ―social life – networks, norms and trust – that 
enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives‖.
186 Put-
nam‘s macro perspective has been criticized for presenting a static, pre-determined, path-
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dependent notion of social capital which would imply that regions are on certain trajecto-
ries and without an adequate original endowment of social capital can never improve.
187 
     A third approach to social capital can be found in Coleman as part of the rational choice 
paradigm. For him, social capital is an ―informational resource emerging as a result of inte-
raction between rational agents needing to co-ordinate for mutual benefit‖.
188 Social capital 
is, like any other form of capital, also productive in the sense that it enables accomplish-
ments based on network structures and trust that otherwise would be impossible or at least 
much more difficult to achieve.
189 However, he interprets social capital as a characteristic 
of social structure and social relations in which the individual is embedded and thus takes 
on a more micro perspective.
190 Insofar, social capital is not owned by an individual but is 
a public good.
191 Social capital can not only be accumulated by individuals, but also by 
collectives, such as corporations, which can use it as competitive advantage (and as unique 
selling proposition).
192 Even more so, the foundation of social capital are family and group 
solidarity, which means that the more stabile and closed to the outside a community is, the 
more social capital it has. Open structures that allow members to come and leave freely 
can, according to Coleman, not accumulate as much social capital, differing here from the 
concept of other authors, like Granovetter (see 3.1.2.). For Coleman, within a closed social 
community the cohesion, trust and mutual assistance are higher than elsewhere. Social cap-
ital is the ingredient that makes a group of individuals a community.  Social capital func-
tions as ―moral resources‖ but in contrast to other forms of capital does not decrease but 
increase with extensive use. Even more so, people who possess a lot of social capital tend 
to accumulate ever more.
193 An entrepreneur uses social capital like all other forms of capi-
tal: she ―transforms financial capital into physical capital in form of building an tools…, 
human capital in the form of persons occupying positions and social capital in the form of 
organization of positions…Social capital (like other forms of capital) requires investment 
in the design of structure of obligations and expectations, responsibility and authority and 
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norms and sanctions which will bring about an effectively functioning organization‖.
194 
Although  being employed  for instrumental reasons,  social  capital is still part of social 
structure and thus an individual cannot act entirely egoistic and out of self-interest. The 
creation and destruction of social capital follows similar rules, as it is constructed in social 
systems. Obligations, which are created by doing favors, are part of social capital. In refus-
ing to reciprocate, the process is reversed and social capital destroyed. Favors guarantee 
durable participation in networks. This again leads to access to knowledge, experience and 
infrastructure that reduces uncertainty and risk and thus serves as a kind of insurance for 
the future.
195 Another important form of social capital is information as it is the basis for 
action. Better knowledge of the members of the group facilitates co-operation and informal 
norms support the enforcement of formal rules.  Obtaining efficient and reliable informa-
tion can be complicated and costly  because at least attention is required for it.  However, 
the information obtained over network contacts is ‗thicker‘ than that over markets and also 
‗freer‘ than in hierarchies.
196 
     Norms are part of social capital but are a fragile form of it as sanctions are needed to 
keep them effective. However, a cultural order is the foundation of social capital because it 
provides a shared identity and solidarity.
197 Fukuyama adds to that view that social capital 
accumulates especially in closed static social contexts which might impede change and 
advocate intolerance.
198 High levels of social c apital can  thus also have negative side-
effects as it exercises particularistic pressure on its members and it also permits free riding 
of community goods.
199  
     A similar view to Coleman can be found in Burt as well as Dasgupta who have an even 
more economic, structural view on social capital that is based on the individual.
200 For 
Burt, social capital refers to ―friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom 
you receive opportunities to use [other forms of] capital… Relations within and between 
                                                 
194 Coleman, 1990, p. 313. 
195 Walter, 2004, p. 86, Putnam; Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993, p. 172. Reciprocity is an important element of 
social capital. In the short-run it can be considered altruistic, in the long -run it has also instrumental objec-
tives and is led by self-interest, but still makes all participants better off, Gouldner, 1960. See 3.1.2., fn 218. 
196 Powell, 1990, p. 304. 
197 Coleman, 1990, p. 310, Coleman, 1988, p. S105. The concept of sanctions is closely related to socializ a-
tion. This means that social norms can be internalized and thus are followed of one‘s own accord. Otherwise 
the fear of sanctions from others is the reason for complying social norms. "Norms do not need external sanc-
tions to be effective. When norms are internalized, they are followed even when violation would be unob-
served and not exposed to sanctions. Shame, anticipation of it, is a sufficient internal sanction". Elster, 1989, 
p. 131.  
198 Fukuyama, 1995. 
199 Woolcock, 1998, p. 158, 165. 
200 Dasgupta, 2000, p. 380ff. Dasgupta describes how the social positioning of actors within networks can be 
used for economic purposes similarly to human capital. See also Lin, 2001.  49 
 
firms are social capital…; [it] is the final arbiter of competitive success‖.
201 Depending on 
the position within a network and the type of ties, an actor can use his connections (which 
here means the same as social capital) strategically, especially if he closes gaps, so-called 
‗structural holes‘, in networks. He becomes thus a ‗broker‘ who can make profits by con-
necting  otherwise  not  connected  nodes  of  a  network.  In  the  same  vein,  an  actor  uses 
‗strong ties‘ to be well informed about (economic) opportunities and investment possibili-
ties.
202 In the view of Dasgupta and Burt, social capital is a highly individual resource that 
is used for instrumental reasons only. It differs immensely from Bourdieu‘s view and also 
is different to the concept of Guanxi as will be further discussed below in chapter 6. 
     To recapitulate, social capital is the sum of social relations, informal rules and psycho-
logical dispositions as well as the interdependence between its three parts facilitate co-
operation within society. Social capital is the product of social interaction in the past which 
exhibits substantial inertia in the present.
203 As common within sociology, the exact mean-
ing differs from author to author. For Putnam, social capital is represented in voluntary 
social work; other schools emphasize the role of networks. Social capital in this sense is 
measured in the degree of engagement for the network, which not necessarily has to be 
voluntary.
204 The diversity of approaches defining it shows that social capital gained i m-
portance as explaining variable for economic activity. Common to all definitions is that is 
it often interpreted, although being immaterial, as merely one factor among others for capi-
talistic success and thus as purely instrumental, ne glecting a broader social and cultural 
context. The concept of social capital has even gained the attention of international ec o-
nomic organizations such as the World Bank which ―[a]fter the failure of shock therapy in 
transition economies, [reached] the insight that markets have social and political precondi-
tions‖ and made the concept ―a core policy concept‖.
205 
 
3.1.2. Networks 
     The first usage of networks as form of organization has been in the 19
th century for 
transport and communication purposes. It was made possible with the help of additional 
infrastructure that is needed to use networks for industrial purposes and which earlier were 
not yet available. Although already in the 18
th century road maps were known concepts, 
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the first net in its modern sense was the railway system conceptualized by Friedrich List
206, 
which again enabled the establishment of a postal network. Cities were equipped with wa-
ter, canalization and electricity networks that contributed to urban development.  
     This rather technical conception of networks changed only in the 20
th century when it 
became a sophisticated means to analyze personal relations.
207 Network as a term for social 
connections between people  is ―a specific set of linkages among a defined set of per-
sons‖.
208 The members of a network and their actions are not autonomous but interdepen-
dent actors that share material and immaterial resources. These relations between actors are 
durable patterns.
209 A network can besides individuals also link organization s, political 
actors, households and families. The link itself can be specified as relation or interaction 
and be based on emotions, power or information exchange.
210 Also, ―networks represent a 
third dimension to the existing dichotomy of the vertical (hierarchies) and the horizontal 
(markets) ones. Networks are neither vertical nor horizontal; their enabling quality resides 
in their ambiguity and their ‗navigational‘ … capacity…to compensate for the defects of 
vertical and horizontal structures and to turn these defects into advantage of network mem-
bers‖.
211 Between the two extremes of market and hierarchy, networks are hybrid forms 
that combine elements of competition with hierarchical organizational structures.
212 Net-
works can act as substitute or addition to markets and the state and be associated with both 
negative and positive effects of social capital. Networks are system s of nodes and ties 
around particular persons and are thus considered highly personal. Networks can be an a-
lyzed internally as an object of interest itself to evaluate its importance and utility for the 
individual or it can be seen only as an instrument and thus is scrutinized externally.
213 
Formal and informal networks are part of nearly every existing society in past and present, 
although networks may vary in influence and structure.
214 The existence of networks does 
not necessarily have influence on economic growth, but  it might have depending on its 
structure, as becomes clear in the comparison  of the Chinese and Russian  reform expe-
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rience.
215 The term network is also used as metaphor and ideal type for a modern system 
organizing economic interaction.
216  
     Various types of networks can be defined  in combining reciprocity, interdependence, 
power and loose affiliations in different ways. Reciprocity is important within networks as 
it guarantees the voluntary sequence of transactions over a longer period of time .
217 There 
are networks that require a balanced reciprocity, hence a simultaneous exchange of goods 
and favors of comparable value (this kind of reciprocity is often found in corporate ne t-
works, like that  connecting the German Mittelstand, see also below and chapter 6.4.1.). 
Other types of networks are more reliant on generalized reciprocity, which is never ba-
lanced but always entails the expectations that a favor given now will be repaid at an un-
known time in the future (this kind of reciprocity is an important part of Guanxi networks, 
see  chapter  6).
218  Networks thus rely on the interdependence of intertwining relations 
somewhere between the complete independence of markets and the complete dependence 
in hierarchies. Over time, reputation, loyalty and trust are built up within a network, d e-
pendent on experience, strengthening the permanent nature of network relations. Neverthe-
less, not all participants of a network need to be equal as power asymmetries can exist, 
which are often more complex than within markets or hierarchies. One reason for that can 
be seen in the nature of connections which are often only very loos ely linked as well as 
voluntary, each ‗node‘ keeping its autonomy. Loose affiliations also result in redundancies, 
which further stabilize the networks.
219 Building up a reputation within a network is para-
mount as it is the foundation for trust and only then can an a ctor have full access to his 
social capital.
220  
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     Networks consist of strong and weak ties. The strength – or quality – of a tie ―is a 
(probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy 
(mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie. Each of these is 
somewhat independent of the other, though the set is obviously highly intracorrelated‖.
221 
Bian adds to this the finding that the strength of a tie also depends on its institutional and 
cultural environment and additionally, if the connection is used for obtaining influence or 
information.
222 However, strong ties create dense networks with high levels of trust and 
loyalty, whereas weak ties are part of less dense networks , that above were called loose 
affiliations. Different ‗nodes‘ of a network might be connected over so-called ‗bridges‘ 
which are ‗lines‘ in a network that are the only existing connection between two points. 
Usually, two persons A and B each have many contacts and a bridge between the two thus 
―provides the only route along which information or influence can flow from any contact 
of A to any contact of B, and, consequently, from anyone connected indirectly to A to any-
one connected indirectly to B‖. In other words, this means that new ideas or innovations 
can flow, or, in Granovetter‘s terms, ―diffuse‖ over these bridges which usually are weak 
ties and thus create shortcuts for the diffusion that is also able to reach more people over 
greater (social) distance. As mentioned before, an actor that is able to bridge these structur-
al holes acts as a broker. However, weak ties are not only important for innovation, they 
also usually help in finding new employment opportunities and thus support (social) mobil-
ity.
223 Granovetter calls this the ―strength of weak ties‖.
224   
     By using ‗strong ties‘ of dense networks on the other hand, an actor can keep herself 
always up-to-date with investment opportunities. Strong ties also support co-operations as 
everyone in the network knows each other well. Sanctions are easy to enforce, as the level 
of  information  on  everybody  is  high  which  makes  monitoring  costs  low.  Also,  within 
dense networks ideas about proper behavior are more likely to come upon which makes 
deviation from existing norms as well as free riding harder. An individual has to invest 
time and financial resources to become part of those close relationships and to be able to 
use them as resource.
225 
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     Networks function as safety net in that they provide mutual assistance and support; it is 
also a survival kit for hardships. Additionally, it is an enabling structure to overcome ob-
stacles for example of a bureaucratic state. It also compensates for defects and gaps in the 
legal and formal system.
226 Social networks are multiplex in nature which means that s o-
cial relationships within networks can be of different character which is typical for social 
networks in cultures like China and its culture of Guanxi. Corporate networks, in contrast, 
are one-dimensional in nature, which means that their members are only  connected over 
one type of connection (typically work relations). Generally, Western industrial societies 
separate spheres and thus networks for different purposes, a notion that is foreign for e x-
ample in China that is used to intertwining of spheres (see  also chapter 6). In contrast, ac-
tors in one-dimensional networks switch between different social situations and their ch a-
racteristic discourses. These differences in culture result in different network structures.
227 
    To analyze the specifics and structure of social networks, a sophisticated technique of 
data analysis with the help of complex software has be en developed. It is mainly used to 
map networks between companies but also within communities and  aims to present the 
different roles and power structures within networks, personal and professional ties as well 
as centrality and cores of networks by simply counting connections of each member of the 
network. This enables them to locate people within networks and estimate the amount  of 
knowledge and access to research they have. It is an approach that is often used for bus i-
ness and management studies and is concentrating on the instrumental functionality of a 
network.
228  
     A highly controversial approach to network analysis comes from Hofstede as part of his 
research on inter-cultural management. Hofstede is most known for his studies on cultural 
preferences which he also applies to network analysis. Networks in his view result from 
the behavioral codes of norms and rules, which, in the case of China, he finds in Confucian 
values.
229 Culture, in Hofstede‘s view, can be analyzed using five dimensions, that are de-
fined by using certain variables derived from surveys (originally, his research was based on 
a global survey of IBM employees)
230, namely individualism versus collectivism, long- 
versus short-term orientation (originally called  Confucian dynamism), masculinity versus 
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femininity (performance-orientation), small versus large power distance and weak versus 
strong uncertainty avoidance (reciprocity). The factors that in Hofstede‘s view are able to 
explain Chinese network behavior are collectivism, long-term orientation, reciprocity and 
large power distance. Collectivism induces the creation of networks that connect small 
groups of people that have no direct economic function. These networks serve more the 
purpose to gain status and reputation for the entire group in a long-term perspective that is 
also necessary for reciprocal relations. This does not imply that each member of the net-
work needs to be equal to other members. However, Hofstede‘s approach is highly con-
tested as being a static approach that treats the culture of a nation as homogenous and uni-
form. He also compares cultures in assigning certain values to the respective dimensions 
that result in either ‗good‘ or ‗bad‘ behavior. It also fails to explain the creation of net-
works without resorting to social groups that are the foundation of the networks and thus 
offers an insufficient set of explaining variables. Also, resorting to Confucian values makes 
it also in this sense a rather dissatisfactory approach (please see the discussion of the relev-
ance of Confucian values in chapter 4.4. and 6.3.).
231  
     In contrast, qualitative network analysis, which is mostly used in anthropology but i n-
creasingly also in sociology, has a different methodological approach. It deploys expert or 
structured narrative interviews, network maps or other visualization, sometimes combined 
with quantitative methods. Qualitative analysis tries to be close to the individual actors and 
their perceptions and interpretations. It is a relational approach that goes beyond the indi-
vidual and aims at the formal structure of connections such as dimension, the frequency of 
contacts or spatial distance between members of the networks.
232 These formal aspects are 
often combined with functional characteristics to analyze the virtues of the network, such 
as an emotional, material or practical support functio n.
233 Qualitative network analysis 
aims at a hermeneutic approach of an understanding of social reality in retracing its mean-
ing and its context, or in other words, it is a controlled methodological perspective ta k-
ing.
234 By that it tries to eventually reach the subjective interpretations of reality of the ac-
tors and their individual priorities.
235  
   Network analysis in general aims at a depiction of the structures of networks and the ir 
dynamics as well as their use for social integration. Network analysis as relational a p-
proach is situated between a micro and a macro level. 
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3.1.2.1. Corporate networks 
    A corporate network is a strategic network that constitutes an organizational form of 
economic activity that has the aim to realize competitive advantages. It is characterized by 
complex reciprocal relations of at least two corporations that are more co-operative than 
competitive. These connections are relatively stable ties between legally independent but 
economically mostly dependent corporations.
236 Corporate networks are often received as 
the most relevant organization form of the 21
st century and as model developmental path 
for corporate rationalization processes. Co-operation and networks are conceived as the 
consequence of the crisis-laden socio-economic development trends that forced corpora-
tions to more or less voluntarily join strategic networks. They provide better means to react 
to the fast changing demands of a global market that required brief ‗just-in-time‘ product 
cycles, specialization, flexibility and innovativeness. The emergence of information and 
communication technology enhanced this process.
237  
     Participating in a corporate network is received as an efficient model of facing these 
changes in the economy and as superior to market and hierarchies. Corporate networks are 
a form of network that is a strategic, medium-term project-related structure to co-ordinate 
enterprises. The objective is to reduce complexity, risk and uncertainty and by pooling 
resources facilitate collective learning processes and the accumulation of knowledge and 
ultimately the performance of the co-operating companies by synergy and rationalization 
effects.
238 It thus found its theoretical outlet in NIE and especially in the transaction cost 
theory of Williamson who emphasized the reduction of transaction a nd control costs and 
thus an increase in profits (see also chapter 2).
239  
     Networks combine the organizational advantages of market logic and the paternalistic 
structures of hierarchies. Networks create commitment, routines and controllability but 
also individual freedom of action for each participating corporation. The increasing stabili-
ty of relations reduces risk and costs but increases the dependence of network partners and 
thus might again result in rigid structures. This casts doubt on the fact that networks are 
always ―lighter on the feet‖ as Powell claims.
240 The requirement of networks of a certain 
level of mutual trust, reciprocity, altruism, shared values and goals often contradicts eco-
nomic objectives which endangers the durability of networks.
 The relationship of autono-
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my and dependence in co-operations is sometimes considered as ‗paradox‘. It also means 
that networks are only viable in a certain context under specific conditions.
241 Some au-
thors even claim that networks are nothi ng else than huge corporations ―dressed in new 
costumes and armed with new technology‖.
242 
     The co-operation needs to be of use for all partners but it can be of material as well as 
immaterial nature. The disadvantage of collaborations is that companies have to give up a 
certain degree of autonomy. However, as companies are often competitors in the same i n-
dustrial sector, there is also a degree of ‗domesticated‘ competition within the network 
which is said to encourage innovation. This interpretation and the assumption that more 
than pure rational, strategic motives are to be considered, puts strategic networks not far 
from  regional  networks  (see  below).  However,  the  most  important  incentive  for  co-
operation is greater profitability and cost-efficiency which is achieved by the complemen-
tarity  of  specialization  and  systemic  rationalization  together  with  the  integration  of 
processes of the entire supply chain.
243  
     Members of strategic networks therefore not only include the companies itself but also 
suppliers, logistic, transportation and financial institutions as well as research organizations 
and business associations. The intensity of the relations between these actors results in dif-
ferent network structures.
244 Corporate networks existing on a sector level are mostly stra-
tegic in nature, which means they have  a formal structure. Mostly, they are established 
around one central, ‗focal‘, corporation with international dimension but they can also be 
situated in a certain region.
245  
 
3.1.2.1. Regional networks 
     ―We  define  (regional)  networks…as  (regional)  clusters  which  develop  an  intensive, 
lasting and comprehensive multilateral co-operation, which utilize specific infrastructures 
and which, therefore, co-operate with relevant public, semi-public, and social agents….We 
define (regional) clusters as (regionally concentrated) groups of firms which are function-
ally interconnected (vertically as well as horizontally), including manufacturing and ser-
vices, plus related (‗hard‘ or ‗soft‘ infrastructures and public, semi-public, or social agents 
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financing and/or running them‖.
246 A regional network integrates ‗hard‘ economic condi-
tions with social and cultural relations for economic activity. The economic objectives of 
strategic networks between corporations are combined with the notion of the innovative 
milieu (see below) as they are additionally territorially, socially and culturally linked. The 
development of a region is the result of interaction between resources, technologies, enter-
prises and the socio-cultural interaction of the people in the region. The success of a region 
depends on the quality of its network structures (which, following Putnam‘s argument is a 
function of the competence of its civil society). It is also dependent on the cohesion of 
connections between individuals, the access to information, trust and reciprocity, consen-
sus and recognition. A region is regarded as communicative space and socio-economic 
field of interaction.  
     Regional networks often consist of a  mixture of different  sectors (depending on its 
structure, see below), a diversity of linked enterprises and a dense net of local supporting 
institutions that foster innovation, knowledge transfer and co-operation such as associa-
tions, banks and local government. An industrial district as a specific kind of regional net-
work typically only consists of one sector. Regional networks in general are characterized 
by a high level of trust and strong identification with the region and thus a social embed-
dedness of companies. Regional networks are polycentric organized structures within a 
geographically bounded area, consisting of many SMEs instead of one central authority.
247  
     However, within regional networks the chance of getting locked -in can have serious 
consequences for the entire region. This might happen when strong ties overpower weak 
ties and the network isolates from the outside. Weak ties are needed to stay open to new 
influences which ultimately will be needed to stay innovative. Granovetter argues that 
strong ties are only helpful with uncritical, incremental i nnovations but that radical new 
ideas are mostly received over weak ties at the periphery of a network. The same pro blem 
may arise with a too high level of trust that emphasize s well-tried problem solving strate-
gies.
248  
     Regional networks can take on different forms, such as innovative milieus, industrial 
districts or clusters, which will be analyzed in detail below. 
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Excursus: embeddedness and trust 
     Embeddedness as a concept has been developed by Karl Polanyi in this book The Great 
Transformation.
249 However, Polanyi himself, although coining the  term, never used it 
frequently or even defined it thoroughly. He mentioned it in the chapter  ―Evolution of the 
Market Pattern‖ of The Great Transformation, but besides that he never attached great impor-
tance to the term.
250 He defined it as anchoring of economic institutions (first and foremost the 
market, but also other forms of exchange like reciprocity and redistribution) into social regula-
tions that confine their functioning. Also, Polanyi regarded embeddedness not only as theoreti-
cal term but also a political and social one which makes the term more than merely related to 
the economy but to the entire system as such.
251  
     Thus, the significance of the concept derives from the reception of the book rather than 
from Polanyi himself. The term was taken over by New Economic Sociology when social 
anchoring of economic configurations such as the industrial district seemed to contradict 
the  mainstream  economic  theory.  It  has  been  made  famous  by  Mark  Granovetter  in  a 
―founding manifesto‖.
252 However, Granovetter‘s use of the term differs from that of Po-
lanyi. Whereas the latter strives towards an institutional analysis, Granovetter develops a 
structural network approach which limits the analysis, for example of markets, to a single 
aspect. This ―leads to a neglect of the social content underlying the observed structure‖ 
which ultimately fails to explain the structure of specific networks and neglects ―Polanyi‘s 
concern with the stability of social order‖.
253 
      Granovetter developed his embeddedness theory essentially to build up an approach in 
opposition to the NIE around Williamson who declared network relations as weak and 
temporary (see also chapter 2). The latter ―explains existence of economic institution mere-
ly by functions it performs for the economic system‖, but fails ―to recognize the impor-
tance  of  concrete  personal  relations  and  networks  of  relations‖.
254  Granovetter  argues 
against this atomistic, functionalistic concept of economic action that happens without be-
ing embedded in a context. In contrast, he argues that actors are embedded into systems of 
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social relations and are neither undersocialized and only focused on profit maximization 
nor oversocialized and only acting under the impression of norms, but rather relational and 
embedded. Embeddedness marks the quality of a relationship between persons which is not 
only opportunistic. Social relationships are the foundation for trust which is built up by 
time and experience. Thus, the concept of embeddedness implies that economic relations 
are contextual and dependent on experience. Social routines and institutions give trust that 
facilitates decisions and the conclusion of contracts will not fail due to uncertainty through 
opportunism. Based on that, long-term network relations are constructed.
255 The embed-
dedness approach lies in the middle b etween the undersocialized notion of impersonal, 
institutional arrangements and the oversocialized one of generalized morality and scrut i-
nizes concrete forms of social relations.
256 
     However, embeddedness consists of relational and structural dimensions. The relational 
embeddedness characterizes the quality of a relation between two actors that is based on 
mutual trust. Structural embeddedness means the quality of connections between several 
actors. The action of two actors is in this v iew dependent on the context of the ties to the 
other individuals as well as their reputation within the network.
257 
     Trust also creates and enforces norms and together with embeddedness adds social and 
organizational connections to the analysis of economic systems. However, embeddedness 
is ―not merely […] a structure that springs in to fulfill economic function but […is] a struc-
ture with history and continuity that give it an independent impact on the functioning of the 
system‖.
258 Trust is unlike other resources never diminished by use, to the contrary.
259 
However, distrust ―is very difficult to invalidate through experience…once distrust has set 
in it soon becomes impossible to know if it was ever in fact justified, for it has the capacity 
to be self-fulfilling‖.
260  
    Trust is the central mechanism for coordinating networks. The ability to trust, so-called 
generalized trust, is the foundation for situational trust. It is also the foundation of reciproc-
ity and is a main mechanism for integration for a network in that it reduces the complexity 
and need for co-ordination within networks. Vice versa, reciprocity again engenders trust. 
Powell even claims that trust is more efficient and economical than ―prediction, authority, 
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or bargaining‖.
261 Trust is crucial for the stability and capacity for action of networks and 
is necessarily connected to the reputation of a network member. Reputation, together with 
reliability, loyalty and trust can only develop in long-term relations because they strongly 
depend on repeated experience. Trust reinforces the durability of reciprocal connections 
and reduces opportunist behavior. 
262 
      Trust can take on an informal and a formal form. Formal trust means that by interacting 
with another person, both believe that the other will obey t he accepted rules and conven-
tion of the encounter. Informal trust depends on the degree of knowledge of another person 
in different situations and that this person is dependable even in stressful circumstances . 
The latter form of trust needs time to develop.
263 
Trust can be conceptualized in different ways, for example in the distinction of trust as 
familiarity or confidence in the case of system trust of Niklas Luhmann. For Coleman, trust 
is essential for (non-)economic transactions but it is not ‗entrusted‘ without a calculation of 
utility. Trust is a risk-carrying decision as the behavior of the ‗transaction partner‘ remains 
uncertain. Trust in this approach is conceived as investment.
264 It can also be defined as 
goodwill and competence or as expectation of benign action and reliance within ne t-
works.
265 
     Redding defines two forms of trust in the case of China, one that derives from formal 
institutions such as law and regulation, and an informal one that derives from ―networks of 
interpersonal obligation‖, with the latter dominating ―by a wide margin‖. Institutional trust, 
in contrast, is ―still in its infancy and its growth is not aided by any collective memory of 
its existence in the past‖.
266 However, in China trust is ―mainly based on some subsocieties 
such as family or clan family, the village, etc.‖.
267  
 
3.2. Network organization  
3.2.1. Flexible specialization 
     The concept of flexible specialization, or how it is often also called, flexible production, 
has been created by Piore and Sabel in their book "The second industrial divide", published 
in 1984. They compared the socio-economic systems and the networks of small and me-
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dium enterprises (SMEs) of regions in and outside Europe and observed that artisan pro-
duction seems not to be an outdated form of economic action but rather a viable alterna-
tive. The book thus draws a connection from premodern craft traditions to the organization 
of modern production. The authors argue that while the typical production method of Ford-
ism
268 which takes place within large-scale enterprises and being highly dependent on ver-
tical integration, has dominated and replaced small-scale production up until the middle of 
the 20
th century; the trend has been reversed towards flexible production within industrial 
districts in the second half of the last century. However, up to this point, mass production 
triumphed everywhere, except in areas that were "too narrow and fluctuating to repay the 
specialized use of resources of mass production".
269 When in the middle of the 20
th century 
a crisis of Fordism began, flexible production ―became the leading edge of a totally new 
form of capitalist production‖.
270 By deploying flexible specialization and with the help of 
subcontracting, SMEs could use advanced and innovative technology to meet the differen-
tiated and fast changing demands of global costumers.
271 Even more so, the small enter-
prises were by this method forced to move "toward greater flexibility [in] provoking tec h-
nological sophistication - rather than regression to simple techniques".
272 Also, it is ―clear 
that this form of production has become increasingly rationalized so that these small-firm 
economies progressively get better at being efficient, flexible producers‖.
273 
     To be able to do that, flexible specializat ion needed to remove itself from the type of 
organization of production of Taylorism.
274 Together with small-scale, custom-made goods 
it had to introduce co-operation between workers on the three levels of white collar, skilled 
and unskilled workers as well as a middle skilled group. This increases the professionalism 
of all workers on the job by experience. This approach often resulted in workers quitting 
their job to become independent entrepreneurs themselves. Hence, in contrast to Taylorist 
organizations of work, flexible specialization is intertwined with social mobility and takes 
place in SMEs within regional economies (see also below).
275 
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     ―Thus, production systems develop complementarities with their societal contexts so 
that a limited number of different ones become established and, once dominant in a partic-
ular society, they are slow to change….Many forms of flexible production, in contrast, are 
associated with extensive obligational networks between economic actors and considerable 
cooperation between competitors that developed and continue to be reproduced by particu-
lar state and private structures and agencies‖.
276 
    Regions that emphasize flexible specialization have three features in common. Th ey 
have a specific relationship to the market in the sense that they produce for highly differen-
tiated, regional as well as global markets with instable demand. They are able to change 
product types and styles quickly to meet the changed needs but also to  create those needs. 
Additionally, they use diversely applicable, highly flexible technology. The third characte-
ristic is the creation of regional institutions that support co-operation, and competition be-
tween companies stimulates innovation. This means that competition does not rely on price 
reductions  but  requires  creati vity.  This  reconciliation  between  competition  and  co -
operation can be achieved by regional clustering of SMEs, like for example in the  Third 
Italy, by groups of loosely connected large corporation, by ‗solar‘ enterprises that gather 
small subsidiary companies around them geographically and also by decentralized produc-
tion.
277  
    Within regional clusters, no single enterprise has perma nently the leadership but a r-
rangements between companies are organized over short-term contracts in which the role 
of the participating companies can change, supported by surrounding institutions like trad-
ing associations or unions. The cohesion of these regional industries is based on a deeply 
rooted sense for community or sometimes also ethnical or religious ties. Familism and kin-
ship ties play also a decisive role in providing the necessary capital for starting up a small 
enterprise or providing labor.
278 
    Flexible specialization relies on the complementarity of co -operation and competition 
that enhances the potential for innovations and impedes a ‗race to the bottom‘ for wages 
and prices. Also, it includes the workers and their skills into the production and innovation 
process and thus also works towards a strong community and an attractive atmosphere for 
working and living. It is interesting to note that the implementation of high-end technology 
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depends to a large part on social relations and loyalty that are usually associated with a pre-
industrial society.
279 
 
3.2.2. Concepts of regional networks  
“For in these trades the advantages of production on a large scale can in general  
be as well attained by the aggregation of a large number of small masters into  
one district as by the erection of a few large works”.
280 
 
3.2.2.1. Neo-regionalism 
     In contrast to the notion of mainstream economics that international enterprises are not 
geographically or nationally bound and not anchored to a certain region, and that locations 
of production are merely determined by the most cost-efficient production factors, the con-
cept of neo-regionalism emphasizes the significance of regional embeddedness.
281 A re-
gion in this setting is defined as a socio-economic integration as well as a relational space 
and political unit with a shared territorial identity.
282 Whereas the first view regards global 
players  as  being  connected  over  a  dynamic  global  network  within  a  ―global  space  of 
flows‖, the second approach sees territorial attachment as competitive advantage as the 
region serves as spatial synergy and innovation system without a single business being the 
driving force behind the overall technological progress.
283 It is rather the geographically 
bound cluster of specific, regionally developed skills and knowledge that benefits from the 
highly innovative, post-fordist environment instead of price competition.  
     Therefore, one of the key assumptions of neo-regionalism is that ―long-term industrial 
competitiveness is related to the ability of firms continuously to upgrade their knowledge 
base and performance, rather than just to obtain static efficiency through identification and 
exploitation of cheap resources and economies of scale‖.
284 Thus, neo-regionalism assumes 
that differences between regions will increase as local skills and knowledge further diffe-
rentiate, collaborating in a highly dynamic setting of flexible organization and intertwining 
of competition and co-operation within a network.
285 However, ―the more tacit the know-
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ledge
286 involved, the more important is spatial proximity between the actors taking part in 
the exchange. […] To communicate tacit knowledge will normally require a high degree of 
mutual trust and understanding, which in turn is related not only to language but also to 
shared values and ‗culture‘‖. Hence, companies are connected over relationships that are 
dependent on local conventions, norms and values.
287 Regions compete and can be distin-
guished by their cultural background and ethics which are regarded as an influential varia-
ble for economic development.
288 Economic agents are embedded in enduring systems of 
social relationships which are necessarily locally and contextually bound. So besides ge o-
graphical closeness, also social proximity is essential because only by that participation in 
regional labor markets and supply structures can be ensured.
289 The explanation of how a 
specific region can be more successful than others is often seen in the particular communi-
cation  and  co -ordination  structures  that  result  in  routines  that  favor  innovation  an d 
progress. 
     Neo-regionalism also emphasizes the active role of public policy and implicitly claims 
that it is in principle possible to choose specific regions and by the right dose of subsidies 
to induce learning processes and turn those regions into  successful industrial hubs. Al-
though neo-regionalism emphasizes the role of specific regions in supporting learning, 
innovation and growth processes, it fails to explain the socio -cultural conditions of those 
innovative networks. When and how these are dev eloped is largely left unexplored.
290 
―Without adding a cultural dimension to structural accounts of embeddedness, it is difficult 
to understand the negotiated, emergent quality of trust in many concrete settings, and the 
ability  of  entrepreneurs  to  construct  networks  out  of  diverse  regions  of  their  social 
worlds‖.
291 The concept of regional economies dependent on flexible production has been 
linked to the notion of Marshall‘s industrial district (see also below).
292  
     It is also connected to the concept of innovative milieu, also further analyzed below. 
Regions equipped with the necessary endowment or ―localized capabilities‖ developed a 
so-called innovative milieu with a thick knowledge  base. It is embedded  in individual 
skills, in routines and procedures of organizations. The milieu itself encompasses dynamic 
network structures within firms and auxiliary institutions. If skills and knowledge are diffi-
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cult to obtain and imitate and if they are singular enough, the competitive advantage of a 
milieu (and hence, a region), can be a long-term phenomenon. Generally, the combined 
capabilities of knowledge creation and cumulative learning of a region is more than ‗the 
sum of its parts‘ and for that difficult to replicate. This fact is often called path-dependent, 
as it is regarded as explanans for the development of ―spatial agglomerations of related 
firms‖.
293 However, ―there is a need to remain open to the radical change which will soon-
er or later require, to paraphrase Schumpeter, a readiness for creative ‗un-learning‘‖.
294 
 
3.2.2.2. Innovative milieus 
     The concept of innovative milieu is a European invention
295 but is not a uniform a p-
proach. It defines a milieu as ―context for development, which empowers and guides inno-
vative agents to be able to innovate and to coordinate with other innovating agents‖ within 
a ―system of regional institutions, rules, and practices‖.
296  
     A common definition of the milieu can be given as follows: ―A territory is not a defined 
space of resources. It is the mode of establishment of a group, in the natural environment, 
which through the organization and localization of activities, generates prevalent condi-
tions of communication-language and collective learning (the forms of cooperation which 
create technological and organizational rationalities)‖ and ―the milieu appears as the socio-
economic formation which, at one and the same time, generates the economic dynamic and 
constitutes itself in setting this dynamic into motion. In other words, milieux take form in 
organizing themselves and they do so even better insofar as they are territorialized. The 
emergence of organizational dynamism is correlative to the dynamism of local milieux‖.
297 
     A milieu determines ―a specific external ‗image‘ and a specific internal ‗representation‘ 
and sense of belonging, which enhances the local innovative capability through synergetic 
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and  collective learning processes‖.
298 The milieu as  localized production system is the 
geographical phenomenon of what Mark Granovetter called the ‘embeddedness‘ of social 
and economic processes.
299 It uses informal networks to organize these processes as well as 
for co-operation and communication but is often regarded as network of the actors itself 
who are bound to a certain territorial context  and therefore also produce the milieu. The 
localized production system relies on the network relations between companies. These r e-
lations are on the one hand material and commercial, but even more so horizontal and mul-
tilateral, immaterial and non-commercial and dependent on the strength of ―relational capi-
tal‖. The habitual collaboration results in dense relational capital and trust which are mu-
tual  dependent.  Personal  contacts  are  transformed  for  innovative  business  purposes.
300 
These relations are part of what Ratti calls „supporting space―, which is separated from a 
market and production space.
301 Nevertheless, the region is not merely a passive location 
but has the ability to organize its development within global ec onomic structures.
302 As 
within Marshall‘s district, there is something ―in the air‖ that supports innovation.
303  
     The spatial delimitation of an innovative milieu is not dependent on administrative units 
but on homogeneity of behavior, values, collective know-how, technical culture and shared 
work ethics, resulting in solidarity and mutual trust and ultimately in a feeling of belong-
ing.
304 The milieu is defined as innovative if it is able to open up to the outside to acquire 
necessary information or resources for alterations.
305 Innovation is thus possible when the 
endogenous logic of the milieu and the strength of its relational capital is combined with its 
interaction with the world outside. It is a continuing process of adaptability, change and 
evolution. Knowledge becomes a territorial specificity and withdraws itself from the com-
petitive pressures of the market because it is hard to reproduce elsewhere.
306 Regional in-
novation networks are multi -functional and developed based on the existing relational 
capital, without clear defined costs and benefits. It remains open under which circumstance 
actors are induced to use personal contacts for innovative projects and networks.
307 
     A milieu is seen as metaphor for the explanation of regional embeddedness of economic 
activity  in  cultural,  social  and  political  structures.  Related  to  the  concept  of  neo -
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regionalism, an emphasis is made on cumulative learning processes which stem from a 
regional identity and typical local production structures.
308 However, the mechanism of 
how a milieu encourages innovation remains unresolved. It is a circular argument that i n-
novation happens within a milieu which only exists because of the innovative environment. 
Besides the notion that knowledge creation is an e ssential part of it, the economic logic 
behind its processes is no more specified than the importance of the geographical limit a-
tion for its dynamics.
309  
     The boundary of an innovative to milieu to an industrial district is also not straightfo r-
ward and mostly both phenomena are described very similar.  Often, no differentiation is 
made between innovative milieu, industrial district and cluster and these terms are used as 
synonyms.
310 However, the theories of the industrial district seem to be further developed 
and are presented below in detail. 
 
3.2.2.3. Cluster 
     In his book The Competitive Advantage of Nations Michael Porter developed the con-
cept of the business cluster which is today therefore also often called Porterian cluster. 
Similar to the concept of the milieu and the district, the cluster is defined as consisting of 
enterprises, suppliers and related institutions producing in the same or a complementing 
sector, which are connected over networks within a specific region. Clusters for Porter are 
―critical masses - in one place - of unusual competitive success in particular fields‖, its 
boundaries determined by ―linkages and complementarities across industries and institu-
tions that are most important to competition‖, but which do not necessarily coincide with 
national borders.
311 As other forms of agglomeration economies, also the cluster is r e-
garded to increase competitiveness and productivity by supporting innovativeness and a t-
tracting more businesses to the cluster. It is an ―alternative way of organizing the value 
chain‖.
312 To be a cluster, a region needs sufficient resources and know-how to stand out 
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from its competitors. It also requires a long-term perspective to develop and maintain its 
competitive advantage. It needs to produce goods that are either unique in quality or inno-
vativeness because then they can be sold with a price premium. Porter specifies three types 
of clusters, namely the so-called techno cluster that is concentrated on high-end technology 
and often associated with universities or research centers (a famous example is Silicon 
Valley). The second is the historical know-how-based cluster that has its knowledge accu-
mulated over a long time period and has a strong tradition in production; the last is the fac-
tor endowment cluster that is successful due to a comparative advantage related to its loca-
tion.   
     Porter specifies his definition of the cluster in the so-called diamond model,
313 which 
determines how a region can increase its competitiveness and  why this might be the case. 
The model is primarily aimed towards business strategy and government advice.  Porter 
lists four determinants of national advantage, namely the factor conditions, which means 
the factor endowment and the level of skilled labor and infrastructure; the nature of d e-
mand for the products; the status of related and supporting industries; as well as firm strat-
egy, structure and rivalry. These factors are often represented in ‗Porter‘s diamond‘, a di-
amond-shaped graph that interconnects the elements of this structure. It is a mutually rein-
forcing system. Additionally, Porter names the government as significant factor, but also 
ascribes chance not a small role either, as it accelerates the development process of a re-
gion. The listed factors are not necessarily path-dependent or even natural or inherited as 
they might develop and change by government programs, innovations or socio-cultural 
changes.
314 The core of  Porter‘s argument is the rivalry between regions and enterprises 
that results in high quality products and innovation, supported by state policies such as 
infrastructural investments, subsidies and research and education political measures at the 
local, but also national level
315: ―Clusters affect competitiveness within countries as well as 
across national borders. Therefore, they lead to new agendas for all business executives - 
not just those who compete globally. More broadly, clusters represent a new way of think-
ing about location, challenging much of the conventional wisdom about how companies 
should be configured, how institutions such as universities can contribute to competitive 
success, and how governments can promote economic development and prosperity‖.
316 The 
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performance of one company is correlated to that of competitors and other participants of 
the value-added chain, including customers.  
    However, the term cluster is not exclusively employed for Porter‘s concept. It is also 
used as generic term for spatial agglomerations of economies. The OECD, for example, 
mentions it in a more broad definition: ―Large companies can shape environments – SMEs 
typically can only operate within them... [and] gain strength by cooperation and collabora-
tion...through clusters [of]...formal and informal networks...anchored in their local com-
munities‖.
317 This definition puts it more in the line with the concept of the industrial dis-
trict, analyzed below. 
 
3.2.2.4. Industrial districts 
“[T]he small and medium-sized firm industrial districts in Western Europe…each tells  
a different story of how trust became, for it, a fact of life; and the only common feature of these 
stories is that none could be reproduced elsewhere precisely because each  
dependent on an improbable chain of fortuitous local circumstances”.
318 
 
The industrial district is a concept first developed by Alfred Marshall.
319 He used it to 
analyze locally bounded socio -economic systems in Great Britain. Later it has bee n 
adopted by Giacomo Becattini
320 for the Italian case (see also chapter 6.4.2). Marshall de-
fined it as consisting of ―many social advantages‖ as artisans are ―intelligent and self-
reliant‖ because they have escaped ―the dominion of custom‖.
321  
     Today, it is defined by certain stylized facts that include a flexible production that meets 
the final demand and variable different needs of global clients, production in a large num-
ber of small- and medium sized firms in a naturally and historically limited geographical 
territory, or what Becattini calls ―a socio-territorial entity‖
322 and Marshall describes the 
following way: ―When an industry has thus chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay 
there long: so great are the advantages which people following the same skilled trade get 
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from near neighborhood to  one  another―.
323 The local enterprises  produce in the same 
broadly defined industrial branch with the same kind of production process but at different 
stages of this process, which Marshal calls ―main industry‖ and ―auxiliary‖ or ―subsidiary 
industry‖ in vertically integrated sectors: ―[S]ubsidiary trades grow up in the neighbor-
hood, supplying it with implements and materials, organizing its traffic, and in many ways 
conducing to the economy of its material…the economic use of expensive machinery can 
sometimes be attained in a very high degree in a district in which there is a large aggregate 
production of the same kind, even though no individual capital employed in the trade be 
very large. For subsidiary industries devoting themselves each to one small branch of the 
process of production, and working it for a great many of their neighbors, are able to keep 
in constant use machinery of the most highly specialized character, and to make it pay its 
expenses…‖.
324   
     An industrial district is regarded as a special case of the innovative milieu described 
above, but the line to strategic networks is blurry.
325 However, it differs from the lat ter 
concept in being more than just a cluster of atomistic companies in one locality. Necessari-
ly connected to the concept of the industrial district is the embeddedness of its economic 
activity as well as the significance of trust.
326 It differs from the concept of the innovative 
milieu in not only being an instrument to overcome uncertainty. In the past, solving this 
problem was possible for single companies, but in the global economy of the 20
th century 
uncertainty could only be overcome by co-operation as best practice.
327 Thus, the innova-
tive milieu is „a set of territorial relationships encompassing in a coherent way a produc-
tion system, different economic and social actors, a specific culture and a representation 
system, and generating a collective learning process―.
328 
     An industrial district is heavily characterized by the collaboration between business and 
social sphere which means that the local community plays a decisive role for the function-
ing of the district and social cohesion is a important component of the district‘s vitality.
329 
However, it differs from other types of economic region in  that the industrial process do-
minates. ―Self-containment and the progressive division of labor‖ result in an ―increasing 
surplus of final products‖ that has to be sold on the global market. Hence, it ―requires a 
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permanent network of links between the district and its suppliers and clients‖.
330 Conse-
quently, a district consists of a mixture of firms, of which some sell directly to a (global) 
market and some act as sub-suppliers producing components without clear boundaries and 
a separation between producer and supplier as a firm can be both. By working together, the 
often family-owned small-scale firms can achieve economies of scale by lending out ex-
pensive machinery or subcontracting to a competitor if an order is too large for one firm or 
business is low.
331 Enterprises can be categorized as final firms that produce the final good, 
stage or phase firms that specialize on one stage in production and complementing firms 
that provide supplemental  products or services.
332 Nevertheless, the division of labor is 
localized but not restricted to one firm neither is it distributed over a general market as the 
firms of the district are firmly rooted within a certain area.
333      
      It is a concept closely related to that of flexible specialization already analyzed above. 
The individual steps of the production process need to be separable in time and space as 
they are often distributed within local networks and mostly are not standardized.
334 How-
ever, the relations to a local supplier are typically long-term in nature which has the advan-
tage to be able to rely on contextual, tacit knowledge and adap tability of the local sub-
contractor.
335  
     Related to this, workers have acquired a specialized knowledge of production and a l-
though they frequently change the workplace within the district to find an occupation most 
suitable for them, the knowledge is still not lost for the district as such as it is still part of 
the ―local pool of skill‖.
336 Knowledge is rather treated as a public good, resulting in an, 
how Marshall puts it, ―industrial atmosphere‖ that has its secrets in form of ―skill and the 
taste required for their work…in the air, and children breathe them as they grow up‖.
337 
Elsewhere he says: ―The mysteries of the trade become no mystery; but are as it were in 
the air…Good work is rightly appreciated, inventions and improvements in machinery, in 
processes and the general organization of the business have their merits promptly dis-
cussed: if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with sugges-
tions of their own; and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas‖.
338 Entrepreneurs 
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and workers meet each other in informal places like bars and restaurant and thus acquire 
information on new technology and innovations. It is also a way to spread knowledge. This 
can only work, if all members of the district have principally the same goals, hence, the 
success of the district as a whole.
339 The free flow of information also means that informa-
tion on new employees is easily available at very low cost. Overall, this makes an industri-
al district a space where workers find their skill acknowledged and appreciated. ―[A] loca-
lized industry gains a great advantage from the fact that it offers a constant market for skill. 
Employers are apt to resort to any place where they are likely to find a good choice of 
workers with the special skill which they require; while men seeking employment naturally 
go to places where there are many employers who need such skill as theirs and where 
therefore it is likely to find a good market. The owner of an isolated factory, even if he has 
good access to a plentiful supply of general labor, is often put to great shifts for want of 
some special skilled labor; and a skilled workman, when thrown out of employment in it, 
has no easy refuge‖.
340 However, a large fraction of workers are on a continuum between 
homeworkers and part-time workers in addition to waged workers, self-employed and en-
trepreneurs,  which  links  the  production  process  to  the  family  structure  of  the  district. 
Hence, beside the worker, the entrepreneur is another prominent character of the industrial 
district whose entrepreneurial spirit and ability lie in her ―special function in translating all 
the capabilities which are latent in the historical heritage of the district into products‖. She 
has to negotiate to sell and advertise the district‘s products on global markets and hence 
has a tendency to lose her roots and become a cosmopolitan and thus leave the boundaries 
of the industrial district.
341 However, her motivation and life style are defined by her enter-
prise whose success is dependent on her reputation which again is locally bound. Her ulti-
mate aim is to ensure the long-term well-being of her family.
342 
     Another very distinct feature is the parallel existence of competition and co -operation 
which means that ―firms do not fight one other but try to find market places for new pro-
duction without having destructive effects within the industrial district‖.
343 Competition 
rather leads to technological dynamism which is embedded in social culture. ―[…] Inven-
tions and improvements in machinery, in processes and the general organization of the 
business have their merits promptly discussed: if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up 
by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus it becomes the source of 
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further new ideas‖.
344 A district is a very dynamic, adaptive system that conceives technol-
ogical changes and innovativeness as an important trait.
345  
     Thus, the strong interdependence, or how it sometimes also called ―the merger‖ of the 
production sphere with that of the social and political structure of the district mentioned 
above is a crucial factor. Or, as Marshall put it: ―The whole mechanism of society rests on 
confidence―.
346 Even more so, the industrial district is shaped by the functioning and inte-
raction of all spheres. The community, including the family, with its social and political 
life, plays an important role within the district and for its success. Social structures and 
shared values are shaped as to complement economic activity in providing labor or finan-
cial resources especially in the case of the family, and generally offer mutual assistance in 
times of need and the incentive to become an entrepreneur.
347 The district can also be in-
terpreted as network with the community providing social capital and entrepreneurs being 
connected over kinship ties.
348 A district is a ―thickening of industrial and social interde-
pendencies in a certain place‖ that also includes the role of public policy and a local credit 
system.
349 It is an intermediate case between extremes of social relationships and the ―capi-
talist core‖ found in factories. This also means that a district exhibits a homogenous system 
of values related to a certain view on work, the family, reciprocity and ethics in general, 
including the attitude towards change. These rules and values are distributed throughout 
the district and passed along to every new generation and lead to a strong feeling of be-
longing, local traditions and social cohesion.
350 Industrial districts can accommodate vari-
ous sets of values and cultures but these have to be complemented by a certain institutional 
structure, such as ―market, firm, family, church, school, local authorities and structures of 
political parties, cultural and charitable, religious and artistic bodies‖. The value system is 
important for the functioning of the economy of the district and thus is more conceived as 
enabling than as limiting.
351 
     However, it would be misleading to conceive the industrial district as a closed commu-
nity. Although it has a quite homogenous population, it still heavily relies on being dynam-
ic, innovative and adaptive to maintain the unity of the district which can only happen if 
the system stays open to outside inflow, for example through migration. This also implies a 
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high capacity of assimilation of the migrants to the homogeneous structure of values and 
views existing within the district, although migration is often a short-distance phenomenon 
(for example within Italy). The ―cultural distance‖ between native and ―alien‖ also results 
in behaving differently towards people from within than from outside.
352 
    To summarize, an industrial districts is has several main features: ―the presence of a 
special ‗atmosphere‘; its settlement for a long period of time (more than one generation); a 
division of labor among the (small and medium) firms collected in the district; the presence 
of an ‗automatic organization‘, that is a high degree of technological complementarities; a 
continuous interplay between competition and cooperation‖.
353 It thus mixes specific so-
cio-cultural characteristics of a community such as values and institutions with the histori-
cal-natural facts of a certain territory and the technical aspects of the production process 
resulting a in dynamic process of interaction within production networks for the flexible 
allocation of labor and the distribution of products. It is a territorial organism and social 
reality.
354 As in the case of innovative milieus it remains unclear how the development of a 
district comes about and why they, as in the case of the Third Italy, seem almost to appear 
spontaneously.
355 However, for many authors it is obvious that an industrial distri ct can 
only have long-term success when it besides being able of ―systemic integration‖ is also 
able of ―social integration‖ that incorporates the ―self-organizing capabilities of society as 
a whole‖. Often, economic success comes at the expense of social viability of industrial 
districts.
356 
     Regional networks are a concept that is immanent to industrial districts which are also 
more local, rather than international constructs. Regional networks are sometimes also 
called geographically integrated corporate networks but they are enlarged by its embe d-
dedness in the socio-cultural context of the region. Economic activity within an industrial 
district is embedded in a dense net of relations. As mentioned before, an industrial district 
is a special case of innovative milieu that enables an analysis of the different levels of net-
work structure within the region. Networks are often also interpreted as economic intera c-
tion and the milieu adds to this the surrounding social cont ext. Both concepts interact but 
do not need to be identical.
357  
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4. Capitalism: definition, history, typology 
“No mistake about it, the travail was over and the market system had been 
born. The problem of survival was henceforth to be solved neither by custom 
nor by command, but by the free action of profit-seeking men bound together 
only by the market itself. The system was to be called Capitalism. And the idea 
of gain which underlay it was so firmly rooted that men would soon vigorously 
affirm that it was an eternal and omnipresent attitude.”
358 
 
4.1. Capitalism since the 19
th century – derivation and rapprochement 
     The term Capitalism was from its creation in the 19
th century controversially discussed 
among and within disciplines, its definition varying enormously in the understanding of 
different authors, mainly due to the lack of agreement of its precise meaning.
359 Therefore, 
many interpretations exist, of which most are encumbered by value judgments and political 
connotation.
360 Economists and historians are disputing over the question if capitalism is a 
system that can be described abstractly by various characteristics or if it is rather an histor-
ical entity.
361 This is additionally  exacerbated by the fact that the usage of the scientific 
term is different from that in everyday language, where it is less a means to gain insights 
but rather an accusation that is more intended to address v alue judgments and preconcep-
tions.
362 In English speaking countries it is considerably less burdened and less political 
than in Germany, where the term Capitalism was a popular ideological instrument, esp e-
cially at the beginning of the  20
th century. Today Capitalism is on the one hand the self-
designated term for the economic modernity, on the other a concept to analyze economic 
structures.
363   
     The common ground of all definitions is the association of Capitalism with an economic 
system for which capital is central for all economic activities, together with a liberal ec o-
nomic order with ‗free‘ work(ers) and freedom of property and the accumulation of money 
and wealth as a common objective.
364 Capitalistic economic orders are often seen as the 
―eternal shape of an economy‖, a ―realization of economic rationality‖ and ―the means for 
the end of satisfaction of needs‖
365; others see Capitalism merely as a special case of a ra-
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tional economy.
366 On the other hand, Capitalism cannot only by ―identified with a system 
of unfettered individual enterprise: a system where economic and social relations are ruled 
by contract, where men are free agents in seeking their livelihood, and legal compulsions 
and restrictions are absent‖, because it would reduce it to a synonym to ―a régime of lais-
sez-faire‖.
367 To the contrary, Capitalism is more than a market economy, as it also in-
cludes social relations as part of the economic system, it is thus non-technological.
368 Most 
definitions of the 19
th century associate with Capitalism a machinery gobbling up all as-
pects of society from which no one can escape. 
     Probably due to its imprecise definition the term Capitalism was not included in many 
encyclopedias for a long time. It was not integrated into the ―Handwörterbuch der Staats-
wissenschaften‖ until its 4
th edition in 1923, and Palgrave‘s ―Dictionary of Political Econ-
omy‖ did not contain an article named ―Capitalism‖ until 1926. Today it is left out of many 
mainstream encyclopedias again because it is not considered a scientific term. One reason 
for this could be its ideological and political connotation. Some authors dismiss it on the 
grounds that Walter Eucken‘s theory of economic orders replaced the elusive and impre-
cise term ‗Capitalism‘ with its analytical instruments after the Second World War. It is 
argued that the creation of a hierarchy of economic systems such as the market and the 
planned economy made the term ―Capitalism‖ obsolete for scientific discussion.
369 It has 
been reactivated within the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach to compare different 
forms of economic systems, which will be discussed in detail below (see chapter 4.5.) 
     In this book Studies in the Development of Capitalism Dobb distinguishes three differ-
ent meanings of Capitalism.
370 The first is the one coined by Max Weber, who creates the 
notion of a ―spirit‖ of Capitalism, also inspiring the writings of Werner Sombart. Their 
approach links culture and economy, showing their interdependency, contrasting the more 
material approach of Marx (see below) who regarded Capitalism as the inevitable result of 
technological progress.
371 Weber‘s notion of Capitalism and the capitalistic spirit is closely 
related to Sombart‘s. He distinguishes between modern and pre-modern Capitalism. He 
defines  pre-modern Capitalism as  a purely economic phenomenon,  existing in any ex-
change of products with the purpose of making profit. The modern Capitalism instead re-
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lies on a rational capitalistic spirit inspired by the religious assurance of salvation of Cal-
vinism. Weber creates an ideal-type of Capitalism that requires a certain attitude towards 
the economy, which is inevitably accompanied by rising rationalization, bureaucratization 
and  professionalization  within  a  homogenous  institutional  framework.  An  autonomous 
system of large-scale enterprises under rational, bureaucratic management emerges, which 
does not leave space for outdated socio-cultural structures like small family businesses. 
Local economies are standardized to fulfill the objectives of ―individual maximization, 
rational-legal principles and private accumulation‖.
372 Capitalism is described by a syste-
matic combination of characteristics and imposes a unique institutional structure on the 
existing traditional society, with obsolescent cultural idiosyncrasies being replaced.
373 We-
ber and also Sombart regard the capitalistic development as an ongoing struggle. Keeping 
up with it and not g oing to rack and ruin in the evolution of events is another essential 
attribute of modern economy.
374 In their view, social institutions serve as mere accessories 
to the economic system instead of the economy being embedded into socie ty. The certain 
attitude needed for modern, rational Capitalism is described by both Weber and So mbart 
but justified in different ways. It will be shown that both authors consider Capitalism to be 
an age of separation, by which not merely separating the pre-modern traditional economy 
from the modern, capitalistic one is meant, changing the notion of what economy is forev-
er, but also the separations taking place in people‘s private lives. Both authors and their 
works on Capitalism will be discussed and compared in detail below (see chapter 4.2. and 
4.3.). 
     The second meaning of Capitalism according to Dobb identifies it with production for 
an anonymous market with the motive to gain. This definition was created by the German 
Historical School
375 and its concept of development, but associated with a modern mone-
tary economy as the term Capitalism was hardly ever used. Development for the Historical 
School meant, roughly speaking, that there is a distinction between the natural economy of 
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the mediaeval  time  and  the  money economy  which  followed to  that.
376 The Historical 
School emphasizes ―the area of the market as defining the stages in the growth of the mod-
ern economic world‖.
377 For the authors belong to that school of thought, every economic 
stage also comes with an increase  in morality and ethical progress (Sittlichkeit). Most ex-
plicitly this is elaborated  by Hildebrand,  an important member of the Older Historical 
School, in his work on economic stages. He strongly believed that morality is improving in 
the course of time and stressed the importance of the forms of economic communication 
and transactions (by which he means the succession of barter, money and credit). There-
fore his stages are natural economy, monetary economy and credit economy.
378 His theory 
already points to the idea of economic style (see below, chapter 4.5.3.). Similarly, also Karl 
Bücher, a member of the Younger Historical School, developed a stage theory, based on 
progress in social integration. He defined the stages of hunting and gathering, household 
economies, city economies and national economies. He is also famous for spurring the so -
called Bücher-Meyer controversy
379 on a methodological level.
380 The Historical School, 
with its relativity of economic systems and epochs associated with particular characteri s-
tics without general economic laws necessarily needed, has an important influence on We-
ber and Sombart, who are part of the Youngest Historical School, and for the emergence of 
the so-called ‗intuitive theory‘.
381 However, as stated above, the Historical School hardly 
ever uses the term Capitalism because the aforeme ntioned need to draw a line betwe en 
traditional and modern economy does not fit into their theory of evolutionary stages with 
uninterrupted economic development.  In contrast, Weber and Sombart  both  regard the 
need for a concept that reflects the disruption between the two economic orders  as essen-
tial, which led them to the development of the notion of the ‗spirit‘ of Capitalism in their 
works.
382  
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     The third meaning of Capitalism is derived from Marx
383, the most important forerunner 
of Weber and Sombart, with whom most people identify the term and the concept of Capi-
talism. He associates Capitalism with a certain mode of production, which includes that the 
ownership of means of production is concentrated within a certain class of the society, 
which consists of only a small grou p of private owners. In contrast, a pr opertyless work 
force emerges, which through the specific process of production is inseparably bound to 
contract labor. Such created labor-power is free from feudal obligations but also free from 
ownership of means of production.
384 In Marx‘ notion of Capitalism labor itself becomes a 
commodity for which a market has to be created. This was possible through the emergence 
of the ‗double-free‘ class of laborers, the proletarians. For those people the sale of their 
labor power is the only way to make a living, thereby giving the owner of the means of 
production the possibility to exploit them.
385 This means that workers do not get the full 
value of their work but only a fraction, which is defined through wage. The surplus labor is 
appropriated  by  the  ‗capitalists‘.  The  production  of  commodities  becomes  anonymous, 
made for unknown demand and therefore creates ―anarchy of production‖.
386 
     Capitalism for Marx is an epoch in social and economic development, connected to a 
certain period in history.
387 Although Sombart and Weber define this the same way, both 
push ahead in their works, which separates them from Marx  but also  from each other. 
Marx ‗historical materialism‘ is the starting point of Weber‘s thinking and more notably, 
Sombart‘s, who goes beyond that method to create his own type of ―cultural morpholo-
gy‖.
388 He provides a multicausal explanatory model for the origins of the capitalistic spi-
rit.  
     Modern Capitalism has shaped the culture of all the societies in which it emerged, be-
ginning with Europe since the late 18
th century. However, the cultural impacts of Capital-
ism are extremely varied, depending on the institutional preconditions dominant in a coun-
try.
389 Yet, it has some key concepts to it, like the profit motive, human desire and the 
market economy. The capitalist system is one based on private ownershi p and consolida-
tion of the means of production, where the production of commodities is guided by a profit 
motive to satisfy human desires. The standard textbook defines this principle as ―the study 
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of human choice in using scarce resources to satisfy unlimited wants‖.
390 The operations of 
the market economy determine how much is invested, how goods are distributed and in 
general decide about production, pricing of goods and services. Economic growth since the 
industrial revolution has been consistently strong, life expectancy has increased considera-
bly, and child mortality has decreased in every developing region of the world.
391 
     Additionally, one of the most important features of Capitalism is competition. It pr o-
motes progress which also encourages entrepreneurs to use their knowledge and resources 
to accumulate profits. This is complemented by a culture of desire which means that the 
higher the desire of consumers for certain goods, the more can be sold on a market, which 
then expands and  which results in an increase of  profits. Capitalism organizes itself in 
complex decentralized systems without the need of external guidance or planning mechan-
isms. The transactions on free markets serve as price signal and the system regulates itself. 
Private enterprises and ‗free‘ markets are seen as the core of Capitalism, giving the state 
only the role as ‗night watchman‘ that sets the legal framework of the economy and pro-
tects private property.
392 
     In a more recent definition, McNally names the ―three basic elements of capitalism‖ as 
―the drive to amass capital; the emergence of market society; and the bifurcation of secular 
authority‖.
393 The third element means that ―an autonomous, self-directing economic realm 
appears that assures the continued existence and social influence of capital-holders […] 
The power structures of ‗the state‘ and ‗the economy‘ become different realms, each with 
its own logic, yet a need to coexist in the same territory. […] [I]n order to survive and 
thrive, capital must exist in a mixed state of independence from and dependence on state 
power‖.
394 Heilbroner adds that although markets are the main organizing principle and 
exercise competitive pressure via the price mechanism, ―Capitalism is a much larger and 
more complex entity than the market system we use as its equivalent. […] The market sys-
tem is the principal means of binding and coordinating the whole, but markets are not the 
source of capitalism‘s energies or of its distinctive bifurcation of authority‖.
395 Capitalism 
is based on the accumulation of capital and the dynamic of exchanging money for goods 
and vice versa, which is the ―major organizing basis for sociopolitical life‖.
396 Capitalism 
is always seeking new production opportunities to further expand and therefore is not only 
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open for change and progress, but simultaneously demands it in the economic, social and 
political sphere.
397 Another important element of Heilbroner‘s definition of Capitalism is 
the emergence of a ‗capitalist‘ class and their rise ―from a subordinate position within so-
ciety‖ to one with control over strategic resources and social functions which triggers the 
aforementioned bifurcation of authority.
398  
     Other definitions define Capitalism as an amoral process of unlimited accumulation of 
capital by formally peaceful means. The repeated reinvestment of capital into the economic 
system with the aim of drawing profits, combined with wage labor and competition results 
in the dynamic of the capitalist system. The capitalistic system demands at the same time a 
high level of commitment of workers, especially on the managerial level to create a mean-
ing for their lives – a modern form of the spirit of Capitalism. In Boltanski‘s sense of the 
term the ‗spirit of Capitalism‘ is an ideology that justifies the involvement into the capital-
ist system.
399 This involvement includes being part of what Boltanski within his approach 
to Capitalism terms ‗project-based polis‘. For him the model of a hierarchical and inte-
grated large-scale corporation that is so important for Weber‘s view on Capitalism has 
been replaced by a „network metaphor‖.
400 
     Tobias ten Brink distinguishes five structural characteristics of capitalist system, which 
he  differentiates  from  a  capitalist  society  that  also  has  to  include  institutions  such  as 
housework, family and cultural factors. He names the horizontal axis of capitalist competi-
tion which describes the decentralized structure of capitalist markets that guides coopera-
tion and competition between companies that leads to capital accumulation and innovation. 
Next he lists the vertical axis of capitalist social relations, namely the conflict between 
labor and capital over the participation in the processes of decision-making, planning and 
controlling  production,  distribution  and  consumption.  The  third  feature  consists  of  the 
monetary and fiscal relations, the fourth is the role of the state in capitalist systems and the 
interaction between economic and political actors. The fifth dimension of a capitalist sys-
tem is its international and transnational embeddedness.
401   
     As this last point indicates, Capitalism is often described as a global system. Globaliza-
tion has increased the mobility of people and capital since the last quarter of the 20th ce n-
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tury. The growing internationalization of capital and the relocation of operations of large 
corporations to low-wage states especially contributed to the belief that the state is no 
longer able to control economic forces. However, in most modern states, some centralized 
economic planning exists, for example to set interest rates on financial markets, but more 
importantly to protect the workers in regulating the labor market. Those regulations actual-
ly allow the market to operate more efficiently.
402 In implementing those policies, the state 
guarantees a legal framework for doing business and especially protects private property 
rights in securing ownership and transactions, setting ―the economic rule of the game‖.
403 
Thus, governmental intervention can improve market outcomes also in ec onomic crises 
when due to market failures resources are not allocated efficiently. At the same time Capi-
talism has created and maintained the political and economic institutions needed during its 
historical development to function optimally, and more so it ―becomes increasingly capa-
ble of defying, or existing ‗above‘ the state‖.
404 Capitalism is a system that reveals a great 
ability to adapt to different epochs and usurping different cultures and societies.
405 
     However, the relationship between a political system and Capitalism is not restricted to 
democratic orders. In the 20th century, Capitalism also emerged in as diverse political sys-
tems such as liberal democracies, fascist regimes, monarchies, and single-party states, with 
the most recent example of China. Some researchers tried to prove that capitalist develo p-
ment inevitably leads to the emergence of democracy, but authoritarian regimes like China 
have been able to achieve economic growth without making concessions to greater polit i-
cal freedom (for a more detailed discussion please refer to chapter 5 and 8). 
    In this work, it will not be tried to find an unambiguous, ultimate definition of Capita l-
ism, but rather the view of Max Weber and Werner Sombart will be presented, whom have 
the most valuable and useful definition for this purpose. Their view creates an ideal type of 
Capitalism that assumes a certain attitude towards the economy with increasing rationaliza-
tion, bureaucratization and professionalization within a homogenous institutional fram e-
work. In this setting, personal connections do increasingly not play an important role for 
doing business but are replaced by contractual relations. This point of vie w is still a com-
mon argument within mainstream economic literature.  
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4.2. Max Weber’s definition of Capitalism 
“The most trifling actions that affect a man‟s credit are to be re-
garded. The sound of your hammer at five in the morning, or eight at 
night, heard by a creditor, makes him easy six month longer; but if he 
sees you at a billiard-table, or hears your voice at a tavern, when you 
should be at work, he sends for his money the next day; 
demands it, before he can receive it, in a lump”. 
Benjamin Franklin
406 
 
     At the beginning of the 20
th century, Max Weber described the relatively new economic 
system called Capitalism developing then in Europe. He defined Capitalism as ―present 
wherever the industrial provision for the needs of a human group is carried out by the me-
thod of enterprise‖ and ―a rational capitalistic establishment‖ as ―one with capital account-
ing‖. Rational Capitalism has the following institutional characteristics: firstly, a capitalis-
tic enterprise holds profit-making as its sole end; profit is the criterion of its success or 
survival. Secondly, profit is pursued by the ‗capitalistic adventurers‘ by rationality, conti-
nuity, and moral restraint. Also, the labor force is a legally free wage-earning class sepa-
rated from ownership of means of production. This free labor is rationally organized under 
bureaucracy, the most efficient pattern of organizing large numbers of people for perform-
ing common impersonal functions for Weber. And lastly it involves modern technical fea-
tures such as production technology and technical means of exchange and distribution, and 
the price mechanism in competitive markets.
407  
     In his study The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
408 Max Weber analyzes 
the relationship between religion and the economy and its relevance for the emergence of 
Capitalism. For him, although he avoided a conclusion on causality and merely strived to 
analyze the influence of religion on the emergence of a certain economic system, the mod-
ern rational capitalistic spirit of Capitalism relies on the religious assurance of salvation of 
Calvinism and for him described ―the attitude which seeks profit rationally and systemati-
cally‖.
409 This new type of economic order was developed as ―a very different form of Ca-
pitalism which had appeared nowhere else: the rational capitalistic organization of (formal-
ly) free labor‖.
410 Not only is free labor a major characteristic of rational bourgeois Capi-
talism, but it is also necessary to have a ―rational industrial organization, attuned to a regu-
lar market, and neither to political or irrationally speculative opportunities for profit‖. This 
can be accomplished with the aid of rational business book-keeping and the ―rational struc-
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tures of law and of administration‖, which provides a calculable legal system and adminis-
tration in terms of formal rules.
411 Essential for this type of economic system is thus free-
dom of markets with a regulated exchange and rational forms of organiza tions like corpo-
rations that use budgets and capital accounts for their business calculations with the aim of 
profit maximization. 
     Weber defines rationalization
412 as a unique view of the world achieved only by Wes t-
ern civilization. He associates it with the rise of science together with the ―belief that 
sense, perception and reasoning (rather than faith) are the sole or ultimate source of know-
ledge‖.
413 By rationalization of bureaucracy he therefore indicates a process in which a 
firm is reorganized with the aim of profit maximization. This also means the growth of an 
elaborately formed organization. Thus, Weber emphasizes the legal separation of corporate 
from personal property and the invention of rational book-keeping as distinctive patterns 
that made Western Capitalism unique. These characteristics are ―indispensable requisites 
for […] independence‖, which other parts of the world like the Far East, the Near East and 
in Antiquity lacked.
414 He uses rational as opposed to irrational Capitalism in the sense of a 
Capitalism that develops the methods and the increased quantity of production and can 
therefore also be called productive. Irrational Cap italism in contrast would not enhance 
technical progress or growth and thus is 'parasitic'.
415  
     Capitalism is therefore defined as a function of a certain spirit, described by a systemat-
ic combination of characteristics, creating the modern, rational Capitalism.  Max Weber‘s 
works were not only concerned with the evolution of Capitalism, they were also, and this is 
probably what stands out, involved with what this spirit of Capitalism is, what the conse-
quences of this for people are and how they could lead their lives within this economic 
system. He very vividly describes the spirit of Capitalism as having irretrievable conse-
quences which changes the lifestyle of people fundamentally. Max Weber also assumed 
that it is the nature - or spirit - of modern Capitalism to impose a unique institutional struc-
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ture on the existing traditional society to develop, with obsolescent cultural idiosyncrasies 
being replaced. Capitalism had constituted a completely new epoch, breaking with the old 
economic order and challenging the existing institutions. Constructing a severe disruption 
between the traditional economy and modern rational capitalism lends Max Weber‘s ar-
guments plausibility. It also separates him from the stages theories of the Historical School 
that interpreted development more in an evolutionary manner. For Weber, modernity and 
hence, Capitalism, is defined by inescapable and ongoing conflicts; an interpretation he 
shares with Sombart. Both also agree on the impression that Capitalism develops a dynam-
ic which becomes impossible to stop once it started; competition is the fuel that keeps this 
‗machine‘ going.
  Sombart calls this the ―esbat‖ of Capitalism.
416 Price becomes the means 
of struggle in markets to the e nd of economic surviving.  This ―struggle for gain is in a 
‗continuous, rationally conducted capitalistic enterprise‖.
417 Weber stated about the ration-
al economy: ―It is oriented on money prices, found in a fight of interests among men in the 
market. Without estimation in money prices, that is, without any fight, there is no possibili-
ty for calculation given. Money is the most abstract and 'impersonal' concept in the exis-
tence of men‖.
418 Capitalism is accompanied by an enormous increase in production of 
goods but this is not connected with rising social harmony or distributive justice.
419  
     This shows that an even more important prerequisite is a cultural factor that is man i-
fested in both economic ethos and a special business ethic for both entrepreneur and e m-
ployer. This results in a causal relation between the ―spirit of Capitalism‖ and the protes-
tant ethic. The economic spirit is the prerequisite, not the result of Capitalism. A state of 
mind had been developed that fitted perfectly to the functional characteristics of the capita-
listic economy.
420 Thus, a certain form of organization is not enough to create the nece s-
sary attitudes for Capitalism which is therefore not merely a reflection of its material el e-
ments.
421 In opposition to Marx‘ historical materialism Weber stresses the importance of 
―ideas and ideals, which instead of always being reflections of materialistic conditions can 
be independent, voluntaristic forces in initiating socio-economic change‖.
422  
     Therefore, not only is the notion of free labor essential for the Weberian type of Capi-
talism, but institutional preconditions also play an important role, especially the spatial 
separation of business from the household, therefore also the separation of corporate from 
                                                 
416 See Köster and Plumpe, 2007, p. 3ff., 10, 18f., Sombart, 1987 [1908-1927], Vol. III,2  p. 1010. 
417 Parsons, 1928, p. 36. 
418 Weber, 1963 [1924], p. 544: „Zwischenbetrachtung―, my own translation. 
419 Köster and Plumpe, 2007, p. 8. 
420 Weber, 1976 [1930], p. 91ff. 
421 Parsons, 1967 [1937], p. 516f. 
422 Weber, 1968, p. xv.  86 
 
personal property.
423 But not only physical institutions are separated, destructing formerly 
holistic units into fractions; Capitalism also separates people from their homes. In 19
th cen-
tury Germany, family structures were still built so as to fit in the feudal structures of me-
dieval Europe. Without going into details of the historical development, in the end the tra-
ditional  self-sustainable  household  was  not  able  to  counter  Capitalism  and  the  long-
established institutions withered away (see also chapter 5.2). In this process, the unity of 
house and business was lost, which for Weber was a mandatory prerequisite for successful 
capitalistic  production.  The  ―iron  cage‖  of  modern  Capitalism  makes  people  feel  that 
through the forced artificial conditions of separation of private sphere and working life also 
their body and soul are separated.
424 For Weber, Capitalism changed the lifestyle of people 
fundamentally once it emerged; he  portrays it as separation of formerly unified units and 
institutions, breaking with the old economic order and challenging existing traditional i n-
stitutions. Free labor thus also means social inequality, which forces people to work in fac-
tories only able to sell their labor power. Not pride or pleasure in the quality one is able to 
produce motivated to work hard but piece-work wages and the fear of dismissal. Capital-
ism has ―through the subordination of the process of production to scientific point of view, 
relieved it from its dependence upon the natural organic limitations of the human individu-
al‖.
425 
     Individuals had to be turned into ‗fictitious commodities‘
426 who found themselves in 
an inescapable ‗iron cage‘, traded on (labor) markets for sale to entrepreneurs and became 
a class of propertyless workers that was forced to sell its labor power, not being able to 
escape that "iron cage".
427 The traditional family division of labor was put under pressure 
because production and retail sale were disconnected in time and space by the intervention 
of an entrepreneur who advanced money for production with the object of subsequent sale 
at a profit.
428  
     After migrating to the cities, the significance of the household in providing shelter and 
guidance vanished. In the traditional economic, the  pater familias had sole responsibility 
for business, organizing the work within the household.
429 With the emergence of Capital-
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ism, the head of the household lost his main function, to protect and to organize the work 
within the family household. He also lost his power over family members who were not 
bound to the strict hierarchy anymore.
430  
     This type of Capitalism not only needs a ce rtain attitude, but is also considered as an 
age of separation, by which not merely separating the pre -modern traditional economy 
from the modern, capitalistic one is meant, but also the separations taking place in people‘s 
private lives. To achieve this, Capitalism needs to destroy and override all traditional so-
cio-cultural structures of society to prosper. Weber‘s concern was mainly with the cultural 
significance of Capitalism which had constituted a completely new epoch of evolution in 
economy and society, breaking with the old economic order and challenging the existing 
institutions. In that sense it artificially constructed the notion of a traditional economy se-
parated from the emerging modern, capitalistic economy, which as the main characteristic 
exposes the accumulation of wealth that goes far beyond the former pure satisfaction of 
needs.
431 
     Related to the aim of money acquisition is that gain is sought without limits such as the 
needs of a standard of living or any other notion of traditional contentment. Hard work is 
considered a duty and a moral obligation that requ ires discipline and control. It is ―syste-
matic, continuous rational honest work in the service of economic acquisition‖. Although 
in former economies greed and ―the universal reign of absolute unscrupulousness in the 
pursuit of selfish interests by the making of money‖ existed, they were driven by an ―un-
controlled impulse‖ of ―ruthless acquisition‖ which lacked the discipline and rationality of 
bourgeois Capitalism.
432 This separates the modern human from the traditional which – at 
least in the philosophical thinking of the time - ―contrary to the ethical feelings of whole 
epochs‖
433 - did not strive to earn more and more money but were content in the Aristote-
lian sense to lead a ‗good life‘. This Weber refers to as ―backward‖; Calvinism gave people 
the means to ‗overcome traditionalism‘ and expose ‗a cool self-control and frugality which 
enormously increase performance‖.
434 ―The sole purpose of his life-work, to sink into the 
grave weighted down with a great material load of money and goods‖ and the difference 
between the ―hand-to-mouth existence of the peasant‖, the ―privileged traditionalism of the 
guild  craftsman  and  of  the  adventurer‘s  Capitalism‖  can  only  be  understood  from  the 
viewpoint of Calvinism and its role for the development of rationalism and hence capitalis-
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tic economy.
435 Nearly the same description of capitalistic characteristics can be found in 
Sombart, as described in chapter 4.3., but Weber adds religion as the main cause for that 
development. Thus, a certain spirit is the prerequisite not the result of Capitalism.  
     Weber chose Calvinism for that purpose because it especially represents the asceticism 
that shows the closest affinity to the spirit of Capitalism. It rests on predetermination which 
committed the believer to an active, ascetic, this-worldly life with work being a sign of true 
faith and self-confidence that oneself was among God‘s chosen. ―Labor must […] be per-
formed as if it were an absolute end in itself, a calling‖.
436 This also cultivated an imper-
sonal attitude toward the duties of an office and fostered the individualism necessary to 
rationally organize labor in a competitive world. Through the notion of predestination Cal-
vinism also created an ―inner isolation of the individual‖.
437 This derives from the fact that 
no worldly agency exists between the individual and God as would be the case in Catholic-
ism. For Calvinists, other humans might only endanger the election by God, therefore indi-
viduals need to separate themselves from their fellows to ensure their own election.
438 Fur-
thermore, although the election by God is predetermined before one is even born and the 
‗outcome‘ cannot be changed ‗ex post‘, Calvinists still work hard, as success in life and 
work means that one belongs to the chosen ones. It is a mechanism to overcome this uncer-
tainty. Thus, rationality is not only restricted to the economic realm but also has an effect 
on how people lead their life in general.
439 
     Max Weber believed that Capitalism will always and inevitably lead to a rising bureau-
cratization and rationalization and thus mass production, which does not leave space for 
outdated socio-cultural structures like small family-owned businesses: ―The modern capi-
talist enterprise rests primarily on calculation and presupposes a legal and administrative 
system, whose functioning can be rationally predicted, at least in principle, by virtue of its 
fixed general norms…The modern enterprise finds incompatible the theocratic or patri-
monial governments…whose administrations operated according to their own discretion 
and, for the rest, according to inviolably sacred but irrational traditions…The specific fea-
tures of modern capitalism, in contrast to these ancient forms of capitalist acquisition, no-
where developed in such irrationally constructed states….‖.
440 Max Weber assumed that it 
is the nature of modern Capitalism to impose a unique institutional structure on the existing 
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traditional society to develop, with obsolescent cultural idiosyncrasies being replaced. A 
market economy arose where instead of an economic life embedded into society, social 
institutions served as mere accessories to the economic system. The economy became an 
autonomous system which was dominated by a rational spirit based on efficiency and prof-
itability and at least similar institutions no matter where it arose.
441 For this, personal rela-
tionships had to become less important and had to be replaced by contractual relations. 
Enterprises grew in size and were put under efficient rational management and thus b e-
come increasingly independent of specific individuals. I mpersonal bureaucratic authority 
replaced the traditional, personal authority. Additionally, "administrative staff  should be 
completely separated from ownership of the means of production or administration".
442 In 
this view, social institutions serve as mere accessories to the economic system instead of 
the economy being embedded into society. The economy becomes an autonomous system 
which is dominated by a rational spirit based on efficiency and profitability.  When enter-
prises grow in size and are put under efficient rational management, they become incre a-
singly independent of specific individuals. Impersonal bureaucratic authority replaces the 
traditional, personal authority. As mentioned before, the growing bureaucratiz ation of the 
enterprises with the sole aim of profit maximization not only had separated the sphere of 
business from the sphere of the household, but also corporate from personal property. The 
character of the entrepreneur increasingly became unimportant for the success of a firm 
and the maximization of profit does not depend on the personality and connections  of one 
specific individual. In contrast, it was organized in a way to be maximally independent of a 
certain individual. Therefore, the development of capitalistic societies is connected with 
increasing rationalization, bureaucratization and professionalization; personal connections 
and the family do increasingly not play an important role for doing business but are r e-
placed by contractual relations.  In addition to the increasing integration of enterprises in 
relation to rising bureaucratization Weber also analyzed the development of the so-called 
middle classes that serve as buffer between working and upper class and who derive their 
position also from their authority with this bureaucratic system in the economic and pol i-
tics (see also chapter 7). However, he emphasizes the significance of the entrepreneur for 
capitalist production and in this precedes the famous work of Schumpeter and by the n o-
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tion of a charismatic leader of a bureaucratic corporation he furthermore precedes the the-
sis of the ‗managerial revolution‘.
443  
     As has previously been said, the rational characteristics of state and economy in a capi-
talistic society are associated with a whole set of values that constitute Weber‘s ‗spirit of 
Capitalism‘. Most importantly, money acquisition is now treated as an end, rather than a 
means and is not seen as evil any more, although the entrepreneur is still careful of the 
―ethical limitations‖ given by religion. Those constraints given by religion seized over time 
in a matured Capitalism, and with ―the dying out of the religious root, the utilitarian inter-
pretation crept in unnoticed‖ - but the point for Weber is rationality as the major force 
people follow and that keeps things ‗orderly‘.
444 As he says ―the Puritans wanted to work 
in a calling; we are forced to do so‖, finding ourselves inside the ―iron cage‖.
445 Weber‘s 
image of the ‗iron cage‘ is at the same time prison and home. Within, it is possible to con-
struct personal relations, but at the price of giving up individuality and freedom.
446 
      In conclusion, the system of modern Capitalism in Weber's sense is constituted in a 
process of rationalization under the conditions described above. The autonomous and a c-
tively-participating citizen of occidental cities is the main agent of the process, support ed 
by the instructions and value-system of Calvinism. Weber's system of modern Capitalism 
is constituted in a process of rationalization, which needed to overcome the traditional fam-
ily-based institutions to create an economic order that could be based on propertyless wage 
labor and thus, be successful. Weber‘s Capitalism is designed as an ideal-type that does not 
exclude the existence of a real type, hence, differently developed forms of Capitalism. The 
ideal-type contains characteristics that need not exist in reality in their pure form and is 
thus a utopia.
447 However, for Weber the notion of rising rationalization and bureaucratiza-
tion in combination with growing enterprises, which through the professionalization of the 
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entrepreneur also becomes increasingly independent of certain individuals are necessarily 
connected to Capitalism. 
 
4.3. Werner Sombart’s approach to “Modern Capitalism” 
     Werner Sombart (1863-1941) is one of the most famous members of the Youngest His-
torical School. In line with the research program of this school (see above), which com-
bines an historical and a theoretical approach, he analyzes the phenomenon of modern Ca-
pitalism, particularly the reasons for its emergence. He ―claims to have made the first 
scientific approach ever to the concept of ‗capitalism‘‖.
448 In doing so, he goes beyond the 
theoretical horizon of the stages theory of the German Historical School because he uses 
more than one criterion to characterize an economic epoch.
449 In trying to systemize eco-
nomic life and defining economic systems, he ―targets the phenomenological description of 
a formal connection brought about by a unity of inner orientation‖, but is actually ―talking 
about what was later to be called economic style‖.
450  
     Instead of the notion of stages, he uses the term economic system, which for Sombart is 
defined as a meaningful portrayal of an economy, which basic principles reveal a specific 
form.
451  Sombart wants to identify the basic  structure  of an economy and construct a 
theory within an economic system to understand the meaning of economic activity.
452 An 
economic system for him is a ―particular organization of economic life within which a par-
ticular mental attitude predominates and a particular technique is applied‖,
453 and thus ―a 
number of spiritual and material, natural and artificial circumstances‖.
454 It is not a me-
chanism assembled from individual components.
455 Each economic system is connected 
with a certain epoch in history and its material definition has to include three aspects: a 
certain form of organization based on private initiative and exchange, sophisticated tec h-
nology, and a mental attitude or spirit. E ssential to this thought is the rational capitalistic 
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entrepreneur, state intervention and bureaucratization.
456 This especially in the ‗last phase‘ 
of Capitalism points to a socialist, planned economy.  
     With the coinage of the phrase ‗Capitalism‘ modeled after the ideas of Marx, he catego-
rizes the development since the medieval times.
457 He uses a dichotomic approach within 
the three main components attitude, organization and technology to characterize a specific 
economic system and the separation of traditional from modern economies. He contrasts 
the  ―satisfaction  of  needs‖  (Bedarfsdeckung)  with  the  ―principle  of  acquisition‖  (Er-
werbsprinzip), traditionalism with rationalism and solidarity with individualism to describe 
the  economic  mentality  and  continues  with  similar  dichotomies  for  the  other  two  ele-
ments.
458 
     In his work Modern Capitalism
459 Sombart follows the trace of Karl Marx, who ―only 
occasionally specified one or two elements of this concept‖.
460 Like him, Sombart eva-
luates Capitalism as an inexorable, even instinctive historical process motivated by capital 
utilization.
461 He writes Modern Capitalism with the aim to present a ―systematic, genetic 
treatment of the development of European and American economic life as a whole‖.
462 
Sombart characterizes Capitalism as defined by the principle of acquisition, individuality 
and competition and governed by economic rationality. This includes the freedom of trade, 
private property and organization of the economy by the private sector as well as an aristo-
cratic  structure  of  society.
463  It is an exchange economy with two different classes of 
people: those who own the means of production and the ―unprosperous only-workers‖. The 
first, the entrepreneurs, are also responsible for the management and are therefore econom-
ic subjects, whereas the latter are only economic objects. Both groups are interconnected 
by the market and motivated by the principle of profit-seeking and economic rationaliza-
tion‖.
464  
     Sombart also tries to both historically and theoretically define the essence of Capital-
ism, which for him can be found in his creation of the term ―spirit‖ (Geist) that also in-
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spired Max Weber when writing his Protestant Ethic. This attitude towards the economy, 
an ―economic mentality‖, is found in the moral concepts and setting of goals of economic 
actors.
465 Sombart wants to understand the historical development that led to the creation 
of the capitalistic economy, because ―Capitalism has to be there first before there are capi-
talist motives. And I can only understand these if I know what Capitalism is‖.
466 This is in 
contrast to Weber who assumes that the spirit of the entrepreneur is the prerequisite for 
Capitalism, not its result.
467 
     Thus, the spirit of an epoch is a unique phenomenon of this particular period of time. 
Sombart believes that ―at different times different economic attitudes have always reigned, 
and that it is this spirit which has created the suitable form for itself and thereby an eco-
nomic organization‖, which for him is the fundamental idea of his work.
468 Sombart‘s spi-
rit is therefore a mixture of an adventurous entrepreneur and a rational bourgeois. The first 
can either be a conqueror, inventor, explorer, organizer or merchant. Only when this dy-
namic entrepreneurial spirit is combined with a morally upright bourgeois spirit that guar-
antees a well-ordered, rational management modern Capitalism can develop.
469 The organ-
ization of capitalistic production needs the help of certain techniques of which Sombart 
describes double-entry book-keeping as the most important symbol. This method separates 
capital stock and the managing person and so enables production to become abstract and 
thus unlimited.
470 The virtues of tenacity and perseverance needed to be merged with busi-
ness ethics and accountability to be able to create a rational, well-planned management.  
     This means that the origin of Capitalism for Sombart lies in the human mind and the 
creation of conditions suitable to generate the institutional environment of a modern ma r-
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ket economy.
471 ―Out of the bottom of the European soul Capitalism arose…It is the spirit 
which since the middle ages tears men away from the quiet, organically grown love and 
community relationships and forces them onto the way of restless selfishness and self-
determination‖.
472 
     Sombart  believes  that  the  notion  of  Capitalism  always  existed,  but  that  in  pre-
capitalistic times the ―living man‖ was the most important element and production was 
only for the purpose of satisfaction of human needs.
473 Those needs were limited and fixed. 
The capitalist ―rooted up‖ this ―natural man‖ and ―turn(ed) topsy-turvy all the values of 
life‖, who now regarded the accumulation of capital as major incentive to engage in eco-
nomic life.
474  
     The rationality of Capitalism becomes the most important issue, subordinating ever y-
thing in life to this end with the unlimited multiplication of wealth connected with sober 
and precise calculations, orderliness and expediency.
475 As already indicated above, Som-
bart therefore distinguishes between ―satisfaction of needs‖ and the ―principle of acquisi-
tion‖
476, where the aim of the first case is the ―attainment of the goods necessary to meet 
personal needs‖ in a traditional economy, the ―latter a struggle for profit free from the lim-
its set by needs‖, therefore merely the acquisition of money.
477 The economy of satisfac-
tion of needs is built upon craftsmen working in a static, feudal system which is always in 
equilibrium. The economy based on the principle of acquisition of money is characterized 
by unlimited material pursuit.
478 The greed for money he defines as the objective aim of a 
capitalistic economy, which may not need to coincide with the subjective goal of individu-
als.
479  
     Similarly, Werner Sombart described the change of attitude towards the conduct of 
business during the process of industrialization. Related to this, the tendency towards juri-
dification complemented the rationality of capitalism in replacing personal connections by 
contractual relations quite early during the process of industrialization.
480 On the one hand 
this involved an increase of personal freedom; on the other hand it made relations less per-
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sonal and took away the security of traditional social formations.
481 In the beginning of 
industrialization a good citizen had to show a certain morally defined behavior towards the 
outside world, including the behavior in doing business, whereas in a mature capitalistic 
system the sphere of private life and business  were separated. This included the image of 
the ‗good citizen‘ that had to show a certain morally defined behavior towards the outside 
world in the beginning of industrialization, including the behavior in doing business. Som-
bart  describes  this  notion  was  overcome  in  the  matured  capitalistic  system,  when  the 
spheres of private life and business were conceived as and actually were separated. Tradi-
tionally, only a morally sound lifestyle could lead to success in doing business in creating 
trust in the persona of the entrepreneur. Only a person who overall exhibits moral behavior 
was regarded as trustworthy in a business context.
482 This is complemented by the estab-
lishment of transaction with the help of contracts and by the juridification of hitherto u n-
official norms and thus the emergence of the state as regulative authority. The West has a  
long tradition of contracts, originating from Roman law, which regulates the relationships 
between individuals (ius est ad alios).
483  
     Thus, the behavior in private and in business was separated. This created a specific set 
of manners for entrepreneurs, which have often been described as necessary for the devel-
opment of a mature Western capitalistic system. In this environment, it is not the character 
or the individual personality of an entrepreneur that is important for doing business, but 
merely his actions in the process of business transactions. The private life of businessmen 
is not of interest anymore; it is regarded as totally detached from the actions conducted in 
the role as entrepreneur and underlies different rules.
484 The success and the reputation of a 
firm do not depend on the personality and connections of one specific individual but on the 
quality of its products.
485 This means that ―business relations in the West are more technic-
al and company orientated with early recognition of the possible need for contractual for-
mality.‖
486 
     Additionally, the increase in productivity of labor relieves economic life ―from its de-
pendence upon the natural organic limitations of the human individual‖.
487 Economic ac-
tivity in a modern, capitalist surrounding is characterized by rationality and orderliness, 
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separating it thus from the traditional feudal economy. Its major rationale is the need for 
capital to be utilized in a competitive environment created through a market, in a competi-
tion that can be called a fight with only formally peaceful means. Capitalism has also de-
veloped individualism in the sense that entrepreneurs compete with each other, seeking 
advances for themselves.
488 This is also true for the propertyless workers, who however 
also express solidarity in creating a group of people they belong to and feel responsible for. 
Thus, the spirit of Capitalism is either shaped by the traditional satisfaction of needs or by 
the rational-effective principle of acquisition; hence the behavior of economic actors is 
either individual or communal.
489 
     The necessity to grow is another major condition for the success of a corporation in a 
capitalist system. Sombart regards the level of profits as the sole sensible objective of a 
capitalistic enterprise.
490 For that, specific business principles are necessary that lead to an 
absolute rationality that helps to extinct the ―old bonds of tradition and morality that held 
capitalism in check in its earliest stages‖.
491 The organization and growing bureaucratiza-
tion of a profit-maximizing firm requires the separation of the sphere of business from that 
of the household, therefore also corporate from personal property.
492 To achieve this kind 
of independence from ethic considerations the idea of ‗reckless acquisition‘ has to be es-
tablished. This puts the value of acquisition above moral and aesthetic values which are not 
considered as relevant any more. In contrast, doing business becomes unscrupulous in the 
choice of its means and completely detached from any moral considerations.
493  
     Moreover, Sombart argues that the emergence of Capitalism has caused extreme cultur-
al changes, and thus he seems to express a certain sadness about a lost era.
494 He affirms 
the need for Capitalism even in the knowledge of its costs. As a consequence, the trad i-
tional way of living in a static equilibrium would disappear and be replaced by the solitude 
and ―asphalt culture‖
495 of urban life.
496 Science and technology, in his opinion soulless, 
lead to a process of depersonalization. Capitalism ―took the inner quiet‖ of feudalism and 
―alienated from nature‖ and thus created a proletariat that instead is bound to the entrepre-
neur in a slave-like relationship of dependence.
497 
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     Sombart divides Capitalism into three phases: Early, High and Late Capitalism.
498 The 
latter two are differentiated from the earlier version by a new structure of enterprise ma n-
agement. This transition to High and also Late Capitalism was not immanent to the nature 
of Capitalism. Science and technology broke through the boundary of living nature in us-
ing inorganic substances for the first time.
499 A worldly spirit emerged ―out of the Euro-
pean soul‖ destroyed ―old formations of nature (alte Naturgebilde), bondages and barriers‖ 
and reconstructed new ways of life in artificial functional forms (künstliche Zweckgebilde). 
It forced people ―to the track of restless selfishness and self-determination‖.
500 
     Sombart‘s analysis dissects the capitalistic structures in all existing institutions showing 
the whole margin of Capitalism from a historical perspective. Capitalism develops from its 
early stage where capital and manpower were the driving forces in a market environment 
of demand and supply. In a second stage the system rationalized and objectified. With ob-
jectification, Sombart does not mean a motivation that gives the essential impulses to de-
velop a capitalistic economic. He rather means that there is an independent machinery of 
modern life which produces a competitive pressure. If an entrepreneur does not obey, the 
mechanism of this rational system he will be eliminated. He will also lose all sense for 
non-business matters like art, nature or family and will ―live his business‖.
501 
     Finally, in the third and last phase of Capitalism, rationalization turns into spiritualiza-
tion. Rationality is for Sombart a process including all economic activities, which through 
scientification, planning and risk aversion controls the economy. In this final stage, the 
competitive capitalistic economy tries to stabilize the business cycle, having lost all ‗ad-
venturous‘ features. The entrepreneur becomes fully rational and exchanges the entrepre-
neurial talent through learnable skills.
502 The entrepreneur is confined to his corporation, 
having only a few degrees of freedom left. The space for speculation is minimized due to 
cartelizing and organized workers, so the freedom of the high time of Capitalism fades in 
favor of a more bound, reasonable late capitalistic economic order.
503 
     In sum, the three components of spirit, technology and order define which economic 
system an epoch constitutes. The spirit is thus a means to define economic phenomena in 
accordance with other theoretical elements of an economic system. It is not only an ethos 
of individual entrepreneurs but also becomes on objective principle. In Sombart‘s notion, it 
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is thus not a psychological but more a sociological precept and in this sense a guideline for 
economic activities.
 504 
 
4.4. Confucian Capitalism? 
“There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; 
when the father is father, and the son is son”.  
Analects XII, 11 
4.4.1. A brief summary of the main principles of Confucianism 
     Confucianism is not a religion, but rather a very complex social philosophy and ethical 
doctrine including moral, social, political and philosophical thoughts.
505 It is a this-worldly 
philosophical construct that stresses the importance of idealism and humanism, hence, per-
sonal relationships.  It emphasizes ―the ideal of a society in which ‗right principles pre-
vail‘‖.
506 It is not oriented towards a transcendent, divine entity or towards the idea of faith 
connected to an afterlife as Christianity is. It is instead built upon a practical rationality-
based activity-orientation which seeks the mastery of life in the here and now.
507 Ritual 
propriety in terms of graded degrees of kinship distance and levels of obligations are em-
phasized, as for example with the concept of Rénqíng (see chapter 6.1.2.). The concept of 
Confucian values like trustfulness, sincerity, loyalty and humaneness are today also used to 
link Confucianism to economic behavior favorable for development and the standing of 
Chinese business managers.
508  
     Confucianism was developed from the teachings of the Chinese philosopher Confucius 
(ca. 551–479 BC, Kǒng Fūzǐ (the latter part of name being a respectful form of address, 
meaning old master). The name originates from the Latin translation of Jesuits in China; 
the term itself exists in China only since the beginning of the 20
th century).
509 The most 
important source for Confucianism are the Confucian Analects (Lún Yǔ, 论语) and The Book 
of Rites (Lǐjì, 礼) which is one of the so-called Five Classics of the Confucian canon.
510 It is 
believed that it also goes back to Confucius himself.
511  
     Confucianism had an enormous impact on the structure of state and society. Traditional-
ly being an agrarian state, China was based on the self-sufficient family household (jiā, 家). 
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As will be demonstrated in chapter 5 in more depth, the family served as shelter and insur-
ance against disaster and was thus the fundament of society. A main component of Confu-
cianism is the notion of self-cultivation and moral perfection and to obey the main moral 
values of rén and lǐ, emphasizing humanity and honesty with the goal of social harmony. 
The three main elements of Confucianism are: rén (仁- humanity, goodwill), lǐ (礼- rituals, 
in the sense of moral order, ethics; in Chinese ―violating ritual‖ means ―having no decen-
cy‖) and yi (義, righteousness). Ritual, which also means the behavior in everyday life, and 
filial piety (xiao - 孝) are the rules of interaction, including the notion of reciprocity, as part 
of rén. Rén is not meant for individuals but can only be practiced between a minimum of 
two people and can only be reached through virtuous acts.
512 Thus, Confucian culture is 
build upon harmony, consent and sta bility. In addition to the three main principles, the 
Confucian virtues of loyalty, brotherhood and trust are seen as the cultural roots of Gua n-
xi.
513 For the sake of the whole, the individual has to stand back. The individual is embed-
ded into a network of personal connections. More than that, they are part of a social struc-
ture, which views individuals not ―as apart from their social positions‖.
514 The position 
within the family defines the personal identity and thus the Chinese society is not based on 
discreet individuals but defined by interpersonal relationships.
515 Thus, the social catego-
ries of ‗man‘ and ‗woman‘ are meaningless outside familial relationships. The main rela-
tionships (each connected with an appropriate tenor) for Confucianism are those of i (righ-
teousness) between master and servant (or ruler and subject), ch‟eng (affection) between 
father and son, pieh (distinction) between husband and wife, hsu (order) between old and 
young and hsin (sincerity) between friends.
516 The most important relation is between fa-
ther and son and thus filial piety is considered as the virtue that matters the most. Children 
owe their parents absolute obedience, even when they are already grown up. This also 
means that they have to care for their parents once they are old; individualism is not su p-
ported.
517 The emphasis on learning (学, xué) is closely related to that issue.
518 Thus, eve-
rybody has his or her natural role to fulfill within society, with certain duties and norms to 
obey. Both society and personal relationships are structured as vertical hierarchies, being a 
culture of status.
519 Interpersonal relationships therefore get rationalized, coincidence and 
                                                 
512 Weggel, 1996, p. 21. Rén is also an important concept of Guanxi, see chapter 6. 
513 Yang, 1994, p. 71. 
514 Gold; Guthrie and Wank, 2008a, p. 5. 
515 Gold; Guthrie and Wank, 2008a, p. 6. 
516 Lo and Otis, 2003, p. 136. 
517 Fukuyama, 1995, p. 94f. 
518 Paul, 1990, p. 69. 
519 Pohl, 2002, p. 115f. 100 
 
spontaneity are eliminated. Hierarchy is legitimated through mutual debts, if one side of 
the relationship acts according to the given norms, the other part will act accordingly. 
Those laws are unwritten, but follow the norm of modesty and morality. The vertical struc-
ture of society is not questioned and individual rights are barely of importance. The notion 
of law is not received as strict categorical norms, adjudicating rights to individuals, but 
always depending on interpersonal relationships, thus revealing a more particularistic cul-
ture.
520 This is not only true among individuals but also for state leadership which is su p-
posed to rule humanly and justly. The ruled owe their leader loyalty. The relationship b e-
tween ruler and ruled is also part of the five bonds mentioned above. Filial piety also in-
cludes certain duties, also towards the ancestors and characterizes not only the relations to 
parents but all relationships mentioned before. Relationships and mutuality are thus central 
to Confucianism and every individual is supposed to know its place within the hierarchical 
order and accordingly ―treat each other differently depending on family background, place 
of origin, shared experiences, educational affiliation…with the nature of these affiliations 
determining the treatment received‖.
521  
 
4.4.2. Max Weber‘s assessment of the relation between Confucianism and Capitalism 
     In his studies on Confucianism and Taoism, published in the first volume of the Col-
lected Essays in the Sociology of Religion, named Religion of China in the English transla-
tion, Weber again attempts to prove the causal relation of Protestantism and Capitalism. 
Whereas in The Protestant Ethic he argues that rationalization is the result of the 'spirit of 
Capitalism' derived from Calvinism, in The Religion of China he distinguishes that from 
the rationalization found in China which did not lead to the emergence of rational bour-
geois Capitalism in the 19
th century. He compares Confucianism with Calvinism to high-
light the uniqueness of development in Western cultures in the 19
th century and its diffe-
rentiation, for that matter, of any other great civilization of the world.
522 
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    He tries to show why anything like rational bourgeois Capitalism fails to appear in any 
of the other great civilizations of the world. But instead of really doing a comparative study 
of the different ethics of other religions and ascetic Protestantism to analyze the relevance 
to the spirit of Capitalism, many authors criticize his work because it is rather meant as a 
substantiation of his thesis in the Protestant Ethic.
523 He is stating that the ideals of a cer-
tain religion support the arising of Capitalism. He analyzes Confucianism to demonstrate 
that ―China‘s failure to develop rational bourgeois Capitalism owed mainly to the absence 
of a particular kind of religious ethic as the needed motivating force‖.
524  
     That is probably due to the fact that China did not exhibit typical features of Capitalism 
such as rationalization, mechanization and growing urbanization. Max Weber scrutinizes 
the Chinese culture to see which aspects inhibited the development of rational Capitalism. 
He first takes the monetary system and the cities into account, choosing these areas be-
cause they show the closest affinity to analogue factors in the West that did lead to rational 
Capitalism. Additionally, he also compares the type of agriculture in both regions.  
     In China, this involved large scale works of irrigation and flood control. It was managed 
by a central authority, and once established did not need to ―transform this mode of susten-
ance‖ and thus the system remained stable.
525 Money is an important instrument of eco-
nomic exchange, facilitating the acquisition and accumulation of wealth, and determining 
profits and losses in business operations. Weber also claims China historically failed to 
establish an effective monetary system conducted by the state which was an obstacle to the 
development of capitalistic structures.
526 Also, the occidental city with its bourgeois inha-
bitants as birthplace of Western Capitalism was missing in China.
527 Weber explains that 
with the following reasoning: ―The Chinese city god was merely a local protective deity, 
not the god of the community: usually he was a canonized urban mandarin‖.
528 Thus, Chi-
na's cities, due to their lack of military and political autonomy could not guarantee the l e-
gal and financial grounds necessary for capitalistic businesses.
529 Weber justifies his argu-
                                                                                                                                                    
gions. Please refer to Sieferle, 2003 and for a general overview: Pomeranz, 2000, presenting the California 
School, and Huang, 1990 for the more recent and Elvin, 1984 as well as Elvin, 1996 for the earlier debate. 
Lin, 1995 is representative for a more technological explanation. More general on Chinese economic history: 
Deng, 1999 and Arrighi, 2007. 
523 Hamilton, 1984, p. 400f. and Parsons, 1967 [1937], p. 530 and 539f. 
524 Weber, 1968, Introduction, p. xiv. 
525 Mayes, 1977, p. 163 and Li, 1998, p. 1-15, 157-180. 
526 For a more differentiated – and accurate - picture, see Vogel, 1986, Wang, 1992. As a sidenote: In We-
ber‘s critical review on Chinese towns, he overlooked the fact that these were indeed run by merchants, dis-
guised as scholar officials. Faure, 2006, p. 20. 
527 For a detailed discussion on the relation of bourgeoisie and Capitalism, please refer to chapter 8.1. 
528 Weber and Andreski, 2006, p. 60.  
529 See for a comparison Skinner, 1977. 102 
 
ments with the fact that China was unified very early (around 200 B.C.) which was fol-
lowed by a centralized administration under a national bureaucracy. Although the flow of 
goods was fostered by political peace, this situation at the same time prohibited competi-
tion between feudal states like in Europe. Thus, without the pressure of competition and 
rivalry there was not much stimulation for capitalistic enterprises.
530 
     The central bureaucracy was conducted by Mandarins, a class of civil servants, who 
were primarily recruited from the literati. Access to this status was not given by birth but 
was the result of the passing of examinations, which not only required the mastery of Chi-
nese writing and literature but also knowing the Confucian principles by heart. Although 
this procedure of qualifying objectified the process, due to the limited amount of positions 
the selection of candidates could still be influenced through personal connections.
531 Addi-
tionally, in contrast to rational bureaucracy the efficiency of this system was reduced b e-
cause Confucianism did not see specialization as suitable for an educated man.
532 This is 
related to the fact that Chinese families instead of investing in rational enterprises deemed 
it more worthwhile to invest in their own family member's educati on, so they could be-
come educated and later on probably a Mandarin. This would result in various advantages 
for the family once the member was part of the administration. It also meant that the exten-
sive kinship organization did not support the development of independence and individual-
ism, another social prerequisite to becoming a successful entrepreneur.  
     In addition, Weber compares his view on Confucian and puritan rationalism, both de-
signing a lifestyle according to their respective religious requi rements, both in principal 
consistent with accumulation of wealth for him.
533 He claims that Confucianism as the do-
minant value system in China is serving as life orientation especially for the class of litera-
ti. It leads to a this-worldly orientation, having no metaphysical, transcendental foundation. 
It is based on traditionalism instead of change and innovation, hence also celebrating tradi-
tional conservative education and literature and accepting the existing order.
534 In Confu-
cianism the merchant is not associated with a high social status. This is related to the ideal 
of a gentleman for whom it is more important to be able to cite classical quotations than to 
engage in business. The merchant's importance lies in guaranteeing the lifestyle of the gen-
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try. Thus, the position of the merchant, trade and the accumulation of wealth were not for-
bidden but should not extend without limits. 
    As described above, the heart of Confucian ethic is tào (道), "which is the immutable 
order of harmony, tranquility, and equilibrium underlying the universe and human socie-
ty".
535 Thus, Confucianism is presented in Weber's work as conservative and traditio nal 
and thus impedimental to rational bourgeois Capitalism. Moreover, for him it also corr e-
lates to the rigidification of Catholicism.
536 
     Of course, the institutional preconditions such as separation of household and business, 
the emergence of rational bureaucracy and book-keeping is also said to be missing in Chi-
na.
537 Although some beneficial pre-conditions existed, like a long period of relative peace 
under the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911)
538 and the growth of a diligent population, Capitalism 
did not evolve.
539 Weber accounts the patrimonial order of the state and the importance of 
kinship organization and thus "the unbroken and continued existence of the cohesive sib 
and the pre-eminent position of its head"
540 for the inhibition of a bourgeois Capitalism. 
"Rational and calculable administration and law enforcement, necessary for industrial d e-
velopment, did not exist"
541, hence individualization and capitalistic production were miss-
ing.  
     This rationale presents a very common view of China of the time, namely, that China 
embodies a ―recalcitrant traditionalism that has resisted modernization‖.
542 Max Weber 
only had access to translated and therefore somewhat limited sources and thus based his 
analysis on his understanding of ancient Mediterranean societies.
543 Still, he comes to the 
conclusion that ―Confucian rationalism meant rational adjustment to the world; Puritan 
rationalism meant rational mastery of the world‖.
544 "The Confucian way of life was ra-
tional but was determined, unlike Puritanism, from without rather than from within. The 
contrast can teach us that mere sobriety and thriftiness combined with acquisitiveness and 
regard for wealth were far from representing and far from releasing 'the capitalist spi-
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rit'‖.
545 According to Weber, Confucianism aimed at making rational adjustment to eternal-
ly given social structures, which means that it took the world as set and thus, given. So 
although China had rationality, it was static and hence not prone to new developments and 
the initiation of drastic changes.
546 Confucianism also lacked the emotional pressure and 
dynamic of Puritanism that drove the faithful to rebuild the world according to God's wish-
es. In contrast, Confucianism emphasized orderl iness and self-discipline, thus being ―a 
prudent policy of sound conservatism‖.
547 
     Confucianism tends to a traditional society; it is also not as opposed to nepotism and 
favoritism as Puritan ethic. The latter is based on universalism that applies its ethics imper-
sonally to everybody, not only to relatives. The particularism of the Confucian ethic con-
trasts sharply with this. It is based on the personal relations of individuals especially to 
their kinship.
548 
     As indicated before, it is speculated that the purpose of Weber's anal ysis is to support 
his previous work on rational Capitalism based on a certain spirit as prerequisite for its 
emergence. He is not really interested in presenting China's society and value system sy s-
tematically; his intention is merely to contrast the Chinese economy with the Western. He 
wants to prove the uniqueness of the Western phenomenon. He thus stresses that the d e-
velopment taking place in the Western world was a singular event without really scrutiniz-
ing the Asian culture thoroughly.
549 In contrast Elvin emphasizes that to explain why Capi-
talism has not developed in China, economic and ecological reasons alone  would suffice 
and the detour to religion as Weber does is not necessary. Among other reasons, those facts 
are easier to verify empirically.
550 
     According to Weber, cultural factors are the reason for rational Capitalism not arising in 
China, but they still have facilitated the reception of modern Capitalism there once it wa s 
created somewhere else.
551 Hence, Weber argues that Confucian cultures are able to absorb 
Capitalism more easily than other non-western societies. The reason for this he attributes to 
the specific role of family networks and the importance of learning for the Confucian cul-
ture.
552 He perceives this as essential for an easy incorporation of Capitalism, even though 
the very same culture did not form Capitalism by itself. Weber's research interest in Ch i-
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nese Confucianism is due to its rational utilitarian characteristics which allow to draw 
analogies to the occident and to explain why one society was able to create Capitalism 
whereas the other was not. This made the singularity of development of Western Capital-
ism extremely insightful and comprehensible and thus supported his previous research.
553  
     According to Weber, within the patriarchal structure of China, the family head and the 
head of state held discretionary power ov er rituals and administration, respectively. He 
asserts that ―family piety, resting on the belief in spirits, was by far the strongest influence 
on man‘s conduct.‖
554 He emphasizes institutional factors, such as family and networks, to 
be of great significance for the development of a completely different system of economy 
and society.
555 Weber justifies that with a "lack of a particular mentality" with a "persona-
listic principle" being in place in China with tra its like absence of curiosity, credulity or 
stolidity derived from Confucian values.
556 Additionally, Weber claims that "the Chinese 
soul has never been revolutionized by a prophet"
557 and thus its traditionalism is reinforced 
by a lack of ethical demands, raised by prophets or a "supramundane God"
558, who might 
be able to set up new ethical norms. In contrast, Protestantism was able to shatter the fe t-
ters of the sib.
559  
 
4.4.3. The significance of Confucianism for Chinese Capitalism 
"The mind of the superior man is conversant with righteousness; 
the mind of the mean man is conversant with gain".
560 
 
     The economic rise of the Asian region, most recently of the People‘s Republic of China, 
created the need to develop a capitalistic system which turned out to be different to the 
Capitalisms found elsewhere. With the economic reforms in China after 1978 a gradual 
shift from socialism and the planned economy towards a capitalistic market economy took 
place, with an increasing pace since the 1990s. This coincided with an increasingly flexible 
global production, both probably mutually influencing each other.
561  
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     In the 1980s, the concept of a ‗Confucian Capitalism‘ was developed. It claimed that 
traditional family and kinship ties are more an asset than an obstacle to development due to 
the ―Confucian familistic culture‖ of China.
562 The invention of this ‗Capitalism with Chi-
nese characteristics‘ coincided with a "post-revolutionary discourse on Capitalism" and 
with the retreat of socialism.
563 'Chinese' characteristics were rearranged with the intention 
to create a new model and "a new reality of development" to explain the economic dynam-
ics of East Asia out of long existing stereotypes.
564 Interestingly, the concept was coined 
by US researchers in the wake of exceptional Asian growth and the simultaneous decline 
of Euro-American economies, only later taken on by native Chinese researchers.
565  
     This research drew an analogy to Weber's ‗spirit of Capitalism‘, reversing his impres-
sion of the potential of Confucianism. As a consequence, it also implied that only one 
‗modernity‘ can exist with a timeless and ahistorical identity as a yardstick against which 
the degree of backwardness of a society will be measured. Confucianism got ―Weberized‖ 
in its revival, because it was claimed that it shares similar values to those Weber ascribed 
to the Protestant ethic, such as a collectivist ethic, predilection for hard work, and respect 
for education.
566 Thus, if there is something like ‗Chineseness‘ in doing business and creat-
ing a specific sort of Capitalism, people will be careful not to associate anything tradition-
al, feudal, and hence backward with it. The use of Confucianism as an explanation of a 
unique way to do business was a loophole out of this dilemma and for that reason was fos-
tered as a concept by Chinese researchers and politicians.
567 
     One reason to explain this artificial concept is that the Con fucian renaissance substi-
tuted socialism in providing norms for social behavior and guaranteeing social order  be-
cause it merely constitutes the reinforcing of an already existing value system. This contra-
dicts actual historical facts: Although it is true that Confucianism has a long tradition in 
Chinese society, it was forgotten, and during s ocialism, especially during the Cultural 
Revolution
568, even forbidden. In the course of explaining China‘s economic success, Con-
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fucianism seemed as a logic explanation of an otherwise curious development. Also, Chi-
nese people thankfully took up rationalization, Confucianism getting ‗en vogue‘.
569 Thus, 
Confucian values such as strong family structures, commitment to education, kinship and 
pseudo-kinship social networks, but also diligence, thrift and business orientation are not 
―essential exclusive, unchanging Chinese values‖
 570 of "intrinsic timeless nature".
571 Ra-
ther, those values have been used to create a ‗new‘ tradition to explain Chinese behavior in 
―obliviousness to its historical and social complexity‖.
572 
     For political purposes, Confucianism was since the 1980s often presented in a reduced 
form with only useful elements for ones purpose picked out. The recalling of certain vir-
tues and traditions suited the purpose to limit Western influences on the Chinese culture 
and to create a distinct 'Chineseness'.
573 This suppresses the structural context within which 
this Capitalism did arise, the ‚tradition‘, existing outside of historical time, served as a jus-
tification for the recent developments.
574 Turning Max Weber‘s arguments upside down, 
American and Chinese researchers tried to establish the existence of ahistorical, timeless 
Chinese values in a form of Orientalist economics. This means that for them a Chinese 
‗essence‘ exists, different from the Western individualistic, conflict-ridden society.
575 Both 
lines of research reduce Confucianism to a ―timeless mystification of cultural traits‖ to 
create an effective means to explain the specifics of China‘s experience with Capitalism.
576  
     It is indeed true that Confucianism has a very long tradition in Chinese society, but the 
impact of it over the centuries is more than variable. Some authors
577 even argue that Neo-
Confucianism was invented by US researchers, and then taken up by Chinese scientist as a 
convenient way to explain the Chinese success, therefore reinforcing the belief in their own 
distinctiveness. In posing a dichotomy between the Western and Chinese culture, research-
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ers try to prove that Capitalism is a universal rational construction, no matter in which kind 
of society it arises. 
    For family businesses this means a structure of vertical stability that is built upon mo-
rality and not thread, and depends on the responsibility of the bosses for their subordinates. 
Family firms are thus organized in a paternal, authoritarian pattern. Additionally, the fami-
ly is regarded as the only organization that can be trusted.
578 Having to obey a certain role, 
the individual is subordinated to the family (or the collective), thus showing loyalty and 
obedience. The appeal to the honor of the family, especially through ed ucation and learn-
ing, is also an essential feature of Confucianism.
579 
In addition, it also suppresses class and gender differentiation. The ideology of author i-
tarianism is exported as solution for development also in a political context. The Confucian 
revival celebrates loyalty and obedience as keys to the stability of family and workplace. 
Authoritarianism is instrumentalized ―in the cause of a capitalistic regime of discipline‖ to 
control a social situation ―that no longer is subject to the hold of traditional values‖. Thus, 
it is difficult to describe the emphasis of patriarchy as typical Confucian value as persis-
tence of ‗old‘ tradition and as distinguishing feature of ‗Chineseness‘.
580 This is even more 
doubtful, when also taking into account that during the Cultural Revolution Confucianism 
was dismissed as being part of an old regime which did not have space in the Chinese so-
ciety of the time. 
     The emphasis on Confucian 'rational' values served not only the purpose of contrasting 
it with the issue of Guanxi that is often associated with ―an older ethics of personalistic 
loyalties and indebtedness‖, which from a ―linear teleological scheme of history imported 
from the West‖ perspective is received as backward.
581 It also created a Chinese identity 
build upon Confucian values that assimilates a ―Chinese tradition to the values of Euro-
pean Capitalism‖.
582 The intention of that is to define Capitalism as a unique purposive-
rational action with the same characteristics no matter where it arises, thus denying that 
varieties  of  Capitalism  can  exist.  This  also  emphasizes  the  unique  ‗Chineseness‘  of  it 
which at the same time has the same features of rationality than Capitalism elsewhere has 
and thus cannot be backward. In doing so, the Chinese success could be explained by 
creating a distinctive ―Chineseness‖, at the same time denying that the logic of Chinese 
Capitalism is different from other forms of Capitalism. As Dirlik summarizes: ―The insis-
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tence on essentialist Chinese characteristics erases the historicity of being Chinese to pro-
duce a Chinese identity resistant to time and space‖. In a ―self-orientalization‖
583 it denie[s] 
history […], substituting for historical temporalities and spatialities dehistoricized and de-
socialized  cultural  characteristics‖.
584  In  turning  Orientalism  upside  down,  the  ‗other‘, 
Eastern, culture is seen in the research work on Confucianism as superior to the Western 
culture by both Western and native researchers.
585 
     However, the concept of reciprocity which is typical for  Guanxixue
586 can be found in 
three sources: in Confucian ethics, in the knight-errantry tradition and in the Buddhist no-
tion of retribution. As many researchers feel that Chinese Capitalism is a Capitalism with a 
spirit inspired by Confucianism to it, comparable to the Weberian notion of a ‗spirit of Ca-
pitalism‘, only the first point will be emphasized. Throughout this work it is argued that it 
is actually a Guanxi (network) Capitalism rather than a ‗Confucian Capitalism‘, the latter 
using Confucian values to prove the distinctiveness and superiority of the Chinese way to 
make business.  
During the 1980s the emphasis shifted to Confucian values as the main element and ex-
planation of a Chinese Capitalism, later this was again dismissed and exchanged by the 
notion of a network (Guanxi) Capitalism.
587 
 
4.5. Varieties of Capitalism and China 
4.5.1. The Varieties of Capitalism approach and China 
     Weber's ideal-type conception of Capitalism can also be found within the Variety of 
Capitalism approach (VoC).
588 In recent years a vast amount of literature and much discus-
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sion has been spurred by this research paradigm. Although it defines several types of Capi-
talism, they are also all based on the same (homogenous) institutions that are assumed to 
be essential for a capitalist system. Its models are based on new institutional economics, 
underscoring the effect of distinct institutional arrangements for economic performance, 
thereby painting a static picture of Capitalism, relying "on rather ad hoc descriptions of 
actual institutions and institutional forms" in the sense of a snapshot of the presence that 
cannot represent transformation. It thus is looking for equilibrium outcomes.
589 Still, di-
verse structures are defined to be efficient types of Capitalism. Efficiency in this frame-
work is  understood "in terms  of strategic complementarities  among organizational  ele-
ments".
590   
     This approach mainly concentrates on the firm as unit of inquiry, with an emphasis on 
the organization of the production process.
591 It goes back to a book by Hall and Soskice, 
published originally 2001, who created a dichotomous classification of the  Varieties of 
Capitalism, namely the ―coordinated market economy‖ (CME) versus the ―liberal market 
economy‖ (LME) model.
592 Since its appearance it has spurred an ongoing debate and a 
―vast list of amendments, qualifications, additions, extensions, exceptions to the original 
formulation of the approach‖.
593 The building blocks of the original analysis focus on "mi-
cro-agents  such  as  firms,  employees  or  shareholders,  and  how  they  organize  produc-
tion…describing the affinities between different institutions and the product market strate-
gies of business firms".
594 Hence, it concentrates on industrial relations, vocational training 
and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and coordination of employees, 
with institutional complementarities reinforcing the differences between liberal and coo r-
dinated market economies in the sense that for example ―dense networks of business asso-
ciations support collaborative systems of vocational training‖.
595 Those complementarities 
strengthen the tendency of liberal market economies to rely on markets to coordinate trans-
actions  whereas  the  coordinated  market  economies  maintain  institutions  that  support 
―higher levels of non-market cooperation‖ and aim towards a specific kind of economic 
performance.
596 Ultimately, this design leads to the conclusion that the ―change in any one 
institution, exogenous or endogenous‖ is, due to ―balancing changes‖, followed by a resto-
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ration of the ―system‘s typical performance equilibrium‖.
597 Hence, VoC is basically a 
comparison of different institutional structures in equilibrium, thus delivering an accurate 
picture of the current status of a national economy but – like a snapshot photograph - has 
not much to say about the dynamics of the system. 
     This is also a feature in the amended versions of the approach which also enriched the 
original framework by adding the product-market competition, the wage-labor nexus and 
labor  market  institutions,  the  financial-intermediation  sector  and  corporate  governance, 
social protection and the education sector by authors like Bruno Amable.
598  
     For example, in his book on the diversity of modern Capitalism Amable defines five 
types of Capitalism, including an Asian variety. His approach is much broader than that of 
Hall and Soskice whose dichotomous framework mainly concentrates on the firm as unit of 
inquiry but the basic assumptions remain the same.
599 Amable regards the pressure of glo-
balization and worldwide liberalization, particularly of financial services,  to even out dif-
ferences between the EU and the rest of the world in a rapid pace resulting in a ‗new global 
capitalism‘. However, it can also be argued that although globalization exercises pressure 
on all existent forms of capitalism, this need not lead to convergence. Rather, change can, 
dependent on existing institutional arrangements, have dissimilar influence on institutions 
and political structures.
600 In the end,  "institutions are the expression of a political co m-
promise".
601 Consequently, for Amable Capitalism is a robust environment that principally 
can accommodate varied institutional environments.
602  
     Thus, also the Asian model of Capitalism that Amable introduces hinges on the collabo-
ration of large corporations with the government. He claims that ―workers' specific invest-
ments are protected by a de facto protection of employment and possibilities of retraining 
and career-making within the corporation. Lack of social protection and sophisticated fi-
nancial markets make risk diversification difficult and render the stability provided by the 
large corporation crucial to the existence of the model‖.
603 Hence, it focuses on the state 
and collective sector and ignores the private sector and therefore also entrepreneurs and 
their networks, which on the other hand this work argues to be a main driving force of de-
velopment.  In  other  words,  Amable's  model  largely  neglects  the  importance  of  socio-
cultural institutions as well as culture (let alone an economic spirit), for the formation of a 
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capitalistic system what this dissertation regards as essential for the type of Capitalism 
developing in China. He claims that ―plain regularities of behavior are not institutions […]. 
An institution must be a rule which applies to all the cases‖.
604 It is important to note that 
―Capitalism is a much larger and more complex entity than the market system we use as its 
equivalent…The market system is the principal means of binding and coordinating the 
whole, but markets are not the source of capitalism‘s energies nor of its distinctive bifurca-
tion of authority‖.
605  
     However, the extensions of the original approach of works like that of Amable merely 
blur the underlying fundamentals of the VoC approach, namely that, as Streeck puts it, 
―social systems are politically structured to compete with each other economically; that 
competitive institutional arrangements tend to move and settle into a self-stabilizing equi-
librium; that politics is about designing institutions that enable an efficient deployment of 
economic resources; that today there exist basically two variants of capitalism that are in 
principle equally competitive and therefore unlikely to ―converge‖; that especially employ-
ers and their firms, interested as they are in their own competitiveness, can and do instruct 
states and government on how optimally to organize a society as an efficient production 
regime; and that social systems are kept together by pressures for institutional complemen-
tarity in the service of competitive production‖.
606 In other words, the VoC approach in-
vokes that different national institutional arrangements compete with each other keeping 
the system dynamic, which leads rather to specialization and diversification of products as 
well as institutional frameworks than to convergence to a uniform system. This means that 
national capitalisms can be distinguished ―across both temporal and geographical axes‖.
 607 
However, it is probably more true to say that competition causes tendencies to converge 
and diverge simultaneously. Although the VoC approach rejects the idea of convergence 
towards a ―best practice‖ as the ―economic simplicities of neo-liberal wishful thinking‖, it 
is done, in Streeck‘s view, ―for the wrong reasons‖ as it explains the divergence of systems 
―by the same causal factors: pressures for efficiency originating in competitive markets‖.
 
608 Overall, ―VoC allows for just one possibility of convergence, which is capital market-
driven convergence of CME towards LME models‖, which for him ―looks like defensive 
ad hoc addition in response to uncomfortable empirical observations‖ to keep the theoreti-
cal framework of strict nonconvergence of two dichotomous but nevertheless independent, 
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equally efficient capitalist institutional setups which reproduce themselves continuously.
609 
In some later extended versions of the VoC the ―attempt is made to represent the distinc-
tion between ‗liberal‘ and ‗coordinated‘ ‗market economies‘ as continuous rather than di-
chotomous‖, which for Streeck is not plausible because then a convergence to the nearer of 
the two types would occur.
610  
     Also, the VoC-approach does not incorporate the dynamics happening in the economies 
of developing or transition countries.
611 Not least, because its models take a democratic 
polity as given and "fail to account for the political dynamics of post -socialist econo-
mies".
612 Consequently, research in the VoC line is primarily focused on Western Europe, 
North America and Japan and thus "post-industrial economies".
613 These advanced indus-
trial economies differ considerably from the political structure of China which as develop-
mental and transitional economy still is far from having an established institutional frame-
work. In contrast, its institutions are still constantly changing and defy the possibility to be 
described in a ‗snapshot‘ analysis like that of the VoC or even compared to already exist-
ing ‗snapshots‘.
614 
     However, VoC and all similar modern comparative approaches have in common that 
they try to give an insight to the ―dynamics and contradictions‖ of Capitalism. Beside un-
derstanding, this might, at least in the view of Victor D. Lippit, help to enhance ―its posi-
tive features and ameliorate its most destructive and socially reprehensible ones‖ as ―there 
is no viable alternative to capitalism… the capitalist system is likely to be with us for sev-
eral more centuries at least‖.
615 
 
4.5.2. Other typologies of economic systems 
     The Varieties of Capitalism approach is merely one of many ways to categorize eco-
nomic systems. Another major branch of literature comes from comparative economics, 
which has its origins in the study of different forms of socialism, which became after 1989 
the analysis of the transformation of socialism to capitalism and is concentrating mainly on 
transition countries. It is thus also mainly concerned with institutions, and especially insti-
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tutional change, but it is less occupied with scrutinizing different types of capitalistic sys-
tems.
616 
Beside those more recent approaches, there have been earlier efforts to classify different 
economic orders. In this seminal work Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie also Walter 
Eucken  did  overcome  the  question  if,  or  if  not,  an  economy  is  capitalistic  in  creating 
another  classification  of  economic  systems  in  comparing  market  and  planned  econo-
mies.
617 He defined two basic types (or ‗orders‘ in Eucken‘s terms), which are differen-
tiated into a multitude of system specifications, which are mainly characterized by market 
forms and monetary system.
618 Coming from the Freiburg School and as founder of Ordo-
liberalism, he believed that the state, in contrast to ‗laissez-faire‘, should provide a stable 
framework for the economy, but not interfere as an economic actor in economic processes. 
The state has to guarantee the ‗constituent principles‘ of a market economy, such as mone-
tary stability, free entry, private ownership, freedom of contract, liability, a functioning 
price  mechanism,  consistency  in  economic  policy  and  maintaining  competition.  These 
principles are supplemented by ‗regulatory principles‘ such as monopoly regulation, social 
policy and process stabilization policy.
 In a centrally planned economy, the state dominates 
both.
  619 This reflects the distribution of economic power, not necessarily the degree of 
economic activity by the state. For Eucken, the antipode of the planned economy is not the 
laissez-faire state, but perfect competition which guarantees every economic actor a share 
within the economic process, without giving one group, be it state, large corporations or 
lobbyists, too much influence.
620 His theory therefore deals with the relationship between 
the state and the economy. Economic orders are the ―legal and institutional framework of 
economic  activity,  and  the  economic  process,  the  daily  transactions  of  economic 
agents‖.
621 In his work he formulates an interdependence of orders, both of the economy 
and the state, collaborating within the order of competition.
622 He prefers to use the term 
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―order‖ instead of Sombart‘s system, because an economic system is a special case of or-
ders that rely on contrasting principles and serve the purpose of selecting the appropriate 
set of theoretical doctrines as opposed to a comparative analysis of historical epochs in 
Sombart‘s sense.
623 
     In contrast, ‗Capitalism‘ as a form of economic system provides in Eucken‘s view no 
unambiguous definition of an economy‘s structure and thus fails to describe its order. De-
scribing an economy with this term is for Eucken hypostatizing and replaces the need to 
scrutinize the variations of real economic systems.
624 To the contrary, ―‘Capitalism‘ slurs 
over this variety‖.
625 For Eucken, to analyze the essence of an economy, that is, to reflect 
Capitalism and its spheres of production, distribution and consumption, means speculation 
and distracts from the unity of the real economy which is not separated into different 
spheres.
626 
He also dismisses the notion of ‚stages‗ of development as an idea of the 19
th century on 
the ground that it implies that every country passes through the same sequence of phases 
and that connects higher level of development with every stage.
627 Also, the further devel-
opment in this line of research, the economic style, is criticized by him (in the course of his 
work he uses both terms synonymously). Although it describes less a sequence of different 
stages of a system but rather a parallel existence of different systems, it is for him still con-
cerned with development and also merely with what he calls cross -sections of economic 
history, which neglects the fundamental structure of (economic) orders.
628 Instead, ‗the 
great antinomy‘ of economic analysis, namely the necessity to combine general-theoretical 
models that need a rational, analytical approach with the historical aspects of economics 
that require intuition and empathy, has to be overcome.
629 He denies that economic styles 
with their notion of finding time-dependent theories, valid only for certain epochs and cul-
tures, and thus, an ‗intuitive theory‘ in the sense of Salin, enables to fully understand eco-
nomic processes and hence, economic reality. He demands that to explain real economic 
processes, it is not enough only to understand an economy but that it has to be possible to 
construct a more general theory out of the findings (see below). 
     He prefers to use the term ‗order‘ instead of ‗style‘, because an economic order is an 
universal  prerequisite  for  economic  activity  and  provides  the  framework  for  economic 
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processes. Eucken goes even as far as claiming that without order economic transactions 
are impossible. As described above, an order for Eucken can take on two forms: it is either 
centrally planned or it is a market economy, based on a competitive order (differentiated 
from a laissez-faire state) (‗Verkehrswirtschaft‘).
630 Eucken proclaims the universality of 
economic principles and thus the general applicability of the neoclassical theory, combined 
with the denial of the significance of a specific mind set for the economic activity of an 
epoch or a culture. For him, a theory is always right, but not always timely. He also rejects 
the idea of the differentiation between the ―satisfaction of needs‖ and the ―principle of ac-
quisition‖ which is central to Sombart‘s work.
631 
     Even though the economic order concept claims that the economy is embedded in cul-
ture, both are still treated as separate spheres. It states that cultural factors have a defining 
influence on specific economic systems, but as preferences are said to be given exogenous-
ly, embeddedness has no further meaning for the analysis and is not examined in greater 
depth.
632 Consequently, only abstract theorems are able to describe the individuality of 
economic reality. More than that, Eucken even questions the existence of ―competing theo-
ries for alternative forms of economy; [he] believed the general equilibrium theory was 
‗always valid‘‖.
633 In identifying the economic order first, it is then possible to apply the 
right set of theories that has been constructed for each economic order (therefore theories 
in Eucken‘s sense are not time-bound, but order-bound).
634 Economic orders represent a 
sober and prosaic classification of historical economic structures, which is used as the basis 
of not a historical but current comparison of systems.
635  
     In Eucken‘s view, the economic style-approach neglects the details of reality due to its 
‗macro‘ perspective that is only able to construct ‗types‘. Instead, the economic order-
approach for him emphasizes small elements from a more ‗micro‘, individual perspective 
and thus represents the real economy, thereby identifying (in the sense of recognizing and 
understanding, instead of merely ‗constructing‘) ideal types, thereby eliminating the ‗anti-
nomy‘.
636 In an earlier chapter, he dismisses the creation of ideal types by the economic 
styles (and stages) approach as merely defining arbitrary real types. He justifies his own 
construction of ideal types in differently defining them as a ‗pure‘ morphological system, 
which is more than just representing cross-sections of economic reality. Also, his ideal 
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types are the result of a different form of abstracting process, namely the ―isolating ab-
straction [or] abstraction of specially significant characteristics‖.
 637 They are constructed 
from a ―delimited class of configurations for describing the ideal and typical basic ele-
ments of the economic order‖, which represent the aggregation of real phenomena ab-
stracted from reality, which are used as a model to characterize real economies. Ideal-types 
do not embody perfection, and they only exist in reality, understood as real types, as amal-
gamated forms. They function as connection between historical narrative and deductive 
analysis of economic processes.
638 
     In contrast, generalizing abstraction, as used by the economic style-approach, constructs 
cross-sections and in Eucken‘s view therefore distances itself from reality and details.
639 
Real types of economies, hence ―spatially and temporally localized economic system[s]‖, 
consist thus always of layers of different ideal types earlier defined.
640 Economic orders are 
thus ideal- not real-types for Eucken, although he emphasizes only to perpetuate the defini-
tion of the term by Max Weber in characterizing it more exactly and exhaustive.
641 
     However, Eucken‘s concept is a static concept, not a dynamic theory and it fails to de-
scribe the change of economic systems. He defines stabile and unstable states of economic 
systems which induce the institutional constellation of an order to change towards a stable 
variant, but omits an explanation for this process.
642  
     Eucken‘s dichotomic concept of economic orders has been expanded and refined by 
authors like Norbert Kloten and Michael Kröll, who categorize ideal types in Eucken‘s 
sense and in a second step describe various real types of existing economies, but also these 
more recent approaches fail to describe institutional change and hence, transformation.
643 
Eucken and the theory of orders paved the way for the modern comparative analysis of 
economic systems.
644 In so far it is not far away from the Varieties of Capitalism-approach, 
except that these types are defined according to a different set of characteristics.  
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4.5.3. The economic style approach 
     In contrast to the more functional notion of the economic system (or economic order in 
Eucken‘s terms) with its two antipodes of plan and market, the concept of the economic 
style is able to distinguish economies in a more differentiated way, including its institu-
tions and value systems.
645 The term has been coined at the end of the 19
th century and 
stems from the notion of style in art history, referring to works of the same period.
646 It 
assumes that in every epoch a certain spirit prevails and complements the existing econom-
ic organization, thus culture is endogenized into this theoretical approach. It has therefore a 
fundamentally different approach as system analysis in the sense that ―system analysis in-
volves the reconstruction of functional connections by drawing on formal models – in the 
context of a given order; the style concept on the other hand aims to give the research a 
complementary structure based on understanding and interpretation (hermeneutics)‖.
647  
     The latter concept, namely the intuitive theory [anschauliche Theorie, sometimes also 
translated as ‗concrete theory‘] has been introduced by Edgar Salin in his festschrift for 
Werner Sombart in contrast to ―rational theory‖. Both concepts are theories in the sense 
that isolation and abstraction are the fundamental guideline of both methods. Therefore, 
they are not antipodes, but rather intuitive theory has also to include rational theory, it is 
hence ―also-rational‖ instead of ―only-rational‖. Rational theory only concentrates on the 
functional causal relations of a subsection of the economy, namely the exchange economy, 
and  is  associated  with  the  notion  of  an  economic  system.
648  In contrast  to  this  ‗pure‘ 
theory, which simplifies phenomena and uses deduction to reach conclusions, intuitive 
theory seeks to understand an economic as a whole and deconstructs the various layers of 
the real economy to reveal the ideal type within, using inductive logic. Intuitive theory 
provides mainly ―sense cognition, cognition of totality, unity, for and essence‖.
649 Its goal 
is to draw an image of reality
650, but it abstracts from historical singularities. It is a pheno-
menological description that aims towards greater insight and a revelation of the changing 
of economic structures, trying to understand the embeddedness of economic institutions in 
the cultural background, not to forecast future developments. Intuitive theory means ethical 
economics and is associated with the concept of economic styles.
651  
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     In connection to this theory, Arthur Spiethoff characterized an economic style with the 
following five attributes: economic spirit, natural endowment and technology, economic 
and social constitution, economic dynamism. Economic spirit comprises the moral atti-
tudes, in particular towards economic activity, innovation and technology; natural endow-
ment and technology includes population growth and density, the degree of the division of 
labor as well as available technology, hence material factors; social constitution means the 
solidarity and coherence of a society, be it blood, enforcement or contract as well as the 
degree of social division of labor, whereas the economic constitution incorporates property 
rights  (free,  state,  collective),  economic  institutions  (enterprises,  state  price  formation, 
work relations, principle of acquisition versus satisfaction of needs) and the distribution 
mechanism. With this concept, Spiethoff followed the intentions of Sombart but worked 
out the concept in greater detail, although his structure is partly congruent with Sombart‘s 
notion of economic system, in for example using the term ―economic spirit‖ instead of 
Sombart‘s ―economic mentality‖. He goes beyond Sombart in describing as the fifth cha-
racteristic the dynamics of an economy with the subcategories ‗constant‘ and ‗progressive‘ 
economy (and creates his theory of crises out of that thought).
652  
     In contrast to the concept of economic stages  – and also contrasting Eucken‘s assess-
ment – the notion of economic style uses more than one characteristic to describe a style. 
Here it also goes beyond Sombart in claiming that the catalogue of characteristics has to be 
open and able to expand. The stages theory follows the development of a single attribute 
over time and therefore creates longitudinal sections in observing the economy. It implies 
that every stage is connected to a higher state of material and moral development. In con-
trast, the style concept is going beyond this notion and builds a cross-section of economic 
life, thereby using a theoretical framework and defining the characteristics by the inductive 
logic of description, observation of specific phenomena, resulting in a construction of con-
ceptions and extraction of regularities. This means a considerable progress in comparison 
to the stage theory. In a next step, the reality is scrutinized and the attributes defined before 
are structured to reveal a concrete style, which represents an image of reality. The ideal-
type is always the starting point of this process, the image of reality its end. Economic 
phenomena within the style are thus explained deductively.
653 Spiethoff claims, that the 
attention is not turned towards the sequence of stages but towards their inte rrelation and 
context as well as the development from one stage to the other and thus includes a dynamic 
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element.
654 Hence, ―the concepts of economic style and real type therefore refer not to ab-
solute models of knowledge, but rather to explicative structures which are capable of mea-
suring up to the development of history both because of their inner logical need and be-
cause of the peculiar type of relationship they have with external changes‖.
655 
     A theory in Spiethoff‘s (but also Sombart‘s) sense has to be constructed by a combina-
tion of deduction  and  induction.
656 The universality of economic theories and hence a 
‗time-less economic‘ cannot exist within this theoretical framework. To the contrary, for 
the economic style concept, the relevance of economic theories necessarily varies with 
time and place according to how well their assumptions suit the actual economic circums-
tances and historical change. Rational theory, for instance, may not be suitable to describe 
the economies during feudalism, but has been developed parallel to the emergence of ra-
tional Capitalism.
657  
     Economic styles are differentiated from economic systems like feudalism or capitalism 
in further differentiating them into various types of real economies. A specific style is dis-
tinguished by characteristic behavioral patterns, organically evolved living conditions and 
activities as well as institutions and is thus a qualitative instrument and explicitly not a 
quantitative one.
658 A style reveals intuitively (in Salin‘s sense) the unity of manifold, part-
ly even controversial, phenomena, which goes beyond the functionality of an economic 
system, as it proclaims the complementarity between economic spirit and economic order. 
Programmatically, a style can be understood as a concept of life, deeply anchored in socie-
ty. An economic style describes an ideal type, but not in the sense of Max Weber, whose 
version can include details that do not exist in real economies, but is created to understand 
the essence of how an economy functions. In this sense it reflects realities of past and 
present. An economic style is not able to extrapolate possible future economic systems, but 
only explains concrete and intuitive differentiations of a known system. Insofar it also de-
fines certain types.
659 This approach also implies that it is highly dependent on the person 
of the researcher and his subjective views. He is, however, bound to a catalogue of 
attributes which Spiethoff mostly borrowed from Sombart. Spiethoff himself never defined 
a specific economic style.
660  
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     A style is not static, but dynamic in nature, and thus, it is of most interest how the 
change of a style occurs.
661 Defining a ‚new‘ economic style requires the interaction of 
various  disciplines,  like  sociology,  political  studies,  history  and  economics  to  collabo-
rate.
662 Implying that a certain era is connected to a certain economic spirit does not mean 
that the economic actors were aware of their own attitude.
663  
     The most common, but also the latest, elaboration of the economic style stems from 
Müller-Armack. He defined the ―social market economy‖ as an economic style of com-
promise between a liberal and a social state, balancing between the principles of the market 
and of redistribution. This overlapping of structural principles results into an individuality, 
a unique style.
664 Müller-Armack defines a style as ―unity of expression and composure‖ of 
an epoch.
665 He defines a modern (contrasting a medieval) economic style, which he does 
not  like  to  call  ‗Capitalism‘  due  to  the  terminological  difficulties  associated  with  that 
term.
666  
     Whereas the system approach is better suited for broad description of epochs but less to 
describe the qualitative change of an economy, as it is more abstract and general and look-
ing for the unvarying element of a basic structure; the style concept can be applied to spe-
cific variations of the system. It indicates the transformation of an economy by describing 
the change of economic thought  but rather from a long -term perspective. On the other 
hand, a style can also aim at different eras a nd indicates various systems within.
667 It is a 
concept that is both highly subjective and applying relativism in creating a painting rather 
than a photograph of an economic era.  
     In creating types, the concept of the economic style can be said to be methodically not 
far away from the notion of the holistic pattern model, presented in the last chapter. Wh e-
reas the first concentrates more on past and present, searching for underlying fundamentals 
that often can be better detected with (spatio)temporal distance, the pattern models focuses 
more on continuous updates, therefore on the immediate present and seeks maximal close-
ness with its subject of analysis. However, of course they differ conceptually and methodo-
logically, but both concentrate rather on qualitative rather than quantitative elements and 
thus can nevertheless reveal a rather accurate painting of the Chinese economic system in 
taking also social, political and cultural influences in account  – without neglecting its de-
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velopment and transformation. In this work, these theoretical approaches will be further 
enhanced by the instruments of institutional change outlined in chapter 2.4.  
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5. Chinese development since 1978 
5.1. The Chinese notion of development  
5.1.1. Development – a definition 
     The notion of what (economic) development is, can be or should be, varies widely in 
different schools of thought. The German Historical School, for example, had a specific 
idea  of  what  economic  development  means,  for  them  it  also  included  ethical  progress 
(please refer also to chapter 4.1.). Also the Marxists have their own ideas and for the neoc-
lassical school it has often been treated as equivalent to economic growth (having disastr-
ous consequences for developing countries especially during the time of the Washington 
Consensus).
668  
     In this rather teleological view, the concept of development is associated with gradual 
unfolding of something often already existing hidden ‗in a nutshell‘. It therefore is often 
confused  with  growth  because  development  is  interpreted  as  a  process  of  unwrapping 
something hitherto concealed that grows in size but also changes its structure. It is then 
seen as a transformation towards improvement and advancement. Although this in general 
is a positive tendency, it is also associated with a merely upward and forward movement. 
In this notion development is conceived as deterministic process that leaves no space for 
―agency and choice, conflict and contradiction, risk and uncertainty, and for creative in-
vention and reinvention of the future as it unfolds‖. Hence, development is also regarded as 
similar to a concept of evolution which from this point of view can be defined as ―a theo-
retical model of dynamic historical change in which the passage of time is a causal force; 
events and conditions are conceived as historically unique; and change, while driven by 
causes rather than pulled by effects, is intelligibly patterned‖ and comes about continuous-
ly and incrementally. Just as development, evolution is regarded as being linked to the 
concept of growth as it is also associated with a consecutive appearance of ever more com-
plex structures. ―[E]volutionary theory can therefore serve as a model for a processual 
theory of social systems in which an explainable past and present are faced with an open 
                                                 
668 Washington consensus labels a specific era of development aid. The term was coined by John Williamson 
in his article Williamson, 1990. He used this expression to describe the shared development goals constitut-
ing in policy advices of Washington-based institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. The expression 
became the label for mainstream development theories that argued that best results could be achieved by 
stabilization measures and structural adjustment, resulting in economic liberalization and deregulation. The 
reforms‘ goals were a low inflation rate, lower state involvement and free trade. This type of policy advice 
had its heyday during the 1990s, now called the ‗lost decade‘ by development agencies. Today it is a largely 
contested theoretical frame. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2010, p. 15, Williamson, 
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future‖.
669 Capitalist development can from this point of view be interpreted as an unfold-
ing process that expands market relations and reproduction and exercises endogenous pres-
sure for capital accumulation. It is a ―discontinuous sequence of subversion and restoration 
of order‖, shaped by competitive innovation‖.
670 
     Hence, definitions vary considerably, even within development agencies. Superficially, 
a definition of development seems straightforward: development leads to poverty reduction 
and solves the problems of underdevelopment, satisfying ‗basic needs‘, often also includ-
ing social and economic progress. However, the latter definition just exchanges one vague 
expression (development) with another (progress). Development has besides social and 
economic aspects also a cultural and political dimension and is thus not a synonym for 
economic growth. Hence, from one point of view Capitalism means development, from 
others it is the exact opposite. Even the question what exactly ‗basic needs‘ are, is con-
tested. Some argue that this made the term development even more fuzzy, draining it from 
its meaning and leaving as its only function to bestow any interference with a higher-order 
authority.
671 Cowen and Shenton claim that ―development defies definition…because of 
the difficulty in making the intent to develop consistent with immanent development‖.
672 
     Twenty years ago, Amartya Sen broke new grounds with his capability approach that 
provided  the  philosophical  and  theoretical  background  for  re-thinking  human  develop-
ment.
673 Out of his thoughts the Capability Poverty Measure was developed that assesses 
the possibility of a country to develop, in taking besides growth also nutrition, education 
and health, human rights, empowerment, democratic practices and good governance into 
account, thus also providing a ―clear yet open-ended ethical orientation‖.
674 The capability 
approach also criticizes the notion of development equating economic growth that can be 
measured in GDP growth. It became a paradigm for the debate of development and in-
spired the creation of the Human Development Index
675 (HDI) of the UN that also includes 
per-capita GDP, but also incorporates the ―average achievements in a country in three ba-
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672 Cowen and Shenton, 1995, p. 43. 
673 Sen, 1985, Sen, 1999. 
674 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2010, p. 16. 
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sic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a 
decent standard of living‖.
676  
     China is among the ―top movers‖ of the HDI, meaning it developed rapidly in a very 
short time. However, it achieved this purely on the ground of high economic growth. Yet, 
it has been found that the correlation  between  GDP per capita growth  and  other non-
monetary development goals approaches zero.
677 ―Take a revealing comparison between 
China—the world‘s fastest growing economy in the past 30 years—and Tunisia. In 1970 a 
baby girl born in Tunisia could expect to live 55 years; one born in China, 63 years. Since 
then, China‘s per capita GDP has grown at a breakneck pace of 8 percent annually, while 
Tunisia‘s has grown at 3 percent. But a girl born today in Tunisia can expect to live 76 
years, a year longer than a girl born in China. And while only 52 percent of Tunisian child-
ren were enrolled in school in 1970, today‘s gross enrolment ratio is 78 percent, considera-
bly higher than China‘s 68 percent―.
678 
     The recent Human Development Report defines: ―Human development is the expansion 
of people‘s freedoms to live long, healthy and creative lives; to advance other goals they 
have reason to value; and to engage actively in shaping development equitably and sus-
tainably on a shared planet. People are both the beneficiaries and the drivers of human de-
velopment, as individuals and in groups‖.
679 It includes as major objectives w ell-being, 
empowerment and agency as well as justice. It defines political freedoms, such as democ-
racy and civil liberties to have an intrinsic value for development.
680   
     Common to all definitions is that they are Western centered and even more so European 
centered, with the notion of a democratic, capitalist, bourgeois society in mind.
681 Often, 
they are also associated with the notion of the all-knowing development expert, in Easter-
ly‘s words the ―planner‖ (working for a development agency or NGO) who knows best 
how to develop an economy. Easterly also claims that planners usually act in a patronizing 
way  in  telling  that  ‗we‘  (meaning  ‗we  whites‘)  know  best  what  is  good  for  everyone 
else.
682 
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    However, along with the new line of thinking on development, evolving around the con-
cept of capabilities, it has been recognized that there cannot be a ‗one size fits all‘. Rather, 
―the payoffs to policy reform differ with circumstances and that appropriate strategies need 
to be identified and developed locally‖.
683 Even the World Bank realized that it had to ad-
just its approach to development in recognizing the differences in growth despite similar 
policy regimes.
684 In 2008, also the Commission on Growth and Development supported 
these findings. It claimed that for sustained growth ―no generic formula exists. Each coun-
try  has  specific  characteristics  and  historical  experiences  that  must  be  reflected  in  its 
growth strategy‖. That is also reflected in the rapid economic development of China, but 
also in countries such as Brazil and India.
685  
     This dissertation is not occupied with the history and definition of development aid and 
its failures during the last ‗development decades‘ since WWII, but as the example of the 
transition of communist countries towards capitalist and sometimes also democratic sys-
tems illustrates, the notion of ‗one best practice‘ failed miserably for the post-soviet coun-
tries. The case of China, which did openly defy any advice from agencies such as the IMF 
and World Bank and which therefore should not have developed at all, demonstrates that 
also different strategies can work. As will be outlined in chapter 5.1.5. below, China‘s 
strategy was not to have a strategy at all.
686  
 
5.1.2. Transformation: big bang versus gradualism 
     Transformation, similar to develop ment, is a term that can be applied to diverse 
processes but in its modern definition is mostly used for the transformation of  former so-
cialist countries into capitalist-oriented economies. It stands for social change that - in con-
trast to transformations happening in the past - is not necessarily accompanied by revolu-
tionary activities.
687 The expression transformation is often also used in a broader sense to 
capture change in development countries outside Eastern Europe that are also on their way 
to market-based democracies.
688 The term transformation (as well as transition)
689 is used 
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for modernization processes that aim to implement - from a Western perspective - ‗mod-
ern‘ institutions to a country to achieve a democratic, market-based, constitutional system. 
As such it can be considered as a neutral term, merely meaning transition from one type of 
system to another. However, it is often associated with the notion of ‗one best practice‘ 
that fails to recognize local peculiarities. In reality, transformation is a multidimensional 
and complex process. 
    Nevertheless, in its standard definition a transformation process can take on two differ-
ent forms: it can happen in a ‗big bang‘ or gradually.
690 Basically, the two different ap-
proaches for transformation and thus in the end also for development, can be ascribed to 
two famous development researchers: Jeffrey Sachs and William Easterly. The first stands 
for the shock therapy (or what Ellerman terms ―social engineering‖)
691, the latter is a pro-
ponent for a gradual approach. Sachs argues for ‗one best way‘ a country can develop, 
which is determined by professional development specialists and therefore is a top-down 
approach. For him, the bottom-up gradualism approach leads to ―costly and dangerous 
wrong turns‖ for a country.
692 He also acts as an advocate for the ‗Big Push‘ that aims to 
overcome the so-called poverty trap, regarding poverty as a social engineering problem 
and by investments and actions directing a country toward a trajectory of self-sustained 
economic growth and progress.
693 Sachs argues that ―the ‗big-bang‘ reforms…are attempts 
to create a ‗normal‘ capitalist economy…The long-run goals of institutional change are 
clear, and are found in the economic models of existing market-economies. The ‗big-bang‘ 
countries  had  social  consensus  on  what  economic  institutions  they  wanted,  and  hence 
speed on a broad front was possible‖.
694 
     An illustrious example of the  shock  therapy (hence  of top-down implementation  of 
markets, the official term ―structural adjustment‖ used by IMF and World Bank) are the 
reforms in the Eastern European countries, most famously in the former Soviet Union (see 
                                                                                                                                                    
689 In the literature a distinction is made between those two terms, but as this difference is only in nuance, this 
dissertation will use them synonymously. 
690 An overview on the comparison of the Eastern European versus the Chinese transformation can be found 
in Naughton, 1996. 
691 Ellerman, 2010, p. 3. The term ‗social engineering‘ was used before him by Karl Popper and Friedrich 
August von Hayek who understood it as the planning of economic processes by the state. However, Hayek 
was very critical of social engineering in general whereas Popper, who differentiated between piecemeal and 
utopian social engineering, only supported the idea of piecemeal social engineering. Hayek, 1984, Gray and 
Hayek, 1998, p. 81. 
692 Ellerman, 2010, p. 17. 
693 As this dissertation is not occupied with methods of development aid and more practical issues of deve l-
opment, but is rather interested in the abstract no tion of development, it will not discuss the concept of the 
poverty trap in depth. For a detailed discussion, please refer to Sachs, 2006, p. 14ff. and Easterly, 2006, p. 6, 
39ff.  
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also chapter 6.4.3 for a detailed description of the Russian experience), which had near-
catastrophic outcomes for the economy and society. The strategy has been implemented by 
the Russian government together with the IMF and World Bank and included fast privati-
zation, price liberalization and establishment of an accompanying legal system. It thus ex-
changed both economic and political system at the same time, which in theory should have 
provided the appropriate institutions for a functioning market economy, to enable Russia to 
get rid of the old institutions and start fresh in one big sweep. In theory, Russia became a 
free-market economy on 1 January 1992. In practice, the Russian economy collapsed with-
in one year and to this day a large share of the economy operates in grey and black mar-
kets, with a high level of corruption on all levels of government. Overall, since the begin-
ning of reforms in 1992 production fell and resulted in a 50 percent drop in GDP.
695 One 
reason is attributed to the fact that the approach failed to recognize the ―de facto‖ property 
rights people developed during socialist times, which were discarded by the newly in-
stalled system.
696 The institutions copied from advanced developed countries, which in 
theory should have been the best solution, failed in practice. 
     In contrast, the gradualism approach regards, beside the implementation of a liberal 
market economy, as an equally important goal the establishment of good governance and 
democracy. However, also markets can only be successful when they are established  by a 
process that originates at the basis instead at the top. The planner of the shock therapy is 
replaced by many searchers looking for the best strategies and solution on an individual 
basis. Gradualism changes a society incrementally and involves active participation of the 
population of a country in the transformation process. It is thus also a slow, piecemeal a p-
proach.
697 Often the Chinese economy is given as example of a gradual transformation. 
However, as will be outlined in detail below, this is only partially the case. 
      
5.1.3. A brief recapitulation of the Western industrial revolution 
     This chapter focuses on the actual historical development that  transformed traditional 
(feudal) societies into capitalist (modern) ones and less on the reasons for this develo p-
ment. As already outlined in chapter 4 in detail and as only briefly indicated within this 
chapter, the development of Capitalism has a complex mixture of material and immaterial 
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reasons. However, here and in the following, this dissertation concentrates on the actual 
impact of the capitalist transformation on society.   
     In the 19
th century, the European economy rested on a relatively persistent balance-of-
power system between states which contributed considerably to stabilizing the industrializ-
ing  economy.  This  wider  institutional  environment  hinged  on  the  existence  of  self-
regulating markets and the liberal state for its stability. They shaped the background of the 
Hundred Years‘ Peace after the turmoil of the Napoleonic wars. The new organizations of 
economic life helped to prevent a general war, ―while providing for peaceful business 
amidst an endless sequence of minor ones‖.
698  
    Also, with the development of the ‗new‘ sciences since the 16
th century together with the 
enlightenment movement, the view of the world and the idea of man have been radically 
altered. Individualism and self-interest increasingly were legitimated as base of action, the 
rational calculation reflecting the spirit necessary for capitalistic production. When during 
the  18
th  and  19
th  capitalistic  production  emerged,  new,  more  liberal  institutions  were 
created. The interpersonal relationships of the traditional household
699 slowly disappeared, 
but at the same time the members of the household became more and more equalized and 
individualized to fit into the new system. The traditional cultural institutions requiring a 
compulsory ethical institutional background for economic activity withheld the pressure of 
Capitalism for some decades. Gradually an economic society surfaced that was not stru c-
tured in classes depending on one‘s social status anymore, into which one is born and 
which cannot be changed; but which defines its members in terms of their function for the 
market, for example as farmer, craftsman or merchant.
700 Thus, the daily routines of people 
sustainably changed along with reforms, innovations and the enlargement of markets.
701  
     Put differently, the institution of the self-regulating market is considered as ‗innovation‘ 
that ultimately led to a specific social structure that created the liberal state as a conse-
quence. Hence, the market economy became the foundation on which Capitalism could 
arise, having in turn huge impacts on the lifestyle of the population. It also fostered the 
transformation of the feudal society into an industrialized one.  
     As outlined above in chapter 4, all factors necessary for production, including labor and 
soil, needed to be turned into commodities tradable on markets. Consequently, together 
with the emergence of Capitalism a labor market had to be established, determining calcul-
                                                 
698 Polanyi, 1944, p. 16. 
699 In this dissertation ‗traditional‘  is defined as pre-industrial,  mostly  related  to the (changes  for)  rural 
households. 
700 Brunner, 1956, p. 53. 
701 Plumpe, 2007, In: Jaeger, 2007, p. 363. 130 
 
able prices for working power. This meant nothing less than a class of propertyless work-
ers had to be created that was forced to sell its labor power. Thus, traditional social struc-
tures, including families, had to transform to be able to provide the human factors neces-
sary for factory work and industrialization.
702  
     While in the beginning markets were anarchical and self -regulated, people started to 
realize that to prevent nature and human labor to be destroyed, laws and regulations had to 
be initiated in order to control the market forces. Thus, the state intervened and  – depend-
ing on the respective country but mostly decades after industrialization started– established 
a protective legal framework that at the same time created the necessary (contract) security 
for doing business. Although it can be easily argued that markets existed at all times in 
history, until industrialization they had been embedded into the social structure of society 
which was ruled by custom, autarchy and traditional households, not the motive of gain. 
From the 16
th century and thus, already under the mercantile system
703, markets started to 
become increasingly significant and a main concern of governments.  However, a market 
economy as described previously did not arise until the industrial revolution, as a prerequi-
site of Capitalism.
704 
     As has already been outlined on a more theoretical basis in chapter 4, modern  Capital-
ism emerged in Great Britain first and improved productivity by developing factories. It 
uprooted people from their traditional environment which often put them into extreme po-
verty, before the first regulations for protecting human labor were enacted. Polanyi argues 
that once Capitalism emerged and the ―liquidation of social structures‖ was under way, the 
development could not be stopped anymore. However, German reformers were able to 
slow it down in the case of Germany (see below). No matter where, individuals had no 
chance but to adapt to the new system and social formation. Many people were faced with 
extreme poverty and misery during the 19
th century.
705 
     As Polanyi shows in detail, the enclosures of open fields in Great Britain since the 17
th 
century were the starting point for the industrial revolution 150 years later.
706 Ultimately, 
they were an important component of the dislocation  of common people, which forced 
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them to move into the growing cities. At that time, cities were not yet prepared to provide 
sufficient accommodation, and in the very beginning, also jobs. In setting private interests 
above the public‘s, the enclosures disrupted ―the fabric of society‖, literally ―robbing the 
poor of their share in the common, tearing down houses which, by the hitherto unbreakable 
force of custom, the poor had long regarded as theirs and their heirs‘‖.
707 Workers had 
been ―crowded together in new places of desolation […]; the country folk had been dehu-
manized into slum dwellers, the family was on the road to perdition; and large parts of the 
country were rapidly disappearing under the slack and scrap heaps vomited forth from the 
‗satanic mills‘‖.
708 This vigorous description of the living conditions of England‘s workers 
is similarly vivid in Weber‘s image of the ―iron cage‖
709, describing the forces behind Ca-
pitalism and its effect on cultural and social institutions as ―a veritable abyss of human 
degradation‖
710. 
    A new institutional mechanism slowly transformed Western society to the belief that 
material commodities together with continuous economic progress and growth will lead to 
prosperity for the whole population. As outlined above, for such a mechanism to work, a 
market economy needed to facilitate the free, money-based trading of products. To ensure 
a frictionless production with the help of machines, all factors for production needed to be 
available for sale, including man and nature, with their prices also determined on a market. 
This implies transforming man and nature into commodities, traded on markets that needed 
to be created first. It also meant that now instead of ―being embedded in social relations, 
social relations are embedded in the economic system‖.
711 Even contemporary writers no-
ticed that industrialization could not be stopped without risking the functioning of state and 
society but that at the same time its concomitants severely endanger the social environ-
ment.
712 This view was supported by a strand of economic theory, constructed around Wa-
lras‘s ―general equilibrium‖ that for a long time limited its analysis to the functioning of 
markets. Other institutions were mostly regarded as hindrances for a proper price mechan-
ism to work.
713 
     As already indicated before, until industrialization even the national markets emerging 
during Mercantilism were ―merely an accessory feature of an institutional setting con-
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trolled and regulated more than ever by social authority‖.
714 The extension of the market 
mechanism to labor was the consequence of capitalistic production in factories. A market 
system was needed to provide the factors for a fluent production. The law of the market 
turned labor into being a commodity which as a consequence also limited possibilities to 
decide how someone led his life.
715  
     This also implies that the organization of labor needed to be changed which in the end 
fundamentally changed the lives of the common people. The outcome is a change of socie-
ty‘s social institutions to serve as an accessory to the economic system. In an environment 
of rapid economic growth, increasing productivity and rising wealth, people could hardly 
survive on their own working power, ―detached from home and kin, torn from [their] roots 
and all meaningful environment‖.
716  
     The emergence of Capitalism with its self-regulating markets separated society into an 
economic and a political sphere.
717 Acts of production and of retail sale were disconnected 
in time and space by the intervention of a wholesale merchant who advanced money for 
the purchase of goods with the object of subsequent sale at a profit. Hence, Capitalism 
changed the thinking about economic issues in a ―thinking coming from the market‖ with a 
separately existing economic system being not a function of society.
718 For the market 
economy to function properly, the subordination of all elements of society was neede d, 
including man and land. The substance of society itself was comprised to the laws of the 
market.
719 
     The market economy additionally transformed them into human commodities on a (l a-
bor) market for sale to entrepreneurs looking for factory workers. Polanyi defines labor as 
fictitious commodity, because as economic activity it is part of life itself and is not pr o-
duced for sale, nor can it be sold or stored detached from life. What‘s more, the labor mar-
ket cannot be left to the rules of a free market mechanism for this would lead to the de-
struction of the human being. Labor power has always to be considered as affecting the 
human individual who happens to be the owner – and provider –of this commodity. There-
fore supply and demand cannot be flexible and frictionless; the price has to be stable at a 
minimum enabling subsistence.
720  
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     Germany started to industrialize half a century after Great Britain, introducing Capital-
ism not until the middle of the 19
th century. Germany took over many of England‘s tech-
nological innovations, being able to leave out the less successful steps towards industriali-
zation. The industrialization went not as experimental, and thus, quicker once it got started 
because from the beginning large firms could be created to catch economies of scale.
721 
This meant that by learning from England's mistakes, and additionally due to social specif-
ics, the changes were less extremely life-threatening, but still painful, depending on region 
and industrial sector. The peasants were not forced off the land by enclosures, but the eco-
nomic change nonetheless radically altered social structures. In some cases such as that of 
the linen weavers, conditions turned out to be dramatic.
722 
     In general, industrialization was a much slower process than in Great Britain,  taking 
several decades, thus it did not take place as industrial revolution in the narrower sense.
723 
It is also important to note that the transition from a feudal to a mo dern society developed 
not linear and not at the same pace even within Germany due to its late unification only in 
1870.  Therefore, the traditional class system with its long -established conceptions and 
mentality existed parallel to industrial structures for several dec ades. Capitalism was not 
implemented frictionless or without resistance, but in the end was inevitable.
724 
     As a result, the development in Germany ran along the same lines as in England. Bo r-
rowed technology ensured a high speed of development with German engineers learning 
through ―imitative acquisition‖
725 from British techniques. Additionally no ‗old‘ industries 
existed that occupied working force but all investments could be directed into the sectors 
with the highest profit rates and the newest technology.
726  
     This was possible after Germany got rid of many institutional, e.g. legal and customary, 
obstacles.
727 One of the necessary prerequisites was the emancipation of peasants , which 
was mainly achieved after the agrarian reforms in Germany. Peasants were liberated with 
reforms such as the Stein-Hardenberg reforms in Prussia starting in 1807 with the abolition 
of feudal restrictions, although they were not accomplished for nearly 50 years.
728 The 
feudal system of the Junkers still held its serfs like slaves. Socage and high duties left few 
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resources that could be sold on a market.
729 Additionally, the tradition of sovereign care 
and ―clement grace‖ protected the class society and its social and economic order even 
under the pressure of a growing population. This prevented economic change for quite a 
while.
730 Riehl even claimed that aristocracy and peasants were the conservative core and 
―mights of insistence‖, contrasting it with an image of a degenerated peasant who included 
all forms of rural life that did not fit into his idealized picture of the peasant.
731 This as-
sessment did not reflect but overstated reality, being dismissed as ideology by researchers 
such as Weber-Kellermann because it oversimplified the reality of vi llage life which did 
not develop in a linear progress from traditional to feudal.
732 
     Germany‘s territory was not unified, thus development proceeded unevenly with indu-
strialization  starting  in  its  North-Eastern  part.  Nevertheless,  under  diverse  institutional 
frameworks, technological and economic innovations took place in all parts, forcing agri-
culture eventually to transubstantiate to a capitalistic, commercialized production aimed at 
a market.
733 This was accelerated by the increase of population by nearly 50 per cent b e-
tween 1740 and 1820, mostly due to decreasing  mortality rates rather than to rising birth 
rates. Together with the increasing pressure from international involvements in trade and 
politics this eventually made changes inevitable. Commercial centers arose, villages b e-
came industrial sites attracting rural population but also deconstructing the existing socie-
ty.
734 
     The first generation of factory workers were urban day  laborers, craftsmen and jour-
neymen of the lower end of the petty bourgeoisie. As agriculture changed very slowly, the 
peasants flooded into the cities in a second phase. Half-peasant subsistence work on small 
property combined with seasonal employment was not unusual for a long time. It served as 
social security during early industrialization. Neve rtheless, rural workers became more 
important for industrialization in Germany than the skilled craftsmen who clung to the 
guild because freedom of trade-laws were not passed until the middle of the 19
th century. 
All in all, the totality of the English experience with sudden separation of house and busi-
ness was softened by these regional characteristics.
735  
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5.1.4. History and current state of China‘s economic development since 1978 
5.1.4.1. Economic reforms since 1978
736  
     In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping in turning against Maoist ideology stated that ―develop-
ment is the hard truth‖. In Mao‘s era, egalitarianism was regarded as more important than 
economic growth and made China one of the poorest countries at the end of the 1970s. The 
CCP realized that rapid growth was necessary to overcome poverty and to strengthen Chi-
na‘s economy.
737 Thus, the Chinese reforms were from their beginning neither voluntary 
nor intended to transform the economic system into a market economy. Rather, the CCP 
were forced to act as a crisis of agrarian production, the stagnation of the economy and a 
supply shortfall led to increasing discontentment of the population as a consequence of the 
Cultural Revolution that ended with the death of Mao Zedong on 9 September 1976, and of 
the Great Leap Forward of 1958-62, both devastating the rural economy and leading to the 
death of several million Chinese people.
738 After Mao‘s death and the prosecution of the 
―Gang of Four‖
739, the CCP launched the „Four Modernizations― (of agriculture, industry, 
national defense and science and technology) in February 1978, together with a new con-
stitution, adopted in March 1978. These policy measures were officially sanctioned by the 
Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in December 1978.  
     Thus, reforms started in December 1978, led by Deng Xiaoping, who at that time – and 
for that matter never officially - had no official position as head of state or General Secre-
tary. Nevertheless, he is the most important figure for the Chinese reforms until the early 
1990s, when he died. He introduced a system that was governed by rule and a clear under-
standing of collective decision making without concentration of too much power as it was 
the case during Mao‘s time.
740 The beginning reforms were called "socialism with Chinese 
characteristics" and aimed at improving the overall well-being of the Chinese population 
by economic growth. In the first phase of reforms until the early 1980s, agriculture was 
decollectivized and the country opened up to FDI. As a first result, agrarian output rose 
considerably. This is attributed to the fact that at the beginning of reforms the majority of 
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the rural population was outside the state-sector near subsistence level. This led to a rapid 
growth of the non-state sector as soon as constraints were removed.
741  
     Reforms were launched in several phases, starting with a reform of agrarian production, 
a household-responsibility system (HRS) and an ‗industrial revolution‘ of rural areas.
742 
The HRS made formerly collective land available to individual farmers who were allowed 
to keep the majority of the crop after paying a share to the state. From the end of the 1980s 
and during the 1990s, price controls were gradually lifted and replaced by a dual price sys-
tem that allowed SOEs to sell products above the plan quota for market prices, the so-
called dual-track system (shuangguizhi). It allowed for the coexistence of plan and market 
for allocation of goods. However, the concept does not refer to two separate ownership 
structures and therefore the dual-track system operated only within the state sector.
743 Ad-
ditionally, in coastal areas several special economic zones (SEZ) were established, which 
were open to FDI and were less regulated by the state. These zones  became engines of 
growth for the entire Chinese economy. 
As will also be described with the example of W enzhou in chapter 7, the central go v-
ernment decentralized its control to give local officials the space for economic experiments 
with privatization. One way to do this was the establishment of Town and Village Ente r-
prises (TVEs), which are firms that officially are owned by the collective but actually are 
often privately managed.
744 At the end of the 1980s, corruption was widespread and infla-
tion was increasing which led to rising discontentment in the population which cumulated 
in the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and caused a setback in the reform process.
745 This 
trend was only reversed by the legendary ‗Southern Tour‘ of Deng Xiaoping to the SEZs, 
where he held a famous speech, reaffirming the need for an increasing pace of economic 
reforms in a pragmatic, non-ideological manner. Ultimately, this renewed the commitment 
of the CCP to economic reform and led to the 14
th Congress of the Communist Party and 
the approval of a ‗socialist market economy‘ and the extension of markets to all sectors of 
the economy.
746 Shortly thereafter, Deng retired. His accomplishment ―was not to design 
‗the system‘ from above…, but to allow mundane experimentation from below‖.
747  
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Deng started an evolutionary process of establishing a market economy, and in Novem-
ber 1993 the Third Plenum of the 14
th Party Congress issued a document named Decision 
on issues concerning the establishment of a socialist market economic structure which has 
been conceived as ―turning point on China‘s road to markets‖. In September 1997, this was 
followed by the decision of the 15
th Party Congress to declare state-ownership merely as a 
―pillar of the economy‖ and private ownership as an ―important component of the econo-
my‖. Finally, in March 1999 the 11
th article of the constitution was amended to incorporate 
private ownership and in 2004, at the Second Session of the 10
th NPC, article 11 of the 
constitution was again revised to protect private property and encourage the development 
of the private sector.
748 Also, entrepreneurs were invited to join the CCP on its 80
th anni-
versary on 1 July 2001, in a now famous speech of then General Secretary Jiang Zemin 
(see also chapter 8 on the motivation of this move).
749  
In general, 1994 was a milestone year for economic reforms for example with the adop-
tion of the Company Law that provided a uniform legal framework and regulated legit i-
mized ownership structures (see also below, chapter 7 and 8) and many fiscal and financial 
reforms.
750  
     Before 1978, the government-run banking system was merely responsible for providing 
trade credit and payment services to facilitate the exchange of goods. No long-term lending 
for investment projects nor a bond or stock market existed. The financial system was pas-
sive in the sense that economic decisions were almost never based on financial consider a-
tions but were made by planners and then financed from government budgets that also 
wielded power over the profits of the SOEs. However, especially in rural areas, banks pro-
vided the opportunity to save in form of the rural credit co -operatives.
751 Today, China 
owns a modern financial system, complete with commercial banks and capital market. Par-
ticularly the latter has been developed after 1992 but the reforms of the  financial system 
have been continuous since the 1980s when SOEs increasingly relied on the banking sy s-
tem for finance. Loss -making  SOEs  were  provided  with  credits  as  the  ‗soft-budget-
constraint‘
752 led to unlimited access to bank credit. To uphold the notion of ‗reform with-
out losers‘ the state-owned banking system piled up a large amount  of nonperforming 
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loans wide into the 1990s, which thereafter were merely ‗hidden‘ by a transfer to specia-
lized management companies. Throughout the reforms, the government kept control over 
the financial system, which is still dominated by the banking system and only has underde-
veloped capital markets. Although stock markets developed rapidly during the 1990s, they 
are still far from being transparent and good governed.
753  
     The Chinese banking system in general is very centralized and consists of a core of four 
vast state-owned banks that already existed during the planned economy. These ‗big four‘ 
state-owned banks (originally only subdivisions of one big government (mono)bank) are 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) which is responsible within urban 
areas and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) for rural areas. Additionally, there is the 
Construction Bank (CCB)  that  is focused on project financing and the Bank of China 
(BOC) that handles foreign-trade and foreign-exchange transactions. Additionally, eleven 
joint-stock commercial banks were set up between 1986 and 2001 and thus were relatively 
unburdened by China‘s past economic system. However, they are owned by groups of 
SOEs and thus, local government influence their operations. There are also so-called ‗Poli-
cy Banks‘, which consist of the China Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank and the 
Agricultural Development Bank. Even today, the banking sector is still dominated by gov-
ernment-owned or –controlled institutions.
754  
     However, as this dissertation is primarily concerned with the development of the private 
sector, it will not in detail discuss the reforms of the fiscal or financial system. Neverth e-
less, as the private sector is largely  exempt from receiving bank loans from the official 
banking system, it increasingly turns to more unofficial ways to obtain funds. This so -
called underground banking will be described below in  chapter 7.2. Also the tax system 
and its reform will be analyzed in depths. Apart from the explanations already given, a l-
though there are (rather strict) central government regulations how to govern the fiscal 
system, it exhibits a large variety locally. The issue of predatory taxation on the local level 
will therefore be briefly touched in chapter 8. 
    In the course of transformation, reforms experienced a substantial change of nature. Al-
though decadal differences in GDP growth are rather small, the nature of reforms differed 
enormously in the 1980s compared to the 1990s. Whereas in the first decade of reforms the 
transformation was led by ru ral entrepreneurial endeavors, it was more state -led in the 
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second decade.
755 This means that private sector policies became more illiberal and urban 
biased with an emphasis on investments in state -allied businesses during the 1990s.  In-
creasing tax burdens and other policy measures that curtailed the expansion of rural entr e-
preneurial businesses were shouldered by the rural private sector.
756  
     This tendency was revised only after 2002 with the  Hu Jintao - Wen Jiabao govern-
ment.
757 The state-sector was downsized, privatization became increasingly accepted. E s-
pecially after 1992, decentralization shifted  power from  the central to  local  gover n-
ments.
758 However, after a firm macroeconomic foundation was given, the focus of r e-
forms shifted to regulatory aspects, such as restructuring of the banking and financial sy s-
tem, of the tax system and of corporate governance. Also, the relations to the international 
community were intensified, peaking in the a dmission of China to the WTO. For many, 
this is regarded as a milestone in the global integration of China.
759  
     As already indicated above, the transformation process in China is also characterized by 
what is called the urban -rural divide, which means that China is characterized by what 
Huang calls ―the entrepreneurial, market-driven rural China vis-à-vis the state-led urban 
China‖.
760 The gap can also be explained by the Chinese system of citizenship (hukou) that 
is divided in a rural and an urban form, with fewer privileges for the rural type. The urban 
hukou was also related to membership in a work unit (danwei) that provided not only work 
but health care, pensions as well as low-cost housing and education. This system aggra-
vates the notion of two separate worlds that follow different rules and function in different 
ways, resulting in differing living standards. In theory, mobility is strictly controlled and 
thus most migrant workers have no official urban hukou.
761  
     It is claimed that China‘s transformation process is completed and that now the chal-
lenge became economic development.
762 Indeed, GDP quadrupled in the first two decades 
of reforms, driven by rising agricultural productivity in the first decade and then with the 
help of light industry within the TVEs. This led to a substantial decrease in absolute pover-
ty. However, although the Gini-coefficient
763 is different for urban and rural households, it 
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is still very high (see also below).
764 However, China today is the third largest economy 
and although the per capita GDP is estimated $ 3.744 in 2009 it still an emerging nation 
due to its regional disparities of economic development.
765  
     A 2007 strategy paper of the EU commission addresses the duality of China‘s transfor-
mation process which puts it on the one hand in the position to be one of the most impor-
tant countries in international relations, becoming a strategic partner, and being able to 
hand out development aid to other countries. On the other hand China still remains a de-
veloping country in some aspects, although it has the ―resources to cover its own longer-
term development needs‖. The EU assists China in matters of trade and business exchange 
and also in matters of the environment, energy and actions against climate change.
766 The 
World Bank elevated China from being a ―lower income‖ to a ―lower middle income‖ 
country.
767 However, ―China‘s development guidelines are set out in its 11
th Five Year 
Plan (adopted in 2006) which marks a perceptible shift from all-out economic growth to 
one which places increasing emphasis on the social consequences associated with rapid 
economic development‖.
768  
    In sum, ―[t]he economy grew at a phenomenal eight percent a year for three decades, 
and monetary poverty measures fell more than 80 percent between 1981 and 2005. Yet this 
success was not matched by performance in other dimensions of human development. Chi-
na ranks first in economic growth since 1970, but 79th of 135 countries in improving edu-
cation and health. In fact, China is one of only ten countries in the 135 country sample to 
have a lower gross enrolment ratio now than in the 1970s. […] The costs of single-minded 
pursuit of economic growth also became apparent in other dimensions. Escalating envi-
ronmental pollution threatened many land, water and air systems that people depended on 
for their livelihoods, sometimes with global implications. Income inequalities worsened. 
By 2008 per capita household consumption in the coastal region of Guangdong was more 
than four times that in Tibet. […] Reducing social imbalances is now a priority in the five-
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year plan. China has also recently launched major new policy initiatives aiming to develop 
a low-carbon economy and expand adoption of climate-friendly technologies‖.
769 
 
5.1.4.2. Current state of economic development 
     To this day, it remains difficult to obtain accurate Chinese data. To one part, the reason 
for this lies in the deeply fragmentized nature of the Chinese state with local actors having 
their own agenda and not always being inclined to reveal the true nature, for example, of 
tax income (please refer also to chapter 7 and 8 on that specific subject). However, there 
are also other reasons that contribute to the difficulties of obtaining data. The Cultural 
Revolution completely destroyed the Chinese system of data collection. In 1976 only 46 
people worked at the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and still in 1986, 90 percent of 
the data was handled manually.
770 Additionally, in 1998, the NBS switched to a new sy s-
tem of data collection. In general, the data of the NBS is far from being transparent, and 
the database is particularly dire for microeconomic processes such as concrete policies, 
institutions and behavior of economic agents.
771 Of course, officially still being considered 
a developing country, the fact that GDP and other data might be flawed is not an anomaly 
as such; it is also the pace of the change that attributes to the magnitude of possible e r-
rors.
772  
     Apart from general concerns of taking GDP and GDP per capita data as measures for 
welfare, in the Chinese case there are additional concerns. More precisely, whereas during 
the 1980s GDP growth was accompanied by equally fast household income growth, 
household surveys show that the latter diverged from GDP growth during the 1990s. Also 
indicators on health and education degraded during the 1990s. Illiteracy rose and social 
tensions increased. In the Chinese case, adults over 15 that have not the ability to recognize 
1500 Chinese characters are defined as illiterate. Usually, Chinese children reach that level 
in the 3
rd or 4
th grade in the age of 7 to 9. According to official data, the number of illite-
rates increased by 30 million between 2000 and 2005 (from 85.07 million to 113.9 million, 
or 6.72 percent and 11.04 percent, respectively, of the adult population), mostly in rural 
areas, from a previous steep decline (180 million in 1990 or 15.9 percent of the adult popu-
lation), which is an increase of 64.3 percent. Illiteracy declined until 2000, from then it 
increased again. The reason for this can partly be attributed to the fact that those reaching 
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the age of 15 during that time were born between 1985 and 1990, thus in a time when rural 
education standards decreased rapidly, along with increasing costs for education (govern-
ment spending in 1998 was only 2.2 percent of GDP, but rural households had to pay an 
estimated 14.9 percent of their income for education in 2003).
773 Interestingly, a World 
Bank report found that enrolment and education data show that China fu lfills the goals of 
nine-year compulsory basic education. Indeed, official data shows a near to 100 percent 
enrolment rate. However, local governments often automatically register school-age child-
ren as enrolled. In practice, having drop-out ratios of around 70 percent is not rare. This is 
just one example of many, where details matter and official data is not what it seems on a 
first glance.
774 From 2004, this problem, as many others, has been a ddressed by the Hu 
Jintao - Wen Jiabao government, for example in waiving tuition. A similar example could 
be made with health care expenditures.
775  
    As has been stated before, China‘s economic growth has been very fast since the begin-
ning of reforms, since 1970 it increased twenty-one-fold. Its per capita income, however, is 
only a fifth of the average in developed countries.
776 The development has been more rapid 
in the coastal provinces than in the Western ones, but overall it has been 9.1 percent in 
2009 and is estimated to increase to 10.2 in 2010. Only Afghanistan, Qatar and Azerbaijan 
had higher economic growth in 2009.
777  Its  GDP on PPP per capita is approximately  
$6,600  which makes China number 130 in country rankin gs (to compare, Germany is 
number 35 with GDP on PPP per capita of  $ 34,200, Liechtenstein as number one has a 
GDP on PPP per capita of $ 122,100, Qatar as number two has  $ 121,000).
778  Export 
growth recovered remarkably after the crisis in 2008, but it is expected to decline over the 
next years due to an uncertain global economic environment.
779 The fast rebound of GDP 
growth can be attributed to the stimulus package of the central government . However, 
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when the stimulus spending program will be finished, growth is expected to decline to 8.8 
percent in 2011 and 8.7 in 2012.
780 
     China‘s labor force is 813.5 million (2009 est.), the world largest labor force. India, 
number two in the ranking, has ‗merely‘ 467,000,000 (2009 est.) and the EU as a total 
225,500,000. By occupation, the labor force works in agriculture with 39.5 percent, in in-
dustry with 27.2 percent and in services with 33.2 percent (2008 est.).
781 The GDP is de-
rived from 10.6 percent of the agricultural sector, 46.8 percent coming from the industrial 
sector and 42.6 percent from services (2009 est.). In September 2009 the unemployment 
rate was estimated to be 4.3 percent (it is probably much higher, due to the high percentage 
of unregistered migrant workers that were laid off during the crisis. The data also only i n-
cludes urban areas, it is estimated that including migrants would increase the rate to 9 per-
cent. An even higher unemployment can be found in rural areas).
782 The Gini index of 
2007 was 41.5 (coming from 40 in 2001), which makes China number 54 in the world.
783 
This causes rising social tensions and social unrests (rapid increase in demonstrations and 
strikes, mostly recently in June 2010 in the aftermath of the suicides  of workers of Fox-
conn) in the Chinese society. In a period when China‘s GDP growth was 10 percent on 
average, the income of the poorest 10 percent of the population declined by 2.4 percent 
between 2001 and 2003. Thus, in contrast to a widely conceived truth that living standards 
in China were constantly rising during reforms, they were actually declining for around 
130 million people. The World Bank has similar findings: wage income, and household 
income in general, has declined as a share of GDP from 53 percent in 1998 to 41.4 percent 
in 2005.
784 
     China‘s budget deficit was equivalent to 2.2 percent of GDP in 2009 and 2.3. in 2010, 
slightly improving over the next years as the stimulus spending will come to an end. How-
ever, China‘s official data on this is far from being transparent. Thus, the Chinese fiscal 
situation might not be as healthy as these numbers suggest. However, expenditure on edu-
cation, healthcare and pensions are expected to increase over the next years to meet the 
government goal of a ‗harmonious society‘.
785  
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     Consumer price inflation will stay in the relatively modest height of 4 percent on aver-
age over the next 5 years, although it peaked to 5.1 percent in November 2010 which is the 
highest  rate  since  July  2008,  most  likely  caused  by  rising  food  prices  due  to  unusual 
weather conditions. However, rising food prices could also cause a higher inflation over 
the next years and thus at the same time could lead to discontent in the population, as 
might the rise of asset prices.
786    
   The Economist intelligence unit regards the likelihood of significant political reforms till 
2015 as very small. Not least, because the CCP is primarily concerned about maintaining 
stability, not only in the economy, but even more so in the transition towards a younge r 
generation of political leaders.
787  
 
5.1.5. Reform without a theory  
 
“[G]overnance should „not [be] based on a certain existing doctrine or theory, but 
rather on consideration of actual national conditions and states interest‟”. 
Deng Xiaoping
788 
 
     From the beginning of reforms in 1978, China adopted a transformation strategy that 
aimed at economic growth as sole objective, without changing the political system in large 
scale. It also rejected the policy advice from international agencies, objecting to the ‗con-
                                                                                                                                                    
and law-based, fair and just, trustworthy and friendly, full of vigor and vitality, secure and orderly, and in 
which man and nature are in harmony―. It is part of a series of political innovations that seek to meet the 
discontent of people in justifying the inequities of the Chinese modernization process. It is meant to express 
that the CCP and the government cares for their people who – rather than economic growth – should be the 
end of development, instead of merely its means. To achieve this, the central government claims to strive 
fostering social equity, a welfare system, protection of the environment as well as good governance and 
transparency. The notion of ‗harmony‘ is based on Confucian philosophy that includes the two core elements 
of ‗benevolence‘ and ‗harmony‘ (see also chapter 4.4.3. and 6.3.). ‗Benevolence‘ is more used within inter-
personal relations, whereas ‗harmony‘ is a more social and political concept. Confucian writings state that 
these two elements entitle people to ‗eternal peace under the sky‘. Its rationale is the belief that harmony has 
to be employed on the micro-level to achieve harmony between regions and different social groups on a ma-
cro level. A significant aspect of this concept is the acknowledgement of social tensions and divergent inter-
ests within society that are supposed to be harmonized. However, the central government seeks to reach that 
goal not only by ‗harmonious‘ measures, but also with repressions, monitoring and censoring, for example of 
the internet. Discontent is often aimed at the local governments, whereas the central government still has a lot 
of reputational credit with the Chinese population and thus now aims at building on that reputation of a bene-
volent, paternalistic state. Schucher, 2007. A similar concept is that of the ―scientific development concept‖ 
(kēxu￩ fāzhǎn guān). It is also a people-centered approach that aims to correct the over-emphasis on GDP 
growth that often encouraged dubious construction projects and false statistical figures on a local level that 
neglected social welfare especially in the Western, less developed provinces. Its aim is the creation of the 
‗harmonious society‘. It is a reversal of policies of the predecessor in office of Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin who 
emphasized the importance of economic growth. Fewsmith, 2004, Hansen, 2007. 
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ventional wisdom‘ how to correctly transform a country. Hence, reforms officially did not 
include liberalization or privatization. The driver of economic growth was rural produc-
tion, not FDI or exports.
789  
     As outlined above, the Chinese economic development was the result of a mixture of 
top-down and bottom-up measures that induced institutional change while ―while largely 
ignoring  the  advice  of  economists  affiliated  with  the  International  Monetary  fund  and 
World Bank‖.
790 Deng Xiaoping is often called the architect of the Chinese reforms, but 
actually he had not an explicit reform strategy in mind.
791 Two famous phrases, coined by 
Deng Xiaoping, stand for his approach: ―crossing the river by feeling the stones‖ (mozhe 
shitou guo he, 摸着石头过河) and ―white or black, it is a good cat as long as it catches 
mice‖.
792 In practice this meant adapting a capitalistic economic system without changing 
the political environment. As the term Capitalism was deeply encumbered by ideological 
concerns, the CCP exchanged the term ―capitalistic economy‖ by ―market economy‖ that 
was combined with totalitarian politics. This contradiction was on the one hand euphe-
mized by the party, but on the other hand it is a striking example for the Chinese pragmatic 
mindscape. It can also be regarded as a marketization of power that made economic devel-
opment  and  hence  profit  seeking  the  main  goal  of  political,  economic  and  intellectual 
elites. One reason can be seen in the fact that after Mao‘s death the party as well as the 
economy itself was in a deep crisis. Being used to call their country and its economic sys-
tem the best in the world, political leaders now lacked scheme and vision. 
     Thus, the aim of reforms was to get hold of the socio-economic crisis and as such can 
be interpreted as a familiar phenomenon. A hundred years earlier, when the Qing dynasty 
ended in 1911, the so-called Westernization movement aimed to apply Western practical 
knowledge to the ―substance‖ of Chinese doctrines and thus implant Western technology 
and science into Chinese institutions, without changing social or cultural context.
793 In 
1978, reforms again intended to import foreign technologies to modernize the Chinese 
economy. From 1992 until today the official goal of reforms is called ―system of socialist 
market economy‖. However, the explanations as to what this exactly means vary enorm-
ously. Deng Xiaoping‘s opinion on distributional issues was captured in the famous quote: 
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―Let  some  people  get  rich  first‖.
794  It  is  often  also  compared  to  other  ‗developmental 
states‘ in East Asia.
795 Indeed, the Chinese experience shares with those that it built ―on a 
strong authoritarian national leadership and an elite state bureaucracy pursuing develop-
mental goals and industrial policy‖. However, the concept of the developmental state re-
mains unclear concerning a definition of the features that propelled economic growth and 
how policies can influence industrial performance.
796 
     The Chinese approach is often seen as incremental and gradual. However, some authors 
claim that reforms were such a success not because but despite the gradualist a pproach.
797 
Already fifteen years ago the puzzle of China‘s successful transformation ‗against all rules‘ 
was widely discussed.
798 The common ground of the discussion has been the insight that 
―history and institutions matter‖ which gave China a more favorably starting point com-
pared to other transitional countries. Also, all authors agree on the notion that reforms have 
to introduce competition and choice into the system, to alter incentives for all actors in 
favor of economic change.
799 The gradual nature of reforms is often explained by the rising 
share in output by the private sector.
800 Ellerman identifies the ‗Chinese method‘ as paral-
lel experimentation that ―tr[ies] several options, prototype(s) quickly to test the options, 
and communicate[s] between the experiments since improvements in one option might also 
benefit other options. Eventually a clear winner might emerge so that resources could then 
be concentrated on that option‖. It is a pragmatic approach that acknowledges that it is im-
possible ex ante to know what might be the best reform (or development) strategy.
801 It is a 
process of decentralized social learning that has not the central government as ‗experimen-
ter for the nation‘ that knows and implements the correct solution but the periphery – the 
local governments – that by experiments tries out different solutions. The central govern-
ment merely is the facilitator of this social learning, as it takes on the best experiments and 
applies it to the entire country.
802 Pragmatism ―views the social world as being actively 
constructed by people so, at each point in time, it is radically incomplete and in a state of 
becoming‖.
803 However, the ―Chinese reforms were neither gradual nor slow‖.
804  
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    The notion of gradualism versus shock therapy for many authors is misleading. Some 
authors go as far as arguing that there is no underlying theory for the Chinese reforms at 
all. This ‗strategy‘ was of course not deliberately chosen; it did not refer to the theoretical 
schools of neoclassics, Marxism or IMF police advice, but was an entirely pragmatic, ad-
hoc endeavor. Indeed, measures were cautious and risk-averse; policy directives in official 
central government documents remained vague, leaving room for local experiments to de-
velop a private sector, as outlined in detail in chapter 8, without explicitly planning for that 
to happen.
805 Even at the beginning of reforms, in the resolution of the Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Central Committee, the reform of the agricultural sector was not mentioned – and 
still having the result of completely abolishing the commune system. The whole transfor-
mation process is characterized by regional decentralization and fiscal federalism that re-
sulted in structural learning by regional experimentation.
806 Even without clearly defined 
property rights, the Chinese private (or rath er non-state) sector thrived, pragmatic entre-
preneurs accepting a relatively high level of uncertainty. To interpret that as gradual would 
rather be an ex post construct than an ex ante decision. As will also be outlined in chapter 
7, Chinese tend to be very pragmatic in their actions and thus the acceptance of such a 
‗strategy‘ is not as odd as it might seem from a Western point of view.
807 ―China‘s reform 
was propelled from below via a peculiar form of massive participation by 800 million far-
mers who were incapable of theorizing and organizing, not ‗engineered from above‘ by 
power elites armed with ready theories and systematic strategies‖.
808 
 
5.2. The role of the family for economic development in Europe 
5.2.1. A short outline of the traditional household before the industrial revolution
809 
     In traditional societies, economic activity was usually subordinated to the social rela-
tionships. Material well-being was important, but even more so social standing within so-
ciety. In an ideal-type traditional economy, as for example described by Aristotle for an-
cient Greece (see also below), material goods were valued for their use, not as investment 
and thus for sale. The ideal-type traditional household was mostly autonomous, working 
for its subsistence. Only items that it was not able to produce itself were bought on the vil-
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lage market. Additional goods were produced by artisans. These craftsmen sold their prod-
ucts retail in the town market and were organized in guilds that regulated prices and quality 
of the products. However, they were not motivated by gain and profits. Also, they did not 
work for remuneration as prices were defined by cost of production and custom, and as 
such needed not to be determined on a market.
810 Land and labor were thus part of the so-
cial organization; wages of the craftsmen were determined by the rule of the guild and the 
town. 
     The economy in the old, traditional way was based on the  house or household (―das 
ganze Haus‖) as main institution of economic activity.
811 It was an economy based on 
agriculture; therefore it was a peasant economy, where ―economics‖ was involving a self-
sustaining household integrating all spheres of life, which made it also a family economy. 
The meaning of economics –‗Ökonomik‘ - goes back to the Greek word Oikos, meaning 
‗house‘.
812 This sense of economics eventually got lost with the changed attitude towards 
the notion what life is and, more fundamentally, what the aim of one‘s life is.
813  
     The traditional household was mostly found in rural areas, but also urban households 
were organized in that manner in pre -industrial times. Craftsmen often had beside their 
trade a small husbandry that supplied most of their food (see chapter 7 and 8 for a descrip-
tion of the entrepreneurial bourgeois household).
814 
     However, this ideal-type traditional oikos used to be the origin and basic social unit of 
economic activity but was not as narrowly defined as it is today with the urban ‗nuclear 
family‘ that became detached from the ‗house‘. It was not merely a family consisting of 
just two generations living under the same roof but rather an extended family of three to 
four generations living together including the elders and unmarried relatives.
815 Additional-
ly, the menial staff belonged to the household although it was not related to the family but 
worked on the farm and in the house.  
     The average family consisted of four to six people, plus two to four servants and maids 
forming the rest of the household. There was no distinction  made between blood relative 
and menial staff until the 18
th century regarding status and treatment. The extended family 
- including the people without family ties - worked without any or only a very minor wage 
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and was only paid with food and accommodation. It was essential to have enough workers 
for all errands and duties available and therefore the household needed a minimum size to 
be functional.
816 
     The household gave shelter and subsistence to its members, no matter of the individual 
contribution. Thus, it also served as a social institution for needy  and elderly people and 
even for the lazy. The head of the household had the right to decide about all matters of an 
individual‘s path of life, such as marriage or education. Loyalty and obedience towards the 
family came first.
817  
     This description does not intend to idealize the traditional household as a cozy, snug 
place - as was often done during the 19
th century by contemporary authors like Riehl – in 
contrast it has to be perceived as a patriarchal-authoritarian environment, based on inequa-
lities, especially between men and women.
818 Consequently, no separation of house and 
business existed. This changed drastically with the emergence of c apitalistic structures. 
Later, eighty percent of the population lived in urban environments, their life and work 
becoming mechanized and the old institution of the household disappearing.
819 In the capi-
talistic economy, the rationality of companies and business contrasts the ―sentimentality of 
the family‖, the first being part of society, the second of a community.
820 The household in 
the old sense had the capacity to unify both spheres.  
     However, the typical traditional household was focused on securing food and had little 
involvement with markets, this being characteristic for the subsistence economy of the 
time as outlined before. The house was not only an economic but also a social collective of 
domination and authorization, characterized by unity of production and reproduction. Liv-
ing and working were not spatially separated and duties were assigned according to gender 
roles.
821 
     In the ideal-type house a patriarchal-authoritarian hierarchy reigned. The center of the 
household consisted of the ‚core family‘ – husband, wife and unmarried children. Members 
of the family were not treated equally; head of the house was always a man, the patriarch. 
The woman, the housewife, was subordinated under his command, being his deputy and 
forced to subservience. She was on average far less educated than her husband. The range 
of a women‘s authority depended on the size of the household. In smaller crofter house-
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holds, the women had to be more involved. In the hierarchy below the housewife were the 
children,  beginning  with  the  oldest  of  the  sons  (the  household  being  a  strict  gender-
stratified surrounding), followed by the menial staff and apprentices. The members of the 
household did not appear in public as individuals but always as elements of the extended 
family, represented by the pater familias.
822 He had the sole responsibility for business, 
organizing work within the household and additional ly maintaining contacts outside the 
family.
 He also represented the family in public, for example in village assemblies, which 
further stressed his high position inside the household.
823 
     The status of people within the household was also dependent on their role in the d o-
mestic division of labor. Women, i.e. the housewife, resided with ‗actual‘ domestic work 
inside the house (but were not restricted to it). This included responsibility for the garden 
and the cow barns, whereas the fields and horses were male duties. This traditional division 
of labor had practical aspects and allowed combining work and childcare. The woman was 
thus bound to the house, constituting its organizational center. Her responsibilities required 
diligence and effort, e.g. when handling milk.  
     Due to their little value for household work, children had low social standing. The sta-
tus of maids and servants was also low and depended on their specific responsibilities and 
their gender. The groom had the highest status among the servants.
824 The household work 
in general was diversified and consisted in  primary and secondary economic production, 
reproduction and child care, consumption, care of the elderly and sick and  passing on ec-
clesiastical and worldly norms.
825 
     Besides being organized in a hierarchical fashion, the household had a well -defined 
distribution of responsibilities without clear segregation of domestic and productive d u-
ties.
826 There was no separation of work and private life, people slept where they worked, 
often among the animals or in the kitchen. The notion of p rivacy was unknown. Even the 
most intimate matters were carried out in close coexistence. Additionally, the relation b e-
tween husband and wife was more economical than romantic, being a working partne r-
ship.
827 This often meant that the wife as central figure of domestic life slept near the 
hearth. This enabled her to oversee everything and to attend to her duties even in childbed, 
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even then having no private space. This kind of living reflected the lifestyle of the rural 
family.
828 
     This ideal-type definition of a house(hold) and its power relations can be traced as far 
back as the ancient world and the philosophy of Aristotle, who compared the hierarchy in 
an Oikos with that of the polis. Both are occupied by diverse members, but are unified by 
the ―guiding spirit‖
829 of the head of the hierarchy, which in a sense represented a ―mo-
narchy of the house father‖.
830 This concept is also found in the ‗house father literature‘ 
(―Hausväterliteratur‖) of the 16
th and 17
th century. ‗Father‘ in the traditional economy was 
not necessarily a purely biological or sentimental concept but rather a legal and also eco-
nomic role describing the character of the head of the household. It had nothing to do with 
the soulful, romantic family of the 18
th century (see also chapter 7).
831 
     All in all, the peasants were not in need  for markets to sustain. The main ‗economic‘ 
risk in those times consisted in bad harvests which could be followed by famines. Markets 
(at the local level) were only for the purpose of trading commodities that households had 
abundantly produced (although not for the purpose of selling them) against other goods 
they were not able to produce themselves. Trade therefore was only necessary to fulfill a 
supporting role for the self-sustaining household. In pre-industrial times, a household pro-
duced nearly everything it needed on its own.
832  
     With rising needs, especially of the urban bourgeois, for luxury goods, more commodi-
ties were traded on the market, including many  imported goods from abroad. Of course, 
peasants were too poor to afford those but with the emergence of a bourgeois clas s in the 
course of industrialization, needs changed. Even the proletarians wanted to consume more, 
as they felt that they thus raised their social status as they were able to imitate the wants 
and therefore also the taste of the rich. The merchant became t he unifying element of so-
ciety, who organized the distribution of commodities and resources for  general consump-
tion (see also chapter 7).
833 
     Additionally,  the concept of leisure time opposed  to  work was  unknown   in  pre-
industrial times. This distinction evolved later during industrialization due to fixed working 
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hours in factories. Festivities, and hence free time, were mostly related to the church with 
many rituals and customs (see below).
834 
     The pre-industrial German economy was thus not to a small part shaped  by the rural 
patriarchal family whose objective was not profit maximization but security and care. The 
individual was embedded into the family and hence into a wider social context. This was 
mirrored by a society  ruled by a sovereign as ‗father‘ of public order. The notion of the 
organization of workers in an impersonal factory system away from the feudal system 
seemed  impossible,  even  considered  the  existing  putting-out-system.  The  division  and 
process of labor remained inside the family, with female and children labor being defined 
as ‗care‘.
835  
 
5.2.2. The transformation from traditional household to capitalist economy 
     Although it has already been emphasized in chapter 4, it is worth repeating that Capital-
ism is a phenomenon that separates. It not only separates the place of production from the 
place where the product is sold, it moreover cuts out the business from the formerly ―in-
tact‖, integral house, separating people from their homes. This makes them feel that also 
their body and soul are separated and caught in an ―iron cage‖ that Capitalism created and 
maintained.
836 People had no choice but to take part in capitalistic development and were 
forced into perpetual struggle by external forces they had no command over.
837  
     As said before, until the industrial revolution classes were virtually immobile and rural 
life was bound to traditions and regulations that  provided stability and security but also 
prohibited social change and innovations.  Industrialization dissipated social collectives 
such as the church, the guilds and the village community which were not able to prote ct 
individuals to the extent they did before. Also the putting-out-systems, the home industries, 
were in the concentration process bit by bit replaced by production in factories, depriving 
the families even more of their economic foundation. It took several decades to overcome 
those institutional features but once people were freed from their feudal obligations they 
were left with nothing if they did not own land and thus had to move to the cities.
838 Nearly 
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half of Germany‘s population lived in poverty and affliction, was propertyless, uprooted 
and homeless.
839 
     I do not intend to picture the pre -industrial family life, especially that of peasants, as 
idyllic and unproblematic. Rather, industrialization merely uncovered the paucity of the 
rural population. Also, in providing additional income sources the industrialization enabled 
people to start their own family who otherwise would never have been able to.
840 The 
productivity in agriculture was growing, easing the effects of two famines in the 19
th cen-
tury but it was not able to accommodate the additional workers due to a growing popula-
tion from the 1840s on. Working positions in factories created by industrialization were 
used to absorb the redundant labor.
841 The new organization of family structures can thus 
not be evaluated as entirely negative but nevertheless it brought about irrevocable changes 
to the traditional lifestyle (see below). 
     For the peasant the change to factory work mostly meant moving into cities, leading a 
single life, subletting, and all this in a socially and culturally foreign surrounding. On the 
other hand, the wife, who was left behind, especially if some land  was owned, had to take 
care of all tasks now. This meant the omission of the gendered division of labor. Women 
became responsible for former male duties.
842 Additionally, social support, marriage and 
work licenses were granted only by the village of birth, particularly in Southern Germany. 
Therefore, many peasants waited as long as possible before moving away. Once people 
settled in the city, with its new forms of labor, accommodation and consumption, the fami-
ly lost, among many other aspects, its significance as production unit.
843  
     Due to the development and changing structure of the industries and thus institutional 
pressure, labor itself had to undergo transformations. Industrial lab or, ―in the sense of a 
stable, reliable, and disciplined group that has cut the umbilical cord connecting it with the 
land and has become suitable for utilization in factories, is not abundant but extremely 
scarce‖.
844 In Germany, workers had been raised in the strict discipline of a Junker estate 
which made them more amenable to the conditions of factory work, but still, the transfor-
mation was far from smooth. 
     Industrialization also meant the traditional family division of labor was being ques-
tioned and put under pressure. The family economy had to modify its structure to maintain 
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its functions of socialization and at the same time be able to fulfill the requirements of fac-
tory work. In other words ―a new form of family‖ had to be created.
845 Industrialization 
threw some members of the family into unemployment whereas others found new possibil-
ities of employment. The latter was especially true of women and children.  
     Before industrialization, sixty to eighty percent of the population worked in agriculture, 
in industrialized countries this was reduced to only about five percent, the biggest fraction 
of the population living in urban centers. Those upheavals caused qualitative changes to 
human employment as already described above.
846 Apart from economic aspects, social 
and moral conceptions of the population did change. This means that intuition was r e-
placed by rationality, instinct by calculation and precision.  Rapid technological change 
made constant learning necessary, and when in pre -industrial times old men were consi-
dered wise, they now seemed outdated. Division of labor in the factory led to precise but 
impersonal, indifferent relationships to fellow workers. The pre-industrial patriarchal fami-
ly was stable and provided social security for several generations. The industrial family is 
less stable with fewer functions because the state and society increasi ngly took over re-
sponsibilities.
847 
     In writing about the change of family structures during the process of industrialization 
from the traditional family economy to the modern urban household, it is important to dis-
tinguish two different developments. The first is the development of the peasant family on 
which I have focused so far. They became the proletarians of the cities, the working class, 
as described above. To those people the change was extreme, combined with a total d e-
struction of their living environment and behavior, causing total social uprooting.  
     The second development, no less important, concerns the wealthier part of the popul a-
tion, thus the changes to the middle and upper class households. Their positions as me r-
chants, entrepreneurs and factory owners made them the key players of industrialization, 
giving them a leading role for the economy as employers and investors. For those hous e-
holds the industrial revolution brought mainly advantages in an economic but also soci o-
logical sense. This aspect will be discussed in chapter 8. 
     As argued above, the transformation of social structures was more dramatic for the rural 
population, because they had lost their social and cultural surroundings and were forced to 
leave their homes for the sake of finding work and an income that would at least promise 
to guarantee subsistence. Although wages for day-laborer and unskilled workers were very 
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low, due to decreasing opportunities to find an income in rural areas, many people fled 
from the countryside into the cities, both men and women, if no property was owned that 
needed to be taken care of.
848  
     The structure of the paternalistic peasant household changed from a self-sustaining pat-
tern to a more and more dependent one, which needed a market to be supplied. The degree 
of dependence on supplies from outside the household differed, but basically change a l-
ready came with the emergence of the proto -industrial putting-out-system during the pe-
riod of early Capitalism. This system developed preferably in areas where ownership of 
land was divided between all children due to the prevalent inheritance system. In those 
areas, peasants were in need and also had the time for by -employments. Hence, those 
households had an additional source of income, which was nevertheless still integrated 
within the traditional household. Increasingly, the housewife was autonomously following 
her own trade; additionally she was responsible for the domestic producti on of industrial 
goods.
849 
     The (male) domestic head of the household became an ―agricultural business leader‖ 
who organized the production bearing in mind not merely the well-being of the members 
of the family but also concerned with the sales of the products on the market.
850  This 
meant that domestic production for one‘s own needs changed to production for the market 
and making profits, respectively. In the early stage of development the pater familias still 
incorporated both roles: the business and the domestic head of household, thus being the 
‗father‘ of his (extended) family, but having several additional objectives to fulfill. The 
first and most important ones of those are financing of future production and subsequent 
selling of products. Being the domestic leader of the household also implies a more com-
plicated bundle of aims: nutrition, health care, education of both children and adult mem-
bers of the household, community support; the combination of both sets of duties an in-
creasingly unsolvable problem. Still, the traditional family remained for quite a long time 
the institution that guaranteed the cohesion of wage labor, with the subsistence economy as 
a network for mutual help and exchange.
851 
     Once people started to move from the countryside into the cities, the hierarchical struc-
ture of the traditional household  eventually fell apart.
852 In regions where the single-heir 
system prevailed, the younger son was sent  away to become part of the permanent indus-
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trial labor force. Additionally, young people in particular moved wherever they could find 
work which caused them to be independent much earlier. Not restrained by tradition, they 
were able to marry earlier even without having accumulated savings as prerequisite for 
starting a family.
853  
     The appearance of manufactures had made people increasingly mobile, but the  cities 
were not yet prepared sufficiently for to the inrush of the crowds. Living conditions were 
due to lack of accommodation devastating. The urban population was not only faced with 
entirely different living conditions, but also with the risk of unemplo yment. This became 
more likely due to economic crisis which as a consequence made keeping a household 
more difficult and thus additionally destabilized family connections. Moreover, the d e-
mands of the labor market with the necessity to change jobs often made it hard for an indi-
vidual to keep his ties to his family active.
854 
     As a consequence, the head of the household lost his main function, to protect and to 
organize the work within the family household. In the course of that proce ss, he also lost 
his power over family members who were not bound to the strict hierarchy anymore.
855 
Simultaneously,  the status of the housewife was upgraded making her an increasingly 
equal part of domestic leadership. She also had to work in factories which also meant that 
she hardly had enough time for household chores and the education of her children which 
became far less socialized and increasingly neglected. The organiz ation of child-rearing 
and daily work had been possible in the conditions of the traditional household, but proved 
to be far more difficult while being employed in a factory. Childcare and housework often 
was done during her ‗leisure time‘.
856 Additionally, due to the interruptions of employment 
because of pregnancies and child birth, women were not able to establish a professional 
identity. For women, working simply meant getting additional earnings in undervalued 
replaceable positions.
857 
     As there was hardly time to care for and educate the children, the same is true for lea d-
ing something just remotely resembling the traditional family lifestyle that rural people had 
been used to before. Family life had to adjust its daily routines to the rhythm of working 
shifts.
858 Because the family got together only a few hours during the week, the authority 
of the head of household was diminished and the women increasingly had the responsibili-
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ty for the care for their family, for work, and for organizing all other matters of daily life. 
Women benefited by becoming relatively independent, giving birth earlier and faster due 
to better medical conditions which also gave them more control and freedom over their 
body and their lives. Some authors argue that due to a lack of living space as mentioned 
above, more and more women worked to escape the misery of their apartments.
859 Also, 
the street became a place of communication and living for adults and children alike.
860 
     Wages in general were very low. One income was often not enough to guarantee the 
subsistence of a family. This forced women and even children to work – the children often 
from the age of six or eight. Children were also needed in the factory to fill the gaps the 
vanishing apprentices left. Their low wages made them an unproblematic hire, thus for 
them and also for women work was often easier to find. Also, both children and women 
were not used to negotiating their salary and not in the position to demand better payment 
and  working  conditions.  Although  children  often  had  nearly  as  long  working  days  as 
adults, the low wages forced them to work even longer hours so they could contribute to 
the livelihood of their families.
861 Women were increasingly preferred as employees b e-
cause ―their labor is cheaper, and they are more easily induced to undergo severe bodily 
fatigue than men, either from the praise-worthy motive of gaining additional support for 
their families, or from the folly of satisfying a love of dress‖.
862 Hence, because of the 
work opportunities of the adult male being limited, he lost his status as chief breadwinner. 
Child work also meant that the father had no chance to teach his children his own trade.
863 
The possibility to send children into factories where they could add to the family income 
was an additional incentive for agricultural workers to move into the industrial centers.
864 
    Although working hours were not much longer than those on the farm, the  work in the 
factories was much harder due to the dirty conditions, heat and ear -deafening noise. The 
simple, reduced tasks of working processes involved only monotonous routines at m a-
chines and thus were tiresome. People faced the constant risk of injury, health hazards and 
early invalidity connected with old-age poverty. This, together with the lack of sleep, made 
the workers aged at the relative early age of forty.
865  
     To run a factory efficiently, a work discipline had to be established that was unfamiliar 
to the former farmers. Workers were required to work constantly and regularly to make the 
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machines profitable. Even talking and walking around, let alone being drunk, which was 
not uncommon in that time, were not allowed. People were also not used to having up to 
several hundred co-workers, the impersonal and abstract organization of work was alien to 
them. The first generation of workers reacted hostile to those conditions and did not like 
the long shifts with their rigorous controls. To discipline the workers, company owners 
punished them with money penalties or physical chastisements, especially in the case of 
children.
866 The regularity of working times meant that the starting and ending of a shift 
including the short breaks were exactly scheduled. Some entrepreneurs even confiscated 
watches from the worker so they would not notice when the clocks inside the factory were 
manipulated. It also meant that the notion of leisure time clearly separated from working 
hours was created.
867 
     The repercussions were especially hard for the menial staff of the traditional rural 
household, because in an urban surrounding they were not needed anymore. They formed 
the main body of the proper tyless labor force, the proletarians. Mostly, they had   not 
learned a trade and thus were only hired as day -laborers who were at the low end of the 
working class, the ‗lumpenproletariat‘. Besides working in factories, in particular the ma-
ids often also worked as servants in bourgeois households. In contrast to their former in-
volvement in a traditional household, domestic service was organized as wage earning re-
lation to secure the independence of the individual worker from the householder. This 
freed the individual from any personal relationships to his employer. Hence, like every-
thing else, also service became a commodity, like any other to be traded on a market. For 
the menial staff increasing independence was linked to the loss of the protection within the 
traditional household.
868 
  
     All in all, the family as such became economically dependent. The father lost part of his 
authority, traditional values such as professional identity, striving for independence, pride 
in the exercise and quality of one‘s own work got lost.
869 The education of the children, the 
subsistence of the family and the future in general became insecure and were questioned in 
the course of the industrial revolution. The only thing that mattered was monetary gain.
870 
Due to the small use of precautious saving and because of lacking opportunities for leading 
a proper household due to the cramped living cond itions, people spend and consumed all 
their earning to ease the hardship of their daily working life. As was already said before, 
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many people spend most of their free time on the streets and in bars to substitute for a 
missing home, constituting a ―half-open family structure‖.
871  
     Thus, the family as reference point was also missing in the leisure time, particularly for 
servants and former journeymen without any own family. Time after work had to be spend 
in new ways, which was mostly accommodated by the newly created infrastructure of res-
taurants,  pubs  and  bowling  alleys,  but  also  gymnastic  clubs  and  choirs.  A  whole  new 
worker culture evolved.
872 Those institutions, the friendly society in particular, had besides 
recreational functions also the task to save or withhold a part of the worker‘s income for 
inelastic expenditures such as funerals, sickness or old age. It served thus as savings bank 
and insurance company.
873 
     In conclusion, Capitalism was able to produce more goods that could be afforded and 
consumed even by workers but at the same time it did not cause a better and more equal 
distribution of those commodities within society. Only a small fraction of the p opulation 
gained of industrialization. The bigger part had to face the destruction of their traditions, 
habits and familiar surroundings. This further loss in social harmony between the classes 
later on resulted in uprisings, riots and in the end even revolutions in the 19
th and 20
th cen-
tury. This demonstrates once more the character of Capitalism for conflict and constant 
struggle as Weber and also Sombart described it. 
 
5.2.3. New institutions as precondition for economic development 
     The emergence of Capitalism marked the end of an epoch where ‗nature-given‘ inequa-
lities between humans were transferred into a system depending on one‘s social status. The 
social class an individual belonged to was no longer determined by birth but by the indi-
vidual‘s performance in society. Social positions were defined by new hierarchies between 
worker and entrepreneur, therefore between propertied and propertyless class. Until the 
industrial revolution, life was relatively simple and clearly arranged, taking place mainly in 
small villages and shaped by the obligations of the feudal system. The main concern of the 
peasants was the maintenance of the status quo for families over generations, although of 
course regional differences in the details of daily life existed, sometimes already accompa-
nied by proto-industrial structures.
874  
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     This static system was disrupted in the 19
th century by economic, technological, scien-
tific, demographic, social and cultural developments leading to migration into the cities 
and ushering in the end of the pre-capitalistic era. The most obvious effect of the new insti-
tutional system was thus a process of proletarization, which together with the pauperization 
of the rural population and the emergence of wage labor relations in a market economy 
lead to the destruction of the traditional character of the settled population. They were 
transformed into a new type of individual, ―migratory, lacking in self-respect and discip-
line – crude, callous beings‖
 875 of whom on the lower end of society the laborer and at its 
upper end the capitalist were an example.
876 
     Depending on the skill and the specific sector workers were employed in, they could be 
better off financially by working in a factory than by working in agriculture. Even then, 
Capitalism caused the destruction of the workers‘ social environment, e.g. their neighbor-
hood and their standing in the community and thus of all social and cultural relationships 
they were formerly embedded in. Even more than the economic exploitation which already 
from feudal times was known, this was the main cause of the worker‘s degradation. The 
economic process merely contributes to the destruction of the cultural environment be-
cause ―the goals for which individuals will work are culturally determined‖.
877 The disap-
pearance of the traditional institutions, the individualization and the atomistic dislocation 
of the human being from its ‗natural being‘ of the pre-modern society of the past caused 
the loss of self-respect and standards.
878 
     Capitalism separated labor from the househol d and thus made it a commodity to be 
traded on a market with its conditions negotiated by contracts. Contracts can be interpreted 
as a means of freedom, contrasting to the non-contractual institutions of kinship, neighbor-
hood and religion. These forms of social environment claim the allegiance of individuals, 
restraining their freedom, e.g. within the traditional household. To destroy those relations 
permanently, the spontaneous reinvention of traditional institutions had to be  prevented. It 
was feared that not to do so would harm the economic development of the country.
879 The 
experience of riots and revolutions such as in England during the 18
th century and also the 
memory on the French Revolution made entrepreneurs take precautions to prevent the or-
ganization of the workers. Especially the first generation of laborers despised the factory 
where they felt degraded and tortured. To prevent the association of workers with each 
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other, social structures were smashed and people were forced to work extremely hard and 
long hours, disciplined by the threat of corporal punishment. It was assumed that only an 
overworked and demoralized laborer would refrain from fighting for better working condi-
tions. Justification of such maltreatment could be found even in the economic theory of the 
time. According for example to Ricardo, labor markets could be regulated by keeping 
wages on subsistence level, thus forcing workers to sell their labor. High wages were not 
considered as an incentive to work, probably because during the first decades of industria-
lization people would only work until their livelihood was secured. The appalling condi-
tions  in  the  factories  required  disciplinary  action  to  force  the  workers  into  the  ―iron 
cage‖.
880 
     In Germany, the most brutal consequences of Capitalism were attenuated by the intro-
duction of a social law that protected the rights of laborers and helping to create a „middle 
class― which served as a buffer between the proletarians and the upper class (see also chap-
ter 8). For example, as early as in 1839, a law that restricted working hours for children 
was introduced, followed by the modern Social Security Acts, passed from 1883.
881 To 
achieve disciplined long-term employment,  bourgeois  entrepreneurs started to establish 
occupational housing estates and health and pension schemes, and as a means of personal 
identification and motivation for the workers. These models of ‗corporate families‘ used 
traditional patterns of peasant family life to create a mixture of cultural and material identi-
fication.
882 Thus, patterns based on ―kinship and community permeated the apparently im-
personal factory‖.
883 
     On the whole, the immense changes of family structures were long and painful due to 
rigid organizational structures. Unlike a factory, the family involves social and emotional 
characteristics and thus cannot simply adjust to external pressures by laying off family 
members or adding some more members. When put under pressure, family organization 
would often break instead of merely bend. The new social structures that emerged were 
more differentiated, and therefore better suited for a time of less stable institutions and 
permanent change.
884 
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     As a result, during industrialization the family became less important, and social struc-
tures were increasingly oriented towards the economy. Factory work arranged lifestyle in 
new ways, emphasizing the role of co-workers over those of family members.
885 
 
5.3. The role of the family for economic development in China since 1978 
 
"Gubiao qin beibei qin, zasui gutou lianzhe jin. -  
Cousins are close, close through generations, 
smash their bones, but they are still attached by tendons”.
886 
5.3.1. Chinese family structures before the Cultural Revolution: the ‗obstacle view‘ 
     In the Chinese social system families and kinship play an important role. Over time, it 
changed according to historical circumstances and is thus not a static structure. Family ties 
and kinship structures served specific functions depending on political and economic con-
ditions. Its basic unit is the patriarchal clan which can be divided into several smaller 
households. The Chinese family system traditionally exhibits a high degree of social soli-
darity before the background of parental authority connected with obedience and respect of 
the children. Those values and rules can be derived from Confucian ethic which constitutes 
the most important guideline for Chinese behavioral patterns. 
     The Chinese kinship system is evaluated very differently in the literature. The older part 
of it states that the pre-revolutionary family structure posed many obstacles to rational en-
trepreneurial  development.
887  Max Weber as maybe the most prominent author among 
those described the negative role of the ―sib fetters of the economy‖ which prevents the 
economy from growing (see chapter 4).
888 However, more recent research comes to anoth-
er, positive conclusion which regards the Chinese family as an engine for economic 
growth. It has been recently summarized by Ha-Joon Chang: ―First, take the case of Con-
fucianism.  Today,  many  people  argue  that  it  is  a  culture  that  is  inherently  pro-
developmental. Indeed, if we highlighted its emphasis on education, its notion of ‗heavenly 
mandate‘  (which  gives  some  important  voice  to  the  grassroots  and  justifies  dynastic 
changes), its emphasis on frugality, and so on, you cannot have a better culture for eco-
nomic development. However, if we emphasized its hierarchical nature (which is supposed 
to stifle creativity…), its penchant for bureaucracy, its detestation for craftsmen and mer-
chants (engineers and businessmen in modern terms), we cannot have a worse culture for 
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economic development. Indeed, until the 1950s, many people, including the East Asians 
themselves, argued that the East Asian countries were not developing because of Confu-
cianism….More importantly, over the long term, ‗traditions‘ are not immutable. Cultures 
and institutions themselves change, often dramatically‖.
889 
     In the time before 1949, the individual defined itself through the family, being bound to 
its kinship. In rural areas, those facts led to autarkic households, which would ask their 
neighbors for help only in emergencies. The household was self-sustaining, without the 
need of markets to be supplied with goods.
890 In a way, solely relying on one‘s family 
shows economic rationality, especially taking into account that no well-ordered property 
rights existed. Also, the tax system was random and arbitrary and the state, including its 
officials, could not be relied on. Thus, family ties served as a buffer against social insecuri-
ty and family members were the only ones who could be trusted not to exploit and dece-
ive.
891 As precaution, Chinese families aspire toward having  as many sons as possible to 
secure living in higher age. Therefore, an ideal-typical Chinese family was larger in size 
than the typical Western family. The self-sustaining family with several children was the 
answer to hard living conditions.
892 
    On average, Chinese families consisted of up to five generations, which often included 
the family of the sons. However, also many small families existed, due to the fact that sup-
porting several sons was costly. Women were expected to break with their own families 
after marriage and leave their families and often also villages to live with their families-in-
law. This meant that daughters were of less valuable for the family in terms of provision 
for old age. Much of the stability and strength of a family depended on how well the wom-
en could be dominated.
893  
     The view that the Chinese family poses an obstacle to economic development is based 
on several claims. The tone is set by Max Weber emphasizing the ―sib fetters of the econ-
omy‖ already mentioned above.
894 He considers Chinese families as constraint to the d e-
velopment of values and impersonal relationships that are necessary for the creation of 
modern enterprises.
895 The reason for such  an evaluation concerns mainly the defects of 
family run firms. He describes that the pattern of wealth acquisition was often given 
through family investment in the form of helping a scholarly member to obtain an educ a-
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tion, which later often resulted in a bureaucratic career. In turn, those officials could be 
used for favors, which in conclusion impeded the development of rational economic enter-
prises in the Western sense but is based on nepotism.
896  
     This is for Weber also due to strong family loyalties being based on Confucian values. 
The Confucian culture of authoritarianism, hierarchy, insularity and ethnocentrism fostered 
economic activity in the form of a family business rather than big independent corporations 
(see also chapter 4).
897 The Chinese family possesses a high degree of collective solidarity 
but requires also strict obedience to parental authority, as filial piety is a central Chinese 
value.
898 Family companies in comparison to modern corporations are regarded as an ou t-
dated mode of production more suited to an agrarian society. Due to their paternal structure 
they even impede the creation of independent industries. Although ―minor growth, innova-
tion and technological change may occur‖, they exist in a ―traditional equilibrium‖ of the 
Chinese economy which prohibits ―break[ing] the rigid and inhibiting bonds‖ of social and 
economic institutions.
899 As a result of these static traditional Confucian values, research-
ers claim, China failed to develop a capitalistic industrialized economy in the 19
th cen-
tury.
900  
     In these analyses, the view on the inside dynamics of  family businesses is often very 
negative. They describe that within these family enterprises, the individual family member 
is protected of outside discrimination. Resou rces are distributed according to the status 
within family, generating a lack of work discipline due to nepotism. In contrast, family 
members owe obedience to the father and head of the family firm.  Enterprises cannot ac-
quire labor from a free labor market, because family obligations make it necessary to fill 
open positions within the company with family members corresponding to their status 
within the family. Thus hiring, firing and promoting is not done according to one‘s skills 
but is owed to the position in the hierarchy of the family.
901 Also, it is impossible for 
young people to make themselves available on the labor market, and so cannot fully utilize 
their own abilities and strengths. On the other hand, talented non -family members hardly 
have a chance to get into managerial positions. Furthermore, women are not considered as 
independent individuals, the individual in general appears only as part of a family as mem-
ber of society, discouraging individualism and independe nce. Women mostly are not a l-
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lowed to actively contribute to economic production. Female members of the family are 
further discriminated in being left illiterate and, to fulfill their ideal of beauty, having their 
feet bound. Even though the latter practice is outlawed in 1911, boys are still more com-
monly preferred.
902  
     Through the lack of personal mobility the spread of ideas and technology is also slower 
if not non-existing at all. Beside the problem of nepotism described above, there is add i-
tionally the problem of growth and business size. Due to the fact that sons inherit equal 
shares of their father‘s company by tradition, it never manages to grow over a certain size. 
As merchants traditionally have no good standing within the society, families try to get 
away from their merchant status as soon as they can.
903 Once they have established effi-
cient resources, they buy land and send their sons (not daughters!) away to train for b u-
reaucratic careers. Those positions within the Mandar in
904 system are held in  high es-
teem.
905  
     The family system also develops a self -governing administrative authority within the 
village, mainly through the kinship organization and the power of the elders.
906 This des-
potic  ‗officialism‘  with  its  ―uninterrupted  continuity  of  the  ruling  class  of  Confucian-
schooled scholar-officials‖ leaves not much room for the development of a bourgeoisie and 
hence private enterprises. The purchase of land and buying sons into this officialdom ab-
sorbs all capital of the wealthy.
907  
     For Weber these features taken together prohibit some sort of ―business confidence" to 
arise. The traditional customs and filial piety impede the rationalism typical for bourgeois 
Capitalism of the West to emerge in China".
908 The risk-taking and innovation essential for 
such a system to work is not given in a conservative environment that values harmony and 
a static state structure.
909 In the West, family businesses have been replaced by professi o-
nally run bureaucratic corporations which help Capitalism and the industrial r evolution 
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thrive. The same is predicted for China. Only if Chinese people free themselves from fami-
ly obligations they can hope to establish rational, bureaucratic companies and compete 
with the West.
910 
     In 1949, when the communists assumed control over the country, they were determined 
to get rid of the familism of the Chinese Society. They believed that the traditional patrili-
neal Chinese family constituted a thread to modernization and an obstacle to Chinese d e-
velopment, as also many Western writers like Max Weber did, although for other reasons. 
They identified the family as antagonistic institution to the influence of ideology and n a-
tionalism.  
     Additionally, the Chinese way of doing business only with people they are somehow 
connected to, is considered as weakness by researchers. Thus, the skill to establish Guanxi 
networks, and more importantly, the time and effort required to set up such systems, di s-
tract from business, and furthermore promote corruption. Moreover, it is difficult for newly 
established firms to get into business because of their lack of Guanxi. Particularly in the 
modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960 the personalistic culture is regarded as the 
cause of China's failure to develop Capitalistic structures. The tone for this  kind of expla-
nation is set by Marion Levy already in 1949. She describes how the institution of family 
accounted for the failure of Qing China to modernize.
911 In the heyday of modernization 
theory many works separated societies into 'traditional' or 'modern', assuming they are 
converging in the long-run to a state of industrialization and thus developing into a mod-
ern, capitalistic [Western] economy. The viewpoint of that time is skeptical towards Chi-
na‘s chances for industrializing and developing a rational Capitalism.
912 The reason for this 
is the ‗accepted wisdom‘ that Chinese family firms represent an 'outmoded organization 
form', not able to transform in a way needed for a rational capitalistic economy with mass 
production. The ―family loyalty and obligations t[ake] precedence over other loyalties and 
obligations. Thus, the extended family tends to dilute individual incentives to work, save, 
and invest‖.
913 This leads to the conclusion that economic progress (of the West) would 
have been impossible without the loss of significance of traditional family structures. Con-
sidered how import family ties are for China, the reason for its underdevelopment seems 
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obvious. ―The fetters of kinship ties and overriding obligation to family and clan‖
914 are 
interpreted as ―incompatible with rational economic performance‖.
915 
     The clan had filled the institutional gap in Chinese social and political structure because 
it fulfilled duties like for example acting as juridical authority, lending money and protect-
ing its members.
916 The extended family acted therefore as a corporate body threatening 
the new Communist regime. For those reasons, the Communists tried to weaken and even 
destroy traditional family structures with political actions in order to win back control over 
the areas the clan had under its direction. A family law was enacted that outlawed polyga-
my and supported the rights of women. The latter was an important tool to support ind u-
strialization. Until that point, female labor power had been unutilized. After the enactment 
however, it served as an inexpensive production factor.
917 The CCP also replaced the tradi-
tional image of women with that of the ‗iron girls‘. In propaganda media they were de-
picted as heroic comrades, equal to their male peers, the rhetoric denying the notion of 
hierarchy and gender. These ‗daughters of the revolution‘ were expected to participate in 
production. However, the revolutionary rhetoric differed significantly from women‘s reali-
ties.
918 
     In the traditional society most peasants owned land and were self-sufficient. As a con-
sequence of the collectivism of agriculture after 1949 and the introduction of communes 
instead of clans, the peasant household was deprived of its economic base. Former family 
production was converted collective production. The peasants became hired farm workers 
with only little opportunity for economic diversification within the family.
919 
     The Communists wanted to undermine the authority and the central rol e of the family, 
inherited from traditional society. Traditional Confucian values of a harmonious society 
prevailed even in the time of Communism which became obvious when conflicts between 
the loyalty to family and to political authorities arose. These values required a son‘s loyalty 
to his family to stand above all other authorities. Disagreement was forbidden, because all 
relationships should be peaceful with each other, which in practice was not often fulfilled. 
For this reason, the family should be subordinated to the state.
920 The Communist Party 
also taught children to obey the party, not the family. Probably the heaviest impact on tr a-
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ditional society, based on Confucian culture that deemed it very important to have as many 
sons as possible, was the enactment of the one-child-policy.  
     However, the CCP never succeeded to fully suppress Confucian values because they did 
not take the tenaciousness of these values into account, which against their expectations 
even after the Cultural Revolution did not weaken but prevailed. Economic circumstances 
seemed to have little impact on family structures. Additionally, for a family to change sev-
eral generations are needed. Even considered that socialism endured a couple of decades, 
many people were still alive that were socialized in pre-communist times.
921 
 
5.3.2. Chinese family structures since 1978: motor of economic development?   
     The other side of the coin turns many negatives of the research mentioned before into 
something positive, reversing Max Weber‘s assessment. This is mainly due to a changed 
institutional environment which is prior to 1949 supporting the more impedimental fea-
tures. The pre-revolutionary institutions change in a way so to support the features that 
foster economic success in the competitive capitalistic environment of a market economy. 
Global capitalism with its features of flexible, transnational production favored small busi-
ness production over larger corporations and thus, subcontracting.
922 The ―predatory and 
irrational policies of political authorities and other external constraint [are] removed‖
923 
and now ―Chinese familism will fuel the motor of development‖.
924 
     Thus, when China slowly opened up after the economic reforms of 1978, the family 
proved to be the foundation from which the success of the Chinese economy can be ex-
plained.
925 Peasant families were allowed to lease land or invest in private firms. This de-
velopment was not derogated even with the limitations of birth control policies still in 
place. The collective times seemed to have built -up urge for more autonomy which then 
erupted in massive entrepreneurial endeavors, especi ally in rural areas. Entrepreneurial 
instincts were preserved and could flourish with the institutions provided by economic r e-
forms.
926 
     As a result, the Chinese family was changed but remained the most important social 
institution during the 20
th century, even after several decades of Communism. The rural 
family reconstituted, still serving as shelter against social insecurities, now in times of glo-
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balization and Capitalism. On the contrary, all the political and social commotion seemed 
to only have fortified the trust in the family as the only institution that is able to provide 
stability. After 1949, people had to get used to the ideology of the CCP and adapt to the 
new working conditions in collectives – and they learned to live with the risk of friendship 
and turned their personal relations into ones of comradeship. Even this did not destroy 
family ties, although it definitely changed them and at the same time reinforced the belief 
that strangers cannot be trusted.
927  
     In a way, Deng Xiaoping‘s reforms meant nothing else than a recourse to traditional 
social relations.
928 The Chinese family proved to be a remarkably adaptive social organism, 
able to respond to a complex set of circumstances, like the latest government actions. The 
Chinese family adapted and modernized without changing its fundamental principle as 
most important institution in the life of most Chinese. It is no contradiction that ―young 
women from rural areas may use their work in towns or cities to gain freedom from paren-
tal supervision and meet eligible marriage partners on their own, while at the same time 
they may send home part of their earnings with the understanding that their parents will 
provide them with a substantial dowry when they marry. Rural entrepreneurs may study 
how to use the latest technology to make their family-run factories successful, while spend-
ing some of their new wealth on ancestor-worship rituals, in the hope that the spirits will 
help if modern technology fails them‖.
929 This only emphasizes the longevity of Chinese 
family structures. Contributing to this is also the improvement of medicine resulting in 
extended life expectancy in rural areas. This  makes it more likely than ever to have three 
generations living under the same roof.
930 Parish and Whyte suggest that ―socialism or not, 
demographically the Chinese rural family has many resemblances with its counterparts in 
the past‖.
931 
     But still, even today Chinese tend to mistrust non-related strangers and thus employ 
mainly family members. The problem of unqualified successors is often solved in sending 
sons to good universities, preferably in the US or Europe. Another possibility is to strategi-
cally arrange for a marriage of one's daughter to a suitable son-in-law. Thus, nepotism still 
exists and families play a big role, but in the circumstances of today's economy it became 
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not an obstacle but an advantage, not to be institutionalized and hence not be able to grow 
as company over a certain size.
932 
     Nevertheless, it is a more complex picture that needs to be drawn. There is not ‗one‘ 
type of Chinese family and not ‗one‘ category of Chinese family firm, such as the self-
employed firm or the township and village enterprises (TVE).
933 Firms will succeed or fail 
depending on their leadership and decision-making structure, which can vary enormously, 
and even more so on externalities. However, in contrast to state -owned enterprises, con-
trols are always more latent which makes it necessary to rely mainly on personal relatio n-
ships. Only somebody with whom one a long-standing relationship is established can be 
trusted.
934 Particularly family ties are evaluated as creating strong loyalties which lead to 
economic success and motivation of the single family member. Mutual trust and obligation 
are the essential elements of familiarity and thus are also prerequisites for Guanxixue. I n-
side the family relationships based on a shared identity can be found, so although those 
binding ties are not limited to Guanxi, they serve as  foundation for potential Guanxi prac-
tice.
935 
     Sometimes, families are forced to send their children away to work in a non-family en-
vironment. Working as migrant workers not only means to be among total strangers, it also 
requires them to work even harder to be able to send some money home to support their 
family. Additionally, they learn as much as possible so they might be able to set up their 
own business in the future.
936 As Chinese people do not like to be employed by strangers, 
they work longer than necessary until they are able to open up their own enterprise or r e-
turn to their families.
937  
     Additionally, instead of creating laziness because young Chinese can be sure to get a 
(leading) position within the family business, they study hard for the sake of the family. 
Not only do they seek to get a good education, but once they start working they also work 
hard and long hours for less money than non-family members. Even if more money is of-
fered elsewhere, they tend to stay in the family business, thus providing continuity. Using 
family members for manager positions within the firm also provides the advantage of 
creating a ‗natural authority‘. Those features formerly interpreted as negative are now seen 
as positive. The same is true for the ―many mouths‖. Instead of them ‗eating away‘ the 
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surplus, the ―obligation to provide for not only the entire family and multiple heirs but also 
for a lineage estate and generations to come provides a powerful incentive for the firm 
head‖. On the same time the very same characteristic leads to a rapid reduction of fertility 
rates.
938 
     Business careers get increasingly attractive compared with the traditional high -status 
careers of bureaucratic official or landlords. When a firm is passed to the next generation, 
instead of buying land or investing in official positions, this creates a new ‗tradition‘ of 
family businesses. Even in the third generation many Chinese family enterprises have not 
established an institutionalized firm. The patriarch of the first generation often does not 
implement modern management structures but decides on the basis of personal relation-
ships to his employees. The second generation, mostly the sons, is seen as possibility to 
diversify the decision-making when the firm prospers and grows, with the effect that the 
head of family has not all power. At the same time, there is no loss of profit to outsiders 
because there is no need to employ external managers.
939 Rather, they entrust their sons 
with a subsidiary unit, for which they have the sole responsib ility, including the reinvest-
ment of profits. This creates another incentive to work hard to make one‘s own unit as suc-
cessful as possible within the family firm. When the patriarch dies, the firm is divided be-
tween the sons in equal parts - thus preventing a company to grow over a certain size as 
already mentioned above, but also giving each son the possibility of owning its own busi-
ness. This ―package of individual incentives and group insurance against failure […] en-
courages the emergence of highly motivated, risk-taking entrepreneurs.‖
940 On the other 
hand, family firms are not required to give positions to all family members. Relatives and 
even sons who do not show sufficient talent are driven out of the family business.  
      The limited possibility of companies to grow in size is now seen as advantage. They 
only require small start-up costs and adjustment to changed market situations is more flex-
ible. This situation also produces a highly competitive market environment – if one firm 
collapses, new ones fill the gap quickly. This is supported by the existing system of herit-
age described above. This mode of production is particularly efficient in labor-intensive, 
quickly-changing and segmented markets such as those for textiles, leather or the toys in-
dustries. Chinese family firms are successful because of their flexibility and ability to de-
cide quickly. They operate less successfully in capital-intensive sectors where, due to com-
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plex production processes, profits can only be made when a certain volume of production 
is reached (see also chapter 7). 
     This is related to the issue of Guanxi (see chapter 6). Big networks accumulated through 
Guanxi help small enterprises to get access to larger resources, even in an unstable political 
and economic surrounding, therefore further supporting their flexibility and the ability to 
adapt.
941 As mentioned in the chapter on Guanxi, especially in the time of Communism it 
is often used for favors. During that period of  ―impersonal cruelty and indifference‖, the 
more instrumental side of Guanxi is used. Tactics are emphasized more than ethics when 
using personal contacts. As Yang states, the ―cunning and instrumental tactics [are] re-
quired for survival‖. Even today it is for example used to obtain bank loans or supplies 
from unofficial sources, but the ―social yearning for more warmth and cooperation in so-
cial relations‖ shifts the emphasis of the ―choreography of Guanxi etiquette‖ again back to 
a more traditional ethic.
942  
     For an efficient use of Guanxi, a certain degree of familiarity has to be established b e-
tween two parties on the terms that then a shared personal experience exists. Through el e-
ments of trust and obligation, business can be simplified – for those being endowed with a 
sufficiently big network. The basis of such networks can be found in the family and kin-
ship; due to the nature of the relationship, a shared identity and a more ethical background 
of the connection can be ensured.
943  
     To conclude, the advantage of small family firms in business is their ability to produce 
at very low costs and to react very flexible to changes in the economy. Especially their 
possibility to produce with a minimum of labor costs compared to non-family owned com-
panies gives them a comparative advantage. Therefore, traditional forms of division of 
labor by gender and generation are recreated to achieve economic success. Also, ―despite 
the hectic pace of economic development, an often turbulent political environment and 
substantial weakening of the power of the older generation in Chinese families, obligations 
to parents and the larger family seem robustly intact‖.
944 This is not only a reaction to a 
relaxation of the Chinese economic environment, but is also due to changes in the world 
economy that supported flexible units of productions. These units are willing to subcon-
tract for large corporations and can adapt easily to changing market conditions, producing 
high quality for low cost. 
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     The domain of this new kind of Capitalism is the small Chinese family firm, which has 
been ―both a major engine of economic growth in the region and a key embodier of the 
cultural virtues seen as facilitative of economic success‖, which has the ―traditional, collec-
tivist, mutually beneficial Chinese family‖ as a foundation.
945 Chinese family firms are 
based on paternal authority and trust, not a legal system. It relies more on interpersonal 
relationships than individual rights.
946 Thus, the ―dynamics of the Chinese family are abso-
lutely central‖ for doing business.
947 
     In conclusion, both the obstacle and engine view are overly simplistic. As there are no 
timeless Chinese values, also the Chinese family is not immutable over time. Thus, de-
pending on the external institutional setting, it changed certain patterns while it kept other 
distinctive features and tendencies. In the contemporary institutional environment of China 
but also in the global economy, the Chinese family is able to fulfill the requirements of 
modern economic activity. Under the given circumstances it not only can fuel growth, but 
is also an important prerequisite for it.
948 
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6. Chinese Capitalism: Guanxixue  
6.1. A definition of Guanxi  
6.1.1. A general definition 
 
"If you want to 'go through the back door' (zour houmen), then 
you must first 'pull social relationships' (la Guanxi)". 
949 
 
     While  Western  Capitalism  following  Weber  required  that  feudal  institutions  be  de-
stroyed to create an institutional environment perfectly suited for capitalistic production, it 
is quite different for China. After 1978, traditional institutions were revived, which espe-
cially in rural areas was vital for its economic success. The (re)construction of a private 
sector and entrepreneurship parallel to the state and collective sector by means of personal 
networks, with the (extended) family as core organizational unit, led to a success which is 
largely unequalled in history. In contrast to many East European countries, this transforma-
tion from command to market economy, and thus to Capitalism, was achieved compara-
tively smoothly. The economic rise of China coincided with an increasingly flexible global 
production and thus the transformation increased its pace since the 1990s.
950 The Chinese 
population was able to resort to socio-cultural institutions, such as personal networks, from 
their own history, which were not forgotten during the time of communism. The family 
was the most prominent device for establishing small businesses and networks.  
     The Chinese expression for personal networks is Guanxi ( 关系). It is often translated as 
‗connections‘, ‗relationships‘ or ‗membership‘, but these terms do not reflect the entire 
range of Guanxi relations as Guanxi is ―a form of social capital that acts as a binding agent 
among social actors‖.
951 Guanxi describes the dynamics of constructing personal relation-
ships within networks and is a central feature of today‘s Chinese society. It is sometimes 
even called ―a third arm that evolution has created for the Chinese man‖.
952 Personal con-
nections between individuals consist in granting favors, receiving services or in gift-giving. 
It has to include Gănq￭ng (感情, ‗feeling‘) even in hierarchical relations. It reflects the 
depth of emotion within a relationship.
953 If the Gănq￭ng is disturbed, this means not that 
the emotions but the relationships of people are in disorder.  
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     Another important concept is that of face (miànzi 面子) and favor (Rénqíng 人情, reci-
procity, empathy
954). The latter means feelings found in friendship, family and kin rel a-
tionships but also ‗favor‘, etiquette and custom.
955 Rénqíng was introduced in The Book of 
Rites
956 and includes many virtues, like loyalty, justice, honesty and mutuality. It is the 
source of ritual (lǐ, 礼), which is also part of the Chinese expression for gift (lǐwù, 礼物). Lǐ 
also entails the sense of 'ethics' or 'etiquette', which mirrors the reciprocity of social rela-
tions.
957 The term stands for the proper conduct of social relationships and events that pre-
serve social order, thus, also standing for the emotion based on reciprocity.
958 Rénqíng is 
the moral obligation to maintain personal networks for reciprocal giving of complaisances 
or gifts and is intrinsic to human nature. It ―emphasizes the value of maintaining personal 
harmony  and  social  order  among  persons  situated  in  hierarchically  structured  relation-
ships‖.
959 It is understood as long-term ‗debts‘ established by receiving a gift, enduring 
even generations and failing to repay those debts causes loss of moral and social face.
960  
     The gift-giving relations of Guanxi can be understood as "total social phenomena", hav-
ing their own etiquette and rules.
961 Chinese people traditionally expect that for every giv-
en gift one will be given in return, which can also be done in providing mutual help.  It is 
the ethical part of Guanxi, embedding it on the one hand, but at the same time getting its 
meaning extended in guiding all relationships by rules of propriety. Certain rituals have to 
be employed that reflect the social status of the giving and receiving person within a nexus 
of personal relations.
962 The notion of reciprocity, obligation and indebtedness is essential 
for personal relationships, but can also have a tactical dimension to it.
963 It "is less a set of 
rituals than a cultivating of sensitivity to what is appropriate at any time, it provides the 
lubrication necessary to reduce social friction and it fosters the sublima ting of self-
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indulgence in daily interaction."
964 It is not only a normative standard but also a social me-
chanism for obtaining desired goods ―within a stable and structured social fabric‖.
965  
     Additionally, the idea of "face" (miànzi), meaning social status, propriety and prestige is 
an important factor of Guanxi. A social role has to be successfully performed and main-
tained, needing to be recognized by others. For example, not being able to return a favor or 
give a gift of equal value will cause the loss of face for a person. But also if the hierarchies 
are disregarded, 'face' is lost. The goal of ‗face work‘ is to create a certain self-image and 
favorable impression on others. Face can be derived by social status, sex or family back-
ground. Having miànzi facilitates getting privileges and acceptance through others.
966 To 
maintain face, permanent self-control is needed that also requires no t showing any emo-
tions. Open conflicts are also frowned upon, harmony has to be preserved. As a cons e-
quence, the profession of lawyers is not considered as very respectable and thus "power 
derives from role obedience and not from jurisdiction"
967, which also means that "the no-
tion of order excluded the notion of law".
968 
     Gifts connect people outside the family by the concept of reciprocity. The distinction 
between in- and outside is crucial as access to goods or support is limited to family me m-
bers or other people within the Guanxi network. ―Gift giving facilitates the movement from 
outsider to insider status‖.
969 Thus, it is a cultural concept with strong ethics, and serves 
also as ―a means for disciplining not only others but also oneself‖.
 970 Rénqíng bridges ―the 
gap between the known and the unknown‖.
971 Rénqíng is not equivalent to private, secret 
emotions but is a public socially structured phenomenon with clearly identified mutual 
obligations which means it can have a tactical dimension to it. This has implications to the 
relationship of Guanxi and corruption (s. below).
972  
     An essential element of personal relationships is trust. The meaning of trust in the Chi-
nese context differs from the Western understanding of the term. In the West, trust is often 
focused on systems or organizations so that the dependence on personal integrity and guar-
antee decreases. This reflects the willingness ―to rely on another party because of confi-
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dence in their credibility, competence and reliability‖. It depends on the law to bind a con-
tract, whereas in China default is prevented by a person‘s reputation.
973  
     The Chinese version of trust is referred to as Xìnyòng (信用, use or usefulness of trust, 
but also credit). ―It refers to credibility, integrity, trustworthiness or the reputation or cha-
racter of a person and in business circles it refers to a person‘s credit rating‖.
974 Possessing 
Xìnyòng and being trusted means that a certain behavior is anticipated and thus, that the 
rules of Rénqíng are followed.
975 Thus, it is a cultural concept with strong ethics, and 
serves also as ―a means for disciplining not only others but also oneself‖.
976 
     Guanxi is built on pre-existing links to people with whom a shared identity exist, like 
those from the same regional origin, classmates, co-workers, or people known from the 
military or university, creating fictitious quasi-kin-relationships.
977 The difference to inter-
personal relations in general is that ―this commonality of shared identification distinguish-
es kuan-hsi from ordinary social action. Kuan-hsi have quantifiable strength‖.
978 It enables 
―strangers [to] enter into a meaningful and sustainable social relationship‖.
979 These Guan-
xi  relations  are  also  so-called  ‚tong-relationships‘  (同,alike,  similar  and  co-,  as  in  co-
worker, 同事, tóngshì).
980 and can also be described as ―concentrical Guanxi circles‖, ex-
tending from the family as core reference point to extended zones.
981 Especially for people 
in rural areas Guanxi is more than just networks of personal relations; it rather constitutes 
―the very foundation of the society‖.
982 Guanxi is always based on personal relationships 
which are not transferable and are often used to influence others. Guanxi is a process of 
inventing and re-inventing relationships as ongoing ―social engineering‖.
983 It becomes a 
―cultural metaphor that enables people to imagine and position themselves in new relation-
ships‖ which has particularistic origins but is ―nevertheless applied generally and broadly 
beyond the confines of primordial relationships‖, creating a ―generalized particularism‖ 
and a unique form of civility.
984 
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    The Chinese society is neither group- nor individual-based, but rather ―based on inter-
personal relationships‖.
985 As to Chinese ―human life is a complex web of relations with 
the world, relations with the mind and relations to others‖
986, Guanxi is also embedded in 
most functions of everyday life, including political alliances, recreational and economic 
activities.
987  There are no separate  networks for business relations. More than that,  ―it 
seems that the Chinese are not used to compartmentalizing the different roles that they 
have with others and so treat the other person according to the requirement of the current 
role‖.
988 In contrast to most Western countries, there is no separate morality and different 
rules for business in China. Business affairs and private life are not detached, with separate 
behavior for each sphere. In So and Walker, 2006 a manager of a large Chinese company 
describes that ―one of the primary differences in the Chinese and Western ways of doing 
business could be traced to the fact that in the West business developed its own culture 
separate from private or personal culture, with a different set of rules and a character of its 
own. This is also expressed in the notion of xiaowo and dawo, the private individual self 
and the larger collective self, respectively. The first should be constantly improved and 
cultivated, whereas the latter embeds the xiaowo in society. Both are inseparable and shap-
ing each other. Both selves use different forms of Rénqíng for communication, a more offi-
cial form of polite Rénqíng that serves as universal code for correct behavior and a more 
tacit, indirect version of gift exchange below the surface of ―politeness and gallantries‖. 
The interdependent relations of the both selves cannot be analyzed by the dichotomous 
Western concept of private and collective.
989 
     Hence, in the Chinese context there is no separate morality for business. There are no 
separate rules that divide the conduct of business from that of personal affairs, in which the 
key factor is proper human relations. A successful business relationship between Chinese  
companies begins with the establishment of a personal bond between the principal manag-
ers of the companies and is based thereafter on the careful  maintenance of these personal 
ties‖.
990 Guanxi at the same time considers societal ethics and individual utility, however 
conflictive this may be. Business partners balance on a knife‘s edge between friendship 
and profit, altruism and rivalry, social harmony and competitive advantage.
991  
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     This goes as far as not developing Guanxi with a particular person at all to avoid the 
mutual commitment because ―it is not possible to behave in very different ways when act-
ing in different roles in relation to the same person‖.
992 Accordingly, there is also the wish 
for harmony on the private and societal level which is prioritized over individual liberties. 
Consensus and co-operation are preferred to confrontation. Traditionally, the individual 
perceives itself as part of a whole that hinges on mutual support and respect. It is a hierar-
chical-patriarchal model found within the family but also vis-à-vis the state.
993 A Chinese 
individual typically defines itself ―in relation to others (within the family)‖ which ―results 
in greater tolerance of others, greater self-discipline, and in a constant concern for preserv-
ing harmony with others‖.
994  
     However, although it is mostly the family which is particularly important for starting a 
business, also non-kin can be included if people are seen as family-like and if they can be 
trusted because long-term relationships based on Gănq￭ng exist.
995 Thus, the core group, 
even of larger enterprises, consists often in family members or good friends.
996 
     On a general level, Guanxi can be compared with the theory of social capital, outlined 
above in chapter 3. However, when examining both concepts more closel y, it becomes 
clearer that Guanxi is an ―indigenous Chinese category‖ that includes mutual obligations, 
indebtedness in a reciprocal relation.
997 This constitutes a structure that is more than ―simp-
ly an issue of social embeddedness and social connections; it is a system of gifts and fa-
vors…and there is no time limit on repayment‖.
998 It can be said to be most similar to 
Bourdieu‘s concept of social capital, in that it needs continuous efforts to be maintained. It 
differs from his as well as all other concepts presented in chapter 3 in that it is not oriented 
towards immediate utility in the present or future. It further differs from Putnam‘s defini-
tion, which claims that social capital is manifested in civil engagement and membership in 
clubs, parties or other associations and thus is rather formal in nature. Guanxi in contrast is 
based purely on informal relations, as has been elaborated in detail above. The concept of 
Guanxi differs most starkly from the more economic interpretations of Coleman, Burt and 
Dasgupta of social capital. In contrast to Coleman‘s assessment of social capital, Guanxi is 
neither a public good, nor can it be accumulated by corporations or collectives. It is also 
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not a static concept, as Fukuyama claims. However, Guanxi is still a form of social capital 
in the sense that is a moral resource and a sum of social relations and informal rules that 
facilitates co-operation within society. 
 
6.1.2. Traditional Guanxi: the rural Rénqíng gift economy  
 
“Yuan qin bu ru jin lin. – 
Distant relatives are not as dear as close neighbors“. 
“Gong zhang bu ru lao xiang. – 
An official seal is not as good as a fellow from the same hometown”.
999 
 
     Guanxi network can take on a more moral form or be more instrumental in purpose, 
which is often also a matter of geographic placement as there seems to be a strong dichot-
omy between rural and urban networking behavior. The first is a more traditional form of 
Guanxi, whereas the latter is mainly used in business practices. Clearly, this dissertation 
does not imply that Guanxi can be reduced to a traditional vs. modern or rural vs. urban 
type, but the distinction is useful to elucidate the various functions that Guanxi can have in 
Chinese society.
1000  
     However, the traditional form, typically taking place in rural areas, is a more morally 
bound exchange network, ―reproducing [itself] through an endless process of gift-giving‖; 
the urban one is more an instrument to construct ―webs of particularistic ties‖
1001 to serve 
economic goals. This means that for the first kind the Rénqíng rules are more important, 
whereas for the other it is the more instrumental Guanxi that regulate people‘s behavior. It 
is also worth noting that Rénqíng is traditionally more exercised by women, because they 
tend to be more attentive to obligations, debts and reciprocities in interpersonal relations, 
whereas men often tend to the more instrumental art of Guanxi, found also in business rela-
tions, serving as a substitute or at least as a facilitation of market relations.
1002  
     The traditional type of Guanxi consists  of an exchange network that strongly depends 
on mutual gift-giving, reminding of the ancient gift -giving economy. It is important to 
keep in mind that Guanxi customs differ among regions.
1003 In this analysis, I will mainly 
use a case study done by Yunxiang Yan in a Northern Chinese village
1004, which provides 
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a specific example but hopefully also serves as instrument to illustrate the traditional form 
of Guanxi. 
      In general, kinship ties and a tradition of mutual assistance and obligation are of great 
importance on the countryside. More than just being networks of personal relations, Guan-
xi rather constitutes ―the very foundation of the society‖.
1005 Economic gains are only a 
small part of the significance of Guanxi but rather an essential part of rural human exis-
tence. Either individuals have personal relations – then they are part of society (shèhuì 
shàng  de  rén,  社会上的人,  people  in  society).  They  are  considered  ―dead  doors‖  (sǐ 
ménzi死门) if they are not actively participating in creating personal connections and there-
fore are not at all involved in social exchange and therefore part of society.
1006 It is impor-
tant to establish networks with a large number of people who may vary in social and occu-
pational position as well as geographical location. 
     Within rural Guanxi, Yan differentiates three different local categories of Guanxi. The 
personal core entails the closest family, a reliable zone which consists of good friends and 
less close relatives and an effective zone of friends and family in a broader sense.  
     In the first one only immediate family is part of the ‗inner circle‘. Being a member of 
that is linked to mutual duties and rights. The people who belong to the reliable zone can 
be counted on for help; the distinction to the personal core is not always entirely clear de-
fined. Also neighbors and non-kin relations of equivalent status can be found within this 
zone. The last one is the one that is open to recruitment, and is often used for economic 
purposes, especially to interact with strangers outside the village community, subsuming 
also ―non-kin superior-subordinate relations‖.
1007 
     Of course, Guanxi is not a static structure but a dynamic process which requires en-
gagement and social exchange to keep up with existing relations, redefining, adjusting and 
creating relations every day. Practically, this is mostly done by gift-giving, which has of-
ten, but not always, the function of a ritual and is strongly routinized. A personal network 
consists of shou rén (首任) - familiar persons - and Guanxihù (关系户) - a Guanxi house-
hold. The latter is understood as a person to whom an obligation has to be fulfilled. Shou 
rén are individuals from whom favors can be asked.
1008 Networks are defined and visible 
through the ritualized gift-giving. The number of gift-givers shows its size because every-
one within one‘s Guanxi network is obligated to offer a gift at certain occations. The size 
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of a network depends mainly on the effort of individuals to expand especially their reliable 
and effective zones. Social distance is symbolized by the value of a gift and the occasion 
when it is given. Everyone is aware of the rules of gift-giving, whether it is how much to 
give or when it is appropriate to present a gift. For practical reasons, villagers often use 
gift-lists they can refer to when they need to make gift in return. It is also differentiated 
between gift-giving among family and kinship during festivals (like Lunar New Year) and 
"giving Rénqíng". The latter takes place at weddings, funerals or other ritual occasions and 
is in contrast to the first voluntary. This means, that there are no fixed amounts or types of 
gifts which gives the opportunity to show affection and establish personal relations.
1009 
Gifts have the attribute to be generous and voluntary but at the same time creating oblig a-
tions that must be reciprocated, with the failure to do so placing the recipient in a subord i-
nate position.
1010 
     In his article, Yan defines a ―social space of Guanxi‖ which identifies the degree of 
intensity of personal relations, with a very clear-cut border between the inside and outside 
of a village community.
1011 This social space also constitutes the society for an individual, 
which is why Guanxi is also called shèhuì (society). As mentioned above, individuals, who 
do not interact and therefore do not have any kind of Guanxi, are not considered a respect-
able person (bùhuì zuòrén). This can have severe consequences for those individuals in 
times of emergency. One of the most important features of Guanxi is the mutual support 
during hard times, which during the 20
th century was especially true for the decade of the 
Cultural Revolution, when Guanxi in general became more instrumental (see also below). 
Peasants had to maintain good relations with officials through gift-giving or other social 
favors to ensure to be assigned to lighter work or receive better work evaluations. Also, 
young people 'sent down' to the countryside had to put much effort in building up networks 
to be able to return to the cities as soon as possible again. Nevertheless, the notion of "giv-
ing Rénqíng" also never died during the Cultural Revolution even if the peasants were or-
dered  to  refrain  from those  'feudal' traditions because  they represent a  "wasteful prac-
tice".
1012 
     Whereas in cities it is possible to interact among total strangers, in a village community 
all activities will be with people connected through Guanxi. This means, an individual will 
intermingle mostly with people from its network who are the same ones exchanging gifts 
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on a regular basis. Historically, this was very important, because due to instable social 
conditions, only people with whom a long-standing relationship was established could be 
trusted.
1013 
     Thus, for Guanxi connections family structures are very important, the closest conne c-
tion always being immediate natal family. Personal relationships are mostly not built upon 
individual autonomy but rather inherited through already existing networks of one‘s fami-
ly.
1014  
     Guanxi is a dynamic structure with constant interactions necessary to establish new ties 
or to sever old ones. Individuals need to take care of the people in their network by giving 
assistance in everyday life, therefore fulfilling all kinds of obligations, such as gift-giving. 
Hence, cultivating Guanxi can get very complicated and also economically costly, as gifts 
need to be of a certain value to be accepted. Additionally, building and maintaining a 
Guanxi network entails huge social costs and is very time consuming. Particularly during 
socialist times, gift-giving was often limited by poverty and state restrictions . Yang gives 
the example of a woman leaving the countryside to work in Beijing. Although she would 
very much like to go back for visits, she simply cannot afford it. The gifts necessary for all 
acquaintances would cost her the wages of several months. But going back without provid-
ing the necessary gifts would cost her social credit and face. Visiting also means to  be 
forced to accept invitations to countless banquets. Without having the means to either re-
turn the many invitations or give adequate gifts, the  visitor has no choice but to refrain 
from visiting her home village at all.
1015 This shows clearly that gift-giving not only entails 
a material side but maybe even more a symbolic one, as expressed in the term 'face' already 
mentioned above.  
     Women play an important role in maintaining inter -village or inter-lineage relations. 
Especially married women who moved to their husbands' villages keep close links to their 
natal families and home villages. Also, females are additionally often responsible to main-
tain, expand or establish relations within their own village in their exchange of cooked 
goods or childcare. It is interesting to note that the female component of relations is mostly 
the horizontal one, bringing different social groups together, while the male sphere is to 
"fix individuals into kin groups based on a tracing of roots", thus providing stability and 
security.
1016  
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    To conclude, traditional Guanxi emphasizes gift-giving on a local level and is less con-
cerned with a more instrumental and what Yan calls extended form of Guanxi.
1017 Never-
theless, it shows an inverse relation between material loss and symbolic gain. Thus, co n-
trary to Western rational thinking, giving away wealth and generosity helps gaining mo n-
ey, and, probably even more important, helps to maintain and develop social status and 
facilitates doing business.  
 
6.1.3. Guanxi as evolving institution 
     As already mentioned in chapter 4, the ―art of Guanxi‖ or ―the art of personal relation-
ships‖, also called Guanxixue, means the ―study of connections‖ or ―Guanxiology‖. It em-
phasizes  „the  binding  power  and  emotional  and  ethical  qualities  of  personal  relation-
ships‖.
1018 It is also defined as a ―gift economy‖ because it calls upon obligations such as 
giving, receiving and repayment and unifies material and moral, symbolic aspects of life. 
The gift is never fully separated from the giver, establishing an indissoluble connection.
1019  
     Although Guanxi defined like this cannot be said to be utilitarian, it can still expose 
signs of instrumentalism, in the sense that generous gift-giving serves as a means to invoke 
reciprocity therefore also certain intentions. Hence, there are voluntary and forced el e-
ments of giving and thus of Guanxi.
1020 Most notably during the post-Mao era of the 1980s 
and 1990s, particularism and instrumentalism increasingly dominated behavior, using ritu-
alized relationships to gain material benefit.
1021 Guanxi in this sense emphasizes its instru-
mental side but in general is a very complex phenomenon. Guanxi is not only a ―strategi-
cally constructed network of personal connections‖ that deals with bureaucracy to the end 
of accessing desirable resources, it is additionally intertwined with social institutions such 
as family, kinship, neighborhood and community.
1022 Due to Chinese society changing 
very quickly with some kind of Guanxixue being in use in all epochs, it can be said it is 
―best treated as a multifaceted ever-changing set of practices‖.
1023 
     Guanxi has a long history in China and proved to be very adaptable in the past, espe-
cially its changing utilization in different historical circumstances. Although the concept of 
Guanxi can be traced far back in Chinese history, its re-emergence can be attributed to the 
Cultural Revolution. Guanxi as a social practice is able to adapt to new institutional ar-
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rangements, be it socialism, be it Capitalism, but it is still not a timeless feature indepen-
dent of political context. Even before the Cultural Revolution it was custom to give ban-
quets and gifts in a reciprocal manner. It would therefore be easy to conclude that China 
has always been a personalistic, kinship-oriented society. As much as this cannot be dis-
missed as wrong, it still oversimplifies culture as being a static phenomenon. Cultural and 
social structures are dynamic and subject to changes over time. Cultures are changing and 
personalism may change or be reconstructed, which can be shown in the description of the 
difference between traditional and modern Guanxixue, which indicates the historicity of 
Guanxi.
1024 
     However, the Cultural Revolution is often seen as turning point for relationships b e-
coming more manipulative. This decade is also associated with declining moral standards 
in society. The results of relationships are not  mere material gains or granted favors, but 
―the discernment, acuity, and cunning needed to get by in life‖ affected the essence of con-
nections.
1025 That is due to th e fact that in the time of the Cultural Revolution cutting 
through bureaucratic procedures was hard. It was necessary to ensure the supplying of r e-
sources or even surviving due to the loss of social order and organizational discipline with-
out personal connections. The Cultural Revolution therefore ―unleashed ‗feudal remnants‘ 
of thought with people more relying on personal relations than the state due to the social 
chaos of the time".
1026 The Communist Party also tried to  substitute friendship by com-
radeship. The latter required people to treat all personal contacts equally. An ―absence of a 
private ethic to supplement the public ethic and support the commitment of the individual 
to his friend‖ was created.
1027 
     The Cultural Revolution made social life highly politicized and unpredictable, living 
standards  stagnated.  Due  to  the irrationalities of the system, Guanxi  exchange  became 
highly political, serving mainly the purpose of getting permissions or facilitating other bu-
reaucratic necessities.
1028 It was assumed that Guanxi as supposedly less efficient instit u-
tion would vanish in favor of contractual relations in a fully established market economy 
because in a modern rational capit alist society with contractual certainties, freedom of 
trade, prices determined on a free market, private savings and tradable factors of produ c-
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tion Guanxi is made obsolete. Quite the opposite has been the case: Although the necessity 
to overcome bureaucratic hurdles was waning, Guanxi practices increased enormously in 
the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. Guanxi adapted to the new institutions in the 
emerging ―capitalist developmental state‖, rather than fading away or being exchanged for 
rational-legal institutions imposed by the state able to allocate goods independently of per-
sonal networks.
1029 Guanxi became a more material exchange during the 1980s to facilitate 
the reviving of the private sector during economic reforms. While m ostly ordinary people 
practiced Guanxi during the planned economy, it b ecame an instrument of businessmen 
afterwards.
1030 Guanxi is often seen as a ―shortcut around, or a coping strategy for dealing 
with, bureaucratic power‖.
1031 Due to a Chinese bias against codification, key skills for 
doing business in China ―are [...] those of negotiation; the name of this game is not to eco-
nomize on bounded rationality or to exorcise opportunism but to capitalize on them in a 
linked network of hierarchical face-to-face relationships in which personal power is traded, 
using loyalty, compliance, and protection as the medium of exchange‖.
1032  
     During the rural economic reforms of the 1980s, it was also highly essential to engage 
in Guanxi. With the growth of rural enterprises, peasant entrepreneurs had to employ in 
networking to obtain resources and secure markets in other regions. Part of running an en-
terprise is always to maintain good Guanxi relations, especially to government officials to 
ensure the provision of supplies.
1033 Interestingly, as a result of social reforms, cadres lost 
some of their power. This often is made visible in not giving gifts  for example at a wed-
ding which is one of the most i mportant occasions to display one‘s prestige. Usually, the 
status of a person can be measured in the amount and value of gifts received. Chinese 
would typically give presents to their village leaders at such events to recognize their high-
er standing. Thus, to Chinese refusing to give a present is an obvious sign of lost power 
and face living in rural areas, especially in rural areas.
1034 
     Another aspect of Guanxi is migration. To be able to move into a city to seek emplo y-
ment is much easier if connections to people already living there have been developed b e-
cause they might provide accommodation and food.
1035 Guanxixue became again the in-
strument for economic survival, although on different grounds. In the competitive econ o-
my of China, entrepreneurs needed to make sure that they could keep up with the market, 
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to retain, or even better, to raise their profits and to build up good connections to officials. 
This increasingly contained also monetary purposes and the replacement of formerly unpa-
id favors for paid services. However, monetary relations lack Rénqíng, which means that 
instead of engaging in Guanxixue, people engage in more business-like ―cash nexus‖
1036 
relations to others. Increasingly money is preferred instead of receiving non-monetary gifts 
because it can be exchanged into something else more easily. This changes the nature of 
Guanxi, because ―in many cases money payment has lifted the veil of the language of 
friendship and made explicit the exchange of material interests‖, leaving no debt on either 
side.
1037 
     Thus, from the 1990s Guanxi once again served political and  economic intentions, but 
changed the realm of its appearance. While it faded away in some areas due to the appea r-
ance of legal institutions which replaced it, it simultaneously found "new territory to colon-
ize".
1038 All in all, those changes did not reduce the extent of usage of Guanxi. The gift -
economy yet coexisted with the new form of commodity economy, having significance for 
commercial transactions, because still money cannot buy everything. On the contrary, it 
helps to save money and to facilitate economic transactions, especially for supplies, in by-
passing state institutions for e.g. getting a passport, finding job opportunities or linking up 
with relatives overseas.
1039 Some authors
1040 argue that because of the legal institutions 
newly introduced by the state, Guanxi is not necessary an ymore. It is easy to fall into the 
trap of this argument, because it is often not openly admitted, especially by bus inessmen, 
that they actually engage in Guanxixue. As Guanxi is often associated with corruption and 
bribery especially managers would never  officially claim to use Guanxi as a means of 
business. 
     The fact that Guanxi is often used for business transactions gave rise to an again new 
form of Guanxi that requires doing business with officials or concluding business contracts 
in a less formal environment, namely by enjoying nightlife. As Yang states, this is less an 
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exchanging of gifts but rather, and I would like to quote her literally on this: "No longer 
are gifts or banquets sufficient in these new Guanxi rituals, but a long night sharing the 
pleasures of masculine heterosexuality and giving women's bodies and sexual services as 
gifts will cement Guanxi better."
1041 Thus, strengthening Guanxi through masculine bond-
ing brings Chinese business culture closer to that of other Asian countries and emphasizes 
the practice of Guanxi as a more male instrument (see also below, chapter 6.3). 
    To sum up, there are mainly two institutional changes to the Chinese economy: the i n-
troduction of a legal-rational regime by the state and the "increasing class and gendered 
nature or Guanxi".
1042 Thus, this again is a proof that ahistorical Chinese values do not 
exist. Rather, Guanxi is "a historically evolved regime of kinship and eth nic power" that 
today "traps women and the poor while benefiting fraternal business associations".
1043 It is 
formed during the process of change of the economic system in the Chinese society. A l-
though for example  Rénqíng is based on traditional Confucian values, the extent of its 
usage among business managers cannot be estimated. Thus, beside Guanxi there are also 
typical  Capitalistic  features  such  as  profit-seeking  or  exploitation  of  workers  to  be 
found.
1044 
    As also already mentioned before, Guanxi is a way to bypass bureaucratic obstacles "by 
redistributing what the state apparatus had distributed according to very different principles 
of personal relations rather than political evaluations".
1045 Guanxi exchanges institutiona-
lized dominance with personalized power of people. The need to constantly cultivate and 
maintain connections therefore seems to fit to an environment where power -relations are 
not (yet) stable. Additionally, institutions, for example for acquiring academic degrees or 
property, may still be subject to change. Often, personal networks survive, even if family 
firms change their business or seize to exist. In those circumstances it is still rational to use 
Guanxi, although it may be time-consuming and costly. Yet, this does not imply that once 
rational-legal institutions are established, Guanxi as more irrational mode of economic 
activity will fade away. Rather, it will coexist in a newly defined institutional and cultural 
style of modernity.  
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6.1.4. Modern type Guanxi: the urban art of Guanxi and business practice  
 
“When there are problems, we can always talk it through. With Europeans, 
it‟s quite different. We work with many multinational companies…They are 
not flexible. They won‟t compromise and let you go [if you need to make  
adjustments]. They don‟t share our mutual understanding.  
The Europeans go according to the books and rules”.
1046 
 
     Especially in urban China the exchange of gifts has mostly instrumental reasons. Within 
China many people consider this type of Guanxi as an antisocial behavior purely for ones‘ 
own self-interest and because of this, particularism is morally rejected. Particularly when 
dealing with bureaucracy, it can be difficult to differentiate Guanxi from corruption. This 
issue  will  be  discussed  in  detail  below.
1047  Nevertheless, also the instrumental side of 
Guanxi can have moral aspects and serves as a social function. It therefore not only has an 
instrumental, manipulative side of mutual exchange, but entails also the notion of emotion-
al feeling for the  acquaintance. Additionally, it reveals a resistance to and a mistrust of 
formal organizations in sidestepping official ways of, for example, obtaining employment 
or loans. 
     The range of occasions to use Guanxi in cities covers many aspects of ever yday urban 
life, such as housing, facilitating transportation or better education. One other important 
end for Guanxi is to obtain supplies, which again was especially essential during the Cu l-
tural Revolution, when the production of consumer goods was low. It was also important to 
get rare or high quality products, such as a certain brand of bicycles. Another important 
area was employment. Personal relations were needed to get a job, to change a job or to be 
promoted. 
      As was mentioned before, also moving geographically was much easier if one knew the 
right people because due to the 'household registration' moving was very restricted. To 
change the place of registration was a long process of bureaucracy, intensified when migra-
tion from the countryside increased after the economic reform in 1978. With Guanxi, also 
getting better health-care could be ensured and changing to a certain hospital or doctor was 
made possible. Doctors are particularly important people with whom developing personal 
relationships is especially important due to their role in the system of state-medicine.
1048 
    The range of Guanxi relationships in urban areas had and has more categories than in 
rural areas, entrance and exit to networks are flexible. Not o nly family and kinship are of 
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importance, but also relations to neighbors and other native-place ties and non-kin connec-
tions of equivalent status such as superior-subordinate relations. Especially the kin-like 
relationships that are maintained with neighbors have the purpose of substituting missing 
family which might still live in the countryside. Neighbors are close in a spatial sense and 
share the same experiences. This is even more the case if people stem from the same re-
gion or speak the same dialect. Another important part of personal urban networks are 
(former) classmates, but of course also teachers or bosses, which can result in a lifetime 
relationship. Non-kin-relationships, such as people from the military or university, became 
more important in urban areas, creating fictitious or quasi-kin-relationships. Family meta-
phors, such as the usage of kin-related vocabulary such as ‗dìdi‘ (弟弟, younger brother) or 
‗bóbo‘ (伯伯, fathers elder brother) served the purpose to bring people from outside the 
family into an inner circle.
1049  
     Apart from the more social aspects of urban life, Guanxi is obviously of impo rtance to 
business relations.
1050 This means, that the very idea of kinship of loyalty and trust is ca r-
ried over as principles of urban (business) relations, which are seen as less ―confining‖ and 
―more enabling‖.
1051 Those people are seen as family-like and thus can be trusted because 
long-term relationships exist. With them it is possible to found enterprises, exchange in-
formation and share resources. Thus, only the more positive aspects are taken over from 
traditional, rural Guanxi, leaving out the rigid hierarchy aspect.  
     In urban environments where the state is very dominant, Guanxixue is mostly used to 
cut through boundaries given by administration.
1052 The networks created with non-kin are 
the seed from which private entrepreneurship stems.
1053 If two enterprises want to coope-
rate, it has to happen on the base of Gănq￭ng. In other words, the network will only work if 
personal trust exists, especially between the two managers of the firms. They need to find a 
person they trust, which means nothing else that long-term relationships have to be estab-
lished. Thus, the core group, even of larger enterprises, often still consists of family mem-
bers or good friends.
1054 
     After the economic reforms there had been increasing exchange between rural (family) 
and urban enterprises, due to the bigger networks of personal relationships outside the fam-
ily, especially of the latter. Also, there are exchanges between companies of overseas Chi-
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nese and firms in mainland China that take on the form of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), but which is nevertheless based on Guanxi. The establishment of capitalistic enter-
prises within a socialist system raises a wide range of problems. Many entrepreneurs utilize 
social ties especially to Chinese relatives in mainland China who might be able to facilitate 
and speed up the negotiations of investment. The same is often done in customer negotia-
tions. It is easier to do business with a certain person if a Guanxi relation has been estab-
lished. Also, customers prefer to do business with whom old relations exist on which this 
new connection can be based on.
1055 Increasingly, also Western companies under non -
Chinese leadership engage in Guanxi to facilitate business. During the last year, dozens of 
studies and surveys in business and marketing journals
1056 were published ―to help busi-
ness practitioners in China, especially those from the Western countries, to gain a deeper 
and more practical insight into the Chinese social network, and to help them make effec-
tive cross-cultural adaptation and business decisions in the unfamiliar cultural environment 
of China‖.
1057 
     This strategy relies mainly on social factors without the involvement of legal contracts, 
especially when acquiring new customers  and  business  partners.  This process involves 
dinner banquets and gifts, for example cigarettes or alcohol. In contrast to the often diffi-
cult negotiations common in joint venture investments, involving Chinese state enterprises 
and foreign companies, investments based on Guanxi are established much faster.
1058 Gift 
exchange serves the logic of a Capitalism just emerging within a socialist society, which 
still has gaps in its legal system and lacks the institutions which enable it to establish e n-
terprises in a rational, exact procedure. Guanxi can thus be regarded as a substitute for 
formal institutions.
1059 Those market ‗imperfections‘  favor business connections among 
smaller groups of people over more complex organizational structures. Under the con-
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straints of a not yet fully established market economy, smaller firms such as family enter-
prises have the advantage to react flexible to the requirements for doing business.
1060  
     By and large, family connections build on trust and Guanxi prove to be esse ntial for 
doing business in China in the course of economic reforms.
1061 Hence, ―social relationships 
built on gift exchange provide a substitute form of trust that can improve the profitability 
of investment and reduce the risk of arbitrary bureaucratic interference that is not in the 
interests of the investors‖.
1062 It mobilizes cultural values such as obligation and reciproci-
ty to pursue ―both diffuse social ends and calculated instrumental ends", substituting and 
complementing  for  (not  yet)  existing  market  mechanisms.
1063  Those  market  ‗imperfec-
tions‘ favor business connections among smaller groups of people over more complex or-
ganizational structures. Under the constraints of a not yet fully established market econo-
my, smaller firms such as family enterprises have the advantage to react flexible to the 
requirements of doing business.
1064 This process is known and used as part of the art of 
Guanxi described above. It is in this context used as ―the skilful mobilization of moral and 
cultural imperatives such as obligation and reciprocity in pursuit of both diffuse social ends 
and calculated instrumental ends".
1065  
    Hence, even if the aim of engaging in Guanxi is instrumental, it is still subordinated un-
der the objective to create personal relations, having not only current a dvantages in mind, 
but more a long-term commitment. As a result, business is easier accomplish ed by small 
enterprises mostly in the ownership of families without the involvement of the state. This 
results in the creation of a private sector that largely is left on its own and thus in need to 
establish its own rules - the art of Guanxi.
1066 
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    However, Guanxi does not only play a role in investing and establishing new enterpris-
es. It is also an important factor in the workplace itself. This is not only the place where an 
individual is employed, but much more than that, also a social institution on which a per-
son is socially, economically and politically dependent. The danwei (work unit) functions 
as provider for travel and residency permissions, also able to intervene with municipal 
housing authorities, the courts and police and other agencies on behalf of the workers.
1067 
Extensive interpersonal ties between Chinese employees and more influential people exist 
to obtain goods and services. Workers can also obtain those goods outside the workplace 
but they often do not have the same quality or are more expensive. Thus, in creating a 
small community at their danwei, workers engage in an instrumental Guanxi to utilize their 
opportunities.
1068 The working place takes the place of a big family, with a boss -worker 
relationship replacing father-son relations.
1069 In private family-owned enterprises this rela-
tionship takes the form of a paternalistic management. 
     To summarize, the ritual gift-relations of the rural areas contrast the more situational 
and instrumental ones in the cities. Still, even if the Guanxi practiced in urban areas is not 
organized in clan structures, the exchanges of Guanxi are designed on the base of kinship 
relations. It was shown that Guanxixue is not an ahistorical concept with a specific set of 
practices no matter in which social or cultural situation it is used. Rather,  it has different 
meanings and employments depending on the economic and political context within the 
Chinese society 
      In general, Guanxi Capitalism shares the major principles of Western Capitalism, but 
those instruments are used to obtain not only material, but, equally important, also symbol-
ic capital.
1070 Contrary to Western capitalistic thinking, there is a gain of giving away. The 
more generous businessmen prove to be, the more symbolic capital - social status and face 
- they gain. This type of Capitalism is thus not as instrumental-rational as Western Capital-
ism is. Guanxi represents a different framework for a capitalist system and thus is in need 
of specific institutions to function successfully. In contrast to the 19
th century-type Capital-
ism which superimposed the existing traditional institutions, family structures in particular, 
to create an environment better suiting for its purpose, Guanxi shows that instead of sup-
planting traditional structures, it needs to revive them.  
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6.2. Guanxi versus corruption 
     It is important to stress the difference between corruption and Guanxi. While the latter 
emphasizes long-standing relationships and Rénqíng, the first merely emphasizes material 
exchange, social ties being rather a means than an end. As Guanxi shifts into the business 
domain it increasingly transforms into structures of corruption. This means, that while 
Guanxi is a means of ordinary people during the Cultural Revolution, it may now be an 
instrument segregating them from the wealthy business class. Personal networks estab-
lished for the purpose of doing business cannot easily be distinguished from networks of 
corruption, and often they are not. Instrumentalism and consumption orientation replaced 
personal relationships especially in urban areas.
1071 
      (State) institutions are always prone to exploitation by officials and corruption.
1072 An 
official definition of corruption can be said to be ―the use of public office for private 
gains‖, among similar ones.
1073 What actually is considered as corruption depends strongly 
on the informal and formal rules of a society. The term ‗corruption‘ underlies the Western 
understanding of a clear separation between state and society and between office and per-
son, which does not apply in this clarity to China. Interpersonal connections are seen as 
‗public‘ phenomena and therefore regulated and closely monitored by the moral principles 
of society. Because of that, instrumentalizing personal relations for individual aims does 
not reflect a divergence of private and public interests, they are rather seen as openly 
communicated public connections. In addition, the concept of face leads to strong self-
regulation: the fear of losing face, accompanied with the thread of exclusion from one‘s 
network looms large and can be seen as equivalent to legal norms. Even the Chinese dis-
course on corruption has to be interpreted this way: it has more a didactic character instead 
of a merely descriptive one.
1074  
     Guanxi, especially in the management literature cited above (see fn 1056), is often re-
duced to a purely instrumental business phenomenon: ―Guanxi refers to a network of in-
formal interpersonal relationships and exchanges of favors established for the purpose of 
conducting business activities throughout China and East Asia‖.
 1075 On the contrary, the 
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art of Guanxi in the form of gift exchange is necessarily tied to a pre-existing relationship 
between giver and recipient and differs from bribery. Although Guanxi often touches the 
edges of corruption, it is more subtle and less instrumental than bribery would be. The dif-
ference between gift and bribe is mostly depending on the manner of giving, if the rules of 
giving are not followed, the gift might be devalued and its intention turned negative.
1076 In 
bribery, transactions are only tied to social relations for economic purposes.  If in giving 
gifts the motive of getting something in return is getting too obvious, the gift may get i n-
terpreted as bribe. Even though the instrumental purpose is the reason for engaging in 
Guanxi it is essential that it does not appear that way. For corruption, a connection is only 
established for the purpose of bribing, whereas for Guanxi an already existing relationship 
is mandatory before gifts are exchanged, which raises the exchange to a higher plane.  In 
other words, it has to be apparent that people enga ging in the negotiations share strong 
Gãnqíng.
1077 ―Guanxi is based on reciprocity […], where one does favors for others as ‗so-
cial investments‘, clearly expecting something in return. It is not a cold exchange, but is 
intertwined with Rénqíng‖.
1078 
     This distinction is essential for doing business because bribery is not accepted, even 
among entrepreneurs. Thus, gifts are given in form of banquets or other complaisances 
proving the Gãnqíng element of the connection. The giving of money is avoided because 
this would constitute bribery, but as long money does not actually change hands, every-
thing is fine.
 1079 Additionally, in practicing Guanxi the relation to the recipient is seen as 
long-term connection which creates not only obligations but also a degree of trust essential 
for doing business together. Bribery would not offer this advantage. Businessmen prefer to 
deal with people with whom they share an identity and have a long-standing relationship, 
e.g. in the context of the family or with former classmates. This prevents them to be de-
pendent on corrupt officials and thus minimizes the expenses without loss of face.
1080 The 
latter is especially important because only those with the reputation to have a lot of miànzi 
are also endowed with great networks and thus are worthwhile doing business with.
1081 
     Gifts or banquets serve as creation and expression of public emotions ( Rénqíng) and 
therefore are not private. Thus, if a businessman wants it to be clear that he is engaging in 
Guanxi, the relationship has to be of more importance than the instrumental goal connected 
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with the gift. The pre-determined etiquette has to be followed; otherwise the exchange will 
be regarded as bribe. Thus, gifts are given in form of ample banquets or other complais-
ance proving the Gănq￭ng element of the connection.
 1082 Public expenditure for such occa-
sions follows ethical norms and is adequate in the sense that there are no clear boundaries 
to the outside and therefore no obvious criteria of legitimacy. Different rules apply to 
people  within  the  network  (in-group-members,  zìjǐrén  自己人)  and  outside  the  network 
(out-group members, wàirén 外人).  
     It is therefore difficult to classify certain transactions between state officials and entre-
preneurs as corrupt as they are taking place within Guanxi networks and therefore play by 
different rules. In turn, this does not imply that corruption and outright illegal transactions 
do not exist, but the grey area of corruption is understood in a different way in the Chinese 
context.
1083 Thus, corruption in China can be seen as less destructive as elsewhere.
1084 
     Hence, ―social relationships built on gift exchange provide a substitute form of trust that 
can improve the profitability of investment and reduce the risk of arbitrary bureaucratic 
interference that is not in the interests of the investors‖.
1085 It mobilizes cultural values 
such as obligation and reciprocity to pursue ―both diffuse social ends and calculated in-
strumental ends", substituting for the not yet existing and complementing already existing 
market mechanisms.
1086 Still, ―the line between obligatory giving, flattery, gifts, and bri-
bery blurs on occasions when calculation is prominent in people‘s minds‖.
1087 
 
6.3. Guanxi from a gender perspective 
     The ‗comeback‘ of Confucian values in the Chinese society, as analyzed in chapter 4, 
can also be discussed from different perspective. As outlined above, the traditional Confu-
cian culture is built upon harmony, consent and stability. In addition to these three main 
principles, Confucian values like trustfulness, sincerity, loyalty and humaneness are used 
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to link Confucianism to economic behavior favorable for development and the reputation 
of Chinese business managers.
1088 They are also regarded as the cultural roots of Gua n-
xi.
1089 As has been discussed before, for the sake of the whole the individual has to stand 
back but is embedded in a network of personal connections. Filial piety is considered as the 
virtue that matters the most. Children owe their parents absolute obedience, even when 
they are already grown up.
1090 Thus, everybody has his or her natural role to fulfill within 
society, with certain duties and norms to obey. Both society and personal relationships are 
structured as vertical hierarchies, being a culture of status.
1091 Interpersonal relationships 
therefore get rationalized, coincidence and spontaneity are eliminated. Hierarchy is legit i-
mated through mutual debts, if one side of the relationship acts according to the given 
norms, the other part will act accordingly. Those laws are unwri tten, but follow the norm 
of modesty and morality. The vertical structure of society is not questioned and individua l 
rights are barely of importance. The notion of law is not received as strict categorical 
norms, adjudicating rights to individuals, but always depending on interpersonal relatio n-
ships, thus revealing a more particularistic culture.
1092  
     For family businesses this means a structure of vertical stability that is built upon m o-
rality and not thread, and depends on the responsibility of the bosses for their subordinates. 
Family firms are thus organized in a paternal, authoritarian pattern. Additionally, the fami-
ly is regarded as the only entity that can be trusted.
1093 Having to obey a certain role, the 
individual is subordinated to the family (or the collective), thus showing loyalty and o b-
edience. The appeal to the honor of the family, especially through education and learning, 
is also an essential feature of Confucianism.
1094 
    In addition, it also suppresses class and gender differentiation. The ideology of author i-
tarianism is exported as solution for development also in a political context. The Confucian 
revival  celebrates  loyalty  and  obedience  as  keys  to  the  stability  of  f amily  and 
workplace.
1095 Authoritarianism is instrumentalized ―in the cause of a capitalistic regime of 
discipline‖ to control a social situation ―that no longer is subject to the hold of traditional 
values‖. Thus, it is difficult to describe the emphasis of patriarchy as typical Confucian 
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value as persistence of ‗old‘ tradition and as distinguishing feature of ‗Chineseness‘.
1096 
This is even more doubtful, when also taking into account that during the Cultural Revolu-
tion Confucianism was dismissed as being part of an old regime which did not have space 
in the Chinese society of the time. 
     Guanxi-Capitalism is viewed by many as being more "humane and thus more efficient 
than the alienating contractual and individualistic Capitalism of the West".
1097 This line of 
thought often overlooks in "ritual euphemization" the widespread violence with its cons e-
quence of inequality for many. In the newly developed private sector with its many family-
owned firms an elaborated (labor) law is either not existing or is ignored and thus is rather 
"a government by people".
1098 This contrasts the state-sector in which an official legal sys-
tem is effective and thus, controlled. As a consequence, women are employed mainly in 
"the plethora of new private and smaller enterprises that are less likely to protect their labor 
or safeguard their maternal benefits".
1099 Although family firms have been ―both a major 
engine of economic growth in the region and a key embodier of the cultural virtues seen as 
facilitative of economic success‖
1100, they are based on paternal authority and trust rather 
than a legal system. It relies more on interpersonal relationships than individual rights.
1101 
     Thus, the emphasis on traditional Confucian values for the success of Chinese family 
firms obscures and justifies the more negative implications of their success, namely that it 
is also based on the exploitation of gender and other social inequalities of opportunity and 
reward. Men constantly reproduce the existing structures of domination, disguised with the 
emphasis on human emotional bonds and harmony. Particularly in the 1980s many authors 
celebrated the ―benevolent paternalism‖ of Chinese family firms. S.G. Redding for exam-
ple evaluates the ―productive efficiency‖ as humanistic, ―closely to the needs of their par-
ticipants‖.
1102 Those researchers see the family firm as working to the benefit of all family 
members, and because of that individual family members are willing to work hard to se-
cure the long-term success of the family (firm).
1103 
     However, the success of family firms, instead of being mutually beneficial, is not to a 
small part based on rigid inequalities of gender and generation within the family and firm. 
Rather than building upon old traditions, the recourse to Confucian values and Guanxi is 
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used to reinvent old forms of family life which is dominated by men, the patriarchs.
1104 
The reality of global Capitalism forces these businessmen  to use the one comparative ad-
vantage at hand  – the flexibility of their enterprises. This, in combination with the exis-
tence of large personal networks, once established to meet the necessities of daily life in 
socialist China, and small start-up costs gave them the necessary flexibility to get an entry 
ticket to the world market of commodities.
1105  
     This line of research emphasizing the importance of the revitalization of traditional val-
ues also omitted to scrutinize the power differentials which define who within the family 
really the winner is – and who the loser. One part of Guanxi is thus the recreation of tradi-
tional rigid forms of division of labor by gender and generation to achieve economic suc-
cess. Also, ―despite the hectic pace of economic development, […], obligations to parents 
and the larger family seem robustly intact‖.
1106 Guanxi-Capitalism thus changes the prin-
ciples and logic of the individualistic form of Capitalism but also facilitates the adaptation 
of exploitative Capitalism as Chinese family firms are based on paternal authority, not in-
dividual rights.
1107 The recourse to Confucian values and Guanxi is used to reinvent old 
forms of family life which is dominated by men.
1108 Although a notion of mutual support 
exists, Guanxi also has the aim to give more flexibility to few to arrange business stru c-
tures at the cost of many, particularly in small-scale family enterprises, where the factor of 
cheap labor of kinship is often exploited.  In general, the advantage of employing family 
members is that they are more or less willing to work for little or no money. This would 
imply that factory families are similar to peasant fa milies whose power distributions are 
based on the existence of inherited property opposed t o acquired property of most family 
enterprises. Family firms rely on unpaid or low paid family labor, determined by gender 
and generation, with ―senior males making major decisions, younger males performing 
labor, and females filling in when and where needed‖
1109, slipping ‗effortlessly‘ into their 
traditional roles. Their work is regarded as part of their household and family duties, not as 
careers. Even if not part of the family, "female workers…may become de facto employees 
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of the male head of the household with all the attendant disadvantages deriving from the 
structure of familial authority reproduced in production".
1110 
     Additionally, power structure within kinship is depending on the distribution of  inhe-
rited property. In China, property was historically a source of great respect, the power 
structure  within  kinship  related  to  the  distribution  of  inherited  property.  While  males 
owned the property, having undivided power over the other family members as long as the 
property remained also undivided; especially females are deferred to social and economic 
inferiority. Inherited property has mostly to be divided soon after the marriage of sons, thus 
limiting paternal power. Acquired property instead is bought by the senior male during his 
own lifetime, thus giving him unlimited power over subordinated family members when 
and if property should be partitioned. This also gives him the possibility to decide over 
other family affairs, such as education or careers of family members. For example, not 
even sons may claim the right to study. Relationships among family members are based on 
reciprocal exchange, where junior family members owe labor, commitment and loyalty to 
the senior members to earn the right to be part of the family.
1111 The patriarch of a family 
firm bases his power over subordinated family members often on acquired property, thus it 
is difficult to comprehend how at the same time he can claim to act according to gener a-
tion-old traditions. In contrast to this traditional justification, it is a ―political construction 
of the family head who uses the resources at his command to build his firm out of the 
loyalties and talents of his family‖.
1112 Control is only relaxed to grant favors, or give eco-
nomic or political support, but that does not constitute an entitlement for any of those.
1113 
    Family ties are evaluated as creating strong loyalties which lead to economic success 
and motivation of the single family member.
1114 Young Chinese study hard for the sake of 
the family. Not only do they seek to get a good education, but once they start working they 
also work hard for less money than non -family members. Even if more money is offered 
elsewhere, they tend to stay in the family business, thus providing continuity. Using family 
members for manager positions within the firm al so provides the advantage of creating a 
‗natural authority‘. On the other hand, family firms are not required to give positions to all 
family members. Relatives and even sons who do not show sufficient talent are driven out 
of the family business.  
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     A typical family firm will employ more males than females, the proportion rising with 
business size. Also, sons are the family members most likely to be employed, followed by 
brothers, wives and daughters-in-law. The latter are allowed to hold mainly nonmanagerial 
jobs, often only as part-time general helpers without monetary compensation, merely an 
extension of their reproductive activities. It is regarded as part of their household and fami-
ly duties. The wife of the entrepreneur often has the most responsible jobs among females, 
namely as financial manager or bookkeeper. In both cases the sphere of women is the ‗in-
side‘, concerned with activities that prevent the contact to unrelated men. Additionally, 
although non-working wives are a symbol of high status, due to scarce resources, especial-
ly during the start-up of an enterprise, often also women have to be employed.
1115 Also, 
"women employees have been the first to have their employment contracted or terminated 
in enterprises engaged in some reorganization or streamlining of staff".
1116 
      Male kin mostly work full -time, receiving salaries. This re sembles formal employ-
ments, additionally giving them more responsibilities and a rewarding job than female rela-
tives have. However, the work relation is not based on a formal contract and thus jobs and 
salaries can be easily eliminated if the position hold er does not obey. On the other hand, 
property can be divided to create managerial positions for sons or brothers, giving them an 
incentive not to leave the family business.
1117 
    Especially women have no realistic respectable exit strategy and so are dependent on the 
family, bare of any bargaining tool for a better standing within the family or firm. Men‘s 
social status is also derived from their performance inside the family firm which principal-
ly also gives them the possibility to get a job outside the family firm, but at the same time 
no incentive to do so.  
    What does a female keep from active resistance against those conditions? Entrepreneurs 
purposely pick very dull and unrewarding jobs for women which require no specific skills. 
Those jobs may be based on trust but they also inhibit women to think about them as ca-
reers and therefore are not worthwhile fighting for. That fact is reinforced by a society that 
does not define male and female as equals and thus contributes to women not resisting 
their positions. Independent women are still of no good reputation because this means loss 
of control over them and possible exploitation by men outside the family.
1118 
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     However, also the Guanxi networks are mainly ‗owned‘ by the male head of the enter-
prise. Personal ties are the most useful resource especially for the other family members 
who are not able to acquire other kinds of assets. To women, even that possibility is very 
restricted because their jobs offer few opportunities to build a network of business con-
tacts, because they are mainly concerned with ‗inside‘ functions.
1119 
    As mentioned above, the gender aspect is also used in business negotiations. For one 
part, they often take place in karaoke bars where women are treated as objects in the male-
dominated Chinese society. Another method is to hire ―business-meeting hostesses‖ who 
entertain the business men and also are said to handle discussions ―gentler and softer‖ in 
creating a relaxed atmosphere and by that lower the guard of the opposite business par-
ty.
1120  
    Gender is also utilized to obtain information about a business partner in sending the o p-
posite sex to ―soften‖ the ―target‖. Also, young women feel less constrained when talking 
to other women. Thus, gender is used to establish Guanxi and to obtain information on the 
other person that can be used in the future.
1121 
    Therefore, the success of  family firms, instead of being mutually beneficial, is more 
based on rigid inequalities of gender and generation within the family and firm. Rather 
than building upon old traditions, the recourse to Confucian values and Guanxi is used to 
reinvent old forms of family life which is dominated by men, the patriarchs.
1122  
     However, it has been claimed by organization like the  All-China Women‘s Federation 
(ACWF) that the status of women has significantly increased since the beginning of re-
forms. However, although it gave women a wider range of opportunities, the status itself 
has not been raised within or outside the family, at least not for the average female worker 
(compared to women whose families are part of the ‗new rich‘, see chapter 7).  Women in 
entrepreneurial families are involved in the establishment of business and engage in stra-
tegic planning and in the management of daily operations, often being the boss of the busi-
ness that is still often registered under the husband‘s name. Still, gender stereotypes play a 
decisive role, especially the notion of ‗inside‘ women and ‗outside‘. Although it became 
not  uncommon  for  women  to  go  to  restaurants  and  karaoke  bar  and  drinking  alcohol, 
which traditionally was a highly male dominated space, the notion of inside and outside 
still effects the division of labor. The ‗inside‘ has been extended to the family enterprise 
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but it is still the husband that represents it to the outside. The management of a company 
belongs to the inside and thus to the female realm, whereas the entertaining of costumers 
and  connections  to  government  officials  is  an  outside,  thus  male  sphere.  Entertaining 
clients outside the office is still conceived as inappropriate for women. So, although a new 
degree of public participation has been reached for women, they are still subject to the tra-
ditional gender expectations, even if they belong to the class of the ‗new rich‘.
1123  
 
6.4. The specificity of Guanxi networks  
6.4.1. Networks and the German Mittelstand 
In the early phase of the European industrialization, contractual security and control 
were not protected by government authorities in Germany (or for that matter elsewhere in 
Europe).
1124 Therefore, entrepreneurs had to rely on trust -based networks to secure the 
quality of their products. The foundation of these networks was often the family. Families 
connected their businesses over strategic marriages that ensured the adherence to the most-
ly unwritten agreements. Also, the time spend together in boarding schools established a 
shared identity, values and connections which as adults were further developed and mai n-
tained in clubs or associations. These clubs were an important means to help navigating 
between the now differentiating spheres of private life, business, politics and society.
1125 
Access to those clubs was often exclusive and coupled with high membership fees. Besides 
socializing, those clubs were a platform for business negotiations. As me mber of a club 
you were welcome in similar clubs in other cities or abroad which was an important device 
for conducting business nationally and internationally.
1126 They also assisted in building a 
good reputation which was essential for being successful in business which then again 
meant that without success you were prone to lose respectability and in the lon g-run the 
access to the influential circles.
1127 
     In constructing a civil society that boosted economic relations, entrepreneurs also 
created a self-identity of which the management of mass producing large-scale enterprises 
and material interests was the common denominator.
1128  A social formation was co n-
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structed that justified its distinctiveness not by birthrights but through wealth and qualifica-
tions.
1129     
     The status of this entrepreneurial class within society and their economic independence 
also empowered them to influence the organization of society and the state, especially con-
cerning a legal framework for economic transactions. This in turn meant gains for  civil 
liberties, like freedom of trade, private property, equality etc. Actually, local government 
and leadership of local parties were often in the hand of entrepreneurs.
1130 After 1848 the 
interest in political participation trickled away and people felt well represented by the e x-
isting economic policy.
1131 
    In contrast to Sombart‘s and Weber‘s expectations, the majority – at least in total num-
ber – of (German) firms were still small and middle sized in the beginning and then again 
at  the  end  of  the  20
th  century.  In  1999  the  3.2  million  small  and  medium  enterprises 
(SMEs) (or 99.3 percent of all firms) employed 20 million people (or twothirds of the 
working force). However, the middle of the 20
th century saw the predicted consolidation of 
companies to large-scale enterprises. This trend was again revised towards the end of the 
20
th century with the emerging transnational production and globalization.
1132 The success 
of small enterprises is seen in their complementary relevance for large-scale enterprises as 
subcontractors or in niche and specialized markets. In these markets smaller enterprises 
have the comparative advantage of flexibility. SMEs and entrepreneurship were also seen 
as means to overcome unemployment by encouraging self-employment and to confront the 
global competition that was best faced with lean organizational structures and flexible pro-
duction.
1133 
     From the 1960s, the German government systematically subsidized SMEs, for example 
in expanding the German anti-trust law to improve competition policies and regulations. 
Apart from economic reasons, the legal framework also had the aim to support the middle 
class, which traditionally formed the buffer between the values of the upper and the work-
ing classes. From the 1970s a so-called ‗new middle class‘ emerged that realized that they 
had to collaborate with other small-scale entrepreneurs in joint ventures or within networks 
to be successful. Co-operation enables to compete with larger corporations and is the most 
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rational way for utility maximizing entrepreneurs. Hence, even within networks individual-
ism prevails.
1134  
     These networks have often more formal and contractual relations, set up and formed by 
political bodies and private economic associations. As has been outlined in chapter 3, they 
can be organized in the form of either strategic and or networks.
1135 However, both types 
of networks focus on economic functionality rather than maintaining of interpersonal rela-
tionships, with the latter additionally concentrating on specific regional areas to faci litate 
access for smaller firms to specialized labor pools, suppliers, know-how, R&D and market 
research, customer service and training facilities, which without co -operation they would 
not be able to afford.
1136 Additionally, administrative and financial support is given by 
economic associations, and infrastructure is provided by an actively involved local go v-
ernment.
1137 In general, changing the legal regulations and creating suiting enviro nments 
was easier for regional networks than for strategic ones as the latter were only approved for 
rationalization cartels.
1138  
     Within these ―decentralized, but integrated industrial districts is a seemingly contradic-
tory combination of competition and cooperation‖, with a mixture of low vertical and high 
horizontal integration. On the one hand, firms are competitors always trying to outcompete 
other contestants, on the other hand happily co-operate in the aforementioned areas and 
subcontract to the their competitors when business is low.
1139 This ―professional solidarity‖ 
and the competition for the best product led to high quality standards.
1140 Additionally, 
shared distribution and marketing channels lowered transaction cost considerably and 
created economies of scale and scope for each of the small firms for the price of giving up 
some of their autonomy and free decision making.  The regional networks are often con-
structed around an ‗anchor‘, a large-scale enterprise, for which small firms serve as specia-
lized subcontractors (for example DaimlerChrysler has a huge network of several hundred 
small firms, all concentrated in Baden-Württemberg).  
     Besides that, regional clusters are actively using local chambers and associations to 
coordinate activities and lobby in politics in favor of the network. These organizations 
serve also as mediation- and sanctioning mechanisms and thus further stabilize local struc-
tures and enhance trust building. As firms are always in need of (market) information, net-
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works are good structures to obtain them quite efficiently.
1141 Also, workshops or organiza-
tions like trade chambers offer information, hence, membership in associations and other 
official bodies facilitates access to business opportunities and therefore serve multiple 
functions.
1142 To be successful, entrepreneurs need to be able to navigate within these for-
mal structures and position themselves strategically to negotiate on a political level.
1143 
     Often entrepreneurs, although they would probably benefit from being part of a ne t-
work, are highly hesitant to engage in network activities as collaborating with competitors 
is not conceived as desirable as it is not secured in contracts and hence an equivalence of 
merits cannot be guaranteed, which is a significant factor for (German) entrepreneurs.
1144 
They  are  used  to  ―balanced  reciprocity‖,  hence  a  ―simultaneous  exchange  of  items  of 
equivalent value‖, whereas networks, especially of the kind of successful organically de-
veloped regional clusters in Europe (and their Chinese counterparts) depend more on ―ge-
neralized reciprocity‖ that consists of a ―continuing relationship of exchange that is at any 
given time unrequited or imbalanced, but that involves mutual expectations that a benefit 
granted now should be repaid in the future‖. On the contrary, ―a gift which clearly and bla-
tantly paid off the debt and thereby ended the relationship of obligation between the two 
parties would be considered shockingly offensive‖.
1145 Reciprocity like that is ―made up of 
a series of acts each of which is short-run altruistic - but which together typically make 
every participant better of‖.
1146 Also, networks are often not regarded as such but entrepre-
neurs are rather referring to co-operations with other firms which are not seen as the same 
thing.  However,  only  a  minority  of  German  SMEs  engages  in  networks  or  other  co-
operations as collaboration is received as weakness and the advantages of networks are 
often not obvious.
1147 Besides the affinity for contracts and legal arrangements, German 
entrepreneurs are also highly individualistic and in general less prone for co -operation 
within networks.
1148 
     Building long-term connections and trust takes time and is often regarded as contradict-
ing the paradigm of flexible production. Without corresponding traditions or a culture that 
emphasizes personal relations this process can only take place with the help of an external 
agency – such as the state – that creates the legal and formal institutions necessary for co-
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operation, replacing trust-based network relations by more formal co-operation. This re-
veals the true incentives for collaboration: economic calculus and pressure of larger firms 
that are in need of small subcontractors that are able to produce flexibly on the on hand, on 
the other hand are dependent on the large-scale corporation.
1149 Some authors even claim 
that networks are nothing else than huge corporations „dressed in new costumes and armed 
with new technology―.
1150 What is more, not specific persons, such as owners or managers, 
are partners within the networks, but firms, especially in strategic networks. So even if 
firms collaborate in networks, their success does not necessarily lie in the character of an 
entrepreneur.  
     Hence, even in established networks the reason to co-operate is not enthusiasm for the 
idea but more the pragmatism to solve a concrete problem more efficiently and cost reduc-
ing.
1151 It is a difficult or even impossible task to construct ―trust-built‖ networks from 
scratch, without a local history of co-operation or a tradition of that kind, as ―civic tradi-
tions have remarkable staying power‖.
1152 Even with massive support and subsidizing ef-
forts from the German government and also from the level of the EU administration, de-
signing ‗artificial‘ networks remains problematic.  
    Unlike the networks of the beginning of the capitalist age, the modern networks are not 
based on the family but were instrumentalized to serve economic functionality in building 
long-term connections to business partners. Still, the networks are more stabile when un-
derpinned by shared cultural believes and traditions, common activities (sports etc) and if 
family relations exist. The existing successful regional clusters throughout Europe are as-
sociated with a certain tradition and culture and are ―small islands of prosperity in a sea of 
misery‖
1153 where ―the cohesion of the industry rests on a more fundamental sense of 
community, of which the various institutional forms of cooperation are more the result than 
the cause….Among the ironies of the resurgence of craft production is that its deployment 
of modern technology depends on its reinvigoration of affiliations that are associated with 
the preindustrial past. […] Social norms that forestall opportunism are so deeply interna-
lized that the issue of opportunism at the expense of the community obligation is said to 
arise less often here than in areas characterized by vertical and clientelistic networks‖.
1154 
Yet, these community based structures were strained by the demand of international pro-
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duction  and  needed  to  be  complemented  by  more  official  structures  such  as  associa-
tions.
1155 
     Also, network structures, although flexible within, are often too rigid, resisting changes 
in the production and are hostile towards innovation which led to the break-down of many 
traditional clusters in Europe. Western networks are often seen as overrated in being able 
to be superior. ―While networks can and do promote innovation within an existing technol-
ogical system, historical experience suggests that their fragmented…structure is subject to 
disorganization…during periods of major technological change‖.
1156 
     However, all kinds of networks are long-term constructs with trust as an important 
component, but as typical for German (and Western societies) the networks found there are 
more system than personal trust-based and also more grounded on formal than on informal 
social capital, as can be seen from the importance of associations and political bodies for 
the networks.
1157 Even if manifested in more formal structures, social capital still ―refers to 
features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions‖.
1158  
     Thus, networks and SMEs still play a role in advanced industrial countries today, even 
if organized differently than for example in China. Hence, the argument that only a fully 
developed market economy is needed to overcome this organizational structure needs to be 
enlarged by the thought of complementarities and a coexistence of organizational struc-
tures. Nevertheless, European networks are mostly more formal and where they were not 
initialized by the state they needed a certain cultural tradition to thrive and often only those 
are also successful and sustainable in the longer run. 
 
6.4.2. The Third Italy 
     A special case of the European networks described in the last section is Italy, or more 
specifically, what in the literature is called ―the Third Italy‖ (terza Italia). This phenome-
non was first described by Arnaldo Bagnasco in 1977
1159 and let to a wide discussion on 
the meaning of SMEs for the global economy in outcompeting large multinational compa-
nies with their system of flexible production (please see also chapter 3.2) .
1160 It is not the 
result of a political c oncerted action, but developed spontaneously, unexpected and u n-
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planned.
1161 Besides from the arguments given above, Italy can be treated as a special case 
– and also as different from China. 
     The Third Italy refers to central and north-eastern regions around Bologna, Florence, 
Ancona and Venice. The other ―two Italies‖ are those ―of the northern triangle and the 
backward Mezzogiorno‖. Within the Third Italy, about fifty industrial districts near small 
urban areas are mainly specialized in textiles, clothing, footwear and furniture. They are 
technologically advanced, and highly productive.
1162 Prato, for example, is famous for its 
textiles and Poggibonsi for furniture. As typical for industrial districts (see also chapter 3), 
they developed a high degree of division of labor. Some firms act as specialized sub -
suppliers and thus not all of the firms have direct contact to the market. These small firms 
are mostly family-owned and often still use artisans‘ methods for production and are thus 
in a way dependent on the Italian family structure. Kinship ties that were used to structure 
industrial production, family members who served as low paid labor force and merchant 
traditions that connected the districts with the global market contributed to the success of 
the districts.
1163 Thus, cultural specifics and other factors joined for the innovative turning 
point that made the districts the ‗Third Italy‘. Besides those of the Italian family, the ap-
preciation of craftsmen‘s and merchant‘s traditions and their connection to a global market, 
it was also the support of local parliaments and regional governments that provided the 
necessary infrastructure. The artisan traditions together with a specific form of rent, called 
mezzadria
1164 advocated dexterity, skills, familial solidarity, a sense for business and an 
enterprising spirit. Elements of the traditional peasant society survived this transition and 
supported the social integration of the region during these dynamic changes.
1165  
     Besides that, the development of the industrial districts was also a result of a recent 
economic and political development in Italy.
1166 A significant role played the trend away 
from standard clothing towards fashion that caused the industry to restructure away from 
large-scale factories to small-scale, flexible production that could handle the rapid changes 
in demand and taste of clients. Each firm concentrates on a specific technology and stage 
of the production process.
1167 They compete against each other, thereby creating a highly 
                                                 
1161 Walter, 2004, p. 16. 
1162 Putnam; Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993, p. 159f. 
1163 Piore and Sabel, 1984, p. 252, Walter, 2004, p. 56. 
1164 The tenant was able to bargain the quota of the harvest that had to be delivered which is argued to have 
fostered the negotiation skills necessary for being an entrepreneur. Walter, 2004, p. 155. 
1165 Walter, 2004, p. 56, 146f. 
1166 Piore and Sabel, 1983, p. 394f. For details of the historical development, please refer to Piore and Sabel, 
1984, esp p. 245f., Hamilton and Chang, 2003, p. 182. 
1167 Piore and Sabel, 1984, p. 238. 210 
 
innovative environment as they have to keep up with new technologies and designs. How-
ever, despite the competition, technological innovations are quickly shared within the dis-
trict.
1168 Thus, they also have to co-operate within network structures to be successful, even 
if that seems contradictory. Firms collaborate to subcontract to each other if an order or a 
product is too large-scaled or complicated for one company alone. This requires a high 
level of trust within the whole sector as investments are often based on the faith that other 
firms will pass along orders for certain products the other firm is specialized in. If th e dis-
trict expands, firms grow more and more dependent on each other as specialization and the 
need to innovate increases. Also, often administrative facilities are shared, as are raw mate-
rials purchases, accounting, marketing or technical services.
1169 In that way, low vertical 
and high horizontal integration are incorporated.  
     This is supported by the vital role of business associations and the local state. They pro-
vide administrative services, financial aid and social  infrastructure, such as professional 
training, market related information and fashion trends.
1170 This created an innovative en-
vironment that encouraged collaboration.
1171  Firms are connected over horizontal ne t-
works, which also means that the internal division of labor is extremely flexible but often 
excludes unskilled labor. Still, ―the cohesion of the industry rests on a more fundamental 
sense of community, of which the various institutional forms of cooperation are more the 
result than the cause….Among the ironies of the resurgence of craft production is that its 
deployment of modern technology depends on its reinvigoration of affiliations that are as-
sociated with the preindustrial past. […] [N]orms of reciprocity and networks of civic en-
gagement […] that forestall opportunism are so deeply internalized that the issue of oppor-
tunism at the expense of the community obligation is said to arise less often here than in 
areas characterized by vertical and clientelistic networks‖. The firms within these districts 
exhibit a high level of mutual trust and social cooperation.
1172 They have a collective ad-
vantage by co-operating, but at the same time act as competitors within an atmosphere of 
―professional solidarity‖.
1173 
      A case study of three industrial districts in Venetia by Sieglinde A. Walter strikingly 
reveals how the inner dynamics of the districts work.
1174 Segusino, a typical example of an 
industrial district in Venetia, produces glasses, and one out of five citizens are entrepr e-
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neurs who operate businesses from one-man operation to several of companies with dozens 
of  employees.  They  are  either themselves  official  owners  of  these  businesses,  or  their 
wives or children. Often, entrepreneurs own several firms (within the same sector) that 
provide family members the opportunity to gain experience and probably inherit the enter-
prise in the future.
1175 Overall, the family is an essential factor for production.  
      All entrepreneurs know each other well, on a business as well as on a private level, 
sharing knowledge on technology, procedures, orde rs and clients, combining their core 
competence and being connected over a dynamic, innovative network to achieve success as 
a district. It is important to note, though, that they are neither trusts nor have mafia -like 
structures. Also, all prices are known and if it happens that one entrepreneur sells over the 
common standard, it is assumed that he is struggling with bankruptcy. If there is a technol-
ogical innovation, entrepreneurs will inform each other about it, machinery and raw mat e-
rials are frequently borrowed, information on employees is widely shared. It is also possi-
ble to acquire information about clients and if an order is too big for one company, it will 
subcontract to the competition on the bases of informal non -written contracts. As long as 
the order does stay within the district and is not transferred to the competition in China, 
entrepreneurs co-operate freely. If business is low, an entrepreneur will work as sub -
supplier, as terzista, working for a third party. The entrepreneurs have a strong work ethic, 
work a lot and hardly have any vacation. There is a strong community in the village but 
entrepreneurs are merely passive members of sport clubs or act as sponsors, as they have 
no time to be more active but still want to support the community.
1176 Also, business asso-
ciations or trade chambers and local politics play only a marginal role as entrepreneurs 
rather stay autonomous and solve problems on their own and are not interested in ha ving 
political influence.
1177      
     In sum, co-operation between companies within these Italian districts is not fixed in 
written contracts, but merely in oral agreements between ‗gentlemen‘ which needs a high 
level of trust, loyalty and reputation.
1178 As co-operation often also includes shared r e-
search and development departments, those small enterprises are the driving force of inno-
vation as they have a highly specialized know -how that again fosters collective learning 
processes. Innovativeness and creativity are key to survive the competitive pressure within 
                                                 
1175 Walter, 2004, p. 181f. 
1176 Walter, 2004, p. 10ff., 210f. 
1177 Walter, 2004, p. 205ff. 
1178 Walter, 2004, p. 194f. 212 
 
the district and the global market.
1179 However, as firms and suppliers are connected most-
ly over informal connections, continuity is also essential to ensure quality and reinforce the 
level of trust. Network connections are polycentric in the sense that enterprises can be 
working as producer, terzista or supplier at the same time and multiplex in the sense that 
competitors are related on an economic but also social level. However, corporations still 
stay in the same broadly defined sector and do not switch to different product groups.
1180 
     The Italian case is thus on the one hand a typical example for Western -style networks, 
on the other hand it is due to the strong informal and familial connections similar to the 
Chinese case. However, the Italian industrial districts are merely  ―small islands of pros-
perity  in  a  sea  of  misery‖
1181  and  as  those  are  more  fragile  and  under  pressure  to  be 
‗drowned‘.
1182  
 
6.4.3. The blat of Russia 
 
“Many of the formerly Communist societies had weak civic traditions  
before the advent of Communism, and totalitarian rule abused  
even that limited stock of social capital”.
1183 
 
     Similar to the Chinese experience, also Russia had to open up to market reforms at the 
end of the 20
th century. However, it was considerably less successful in implementing the 
institutions needed; its GDP shrank 59 percent between 1992 and 1998 (whereas China‘s 
increased 107 percent), so economic reforms ultimately caused the Soviet economy to col-
lapse, whereas they accelerated economic success in China. In the process of economic 
liberalization, Russia had to face hyperinflation, industrial collapse and rapid privatization, 
which together produced a more or less chaotic environment.
1184  Two factors were found 
influential for this development: on the one hand the missing foreign direct investment in 
Russia ($9.2 billion in Russia compared to $220.2 billion in Ch ina between 1992 and 
1998) and on the other hand the role of entrepreneurship, which also only thrived in China 
(only 1.4 percent self-employed labor and 850.000 small businesses (with fifty or less em-
ployees in trade or other industries, with approximately ten to twenty percent unregistered) 
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in Russia by 1997 compared to China‘s 5.6 percent self-employment by 1994, even with 
the state-sector still largely intact).
1185 
    The reason for that is often attributed to the differently chosen path of development 
which is often referred to as shock therapy versus gradual change (see also chapters 5.1.2. 
and 5.1.5.). Whereas Russia changed its economic and political system in a ‗big bang‘, in a 
sort of ―social engineering‖
1186, and privatized large areas of the economy in very short 
time, China opted for a more gradual, ―crossing the river by feeling the stones‖
 1187 ap-
proach carried out with the political system remaining in place. This resulted in different 
abilities of the governments of both countries to control resources and personnel.
1188 Al-
though Russia very quickly installed a complete new legal system, it remained weak in its 
ability to enforce contracts and thus to defend the rights of investors and property owners 
as well as regulate economic transactions. Thus, Russia experienced an ―institutional bank 
run‖ during the ―spontaneous‖ or ―insider‖ privatization even of banks under lawless con-
ditions, with a lot of ―public property plundered by political elites‖ who took advantage of 
the privatization process by buying property for only a fraction of its value.
1189 This ―new 
aristocracy‖ experienced a rapid increase of consumption possibilities whereas the poorer 
strata became even poorer. At the same time the society as a whole experienced an extreme 
change of social values away from collectivism towards extensive individualism.
1190 As a 
result, it was rational for people ―to grab what they could in the face of a very uncertain 
and uncontrollable future‖ as privatization often took away the ‗de facto‘-property rights 
and -institutions established during socialist times, such as use rights or other informal 
norms, instead of merely formalizing or legalizing them. As a consequence, the ―market 
reform created social dislocation on a massive scale‖.
1191  
     The gap within the institutional structure was ―filled by a ruthless illegitimate force, the 
mafia‖ which took over large parts of the economy, controlling as much as 40 percent of 
the turnover in goods and services and half of the privatized capital in 1993 and later 70 to 
80 percent of the private sector and became thus the leading sector outside the state (see 
also below). It acts not as complementation parallel to the state but rather overtook the 
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whole economy as a consequence of weak state structures that could not prevent insider 
trading  and  other  profiteering  by  bankers,  managers,  bureaucrats  and  of  course  mafia 
bosses.
1192 Instead of accepting the newly designed formal institutions, people turned to 
semi-legal or even illegal means to secure income – or rather, the formally de facto institu-
tions turned now into illegal ones which still guided behavior.
1193 Also, the dismantling of 
the existing political system led to the weakening of authority structure s that opened the 
opportunity for illegal behavior. This goes as far as preferring the mafia to settle disputes 
than relying on the court system.
1194 
     This situation is conceived as being influential on the level of both foreign dire ct in-
vestment and entrepreneurship.
1195 As much as this is true, it is only a part of the story as 
investors and entrepreneurs experienced and still experience similar obstacles when dea l-
ing with bureaucracy and official institutions or when trying to enforce contracts within 
China. Still, China‘s bureaucrats are conceived as much more reliable because Guanxi and 
the fear of losing face hold them to their word.
1196  
     However, even when ignoring the different government structure, Chinese people seem 
to be much more entrepreneurial than their counterpart in Russia because they could rely 
on Guanxi mechanisms that complemented missing or i nsufficient formal institutions  in 
the post-socialist era. The Russian equivalent of  blat seems to provide less security. Al-
though it served the purpose to overcome the problems of a socialist bureaucracy, it ap-
pears to have not developed into a ―flexible tool which allowed people to create trustwor-
thy, expansive business networks in the absence of adequate legal guarantees‖ in post-
soviet Russia, like Guanxi did in China. It turned into a form of corruption only for ―elite 
players‖ and ceased to be of importance for the Russian post-soviet society. 
      Blat is the Russian term for the use of networks and informal contacts to overcome the 
shortage of supply and the obstacles of bureaucracy within a communist state, similar to 
Guanxi before 1978. It has no direct translation in English but ―the term blat is one of those 
many flavored words which are so intimate a part of a particular culture that they can be 
only awkwardly rendered in the language of another‖.
1197 For reasons elaborated below, it 
was not a sustainable form of interacting with strangers for ordinary people and thus Rus-
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sian  entrepreneurs  come  mostly  from  the  upper  class  which  more  exploited  public  re-
sources rather than invested in their firms.
1198 
     However, examined only superficially, blat and Guanxi seem to have a lot in common 
and they indeed have. But when analyzed in detail, blat evolved in a different way than 
Guanxi in the reform era. The term is rooted in pre-communist criminal jargon of the 
1930s, but actual is an invention of Soviet times although its usage was avoided in official 
communication. It also differs in how it is constructed. Blat transactions engage in two 
different kinds of relations, with a very narrowly defined group of friends (in Russian 
―people of the circle‖) and ―useful people‖. Relations with the latter are more complicated 
to set up and thus the extension of blat networks is more challenging and demanding as it 
is only possible via the introduction of a common friend. Consequently, they mostly re-
mained considerably smaller than their Chinese counterpart as people tend to mistrust each 
other.
1199 Blat is a more closed concept than Guanxi and only a subset of friendship, al-
though it is also possible to use blat with friends of friends. It is still considered as antiso-
cial.
1200  The  Russian  society  seems  to  be  characterized  by  an  ―excess  of  community‖ 
caused by a concept named ―amoral familism‖ that is build on strong and particularistic 
loyalty to the family and is characterized by ―the presence of social integration but the ab-
sence of linkage‖ and limited group-morality.
1201 Under amoral familism, wealth is accu-
mulated by ―trafficking, racketeering, plundering, looting, or favoritism‖ within ―various 
factions, cliques, or groups fighting for power‖.
1202 
     Blat transactions were also more difficult to enforce as the monitoring of the practices 
by the members of the network often did not happen due to mislabeling the action as mere 
‗helping out‘, which meant that favors did not have to be returned.
1203 Blat has a less tho-
rough moral background than the Confucian origins of Guanxi and thus is more prone to 
corruption and is more easily monetarized.  
     As the level of trust decreased during reforms from an already low level, people turned 
away from blat practices. Instead, they were replaced by an institution named ―kryshi‖. 
Originally, a krysha
1204 is part of the mafiya
1205, later also other criminal gangs and even 
government officials acted as  kryshi. However, they provided private security ‗services‘, 
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enforcing contracts also by intimidating the contracting party which again led to a decrease 
of trust in other people and towards the state. Kryshi served as facilitator of business trans-
actions but also as replacement for the state in enforcing contracts, ensuring the safety of 
their costumers (or their business), settling legal issues, protecting property rights, acting 
as creditor. As often even members of the police or the government appeared as kryshi, 
they were regarded as quasi or ‗private‘ state, often being in the position of mediator be-
tween businessmen and ‗real‘ state. For these ‗services‘ they charged at least ten per cent 
of profits as ‗taxes‘ or rather protection money. They had their heyday in the 1990s without 
completely disappearing thereafter.
1206  
     In Russia the distrust in the government and the violation of laws is widely morally a c-
cepted and has a long tradition, which goes back before communist times and can be sum-
marized with the Russian saying ―nel‟zya, no mozhno‖ (prohibited but possible).
1207 As a 
consequence, the whole state apparatus became prone to corruption and even the Kremlin 
was considered as krysha for the Russian oligarchs. The kryshi can be blamed to not a 
small part to be responsible of the sinking level of trust and the resulting reluctance for co-
operation within the Russian society which ultimately also led to a decline of the signific-
ance of the kryshi.
1208 
     Apart from that, the small blat networks were also less well equipped for entrepreneur-
ship, as for that many connections also to less well known people would be necessary 
which with the ―relatively static population‖ of a Russian network was much more difficult 
to achieve. This made it also very hard for newcomers to break into a market and thus en-
trepreneurship was confined to those with a lot of social capital, which included mostly 
political elites and their offspring, whereas in China it were especially the former peasants 
that had entrepreneurial motivation.
1209 Generally, blat lost its central role for (economic) 
transactions in post-reform Russia as it is a transaction that requires trust in the future in 
the sense that it has to be trust that the other party will reciprocate. Russians rather resort to 
‗spot‘ transactions with the help of money or barter. Thus money replaced favors, although 
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large sections of the private sector operated in the informal economy.
1210 On the other 
hand, blat is still used to obtain information, only that the type of information changed in 
post-soviet Russia. Before, it was information to overcome the shortcomings of a planned 
economy, whereas today it is information on money, business and tax evasion.
1211 
     Even if Russian people started a business, it was typically less growth -oriented and 
more geographically confined than small businesses in China as Russian entrepreneurs 
value consumption over investment and expansion and thus reveal a more predatory  beha-
vior. In the literature this is referred to as the Russian enterprise being a worm and the Chi-
nese a caterpillar (which has the ability to develop into a butterfly).
1212 
 
6.4.4. Guanxi networks versus Western forms of networks 
 
“Receive a droplet of generosity; repay like a gushing spring”.  
(di shui zhi en dang yi yong quan xiang bao) 
Chinese Saying 
 
     In China, networks are seen as long-term strategic alliances to access information and 
resources like bank loans or supplies from unofficial sources, even in unstable political and 
economic surroundings, therefore supporting the flexibility of small firms. They are based 
on the long-term oriented reciprocity that is aimed towards the other not the self. This 
means that empathy and knowledge for the needs of the other are necessary which includes 
that anything reciprocated has to be of great value to the receiver and has to be of greater 
value than that received. Which means nothing else than that Guanxi always consists of 
unequal exchange, the ―generalized reciprocity‖ described above. This helps to sustain 
Guanxi in showing the veracity and well meaning of the giver. It also causes indebtedness 
and gratitude towards the giver which will secure that the favor will be returned sometime 
in the future, keeping the relationship dynamic and lasting.
1213 Networks also complement 
the legal framework in guaranteeing the enforcement of contracts and serving as suppor t-
ing entity in case of bankruptcies, by postponing or even preventing it. Moral principles are 
regarded as more influential than legality.
1214 Additionally, they act ―as a form of collec-
tive memory, ensuring that a single failure need not be constituted simply as one individu-
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al‘s loss of investment but as an experience which others can learn from‖.
 1215 Guanxi ―is a 
connection between people, not firms. Even if an individual is running a number of sepa-
rate companies, the counter-party considers itself as still trading with the same entity, the 
person with whom he has Guanxi. He could not have different relationships with each 
company‖.
 1216  
     As has been mentioned before, negotiations often take place at more informal locations 
like nightclubs or restaurants.
1217 This process does not rely on legal contracts but involves 
dinner banquets and gifts to ensure the mutual  Gănq￭ng which differentiates this process 
from corruption, as stated in the chapter on Guanxi and corruption above. In contrast to the 
often difficult negotiations in joint ventures between Chinese state enterprises and foreign 
companies, investments based on Guanxi are established much faster.
1218 ―It‘s all Guanxi. 
But they form a sort of group which no one else knows about. […] The members do not 
publicly announce that they have formed a group. They have no charter, and they pay no 
membership fees, nevertheless, these networks are very important‖.
1219  
     In the West, markets depend on an elaborate legal system to enforce contracts, whereas 
the Chinese system depends on reputation and trust. Contrary to Western expectations, this 
does not increase transaction costs, but rather reduce them due to transactions taking place 
within flexible, but permanent networks within long-term relationships. It takes time to 
build up these networks but once established, they facilitate business although admittedly 
also limit the system‘s capacity to grow.
1220 They exercise a strong incentive for fair and 
non-opportunistic  behavior  as  cheating  would  lead  to  the  exclusion  from  the  network. 
Networks  therefore  have  strong  regulating  and  sanctioning  power.
1221  ―In  the  past,  we 
didn‘t have contracts in black-and-white; no legal documents were involved. A gentle-
men‘s agreement will do. […] For the Chinese traders, the main thing is integrity, credi-
bility‖.
1222  
     Concluding transactions is more flexible when done with the help of Guanxi and favors 
smaller groups of people over more complex organizational structures: ―When there are 
problems, we can always talk it through. With Europeans, it‘s quite different. We work 
with many multinational companies…They are not flexible. They won‘t compromise and 
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let you go [if you need to make adjustments]. They don‘t share our mutual understanding. 
The Europeans go according to the books and rules‖.
1223 Informal ways of securing con-
tracts based on mutual trust is preferred to contracting and ―chatting among firm owners is 
the main channel for a firm to collect information on market conditions [and] technolo-
gy‖.
1224 Pragmatism and uncertainty acceptance is an important feature of Chinese cul-
ture.
1225 This tolerance toward ambiguity is an important Chinese virtue and a fuzzy chao-
tic status is interpreted as something from where "creativity can  emerge‖.
1226 It is in con-
trast to the Western urge to regulate every detail.  
     For similar reasons as within business connections, ties to local cadres are created (see 
also chapter 8). Having to maintain strong ties to local officials can be interpreted ―as evi-
dence of poorly enforced legal property rights and an obstacle to the formation of a more 
complete market economy‖, which is the view mostly found in mainstream economics 
approaches.
1227 As opposed to that it can also be understood as ―reasonably coherent strat-
egies of entrepreneurs designed to produce stable expectations‖.
1228 These networks actual-
ly seem to turn out as the most efficient and rational institutions able to deal with the speci-
ficities found in China, where ―making friend and making money‖ is not an unfeasible 
contradiction.
1229 
Another specific feature of Chinese networks are that in contrast to Granovetter‘s fam-
ous finding about the ‗strength of weak ties‘
1230 for job search, meaning that it is more like-
ly to find new employment through relationships with acquaintances instead through a 
closer core of friends, it is different for China. Chinese people tend to gain new employ-
ment through the ‗strong ties‘ of Guanxi networks that are built on trust.
1231 
     However, if Guanxi connections are indeed equal to Granovetter‘s concept of ‗strong 
ties‘ and if they are indeed crucial for finding a job, is contested in the literature. Yanjie 
Bian, for example, argues that the ―combination of frequent interaction and reciprocal ex-
changes for expressive and instrumental purposes, high intimacy and mutual trust to each 
other, and strong ‗we-group‘ feelings toward each other‖ makes it equal to strong ties, be-
cause weak ties ―cannot meet many of these requirements‖.
1232 Amy Hanser, on the other 
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hand, argues that not all relations, especially on the labor market can be called Guanxi and 
that instead of bridging holes of trust and information in the labor market, Guanxi net-
works themselves contain holes. Without explicitly saying so, she comes back to Granovet-
ter‘s argument, that rather weak ties are the more essential factor to learn about new em-
ployment opportunities. In the end, she falls back on the standard argument of NIE that 
only a functioning labor market itself is the solution. She basically argues in Guthrie‘s line 
of thought that Guanxi is on the decline and will disappear with a complete institutional 
structure – Western style.
1233  
     In my view, although Guanxi requires a high level of  Rénqíng, they still need not be 
equal to strong ties, as can be elucidated by the examples of Guanxi given above (see fn 
1065). A shared identity can also be achieved with ‗loose affiliations‘, hence, weak ties, it 
is not necessarily a matter of the frequency of interaction or spatial or emotional closeness. 
Thus, it is difficult to categorize Guanxi connections as either strong or weak ties. Also, 
looking at more typical categories that characterize network types outlined in chapter 3, 
Guanxi networks are multiplex in that they are not only incorporating different types of 
relationships, there exist no different networks for different spheres like business, politics 
or social life. The Chinese tolerance towards ambiguity and a high level of pragmatism 
results in not categorizing a specific person who consequently can take on different roles in 
different situations. It is also more relying on generalizing reciprocity and informal social 
capital, as already outlined above. Additionally, Guanxi networks not only work within the 
―small islands of prosperity within the sea of misery‖
 1234  as the European (regional and 
strategic) networks do.  
    The typical argument of NIE of having networks as organizational unit as another way 
of reducing transaction costs and enhancing efficiency, is also tracing cultural differences 
back to the Western rationality argument, which in the end leads to the all-encompassing 
criteria of efficiency as sole objective of a rational enterprise. This argues again in Weber‘s 
sense.  History  is  deterministic  so  that  rational  Capitalism  in  the  Western  sense  is  the 
epiphany of modernity which denies a possible difference between cultures. The Western 
discourse has great difficulty in considering social systems as open or emotional and in this 
sense ‗irrational‘ which includes having no clear cut boundaries between society, politics 
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and the economy.
1235 In contrast, the flexible production of Chinese networks is based on 
trust and is determined by its institutional environment.
1236 
     ―The point is that the technology in use reflects the way the economy is socially orga-
nized, as well as the product being made. That young girls made cloth on single-spindle 
looms a century ago or that the women (and often men too) in households gather around 
the dining table to assemble computer parts today does not indicate economic involution or 
capitalistic ineptitude of any kind. But is does indicate that we cannot understand how 
economies work unless we understand how they are organized in some holistic way‖.
1237 
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7. Capitalism, the private sector and Guanxi in the 20
th century 
7.1.  The development of the private sector since 1978  
7.1.1.  The development of the Chinese private sector and the role of entrepreneurs 
 
“Xuehui shulihua, buru you ge hao baba”. 
A command of mathematics, physics, and chemistry is not worth as 
much as having a good father {i.e., with connections}. 
              Chinese Saying
1238 
 
     The transformation of the Chinese economic system after 1978 from a planned to a 
market economy based on competition and the division of labor went surprisingly smooth-
ly, especially compared to similar processes in Middle- and East Europe. The economic 
reforms in general were made possible by the revitalization and creation of institutions to 
expand, regulate, and channel economic transactions especially and foremost in the private 
sector. They developed in areas where State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were less domi-
nant and thus complemented the institutions existing in the planned economy for the allo-
cation of goods and services. The (re-)newed institutions were a response to the organiza-
tional problems arising in agriculture, industry, and commerce in the course of reforms. 
The central government gave space to local governments in finding their own way of deal-
ing with the reform process, than choosing the most successful structures to ex post legi-
timize the actions in introducing legal structures and corresponding laws for enforceable 
rights, supporting individual autonomy.
1239 This development is enforced by the central 
government that gave supremacy to local officials who influenced the local d evelopment. 
They were often motivated to strongly support local economic growth often not complying 
with central state regulations. An ―array of essentially private ownership forms emerged 
[…] with the knowledge and support of sub-provincial local officials but well ahead of the 
regulations and laws designed to govern them‖.
1240 Private entrepreneurs collaborate with 
government  officials,  ―creating  and  benefiting  from  a  web  of  bureaucracy-business  al-
liances. While this can be traced back to the pre-communist years, the reform and open 
policy did not eliminate but deepened this Chinese tradition‖.
1241  
     It  can  be  easily  argued  that  the  Chinese  transformation  was  only  possible  with  the 
emergence  of  entrepreneurs  and  privately-owned  enterprises.  The  particular  problems 
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found in the Chinese economy after their entrance in the global market were most efficient-
ly faced with the re-utilization of the Chinese family, family enterprises and personal net-
works as a means to do business the Chinese way. Thus, they adapted and revived past 
institutions, also bridging the gap left by the breakdown of social order caused after the 
Cultural Revolution. Those institutions based on traditional values assisted in finding a 
unique way of business practices, creating a specific Chinese Capitalism based on Guan-
xi.
1242 
     For the Chinese social and economic system, kinship always played an important role. 
During the Ming and Qing dynasties, businesses were owned by families and Chinese mer-
chants depended to a large part on social networks.
1243 The Chinese family system tradi-
tionally exhibits a high degree of social solidarity before the  background of parental au-
thority connected with obedience and respect of the children which also means that ind i-
viduals define themselves through the family and through relations to others.
1244 The ma-
jority of people traditionally lived on the countryside, where clans dominated the villages. 
Property rights in the Western sense were hardly known, the clan fulfilled duties like ac t-
ing as juridical authority and lending money.
1245 From a Western point of vie w it could 
rather negatively be argued that the clan filled an institutional gap that in the West was 
occupied by the state. 
     As already been outlined in depth in chapter 5, Max Weber describes the ―sib fetters of 
the economy‖ that from his point of view prevented the emergence of Capitalism in China 
in the 19
th century.
1246 For him, the Confucian culture of authoritarianism, hierarchy and 
ethnocentrism fosters economic activity in the form of family businesses rather than large 
corporations.
1247 Weber presents Confucianism as based on conservatism and traditions 
instead of change and innovation and thus as impedimental to ra tional bourgeois Capital-
ism.
1248  
     Further obstacles are the requirement of Chinese families for strict obedience to paren-
tal authority. This and the distribution of resources according to the status within the fami-
ly
 generated a lack of work discipline. Open positions had to be filled with family members 
and thus labor could not be acquired from a free labor market. Additionally, due to the fact 
that sons inherit equal shares of their father‘s company by tradition, these family business-
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es were never able to grow over a certain size.
1249 Weber accounts the patrimonial order of 
the state and the importance of kinship organization and thus "the unbroken and continued 
existence of the cohesive sib and the pre-eminent position of its head" for the inhibition of 
a bourgeois Capitalism.
1250 Weber comes to the conclusion that  ―Confucian rationalism 
meant rational adjustment to the world; Puritan rationalism meant rational mastery of the 
world‖.
1251 In contrast to the harmony-seeking Confucianism, Protestantism was able to 
shatter the fetters of the sib.
1252 
     Weber also considered the time and effort required to establish Guanxi networks as dis-
tracting from business. For those reasons, family businesses have been replaced by profes-
sionally run bureaucratic corporations in the West which helped Capitalism and the indus-
trial revolution thrive. Weber predicts the same for China, if Chinese people free the m-
selves from family obligations.  
     Interestingly, Weber also argues that Confucian cultures are able to absorb Capitalism 
more easily than other non-Western societies. The reason for this he attributes to the sp e-
cific role of family networks and the importance of learning for Confucianism.
1253 Even 
though the very same culture did not develop Capitalism on its own, it easily adapted it and 
institutional factors, such as family and networks, which previously inhibited its eme r-
gence,  became  e ssential  components  of  its  structure.
1254  Consequently,  the  pre-
revolutionary institutions, which prior to 1949 supported the more impedimental features, 
supported the features that foster economic success in a competitive international capitalis-
tic environment after 1978.  
     The revitalization of institutions regulated economic transactions in the private sector, 
complementing the existing institutions. Among the renewed institutions family enterprises 
and personal networks were the most efficient response to the particular problems of the 
Chinese economy after its entrance in the global market. A  kind of collective memory 
enabled the emergence of a private sector in reviving traditional long -known institutions. 
The collective times seemed to have built-up urge for more autonomy which then erupted 
in massive entrepreneurial endeavors, especially in certain rural areas. Entrepreneurial i n-
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stincts were preserved and could flourish with the institutions provided by economic re-
forms.
1255 This shows the resilience of traditional business practices.
1256 
     The transformation process initiated in 1978 brought many changes to organizations, 
production and consumption but also to the thinking of people. In 1992, economic devel-
opment received another push by Deng Xiaoping‘s legendary ‗trip to the South‖, to the 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) of Shenzen, and his call for opening up and economic re-
forms (see also chapter 5). Beside the large SOEs of the planned economy, especially in 
rural areas small, privately-owned enterprises were established. These firms were mainly 
run by families, creating a private sector. Family enterprises worked according to the prin-
ciples of the market economy, giving time and space to the entrepreneurs to find their own 
way of doing business in those instable and risky circumstances.
1257 This newly created 
private sector was established in coexistence with the state sector. Prices instead of being 
planned and thus fixed were set on markets with the facilitation of market entrance and 
exit. There were no clear regulations determining which sector would follow the rules of 
the free market or continue to be led by bureaucracy.  
    Until the economic policies of 1978, the notion of private capitalist entrepreneurs has 
not existed in the CCP‘s ideology.
1258 While merchants were not well respected and did not 
enjoy high social status under socialism, they were able to produce and supply products of 
higher quality than the state grocery stores and thus rose in status together with the estab-
lishment of a market economy. Furthermore, due to monetary incentives and competition 
with the more flexible privately-owned small family firms, also SOEs gradually changed to 
a more profit-oriented production. Thus, the today‘s SOEs of China have not much in 
common with the SOEs in the beginning of reforms. Additionally, the dual-track system 
and a labor market were established that led to competition for better products and em-
ployees. Talented workers changed to private firms because of better payments, making 
those enterprises in turn even more productive. This spurred competition with the formerly 
plan-protected  SOEs  that  during  reforms  often  also  lost  the  privilege  of  the  ‗iron  rice 
bowl‘, hence did change or lose their system of social health care and pension funds.
1259  
     The attitude towards work, money and relationships was transformed due to better eco-
nomic conditions and the rising importance of market forces. The emergence of private 
                                                 
1255 Whyte, 1995, p. 1015, Krug, 2002b, p. 133, Yang, 2002, p. 466ff., Peng, 2004, p. 1059 and Gold, 1985, 
p. 674. 
1256 Faure, 2006, p. 28f. 
1257 Krug, 2002b, p. 131f. See below the example of Wenzhou below. 
1258 Baek, 2000, p. 63. 
1259 Shirk, 1993, p. 42. 226 
 
firms  created a  new class  of individual  entrepreneurs and  managers who became very 
quickly enormously wealthy. Most of these newly set up enterprises were run by families, 
producing a wide range of products, making their profit only from the market. While in the 
1980s entrepreneurs were still seen with mixed feelings, their reputation aggrandized in 
more recent times. The Marxist view of entrepreneurs as "seeds of Capitalism" and thus 
exploiters slowly seized to exist.
1260 The slogan ―Serve the people‖ (wei renmin fuwu) be-
came ―Serve the people‘s currency (=RMB)‖ (wei reminbi fuwu).
1261 
    Although Chinese entrepreneurs as such do not form a class in the sense of a social fo r-
mation like the German bourgeoisie, they are nevertheless a d ynamic element of political 
and social change. They could seek leading positions in politics or society to i nfluence 
social values, but Chinese entrepreneurs seem not to have this in common with their Euro-
pean counterparts.
1262 They are lacking a shared identity, probably because they stem from 
different backgrounds (former peasants or so -called  ‗self-made  men‘  alongside  former 
state officials and other long-established elites).
1263 Other authors argue that ―a newly af-
fluent parvenu stratum of entrepreneurs and professionals has arisen to form a new class 
whose wealth is rooted not in the political order—as with the old state socialist redistribu-
tive era elite—but in the rise of a market capitalist economy‖.
1264 But even though they all 
belong to the ‗new rich‘
1265 and thus economic elite, they do not form a middle class or 
bourgeoisie. If they have the potential to form a strategic group is not yet clear and is 
viewed differently within the literature.
1266 ―The middle class is not a simple concept but is 
made up of different elements and is itself often regarded as stratified: …the middle classes 
are now generally seen in industrialized societies as the large, middle sectors of contempo-
rary hierarchies of economic wealth, social status and political power, identified as much 
by their consumption and adherence to style as in socio-economic terms….Starting with 
the  early  nineteenth  century,  the  bourgeoisie  were  a  new  middle  class  created  by  the 
process of industrialization. They were the captains of industry whose ownership of the 
means of production – extraction, processing and manufacturing activities – drove indu-
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strialization, and they became a middle class because they were neither the landed aristo-
cracy on the one hand, nor ordinary townspeople on the other‖.
1267  
     However, in contrast to the population of most developed countries, Chinese people still 
adhere themselves to the working class.
1268 Mostly, private entrepreneurs do not strive to 
become interconnected over horizontal ties, be it informal or more formal ones. Not least, 
because collective action within an authoritarian state is still a sensitive issue and the polit-
ical circumstances rather support individualism in the sense that each entrepreneur relies 
on his Guanxi to selected government cadres.
1269 Social clubs were founded but are not 
considered as central places for doing business and ties to local officials are considered as 
more important. Still, membership is regarded as status symbol and membership rates a c-
cordingly are very high to make it more exclusive. It  is more a place for showing off the 
accumulated wealth than for engaging in business negotiations.
1270 Goodman draws three 
conclusions from his research: ―The first is that the new entrepreneurs are a complex and 
not a simple social category, including not only owner-operators in the private sector but 
also managers of state-, collectively-, privately-, and foreign-owned enterprises, as well as 
oftentimes confusing combinations of these various sub-categories. The second relates to 
the wealth of the new entrepreneurs. While there were some disastrously unsuccessful en-
trepreneurs and others who were only of moderate wealth, many were not just comfortably 
well off by the standard of their local economy…but were clearly the rich and the super-
rich….The third overall conclusion limits such arguments by highlighting the close institu-
tional and associational links between the new entrepreneurs and the party-state: they are 
neither independent of nor excluded from the political establishment, which on the con-
trary seeks actively to incorporate them if there is no pre-existing relationship‖.
1271 
     A civil or public spirit and a sense for community in the form of individual commitment 
and volunteering are not yet highly developed (however, the willingness for donations rose 
considerably in the aftermath of the earthquake in Southwest China in May 2008). Still, 
volunteer work for social or public causes is still very uncommon.
1272 Heberer traces that 
back to historical reasons. Empathy for people outside one‘s network (the ‗inner circle‘ of 
family, clan or village) is relatively low, which impedes the development of civil tradi-
tions. Modernization processes also often led to the disintegration of traditional communi-
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ties and values and to an increase of individualistic, selfish behavior. Being a citizen means 
to be an autonomous individual that can decide independently. The urban atomization that 
leads to a change of group-centered loyalty to individualism might also lead to societal 
individualism that is concentrated only on one‘s own life that make people indifferent to 
social commitment. Nevertheless, the institutions of a civil society are still missing in Chi-
na and people doing volunteer work are often party members ordered to do so. State pater-
nalism and socialist education rather leads to the image of a good citizen that is loyal to 
state and party and obeys their order without interfering or objection.
1273 The authoritarian 
state has great impact on the action and beliefs of its populations who believe that the 
measures of the state are for their own best.
1274 
Another aspect of the specific Chinese mindset is their ethic of entrepreneurship. This 
can be regarded as another important reason for the extreme growth of private companies 
once the country opened up. An entrepreneur is defined as ―small-scale capitalist who at-
tempts to parlay small capital into big earnings‖, investing ―one‘s resources […] in a long-
term quest to improve the material well-being and security of some group to which one 
belongs and with which one identifies‖.
1275 Thus, the entrepreneurial ethic is not short-term 
but future-oriented, neither is it merely for individual benefit. The group towards which 
those efforts are directed is mostly one‘s family and friends. To set up an enterprise during 
reforms was not done because of personal career considerations but first and foremost to 
secure long-term benefits to your network, the family in particular. So, Chinese entrepre-
neurs are more than capitalist ‗economic men‘ just greedy for money and materialist gain 
but rather concerned about long-term security.
1276  
     The particular problems found in the Chinese economy after their entrance in the global 
market were most efficiently faced with the re -utilization of the Chinese family, family 
enterprises and personal networks as a means to do business the Chinese way. The 
achievement orientation made families strive towards a ―societal marketization‖
1277, which 
explains the mushrooming of private family-owned businesses and the hidden privatization 
of collectives. Past institutions were adapted and revived, also bridging the gap left by the 
breakdown of social order caused after the Cultural Revolution. This can also be inter-
preted  as  a  ―restoration  of  older  Chinese  relationships‖  which  formed  new  institutions 
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based on traditional values.
1278 These institutions assisted in finding a unique way of busi-
ness practices, creating a specific Chinese Capitalism based on Guanxi. Private enterprises 
worked according to the principles of the market economy, but still found their own way of 
doing business in those instable and risky circumstances.
1279 
     Guanxi facilitated the reviving of the private sector during the economic reforms, b e-
coming a more material exchange during the 1980s. It helped to establish small privately -
owned enterprises especially in rural areas. These fir ms were mainly run by families, 
which worked according to the principles of the market economy, but at the same time 
giving time and space to the entrepreneurs to find their own way of doing business in those 
instable and risky circumstances.
1280  
     Hence, in contrast to the Western belief that secured property rights need to exist for 
sustained growth, the establishment of private enterprises despite unclear or stable specifi-
cation proved once again the ―ambiguity [that] is the imperatively important feature of 
Chinese mindscape‖.
1281 The obscure ownership structures of collective enterprises, specif-
ically the TVEs, are an example that this pragmatism or uncertainty acceptance is an im-
portant feature of Chinese culture (see also below). As Casson, 1993 notes: ―Some cultures 
emphasize the importance of theory; it is important to understand the situation before act-
ing, they maintain, and such understanding can only be provided by a theory of some kind. 
Other cultures are more pragmatic; they suggest that it is sufficient to know that, on the 
basis of experience, a certain course of action produces good results in certain circums-
tances without knowing exactly why this is the case‖.
1282 This tolerance toward ambiguity 
is an important Chinese virtue and a fuzzy chaotic status is interpreted as something from 
where "creativity can emerge‖.
1283 
     Family ties are creating strong loyalties that motivate each family member.
1284 Young 
Chinese study hard for the sake of the family to earn the right for a manager position in the 
family business. This provides the advantage of creating a ‗natural authority‘ and not los-
ing profit to external managers.
1285 On the other hand, family firms are not required to give 
positions to all family members. Relatives and even sons who do not show sufficient talent 
are driven out of the family business.  
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     Another characteristic feature of small family enterprises is their inheritance pattern. 
When a firm is passed to the next generation, the sons are entrusted with a subsidiary unit 
for which they have the sole responsibility. This is seen as possibility to diversify the deci-
sion-making when a firm prospers and grows. This ―package of individual incentives and 
group insurance against failure […] encourages the emergence of highly motivated, risk-
taking entrepreneurs‖.
1286 The firm is divided in equal parts between sons - thus preventing 
a company to grow over a certain size, which is now seen as advantage.
1287 Although on 
the one hand the division of property among sons might be a weakening of economic pow-
er it also diversifies investments. This fosters the flexibility of the firms that are divided 
into several sub-branches in the ownership of one family, but under the command of di f-
ferent sons.
1288 
     Economic development was also fostered by Guanxi because it is connected these small 
flexible firms to facilitate access to markets and supplies with the help of personal relation-
ships. Often they would also subcontract to larger companies. Both enabled them to change 
products and the overall mode of production very quickly. This contrasts the huge multina-
tional enterprises with strict hierarchies and a lot fixed investment capital, giving the small 
family firms of China a competitive advantage in the world market.
1289 Small firms require 
only small start-up costs and adjust more flexible to changed market situations. This situa-
tion also produces a highly competitive market env ironment – if one firm collapses, new 
ones fill the gap quickly. In addition, the risk of so-called ―ad-hoc taxation‖
1290 is mini-
mized (see chapter 8). However, ―[d]espite official figures showing that small and medium 
sized firms employed 75 percent of China‘s workers and produced 68 percent of the gross 
industrial product in 2008, private firms have been virtually excluded from direct support 
in the form of preferential access to low interest loans. Though private firms sought eco-
nomic stimulus money, state-owned banks routinely rejected loan applications submitted 
by private firms. Instead the massive economic stimulus has provided a huge subsidy to 
local governments and large state-owned enterprises and public corporations‖.
1291 
     Guanxi now helped to solve the problem of distribution of scarce goods and bridge the 
weaknesses of instable dysfunctional institutions. The market economy evolved from a 
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vehicle to ease consumption of every day goods to a means to access a more restricted 
area.
1292 
Kinship networks not only serve as shelter to protect private property, but through that also 
increase security and reduce transaction costs, additionally providing information on su p-
plies or business opportunities. All in all, networks ―lower entry barriers and raise the sur-
vival and success rates of private entrepreneurs‖.
1293 
    At the beginning of the transition to a market economy in China, due to the yet lacking 
legal and institutional environment, entrepreneurs overcame those obstacles in establishing 
good relations with local cadres. They founded ‗red hat enterprises‘, which means nothing 
else than to be registered as collective (hence wearing red caps, dai hong maozi) but being 
privately-run in reality. These collective enterprises, in the beginning often in form of co-
operative  shareholdings  (gǔfèn  hézuò,  股份合作)  contained  the  advantages  of  collective 
ownership, such as easier access to bank loans and reduced tax rates, but at the same time 
allowed the entrepreneur to have control over the firm‘s assets but ―no guarantees of their 
rights as owners‖.
1294 Still, these firms were highly dependent on the tolerance of the local 
government, had to share their profits with them or were else at risk that local authorities 
break their promise to protect the private property. The existence of red hat enterprises 
shows the mistrust of entrepreneurs in more formal arrangements and official government 
protection. At the same time, dense networks serve protective powers if cadres become too 
greedy and predatory.
1295 Having to maintain strong ties to local officials can be interpreted 
―as evidence of poorly enforced legal property rights and an obstacle to the formation of a 
more complete market economy‖, which is the view mostly found in mainstream econom-
ics approaches.
1296 Opposed to that David L. Wank understands this as ―reasonably cohe-
rent strategies of entrepreneurs designed to produce stable expectations‖.
1297 These net-
works actually seem to turn out as the most efficient and rational institutions able to deal 
with the specificities found in China.  
     Efficiency when applied to Guanxi thus has a broader meaning. It is less rationalistic 
and ―extends beyond a strictly economic consideration‖.
1298 This promotes "organization-
ally diffuse‖ groups of collaborating firms ―connected by particularistic ties of kinship" 
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and gives more security to the entrepreneur to reinvest.
1299 The reciprocal and mutual sup-
porting relations of the co-operating businesses allow resorting to ―considerable economies 
of scale, and the networks of both large and small firms can be extended‖.
1300 
     This mode of production prevents the drain of capital and enables (but also forces) the 
entrepreneur to be extremely flexible. As supplies cannot always be secured on usual ways 
(meaning, without personal connections) this adds to the importance of investing in as 
many different products as possible to achieve the maximum profit. To achieve this, not 
only a certain organization of the enterprise is necessary, but even more so personal con-
nections. As a consequence, the notion of core competence, one of the most important fea-
tures of the Western understanding of conducting business is not really applicable to many 
privately-owned firms as it is not a relevant factor when considering further investments. 
     This again reinforced the strengths of personal ties which not only are needed but are 
also the most helpful tool in such an economic environment.
1301 Having no formalized bu-
reaucratic system, these firms connected over networks are highly flexible, low -cost pro-
ducers. More than that, they thrive in a market that requires fast reactions to changes in 
demand. Additionally, the emergence of niche markets and the need of flexible specializa-
tion favored the small-sized Chinese family enterprises. Multinational corporations increa-
singly subcontracted to small and medium enterprises, therefore Chinese firms could gain 
market shares for low-end, labor-intensive products, trading across borders with the help of 
networks.
1302 Instead of ‗putting all eggs in one basket‘, Chinese entrepreneurs invest in 
diverse branches and products, thus, in economically difficult times they can move re-
sources to activities and locations promising the most profit, being able to leverage gains 
and losses, thereby also discovering new markets and investments.
1303 
     All in all, Guanxi ―is a connection between people, not firms. Even if an individual is 
running a number of separate companies, the counter-party considers itself as still trading 
with the same entity, the person with whom he has Guanxi. He could not have different 
relationships with each company‖.
1304 
     As can be seen, this is almost the complete opposite to the Western notion of doing 
business. Even considered the relatively large amount of transaction or sunk costs does not 
prevent this system to be extremely successful. Also, ―entrepreneurs […] concentrate their 
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investment on transferable assets. And the single most transferable asset which entrepre-
neurs have is themselves and their social capital in the form of the ability to mobilize alle-
giances‖. These assets cannot be confiscated by local cadres and can be applied to as many 
different business opportunities as necessary to be successful. ―It is the ability of the entre-
preneur to form alliances, and the subsequent rents from co-operation, which are crucial to 
the establishment and on-going profitability of firms‖.
1305 
     Useful in times of prosperity and growth, the flexibility to move quickly from on sector 
or location to another derived from the small units of production turns out to be also a val-
uable asset during economic crises. Having relations to people with command over finan-
cial assets or supplies and distribution possibilities saves not only ‗transaction costs‘ but 
can secure survival in economically difficult times. As Barbara Krug writes, there are four 
aspects networks provide: first, facilitating access to insider information; second, social 
and political sanctioning to make up for a missing or inadequate legal system, thereby pro-
viding contractual security; third, ensuring ―that an entrepreneur can fail once yet return for 
a second attempt, but also forming a buffer against failure in the first instance‖; fourth, 
acting ―as a form of collective memory, ensuring that a single failure need not be consti-
tuted simply as one individual‘s loss of investment but as an experience which others can 
learn from‖.
1306 
     Also, concluding transactions is more flexible when done with the help of Guanxi. It is 
more flexible than contracts because when doing business with people in ones network it is 
easier to find compromises or giving new chances, especially if otherwise one of the busi-
ness partners would have to default. ―When there are problems, we can always talk it 
through. With Europeans, it‘s quite different. We work with many multinational compa-
nies…They are not flexible. They won‘t compromise and let you go [if you need to make 
adjustments]. They don‘t share our mutual understanding. The Europeans go according to 
the books and rules‖.
1307 
     In other words, ―risks are borne by the individuals and not absorbed by an external 
agency like a bank; neither is the contract between them bound by an external body, as in a 
legal institution‖.
1308 Still, the advantages of Guanxi in contrast to formal contracts, which 
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in the West are considered as mandatory prerequisites for doing business because only 
those that can be enforced through law, are not recognized by ―the West‖.
1309  
     Large networks help small enterprises to get access to more resources, even in unstable 
political and economic surroundings, therefore supporting their flexibility and the ability to 
adapt.
1310 Having Guanxi to people with command over financial assets or supplies and 
distribution possibilities saves not only ‗transaction costs‘ but can secure survival in eco-
nomically  difficult  times.  It  is  used  to  obtain  bank  loans  or  supplies  from  unofficial 
sources, to make sure that in the competitive economy of China a firm can keep up with 
the market, raise its profit and build up good connections to officials. Networks are seen as 
long-term strategic alliances to access information and resources over indefinite periods of 
time. It is therefore within the logic of this system that contracts are of less use as they are 
based on a ―discrete transaction paradigm, which has a clear beginning when an agreement 
is finalized and a clear ending by performance‖. Also, the identities of the transacting par-
ties are of no relevance within this paradigm.
1311 Entrepreneurs ―pay more attention to the 
cultivation of friendship rather than simply maximizing their profit‖.
1312 
     By and large, personal connections build on trust proved to be essential for doing busi-
ness in China during economic reforms.
1313 Hence, ―social relationships built on gift ex-
change provide a substitute form of trust that can improve the profitability of investment 
and reduce the risk of arbitrary bureaucratic interference that is not in the interests of the 
investors‖.
1314  It mobilizes cultural values such as obligation and  reciprocity to  pursue 
―both diffuse social ends and calculated instrumental ends", substituting for the not yet 
existing and complementing already existing market mechanisms.
1315 Entrepreneurs out-
side the state sector developed informal economic institutions that ―enabled them to com-
pete and cooperate in spite of disadvantageous or simply absent formal rules‖ in the decen-
tralized markets of a newly established private sector.
1316 This mode of production is par-
ticularly efficient in labor -intensive, quickly-changing and segmented markets such as 
those for textiles or the toys industries. Chinese family firms are successful because of 
their flexibility and ability to decide quickly. They o perate less successfully in capital -
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intensive sectors where, due to complex production processes, profits can only be made 
when a certain volume of production is reached.
1317 
 
7.1.2. Types of Chinese enterprises  
7.1.2.1. Public sector 
     The public sector consists of collective as well as state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 
difference, traditionally, was that the state sector is the planned and the collective is the 
unplanned part of the state economy with workers or a locality owning the company.
1318 
Especially SOEs can be of various sizes and in the course of reforms smaller SOEs were 
privatized under the slogan ―grasp the big, release the small‖ (zhuada fangxiao).
1319  
     In the collective sector, which is comprised of collectively-owned enterprises (COE) as 
some authors call it, a huge variety of different property rights structures can be found, 
namely township- (xiāngban), village- (cūnban) and team-run (duìban) enterprises that are 
owned by townships or villages, respectively. Another type of collective firm is the domes-
tic state-collective joint venture (liányíng qǐyè). In Huang‘s terms it is translated as ‗al-
liance enterprise‘, liányíng being ―a 1980s euphemism referring to larger private-sector 
enterprises‖ that was replaced by the term sīy￭ng qǐyè later. Liányíng qǐyè are firms that are 
operated with the money of two or more peasant families.
1320 Also, there is a government-
run variety of shareholding co-operatives (gǔfèn hézuò qǐyè), which is only existent since 
1992, and individually contracted collectives (gèrén chéngbǎo jítǐ qǐyè). The assets of the 
latter are originally financed by the collective.  
     Susan Whiting reports that for example in Yueqing the majority of privately-owned 
firms was granted collectives licenses as shareholding co-operative enterprises and there-
fore also appeared as collective in statistics. However, in government-run shareholding co-
operatives the majority of the shares were hold by the township and the managers were 
appointed by the local government, which also intervenes if the firm runs into difficulties. 
A major objective for local officials to run enterprises with this kind of ownership form 
was the possibility to acquire shares in the more successful enterprises.
1321 
    One major type of collective enterprises are the so -called Township and Village enter-
prises (TVEs). TVEs have a somewhat complex structure, but often are also misinterpreted 
                                                 
1317 Fukuyama, 1995, p. 104ff. 
1318 Goodman, 2007, p. 181. 
1319 Dickson, 2007, p. 835. 
1320 Huang, 2008, p. 74f. 
1321 Whiting, 2001, p. 35f., 159, 223. 236 
 
in the literature as being mostly collective, overseeing the large fraction of private owner-
ship among them. However, Huang traces this back to a different understanding of what a 
TVE is in its English and Chinese usage.
1322 
   The term TVE first appeared in 1984 to replace the ‗commune and brigade enterprise‘. 
Already the terminology proves to be complicated as there are actually two Chinese terms 
that are both expressed as TVE in English. One is xiāngzhen qǐyè, meaning rural and urban 
enterprises, which includes also rural private enterprises. The second term, xiāngcūn qǐyè, 
means township and village enterprises, which refers to collective TVEs only. The English 
term TVE is actually a subset of xiāngzhen qǐyè. Huang claims that most Western econo-
mists assume that collective TVEs represent the entire TVE sector; however it subsumes 
also private businesses.
1323 In literature on the topic written in German, this confusion 
seems to be less widespread. Huang also maintains that these private TVEs are not to be 
confused with so-called ‗red hat‘ enterprises, which are typically larger-scale private enter-
prises that are falsely registered as collective. Private TVEs in contrast are fully private 
with their ownership officially known. However, both types are included in official Chi-
nese statistical data as TVE. In its Chinese usage, TVE is a locational concept, rather than 
a concept defining ownership.
1324 Naughton defines TVEs as having an ―unusual owner-
ship and corporate governance setup…Originating under the rural communes, most TVEs 
were collectively-owned‖.
1325 
Also in the interpretation of Markus Taube, TVEs are synonymously used for the rural 
productions sector that included collective and private rural enterprises, with the private 
forms dominating.
1326 Especially the latter were during the 1980s formally legitimated and 
were regarded as useful complementation of the state and collective enterprises. However, 
property rights structures remained  intransparent  and unspecific. In contrast to Huang, 
Taube claims that many private TVEs were actually ‗red-hat‘ enterprises and registered as 
collective TVE as also for private TVEs access to markets, resources and loans was re-
stricted.
1327 
Naughton attributes the rapid growth of TVEs between 1978 and the 1990s to a mixture 
of favorable factors, namely that TVEs ―faced factor prices ratios that reflected China‘s 
true factor endowment‖. Worker‘s wages were less than 60 percent of works in SOEs and 
                                                 
1322 Nee and Su, 1996, p. 124-127, Huang, 2008, p. 74-76.  
1323 Huang, 2008, p. 74, 106. He quotes Barry Naughton as example but on p. 281 of the same book Naugh-
ton actually states that many TVEs were de facto private firms. Naughton, 2007, p. 281.  
1324 Huang, 2008, p. 75. 
1325 Naughton, 2007, p. 271. 
1326 Taube, 2007a. 
1327 Taube, 2007a, p. 154-159. 237 
 
as TVEs usually did not have access to subsidized loans. Thus, they were most successful 
in sector with a low capital-labor ratios because then the advantage of low wages were the 
biggest. Also, TVEs ―were able to share in the monopoly rents created for state firms‖ 
which means that rural industries were extremely profitable – on average, the rate of profit 
on capital was 32 percent, but declined over time. Naugthon argues that the success of this 
type of firm can be traced back to the existence of empty niches in combination with the 
‗first-mover-advantage‘ of TVEs that were the first to be allowed to enter previously pro-
tected markets. Competition between TVEs gradually drove profits down. The third reason 
for Naughton is the institutional framework of TVEs. Specifically, he refers to the partner-
ship with local governments that depending on locations were highly motivated to promote 
economic  growth.  Also,  formal  taxes  were  low  and  local  governments  also  facilitated 
access to bank loans. TVEs were also geographically concentrated in coastal areas which 
gave them a spatial advantage also by their closeness to urban areas. As last advantage 
Naughton lists the organizational diversity of TVEs that resulted in their flexibility to adapt 
to various opportunities and environments.
1328  
However, the official legal sanctioning of the TVE sector in 1997 came at a time when 
de facto many TVEs transformed into private enterprises because the political climate was 
favorable towards the private sector.
1329 By 2004, over 90 percent of all TVEs were pr i-
vately owned; with the privatization being more formal than real in nature as many TVEs 
had been ‗red hat‘ enterprises and thus already been privately-owned.
1330  
     In the public sector also falls a variety of hybrid forms of ownership and what David 
Goodman calls ‗new public sector‘ that is open to market dynamics but also public equity. 
Ownership is ―more usually mixed than the official categories of the economy into state, 
collective, private and foreign-funded‖.
1331 He identifies four different types of enterprises 
comprising this hybrid sector. He lists the ―urban enterprise‖ that includes collective and 
share-based companies that were established by SOEs and pre-reform-type urban collec-
tive; ―rural enterprises‖ that include collectives and stock companies established by villag-
es or townships; ―wholly or partly foreign-funded enterprises‖ which are often former pri-
vate or state-run enterprises that have been transformed into larger firms by FDI and ―pub-
lic sector private enterprises‖ that are private enterprises that became collectives by co-
operation with local governments or share-based public companies with the original indi-
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vidual entrepreneur staying the head of the company.
1332 Additionally, the Chinese Com-
pany Law defines limited liability companies as a legitimate company type. This type of 
enterprise needs a minimum of capital of 30,000 Yuan in either cash, industrial property or 
land use rights, with less than 50 shareholders. Another recognized company type is the 
‗company limited by shares‘ which requires a minimum share capital of 5 million Yuan. It 
is established by share offer but needs the approval of Chinese securities regulators.   
     Foreign investors can set up various forms of joint ventures. The most common form is 
the equity joint venture. It is a limited liability company with the joint venture parties tak-
ing responsibility for losses and profits according to the ratio of their equity stake. They are 
also part of the hybrid sector mentioned by Goodman.
1333 
   In sum, the non-state sector is a mixture of the most variant forms of ownership and f i-
nancial structures and it differs a lot from official recordings. It also is very different sp a-
tially, so that different sets of enterprise forms exists in different localities, depending on 
the local institutional setting and preconditions. However, in ge neral it seems safe to say 
that it is - at least in the case of actual collective and state -owned enterprises - a far less 
dynamic sector and less influential on the development of the Chinese economy than the 
private sector. 
 
7.1.2.2. Private sector  
     The private sector is also defined as the non-state (opposed to ‗state‘) sector. The pri-
vate sector consists mainly of two types of private enterprises, namely the sīy￭ng qǐyè, 
which is the official Chinese term for private enterprise. It stands for enterprises with at 
least 90 percent privately owned assets employing more than eight people. It also is the 
private variant of the shareholding co-operative. The number of employees distinguishes it 
from the smaller getihu (geti gongshanghu) of the so-called self-employed entrepreneur 
who employs less than eight workers. The getihu is not considered a formal enterprise le-
gally.
1334 This form of enterprise is also called househol d enterprise or even specialized 
household as they are typically family businesses that only employ (extended) family 
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members.
1335 Also, there are the privately -run shareholding companies, so-called indivi-
dually contracted (fake) collectives (jia jítǐ) which are financed by private individuals. Al-
so Chinese-foreign joint ventures can be private, but often are also seen as rather hybrid 
ownership form.
1336  
     In Wenzhou, the  jia jítǐ were granted collective tax rates and the same eligibility for 
bank loans as collectives. However, they also were operated by private investors that had 
no restrictions on the number of employees but had certain guidelines for the distribution 
of after-tax profits. This arrangement was accepted locally, but contested already on the 
provincial level. It led to a nation-wide discussion on the status of this form of enterprise 
and in the end to a legitimization of it. ―In reality, there was little difference in the day-to-
day management and operation of private firms before and after the transition to the share-
holding cooperative form‖. As will be outlined in more depth below, this demonstrates the 
role model function of Wenzhou for the rest of the Chinese private economy.
1337 The im-
plications of running a private enterprise compared to collective enterprises will also an a-
lyzed in chapter 8. However, the case of Wenzhou is a particularly illuminating example of 
the development and difficulties of the private sector in China and will be discussed in 
depth below. 
    The methods of tax extraction employed by local governments are a major incentive to 
register as either private or collective firm. Depending on the ownership structure, these 
varied widely within and between localities (see also chapter 8).
1338 However, ―[i]f one 
were to examine the organization of the textile industry...in China in the past decade...., it 
would be apparent that the economic organization in all of these sectors share organiza-
tional features of putting-out systems of productions that existed a century earlier.[…] Like 
a century ago, the production networks shaped by these big buyers [Walmart, Home Depot, 
Nike...] emphasize piecework (called batch-production system) and flexible work routines. 
These factors give advantages to factories with low overhead (such as small and medium-
sized family-owned firms) and to flexibility in organizing production networks that can 
expand or contract with changing demand. The technology used in such factories must 
necessarily match the manufacturing jobs being done and the resources available to those 
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running the businesses. Inevitably, the technology used in such circumstances is simpler 
and less costly than that deployed in larger vertically integrated factories‖.
1339 
 
7.1.3. The Chinese private sector: definition and some data  
 
“Defining China‟s private sector is fiendishly difficult”.
1340 
 
     As already indicated in chapter 5, the Chinese data collection is far from being transpa-
rent. The same goes for a definition of the private sector and the question, which firms and 
ownership structures are defined to be included. Measures like ‗red hat‘ entrepreneurs or 
nebulous ownership arrangements like in the TVEs make that a difficult task. Traditional-
ly, Chinese statistics differentiate four ownership structures: state-owned, collective, pri-
vate and foreign-funded. Among those, the ‗private‘ category was always the most difficult 
to define. Even the terminology is complicated: the Chinese term for private sector, sīy￭ng 
jīngj￬, is more commonly used in the eastern provinces (literally it means privately operat-
ed economy), whereas in less developed provinces, the term mínyíng jīngj￬ is preferred to 
avoid capitalist connotations with the word sī (meaning private). Even more sensitive is the 
expression non-state  sector (or non publicly-owned economy:  fēi gōngyǒuzhi jīngj￬). It 
comprises all ownership forms that are not state-owned, including sīy￭ng qǐyè and getihu, 
but  also  foreign-invested  enterprises  and  other  very  diverse  ownership  forms  such  as 
shareholding companies  and so-called ‗red hat‘ enterprises, i.e. nominally collective, but 
actually private enterprises. This variety of enterprise types, that includes hybrid forms of 
ownership structure, makes this term statistically less transparent.
1341 Moreover, as already 
mentioned before, David Goodman finds that an entire new sector developed between state 
and privately-owned firms. He subsumes all hybrid forms of ownership in a hybrid sector 
he calls the ‗new public sector‘. He even claims that entrepreneurs engaging in this sector 
are the more successful ones, which makes the notion of the dynamic private versus the 
inert state sector difficult to uphold.
1342 A more recent terminology is to distinguish b e-
tween SMEs (zhong xiao qǐyè, reportedly 80 to 90 percent of Chinese enterprises) and 
large enterprises (most of which are SOEs), which also does not reveal much about the 
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ownership.
1343 Since 1988, when the first amendment of the constitution and a correspond-
ing law on the regulation of private enterprises were enacted, the official Chinese term for 
private enterprise is sīy￭ng qǐyè. It stands for enterprises with at least 90 percent privately 
owned assets employing more than eight people. The latter criterion distinguishes it from 
the smaller getihu (geti gongshanghu), which is the so-called self-employed entrepreneur 
who employs less than eight workers and is not considered a formal enterprise legally. To-
gether, these two forms form the private sector as such, which is said to produce 20 percent 
of China‘s GDP in 2001, following data obtained from Heike Holbig.
1344 Data of the NBS 
on the private sector has the additional caveat that it is biased towards larger firms and only 
includes those with a sales volume over five million Yuan. Hence, an OECD study of 2005 
using this data comes to the conclusion that the private economy accounted for 52.3 pe r-
cent of industrial value-added in 2003, compared with 27.9 percent in 1998.
1345 However, 
in contrast to the categorization used by the NBS that defines ownership by their registr a-
tion status, the OECD uses a conventional definition of firm ownership, taken from co n-
temporary theories of the firm, namely that ―ownership should be defined in terms of what 
shareholder controls the ‗residual rights‘ of the firm, in the sense of who dictates unfore-
seen contingencies‖.
1346 Thus, they separate firms by the type of controlling shareholder. 
With this method they seek to overcome the usual difficulties with defining the private 
sector. Share capital greater than 50 percent determines which kind of firm it is: state, col-
lective or private. They also find that ―[t]he growth of the private sector has not been even 
across the country. An overwhelming share of private industrial output is produced in the 
eastern coastal region (Zhejiang, Guangdong and Jiangsu provinces), that has been at the 
forefront of all types of reforms. In this region the share of industrial value added from the 
private sector is 63 percent against only 32 percent in other regions. These other regions 
are about five years behind in the development of the private sector. However, the central, 
western,  and  north-eastern  regions‘  private  sectors  have  been  growing  faster  than  the 
coastal areas‘ over the five years to 2003, suggesting that catch-up is underway‖.
1347 By 
2007, the value-added of the eastern coastal provinces had increased to 80 percent; it had 
also increased to almost 50 percent in the rest of country, except in the underdeveloped 
western provinces (and Heilongjiang in the Northeast). This is evidence of the growing 
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convergence  within  the  country  –  at  least  when  the  poorer  Western  provinces  are  ex-
cluded.
1348   
     Huang uses the same methodology than the OECD Economic Survey but comes to a far 
lesser percentage, namely 22 percent of industrial value -added in 2005. Throughout his 
book he bases his arguments on the relatively small size of private sector. His measures are 
so significantly smaller because he defines a certain type of ownership as collective, not 
private, namely the legal-person shareholding firms because he argues that these are owned 
by  firms  via  cross -shareholding,  which  means  that  they  are  merely  subsidiaries  of 
SOEs.
1349 However, the ―hallmarks of a market economy is the role and magnitude of the 
private sector…there is no straightforward answer to this seemingly direct question about 
the size of the Chinese private sector….deliberately vague ownership structures‖.
1350  
     According to an article of BusinessWeek of 2005, the private sector already reached a 
share of 70 percent of the private sector in GDP.
1351 The article does not give a source for 
this estimate, but it is commonly found in more recent articles on the private sector, proba-
bly extrapolating the share of Eastern provinces to the entire country. According to the 
OECD Economic survey of 2005, the ―private sector was responsible for as much as 57 
percent of the value-added produced by the non-farm business sector in 2003‖. This report 
also  regards  the  private  sector  as  the  driving  force  of  development  and  economic 
growth.
1352 A ADB report of 2007 finds that ―[t]he PRC‘s private sector now accounts for 
more than 40 percent of GDP, 60 percent of growth, and 75 percent of the new jobs being 
generated‖.
1353 
     However, this data is difficult to verify as in official statistics small private enterprises 
are not registered and many private enterprises are still registered as collectives to escape 
predatory taxes and fees (see also chapter 8). If the fēi gōngyǒuzhi jīngj￬ was reported, it 
already in 1996 had a share of 31 percent of industrial output value and 53 percent of con-
sumer goods retail sales and were growing ever since.
1354 In terms of absolute numbers 
there were 1.76 million sīy￭ng qǐyè registered in 2000 and 2.03 million in the end of 2001, 
employing 24.06 persons. The number of getihu has during that period of time officially 
decreased from 25.71 million at the end of 2000 to 24.23 million at the end of 2001 (from a 
peak of 31 million in 1999). Heike Holbig traces that back to a technical change in statis-
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tical recording and an overall confusion on how to count that category correctly.
1355 The 
private sector  with both forms of private enterprises together employed 82.63 million 
people at the end of 1999 and only 74.77 a year later, due to the decrease of registered  ge-
tihu. Another unofficial data source estimated 130 million employees in the private sector 
for 2000 and the China Daily cites a study that by 2005 29.3 million private businesses 
(getihu and sīy￭ng qǐyè together) employ over 200 million people and are accounting for 
49.7 percent of GDP.
1356 However, nobody knows for sure how many people are actually 
working in the private sector. 
     This is even more the case when alternative definitions of the private sector are cons i-
dered. As Heike Holbig states ―[t]he more ideologically correct a term is, the more statisti-
cally vague it becomes‖.
1357 As will be discussed in more depth in chapter 8, but has al-
ready been indicated above, the ambiguity of classification of enterprises was useful for 
private entrepreneurs who used it as strategy to escape regulatory restrictions and discrimi-
nation by the local governments. The most common strategies are wearing a red hat, which 
means that firms often were registered as collective, for example a TVE, but actually being 
privately owned (often known and tolerated by local officials). Another method is the leas-
ing of collective firms for private operation and co-investing in state and collective firms. 
The latter serves the creation of larger mixed-ownership companies. They were mostly 
joint-stock or shareholding companies that enabled entrepreneurs to give shares to local 
officials, which ensured their co-operation and support. Yet another strategy was the so-
called ‗round-tripping‘ of domestic capital: the re-investment of capital through offshore 
companies (or sometimes relatives). This was advantageous as foreign capital was offered 
tax breaks and other favorable policies (this measures becoming more difficult with the 
admission of China to the WTO).
1358 
     As recent as in 2005, the private sector still consisted mostly of SMEs with fewer than 
1000 employees (in fact, 81 percent of firms that size are privately owned, but only 36 per-
cent with more than 1000 employees).
1359 However, the private sector still grows very fast 
and thus the share of employment, fixed assets and value added of SOEs further decreased. 
However, in 2007, SOEs accounted for only six percent of firms but still produced ―31 
percent of the value added in the industrial sector, employed 22 percent of the workforce 
and controlled 47 percent of the stock of fixed assets, suggesting that SOEs tend to be rela-
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tively large and capital intensive‖.
1360 Today, capital intensity in the SOEs compared to the 
private sector is four times higher than in the late 1990s. Together with the larger decline 
of employment in the state sector, labor productivity growth is much faster (5.6 per year 
from 1999 to 2007) with the result that labor productivity in the state sector is now higher 
than  in  the private  sector.  However,  other  indicators  of  productivity  show  that  overall 
productivity is higher in private firms.
1361 
      
7.2.  Case Study: Wenzhou 
7.2.1. A short summary on Wenzhou‘s location and history 
 
“Moonlight reaches the waterfront pavilion first”.  
近水楼台先得月.
1362 
      
     Wenzhou is located in Zhejiang province, almost at the midpoint of China‘s eastern 
coast. It is situated on the south bank of the Ou River, about 30 km from its mouth. The Ou 
long provided the main transport route for this south-eastern section of Zhejiang as 78 per-
cent of the territory is mountainous, isolating the municipality from the rest of Chinese 
mainland. Wenzhou consists today of an urbanized area (488 square kilometers, four per-
cent of the municipalities 11500 square kilometers) and a large rural region, divided into 
eight counties.  
     In 999, the Song dynasty sanctioned Wenzhou to be a foreign-trade port and the Wenz-
hou people became very skilled in long-distance trade (but also smuggling). Rural house-
hold industries thrived and local markets were developed. At that time it had a flourishing 
shipbuilding industry, and its papermaking and lacquerware craft were well known. Many 
people migrated out of Wenzhou. After several closings, the Wenzhou's port was again 
opened to foreign trade as a treaty port in 1876, and for a while there was a considerable 
tea trade; however, the port never played a large part in China's foreign trade, and there 
was no foreign settlement. Wenzhou's trade flourished again during the early part of the 
Sino-Japanese War, as from 1937 to 1942 it was one of the few ports left in Chinese hands; 
trade subsequently declined toward the end of the war, however. The Mao administration 
invested  little  in  Wenzhou‘s  economic  development.  Not  until  1955  was  sea  transport 
along the Zhejiang coast fully restored, after which Wenzhou rapidly recovered.  
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     The Wenzhou people never totally abandoned their way of specialized production and 
long-distance trade under Mao‘s rule. Its citizens started their own household businesses 
and workshops in the early 1970s, and their efforts redoubled later in the decade as China 
officially began to liberalize economic policy and to move toward more of a market sys-
tem.  By  the  end  of  Mao‘s  era,  rural  Wenzhou  had,  by  and  large,  gone  back  to  pre-
communist practices. This became known as the Wenzhou model; there are now tens of 
thousands of Wenzhou merchants doing business around the country and abroad.  
    In 1984 Wenzhou was designated one of China's ―open‖ cities in the new policy of invit-
ing foreign investment, and there was considerable economic growth. Local products now 
include ceramics, machinery, chemicals, electronics, processed foods, and wearing apparel; 
shipbuilding is also important.  The total product of society (sum of gross output value of 
industry, agriculture and commerce) increased from three billion Yuan in 1980 to 13 bil-
lion in 1988. From 1978 to 1989, the industrial output rose from 1 to 8.9 billion Yuan. The 
average income of Wenzhou peasants, which before 1980 was among the lowest in China, 
was 50 percent above the national average in 1989 (924 compared to 601 Yuan). 
     The region's transportation infrastructure has been greatly improved. A branch rail line, 
completed in the late 1990s, links the city with the Zhejiang-Jiangxi trunk line at Jinhua. 
Expressways northeast to Ningbo and northwest to Jinhua opened for traffic in the early 
21
st century. Newer and larger port facilities also have been constructed, including docks 
near the mouth of the Ou River with berths capable of accommodating 10,000-ton ships. 
The city's airport, on the seacoast, provides scheduled flights to many cities in the coun-
try.
1363  
 
7.2.2. Wenzhou‘s rise after 1978 
     Wenzhou
1364, the ―quintessential capital of China‘s network Capitalism‖
1365, was one of 
the first municipalities to heavily privatize and industrialize after 1978, after being impove-
rished and endowed with only few SOEs during the Mao era. However, it has a long tradi-
tion as a commercial city, a high population density, and a lack of arable land in the region, 
and thus has always attracted tradesman and merchants. The population of Wenzhou also 
resisted  the  collectivization  during  the  1950s  and  the  collective  sector  remained  weak 
throughout the communist era. In contrast, ―private petty commerce and handicraft produc-
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tion‖ prevailed underground ―and were quick to emerge ―above ground‖ in the more per-
missive atmosphere of the reform era‖.
1366 The decision of the Chinese central government 
to give a high degree of autonomy to impoverished areas such as Wenzhou after 1978 con-
tributed to this development. Peasants quickly established small family-run enterprises, 
thereby going back to pre-communist practices. Entrepreneurship has a long tradition in 
Wenzhou and together with the lack of state investment in communist times due to its 
proximity to Taiwan and weak government control due to Wenzhou's geographic isolation, 
this led to a the creation of a ―plethora of enterprises…coalescing into vast business net-
works‖.
1367 This generated an economic growth that earned a nationwide reputation and 
was named Wenzhou model.
1368 Wenzhou is therefore a very revealing illustration for  a 
Guanxi-based economy proper.  
    From 1980 to 1988, the growth of industrial output of Wenzhou increased from 1 to 41 
percent and in 2002 was with 366.7 RMB (or 47.1 percent of total provincial output) high-
er than in most other provinces. From 2002 to 2007 the average yearly growth of GDP in 
Wenzhou was 13.8 percent. Its tax revenue put it among the top 5 percent of counties dur-
ing the late 1980s and early 1990s.
1369 During the same time, the number of private firms 
increased  from  28.430  to  50.317  and  the  individually -owned  units  from  202.458  to 
559.400, not including the private firms disguised as collective enterprises. Major industri-
al products include: footwear, clothing, metal cig arette lighters, razors, locks and plastic 
products. Pens produced in Wenzhou are estimated to be 30 percent, footwear 20 percent 
of China's market.
1370 In addition, the media proudly claims, there are ―about 500 factories 
that make almost two-thirds of the cigarette lighters on the planet‖.
1371 
Reasons for the immediate success of Wenzhou‘s private sector was also that private ru-
ral households as primary productive unit produced goods that at the same time could be 
easily assembled and were commodities disregarded by the SOEs, such as plastic shoes 
and polyacrylic-fiber clothing. Those products could be manufactured in small-scale pro-
duction and with simple labor-intensive technology, which required only small start-up 
capital and gave small profits but a quick turnover. Thus, Wenzhou firms used voids in the 
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Chinese economic structures, exploiting niches for selling these products, which was sup-
ported by "benign neglect" from the state.
1372  
     FDI has not been very important for Wenzhou because of the difficult transportation 
situation and firms being small in size in lower -end production.
1373 In contrast, entrepre-
neurs in Wenzhou reactivated commercial contacts and soon marketing agents and laborers 
spread all over the country, creating country -wide distribution and information networks 
and sending back remittances that helped to kick-start many private enterprises.
1374 These 
transnational networks stemmed from the old Wenzhou tradition  of migration. Migrants 
thus served as  important source of financing and creators of stable social networks over 
great distances. After 1978, ―lively smuggling trade arose between Wenzhou and Taiwan 
fishermen….Wenzhou traders profited by marketing transistor radios and tape recorders 
produced in Taiwan in exchange for antiques and other valuables; […] networks provided 
private resources of raw material outside plan channels. [...] Both local government official 
and  private  entrepreneur  identified  [smuggling]  as  one  important  early  source  of  capi-
tal‖.
1375 These informal markets were complemented by private purchasing agents who 
organized scarce materials from state enterprises around the country.
1376 Moreover, net-
works on a local level enabled the cooperation between otherwise independent family e n-
terprises, allowing for specialization and division of work and thus overcoming the limita-
tions of a traditional family firm.
1377 As official loans were difficult to obtain, entrepr e-
neurs relied on informal sources of finance and the result was ―the rapid development of an 
underground financial market in which various forms of informal networks act as financial 
intermediaries…30 percent of all lending in 2003 was extended through such networks‖ 
(see also next section).
1378 
     Hence, the success of the Wenzhou Model can be attributed to the dynamics of private 
entrepreneurs and the distribution networks between producers and consumers.
1379 Private 
firms were able to flourish because of the  ―evolution of a symbiotic relationship between 
local officials  and entrepreneurs. This  created a  ―political subculture‖ and  semi-formal 
collective institutions which took advantage of the gaps in the rapidly changing Chinese 
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economy and society and lags in government control.
1380 However, this collaboration is 
part of an old tradition as well. Wenzhouese were known to be notoriously insubordinate: 
skilled in smuggling throughout their history and never willing to give up trade and house-
hold industries, even during communist times.
1381 It is also said that the liberation by an 
independent local guerrilla force in 1949 created a structure of local cadres that are willing 
to protect local private initiatives against central government policies and discrimination. 
This pragmatism and the will to take risks enabled local deviation from state policies and 
made government control and also tax collection harder to realize. Apart from the fact that 
its geographical distance and thus its difficult accessibility added to the autonomy given to 
the private sector already, the cooperation with local authorities facilitated the rise of the 
private sector long before it was officially sanctioned. For example, as early as in 1986 the 
Wenzhou industrial and commercial bureau proposed the relaxation of policies toward the 
private sector, also including the limit of employees (until then a maximum of  eight) al-
lowed for individual enterprises.
1382 Many of the laws concerning the private sector were 
also formulated with the Wenzhou model in mind. The passing of those laws was thus ―a 
rather belated attempt to enshrine in statute practices which had been in operation for sev-
eral years‖.
1383 The predatory practices of local cadres described in the section above were 
met by giving many leading positions of the local government to natives. Hence, they were 
embedded into the social structure of Wenzhou through personal ties to family, friends and 
neighbors and were more likely to take local interests into account when implementing - or 
deviating from – state policies.
1384 Officials helped enterprises to obtain land and bank 
loans and reduced taxes and states fees for them. 
     Enterprises in Wenzhou work in a nexus of dense social networks centered on family 
firms and historically rooted trust and culture. Even today it is shaped by the traditional 
labor-intensive industries with their low level of processing and low added value as it has 
been from its beginning in the 1970s.
1385 Its economy is reconstituted of ―local kinship 
relations and structures, in contrast to most understandings of Capitalism as the destruction 
of kinship by the mobility and fragmentation of wage labor‖.
1386 This obviously contradicts 
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1382 Whiting, 2001, p. 135. 
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Weber‘s prediction that industrialization and thus rationalization will supplant traditional 
feudal institutions to be successful.  
     Wenzhou is besides its impressive growth also known for its extravagant consumption 
and spending on weddings, funerals and similar occasions instead of reinvesting in their 
enterprises. Beside the fact that the shifting from investment to savings and consumption 
was a result of the high risk connected with investment over one million Yuan due to tax 
regulations and other legislation concerning the private sector. Entrepreneurs ―preferred to 
dismiss  workers  while  spending  their  money  on  extravagant  homes  or  even  ancestral 
tombs‖.
1387 Excessive consumption like that also displayed wealth and demonstrated the 
generosity towards their networks, earning prestige and ‗face‘. Especially local cadres who 
are rooted in local networks are expected to show their status by spending a lot at festive 
occasions in order to share and redistribute their wealth and to maintain their influence.
1388 
Contrary to Western capitalistic thinking, there is a gain of givin g away. The more gener-
ous businessmen prove to be, the more symbolic capital - social status and face - they gain. 
This can also be a means to channel monetary means to protect them from being confi s-
cated.
1389 
     Although Wenzhouese networks form an ―untouched net‖ and thus impede the intrusion 
of people from outside Wenzhou and contacts to the ―outside world‖, this is at the same 
time a protection in times of crises. They share the knowledge of the local business culture 
and of joint distribution and sale channels. These patterns had helped them to start privati-
zation without the support and even against directives from the government, forcing them 
to invest in labor-intensive industries that only required little capital.  They are able to 
quickly adapt products and designs and thus succeeded to become suppliers for major Eu-
ropean brands.
1390 
 
7.2.3. Wenzhou‘s performance since 2008 
     Since 1978, Wenzhou underwent several restructuring processes to be able to keep up 
its pace of growth and productivity. However, most enterprises are still family-controlled, 
small and low tech and are involved in a nexus of ―local networks and gift culture‖.
1391 
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Even though there were slowdowns in its development, the consistent growth of Wenzhou 
is often seen in its success to face economic challenges.  
     The global financial crisis of and since 2008 turned into a serious crisis for the Chinese 
real economy and specifically the export sector. The Chinese government reacted to that 
with implementing massive stimulus packages.
1392 Thus, economic growth did only d e-
crease from 9.6 percent in 2008 to 9.1 percent in 2009 (exceeding the goal of the Chinese 
government of eight percent) and (estimated) 10.2 percent in 2010, again declining in 2011 
to 8.9 percent, reflecting the gradual impact of tightening economic policy.
1393 Still, this 
information visibly contrasts the fact that the growth rate of 2007 has been revised upward 
to 13 percent, from 11.9 percent previously. (In contrast, the world‘s GDP is assumed to 
grow 3.1 percent in 2010 and OECD 2.4 percent).
1394 After an average annual growth of 27 
percent between 2003 and 2008, exports contracted by 9.1 percent  in 2009, but are ex-
pected to recover to 15.1 percent in real terms in 2010 due to recovery of global d e-
mand.
1395
 
     Credit quotas were widely used which disadvantaged small and medium-sized compa-
nies compared to SOEs. Small businesses were severely affected by the slowdown and 
approximately at least 20 percent went bankrupt, another 20 percent immensely affected by 
the lack of access to credit.
1396  
     To complement this data, a look into newspapers gives an impression on how the crisis 
impacts the Chinese economy and more specifically, the Wenzhou pr ivate sector. In Yin 
and Ng, 2008 the authors state:  
 
“About 67,000 SMEs have gone belly up in the first half of this year alone, many 
located in southern China where many industries churned out goods for the US 
and the European Union. Many complain that they are starved of credit as even 
the cash-rich local banks turned cautious about lending”. 
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     The article also gives the example of Mingda Luggage, an SME based in Zhejiang prov-
ince. Mingda produces Swiss Army knife bags, for example for Walmart and Kmart, with 
80 per cent of its customers being from the US. Orders from the US started to decline in 
2008, and instead of the planned increase of staff to 800, 200 were laid off. The owner was 
unable to get a loan from two local banks but had to sell a new factory building that he had 
built for 'a few tens of millions Yuan'.
1397 Other articles give similar information:  
 
“Feiyue Group used to be the sewing machine manufacturing leader in China, 
and the model of township-enterprise in Taizhou, Zhejiang province.[…]Feiyue's 
export value in the first quarter of this year was only $18.48 million, down 44 
percent over the same period last year[…]. The reduced loans to SMEs from 
banks have made the situation even worse: Feiyue had to turn to underground 
private lenders to maintain its cash flow, but the higher interest rates left Feiyue 
struggling to pay the debts. […] In Wenzhou, China's largest manufacturer of 
small goods, about 20 percent the enterprises have stopped production”.
1398 
 
     Well connected entrepreneurs turn to informal, underground private funding channels 
which will provide them with the necessary credits to bridge the time until the economy 
will recover. Especially small enterprises have strong difficulties in receiving loans over 
official sources which in a crisis situation is a particularly severe disadvantage.  
 
“According to an investigation by the SME bureau of Zhejiang province, during 
the first quarter of this year, new loans from four State-owned banks, namely the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the Agricultural Bank of Chi-
na, Bank of China, and the China Construction Bank, were reduced by 25 per-
cent compared to the same period last year. During the same period, the ICBC 
alone reduced loans to SMEs by 87.5 percent, down from 9.8 billion Yuan last 
year to 1.3 billion this year”.
1399 
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        Still, Wenzhou recovered much faster than other regions in China: ―In the first half 
[of 2008], Zhejiang's economy expanded 11.4 percent from a year earlier, much higher 
than the nation's average of 10.5 percent‖.
1400 
     One reason might be the routine of ex-post sanctioning of practices already in use: 
―What's more encouraging for Zhejiang Province is that the CBRC [China Banking Regu-
latory Commission] is considering legitimizing its underground private lending, and set-
ting  up  a  limited  amount  of  micro-credit  companies  to  connect  private  capital  with 
SMEs‖.
1401 
 
“In Wenzhou, where some of the country's biggest underground lenders operate, 
a similar trend is being seen. Zhou Dewen, chairman of the Wenzhou SME De-
velopment Promotion Federation, estimates that 5 billion Yuan entered the un-
derground system as investors divested plants, property and other projects re-
cently, making about 25 billion Yuan available for loans to small and medium-
sized enterprises. 
Though yet to be legitimized, underground lenders have become more integral to 
the operations of cash-strapped SMEs, which used to absorb 85 per cent of the 
20 million people entering the job market each year”.
1402  
 
     These unofficial bankers describe themselves not as underground or private bankers 
because unlike normal bankers they do not make money from interest payments, losing 
money in times of financial crisis, instead they make their ―biggest profits when borrow-
ers  go  bust‖.
1403  This  sector  ―remains  the  lifeblood  of  entrepreneurial  China‖.  State-
controlled banks tend to confine their lending to SOEs, informal bankers take great risks 
to supply credit to small businesses.
 In Wenzhou, which is said to have China‘s largest 
underground banking network, private bankers consider themselves not at risk.
1404 
“Wenzhou's webs of private lending are held together by a gentleman's code. 
Borrowers are introduced and implicitly guaranteed by friends and relatives. 
Huang Weijin […] explains why local business people would rather lose their 
lives than default on a private loan. "I can fly to Europe or Africa with only 300 
yuan  because  other  Wenzhou  businessmen  will  look  after  me.  They  drive  to 
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Germany from Italy to pick me up, and I would do the same. It doesn't matter if 
you lose money. But if you lose trust, you lose everything." 
Those bonds of business kinship, extending across China and the global Wenz-
hou diaspora, are far stronger than the contracts that bind borrowers to faceless 
state-owned  banks.  „It's  more  secure  than  a  state-controlled  bank  because  if 
someone doesn't repay they have no place to play in Wenzhou any more‟”.
1405 
 
There is also evidence for alliances of Wenzhouese entrepreneurs with local officials: 
 
“Juyi is a well-run enterprise, but no successful Chinese entrepreneur can dis-
play such confidence without earning the patronage of the gatekeepers of Chi-
na's land, finance, labor and government largesse. These patrons are promi-
nently exhibited throughout the elaborate corridors of Juyi's corporate head-
quarters. Some photos show Ms Li and her son with local government officials. 
[…] the company has a luxurious Communist Party Members Room, which is 
lined  with  portraits  of  […]  Joseph  Stalin,  Mao  Zedong  and  Deng  Xiaop-
ing...The room...is a shrine of corporate loyalty to the party rather than any 
indication of ideological bent”.
1406 
 
Also, there is proof for the diversification strategy of Wenzhou entrepreneurs: 
 
“Wenzhou people don't give up easily. The business climate isn't good this 
year and many manufacturers are struggling to survive. Some have halted op-
erations, but they are actively seeking chances to make a change - to enter oth-
er fields”.
1407 
"‟Wenzhou is  suffering less  [than  other  export-oriented cities] as  business-
people are very flexible and have shifted to other industries‟. […]„If I had 
stayed in machinery, I would be in difficulty because of the overall environ-
ment‟ […]. "But our children's clothes business is making a significant profit 
now‟”.
1408 
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     Wenzhou‘s entrepreneurs seem to have survived the crises without substantial 
losses. Not least, because they "prefer being head of a cock than tail of a phoenix", 
as a Chinese saying describing a preference for decision-making power goes. One 
article even claims that only about two percent of businesses failed. ―The figure is 
not significant. It would be similar at normal times‖.
1409 
Many companies made decisions before the most difficult time. The widely travelled 
Wenzhou  people  smelled  the  downtown  early  and  the  message  spread  quickly 
through their network of family, friends and business acquaintances, enabling those 
at home to prepare for the worst. "Because we noticed the crisis early, there was no 
panic or bewilderment when it really landed," says Xu. "We were very clear about 
what we should do. We had a strategic plan and took countermeasures.[…]At the fo-
refront of China's development of small private enterprises, Wenzhou's economy was 
affected early and deeply by the global turmoil. But the city maintained growth of 8.1 
per cent in gross industrial product value last year. In January, bank loans to busi-
nesses rose markedly, electricity demand rose, and employment, especially of tech-
nical  skilled  workers,  was  high.  For  most  companies,  it  was  business  as 
usual.[…]"They are signs of an upcoming economic revival. Wenzhou has stood the 
test. It is likely to walk out of the economic difficulty ahead of other cities in this 
country".
1410 
     Firms can survive economically difficult times because ―family and close friends were 
willing to work without salary and benefits for months, in some cases even putting up 
money to prevent cash flow problems‖.
1411 On the other hand, extensive political Guanxi 
networks are a key element for success. As one entrepreneur argues: ―Guanxi are more 
important than capital. If you have Guanxi, you will have access to capital. However, if an 
entrepreneur has capital but no Guanxi, his/her business cannot survive‖. He adds that he 
spends approximately half of his time cultivating Guanxi ties, particularly with govern-
ment officials.
1412  
     All in all, there is evidence that Wenzhou actually uses the features that this works 
strives to define as typical for Guanxi Capitalism and points also to the fact that  it might 
be a sustainable form of Capitalism.     
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8. Guanxi, entrepreneurs and the state 
 
Laws control the lesser man. 
Right conduct controls the greater one. 
Chinese Proverb 
 
8.1. The bourgeois entrepreneur, networks and the state  
    In contrast to the rather dire experience of the former peasants and now working class, 
the industrial revolution has been a quite positive for the middle and upper classes. For a 
successful industrialization it was necessary that enough talented people had the desire to 
become entrepreneurs
1413, for which plenty of economic opportunities, an absence of ba r-
riers caused by traditional (feudal) structures like the estates and the guilds and a change of 
the value system that tolerated profit-oriented occupations were needed. Hence, within this 
class, people were able to mostly gain from industrialization, especially the middle class as 
the bearer of business in the emerging market economy.  
     Beside the preconditions mentioned above, in  the beginning of industrialization, per-
sonal connections also played an essential role, but those were not restricted to the family. 
However, the family has been particularly important during this process as it served mostly 
as resource for material wealth or social capital such as long -established knowledge of 
production methods and connections.
1414 It also often financed newly established enterpris-
es and provided support in economically difficult times.
1415 
     If business was flourishing the entrepreneurial families were able to provide emplo y-
ment, but if otherwise, they did not hesitate to exploit the physical capacities of the work-
ers without much consideration of the consequences. Polanyi depicts these early English 
entrepreneurs as being mostly indifferent to the fate of their workers as long as private or 
public matters did not add or affect their profits. The effects of the destruction of family 
life, the degradation and devastation of neighborhoods and existence, the deterioration of 
craft standards and the pollution of the environment were disregarded because for the most 
part the middle class merely believed in the beneficence of gain.
1416 ―This attitude meant a 
great incentive to the acquisition of wealth, and is also, perhaps, one source of the rather 
smug self-righteousness often thought typical of the bourgeois‖.
1417 In Polanyi‘s presenta-
tion, in contrast to the proletarians being physically dehumanized, the  members of the 
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owning class, especially the entrepreneurs, were depicted as morally degraded. The tradi-
tional values of a Christian society with its responsibility for the poor were ignored and 
replaced by the sole concern of maintaining ones reputation among one‘s peers. ―To the 
bewilderment of thinking minds, unheard-of wealth turned out to be inseparable from un-
heard-of  poverty―.
1418  However,  this  attitude  slightly  changed  during  the  18
th  century, 
when labor laws came into effect (please refer also to chapter 5.2.). In Germany, which 
industrialized some decades later and much more slowly than Great Britain, consequences 
were not as extreme. Here, entrepreneurs adopted a more thoughtful and caring attitude 
towards their employees. Being a bourgeois entrepreneur, success and a morally upright 
behavior necessarily belonged together (see also below).  
     The advantages of the upper class were not only due to economic reasons, they were 
probably even more due to cultural issues developed in the environment of the bourgeois 
lifestyle, which was dominated and influenced by the entrepreneurs and their values. How-
ever, during the early phase of industrialization, the boundaries between public life and 
private sphere were not yet clearly defined and business and household were still under 
them same roof, which meant that family life had to be organized accordingly.
1419 Roughly 
from the 19
th century, the bourgeois household ceased to be significant as economic unit 
and became merely a safe place to retreat, clearly distinct from business life shaped by 
competition, self-interest and profit orientation. Instead of the family seizing to bind the 
members of the household to a set and planned future in a system determined by birth-
given social status, the individuals now were freed and increasingly master of their own 
destiny.
1420 This was accompanied by a shift in regarding the family as refuge from the 
rigor of daily working life. When economic production shifted to factories, it led to a sepa-
ration of private and public life, appreciating the moral and emotional value of family life 
at least for those who could afford it. This individualism and the retreat to privacy led to an 
emphasis of the family, here meaning the spouse and the children. Domesticity and ma r-
riage out of romantic love, instead of strategic marriages connecting families and their cor-
porations, were quite uncommon before, but they increasingly were held in high e s-
teem.
1421 ―The rigid separation of the private interests of the business man from those of 
the business unit; not necessarily a spatial separation, though this comes to be usual, but in 
thought and for purposes of calculation the individual is split in two. One is a producer 
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who as such is part of a great mechanistic system with no individuality of his own. The 
other is the consumer, who has still part of his life left to devote to his family, recreation, 
cultural interests etc.‖ (please refer to chapter 5.2.2.).
1422 
     The separation of the rationality of business and the sentimentality of the family went 
along with the polarization of gender roles in creating a female and male environment.
1423 
Family happiness and domesticity implied that the bourgeois woman as mother and 
housewife stayed at home, which initially was impossible for the poorer working class 
families. This established a new ideology that defined the ‗nature-given‘ characteristics 
and talents of women and men.
1424 The man had to work outside the house, whereas the 
woman had to administer the household, being a mother and maintaining a family life. She 
had to arrange a homely atmosphere where her husband could relax after work, but at the 
same time it was considered as ‗ladylike‘ to delegate the housework to servants. Women 
were forced to devote their life to otiosity. Through this she lost her external contacts and 
her sphere of influence was diminished until she was solely dependent on her husband. 
Additionally, in contrast to husband and wife being together responsible for the function-
ing of the traditional household, the bourgeois wife merely represented an orderly house-
hold, giving soirees and obeying social obligations such as charity activities. The ‗natural‘ 
characteristics of men were being active and rational, whereas women were considered 
passive and emotional ‗by nature‘, predestining them for their roles in the economy and 
politics and the family, respectively. The household turned from a production into a con-
sumption unit, secluded from economic activities. The family was regarded as ―foundation 
pillar of society‖.
1425  
     The entrepreneur turned into a central figure for economic and social development that 
had to meet demands of the now increasingly differentiating realms of business and the 
family.
1426 In the case of the German bourgeois ‗ideal-type‘ entrepreneur, the status within 
society depended beside his social background mainly on his autonomy, talent, diligence, 
conscientiousness which also required a high degree of individualism, adherence to the law 
and an interest for politics.
1427 But these attributes were meaningless without economic 
success, which had also to be reflected in a concern for public welfare to be socially a c-
ceptable, as mentioned above. Entrepreneurial families developed a distinct attitude, which 
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separated them from the working and the upper class (the gentry), forming a new social 
group. Main principles of their lifestyle included honorableness, diligence, rationality and 
innovativeness. They had a distinct conception of the organization of society and the state 
and their role therein.
1428 Although often just newly established as elite and new ‗upper 
class‘, they were not open for social climbing nor was economic success and achievements 
alone sufficient to enter their circles.
1429 The bourgeoisie
1430 as such was therefore not a 
social formation that defined itself by occupation or income, but more a ‗cultural structure‘ 
for which a certain attitude and shared values were necessary.
1431 Society described as that 
was an important part of reinforcing and stabilizing Weber‘s ―iron cage‖ of modern capi-
talism. Being a bourgeois meant to become an individual forced to forge your own destiny 
and develop your own value system with the family and privacy as a central instance.
1432 
     Together with this development,  personal connections were replaced by contractual 
relations quite early during the process of industrialization. Contracts were conceived as 
far more (cost) efficient and were made possible when the state emerged as regulative a u-
thority to pass laws and legislation to secure economic transactions and thus could enforce 
the formal contractual arrangements through law.
  The Western orientation towards con-
tracts does not consider other ways of reducing transaction costs, such as systems of trust 
as provided by Guanxi.
1433  
     The tendency towards juridification of hitherto unofficial norms was already established 
by Roman law, which regulated the relationships between individuals (ius est ad alios).
1434 
On the one hand this involves an increase of personal freedom; on the other hand it makes 
relations less personal and takes away the security of traditional social formations.
1435 The 
notion of the morally upright bourgeois was quickly overcome and replaced by the concep-
tion that in a matured capitalistic system the spheres of private life and business should be 
and increasingly actually were separated. Before that, only the morally sound lifestyle of a 
‗good citizen‘ led to success in doing business in creating trust in the persona of the entre-
preneur. Only a person who overall exhibited moral behavior was regarded as trustworthy 
in a business context.
1436  
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     Thus, in addition to a separation of society in a political and economic realm,  both 
spheres were also associated with separate value and behavioral systems. This created a 
specific set of manners for entrepreneurs which have often been described as necessary for 
the development of a mature Western capitalistic system. In this environment, it is not the 
character or the individual personality of an entrepreneur that is important for doing busi-
ness, but merely his actions in the process of business transactions. The private life of 
businessmen is not of interest anymore; it is regarded as totally detached from the actions 
conducted in the role as entrepreneur and underlies different rules.
1437  
     Due to the increasing professionalization, the organization of a corporation becomes 
dissociated from the character of managers and entrepreneurs but is subject to other imper-
atives. ―Commercial honesty‖ equals ―contract morality‖ and thus, ―status has given place 
to contract‖ and ―economic relationships‖ lost their ―personal touch‖.
1438 Once a corpora-
tion is established, it is neither the owner and nor the manager who is recognized as impor-
tant factor to evaluate a company. The success and the reputation of a firm do not depend 
on the personality and connections of one specific individual, which might not even be 
known in person, but on the quality of its products.
1439 This means that ―business relations 
in the West are more technical and company orientated with early recognition of the possi-
ble need for contractual formality‖.
1440 The maximization of profit does not depend on the 
personality and connections of one specific individual but are replaced by contractual rela-
tions. The Western way of doing business is regarded as the only efficient and (transaction) 
cost minimizing one.       
     As has already been indicated above, in the early phase of industrialization, contractual 
security and control were not protected by government authorities. Therefore, entrepre-
neurs had to rely on trust-based networks to secure the quality of their products. Over time, 
entrepreneurs build up a certain status within society. Being economically independent 
empowered them to influence the organization of society and the state, especially concern-
ing a legal framework for economic transactions. This in turn meant gains for civil liber-
ties, like freedom of trade, private property, equality etc. Actually, local government and 
leadership of local parties were often in the hand of entrepreneurs.
1441 After 1848 the inter-
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est in political participation trickled away and people felt increasingly well represented by 
the existing economic policy.
1442 
     When SMEs became again more relevant during the 1960s, the (German) government 
began to systematically subsidize the Mittelstand for example in expanding the German 
anti-trust law to improve competition policies and regulations. As has already been men-
tioned earlier, apart from economic reasons, the legal framework also had the aim to sup-
port the middle class, which traditionally formed the buffer between the values of the up-
per and the working classes (see also chapter 6).
1443  
     Political bodies and private economic associations tried to set up networks in a con-
certed action to promote economic growth. These networks were more based on formal 
and contractual relations and focused on economic functionality.
1444 Additionally, adminis-
trative and financial support is  given by economic associations, and infrastructure is pr o-
vided by an actively involved local government.
1445 Besides that, local trade chambers and 
business associations play an important role in coordinating lobby activities in favor of the 
(regional) network and also providing (market) information that are easily spread within a 
network. These organizations serve also as mediation - and sanctioning mechanisms and 
thus further stabilize local structures and enhance trust building.
1446 Membership in associ-
ations and other official bodies facilitates  thus access to business opportunities.
1447 To be 
successful, entrepreneurs need to be able to navigate within these formal structures and 
position themselves strategically to negotiate on a political level.
1448 
     It is a difficult or even impossible task to construct ―trust-built‖ networks from the 
ground up, without a local history of co-operation or a tradition of that kind, as ―civic tradi-
tions have remarkable staying power‖.
1449 Even with massive support and subsidizing ef-
forts from the German government and also from the level of the EU administration, de-
signing ‗artificial‘ networks remains problematic.  
     However, in the Western case, ―[i]n order to survive and thrive, capital thus must exist 
in  a  mixed  state  of  independence  from  and  dependence  on  state  power...Although  the 
state‘s full economic power remains in the background during peacetime, it represents a 
key force shaping capitalist accumulation. Indeed, capital to thrive seeks reconstituted and 
                                                 
1442 Soénius, 2000, p. 443. 
1443 Berghoff, 2004, p. 122ff., 172ff. 
1444 Berghoff, 2004, p. 177ff., Lazerson, 1988, p. 331. 
1445 Putnam; Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993, p. 160. 
1446 Casson, 2001, p. 536f. 
1447 Fiedler and Lorentz, 2003, p. 54. 
1448 Kocka, 1975, p. 128. 
1449 Putnam; Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993, p. 157, similar in Dörsam and Icks, 1997, p. 44f.  261 
 
expanding state power. A free economy thus requires a strong state that can effectively 
regulate markets, establish stable property rights and institute productive governance struc-
tures‖.
1450 
 
8.2. Entrepreneurs and the state in China 
8.2.1. Entrepreneurs and the state 
 
“In the PRC, the bifurcation of secular authority is merely embryonic. 
Most individuals and groups in China at present do not seek autonomy but 
“rather closer embeddedness with the state”.
1451 
 
      During reforms due to the ―pragmatic mindscape‖ of the Chinese people, a ―regional 
decentralization and fiscal federalism‖ led local governments to promote economic devel-
opment.
1452 Each region had its own experiments and structural learning processes which 
strongly depended on the tolerance and openness of local cadres, because the central go v-
ernment gave time and space to local governments in finding their own way of dealing 
with the reform process, so many provinces created their own hand-tailored set of rules. 
Also, the Cultural Revolution left ―a vacuum of state authority in some communities […] 
[and] created an opening for private household industry‖.
1453 Local cadres had strong in-
centives to promote the rural industry. Depending on the institutional environment in each 
locality, they supported the form of production that promised to generate the most profit 
and hence tax payments. Thus, either the collective sector (as for example in Wuxi) or the 
private sector (as in Wenzhou, see chapter 7.2.) was fostered.
1454 Thereby local officials 
constructed ―a qualitatively new variety of developmental state‖,
1455 acting more as ration-
al  economic  than  as  political  actors,  responding  to  incentives  and  reacting  to  con-
straints.
1456 ―Under the post-1980 incentive structure, the political ambitions of individual 
local officials became closely identified with the economic accomplishments of their do-
mains. […] Whether officials aimed to climb the ladder of success to Beijing or to become 
leading figures on the local scene, their reputation was enhanced by industrial growth and 
                                                 
1450 McNally, 2007a, p. 183.  
1451 McNally, 2007a, p. 183, quote taken from Dickson, 2003, p. 159. 
1452 Zhu, 2007, p. 1507. 
1453 Whiting, 2001, p. 69. 
1454 Whiting, 2001, p. 3. 
1455 Oi, 1995, p. 1133, see also chapter 5. 
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local building projects‖.
1457 Thus, the ―rapid takeoff‖ of the Chinese rural economy can be 
attributed mainly to ―local government entrepreneurship‖.
1458 
     Official regulations and tax laws changed quickly and due to the decentralized character 
of the Chinese state, the degree of their implementation varied enormously.
1459 Thus, re-
forms were mostly not active actions by the government but more a permanent ‗fence-
breaking‘ and violating of rules by local cadres and the (rural) population. The most suc-
cessful structures and ‗best practices‘ of provinces were often ex-post legalized by corres-
ponding laws and applied to the entire country. The central government in that way ac-
cepted a moderate dissent as long as it did not question the political system as such.
1460 It 
also found a way to react to strategic actions and even to employ them to survive the rapid 
changes in the economy and society. The change of state capacities by societal forces is 
rather seen as consolidation than as degradation.
1461 As David Wank puts it: ―The key val-
ue of this network between firms and government is expediency. Although they used prac-
tices that deviate from central state policies and laws, local actors legitimate them by a 
logic that represent their practices as actually according with state intentions. This logic 
makes a distinction between the spirit and the stipulations of policy. The spirit is the poli-
cy‘s goal or intention, while the stipulations are the state-sanctioned behavior and proce-
dures to attain it. According to this logic, since China is vast and has much regional varia-
tion, universal (i.e. national) stipulations often do not fit local conditions and, if rigidly 
adopted, might work cross-purposes with the policy‘s goal. Therefore, local actors justify 
deviant actions as necessary adaptations of central policies not only to ameliorate the poli-
cies‘ harmful effects but also achieve their goals‖. It is justified by local official in refer-
ring to ―the necessity of adapting to local conditions‖ and local history and traditions.
1462 
Even more so, rather than maintaining bilateral Guanxi connections to individual govern-
ment officials, entrepreneurs are often connected to entire bureaus including their Guanxi 
to other government units.
1463 This ―broad institutionalized support‖ is characteristic of 
these local network structures and often ―influence officialdom across local state-society 
borders‖.
1464 
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     Hence, entrepreneurs, in pursuing their own goals, not only can have an effect on trans-
forming the society in changing values and the attitude in favor of the economy, but unin-
tentionally also changing the state structure.
1465 This is possible because ―state structure 
and institutions …do not necessarily conform to the functional needs of a given accumula-
tion regime. In that sense form does not follow functions, it rather problematizes func-
tion‖.
1466 States thus cannot be viewed as ―solid, unchangeable and almost timeless […] 
monoliths animated by a single governmentality‖, with a specific ―essence, an immutable 
nature‖ and a clear, ‗natural‘ boundary to (civil) society. The state can rather be conceived 
as ―liquefied into incessant transformations of varying degrees and speed‖.
1467 Hence, local 
authorities have to be seen as a unit that is separate from the central state as well society 
and their agendas.
1468  
     Consequently, the private sector developed more rapidly in areas where  state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) were less dominant and proceeded very differently in different r e-
gions.
1469 ―[I]n 1995…entrepreneurs were referring to new relations of ‗locality‘ between 
private firms and local state bureaus. Entrepreneurs and officials both spoke of a new ag-
gressiveness on the part of local (city and district) government to cooperate with business-
es and a new flexibility by bureaus for actions that deviated from central state policies‖.
1470 
Exogenous factors like the feature of global capitalism to support flexible, transnational 
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1467 Biebricher, 2011, p. 3, 8f., 16 in the manuscript. Critical theory of the state challenges the idea of a state 
standing above society and the economy, being able to regulate these spheres  impartially. Less than ‗the‘ 
state ‗act[ing]‘, ―it is rather warring state and non-state actors that do‖. (p. 5) It defines – in line with Fou-
cault – that ―power comes from below and it is everywhere, if anything, the common sense perception of the 
state as a center of power is already one of its effects.‖ (p. 6) Thus, ―... one can define the state as an ensem-
ble of socially embedded, socially regularized and strategically selective institutions, organizations, social 
forces and activities organized around (or at least actively involved in) making collectively binding decisions 
for an imagined community‖. (Jessop, 2005, p. 6) The state is understood as a ―social ensemble‖ with a ―spe-
cific, differential impact on the ability of various political forces to pursue particular interests and strategies 
in specific spatio-temporal contexts through their access to and/or control over given state capacities – capac-
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1468 Oi, 1999, p. 9. 
1469 Zhu, 2007, p. 1507ff. 
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production also favored small businesses and subcontracting over larger corporations and 
thus contributed to domestic development.
1471 
     As a consequence of the distrust of more formal institutions (as for example courts, see 
below), the informal collaboration of private entrepreneurs with government officials over 
Guanxi is long-established, going back to pre-communist times and reaching new heights 
during reforms.
1472 As local officials are often embedded into local networks, many feel 
compelled to protect the newly established privat e sector and vice versa individuals seek 
this protection to facilitate access to resources and bank loans. Most entrepreneurs aim at 
meeting their own needs to be successful in business in interacting with government off i-
cials without contesting the politi cal system as such.
1473  Quite the contrary, political 
change seems not to be wanted, as long business is going well.
1474 Moreover, they discov-
ered other, non-democratic ways to pursue their interest.
1475    
     This again is in line with Foucault‘s argument that state power is not necessarily si-
tuated in its institutions but rather is ―widely dispersed throughout capillary networks‖ and 
not ―localized in the state apparatus‖.
1476 Of course, Chinese entrepreneurs have more or 
less the same economic objectives in common but this proves not to be enough to bond to 
influence politics. Mostly, private entrepreneurs do not strive to become interconnected 
over horizontal ties, be it informal or more formal ones. Not least, because collective ac-
tion within an authoritarian state is still a sensitive issue and the political circumstances 
rather support individualism in the sense that each entrepreneur relies on his Guanxi to 
selected government cadres.
1477 They need not rely on this as there are other possibilities to 
represent their interests. Their ties to local cadres have different  – and more economic – 
reasons and therefore do not exercise pressure for political reform.
1478 They used their 
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power and tried to achieve their goals outside official institutions but rather with more in-
formal measures like Guanxi.
1479  
     As already discussed in chapter 7, although Chinese entrepreneurs as such do not form a 
class, they are nevertheless a dynamic element of political and social change. Due to their 
economic success and wealth they command over negotiating power to achieve their own 
aims. From a Western point of view, it could be assumed that those include th e desire for 
democratization
1480 or at least a legal framework for free competition. They also could seek 
leading positions in politics or society to influence social values, but Chinese entrepreneurs 
seem not to have this in common with their European counterparts.
1481 They are lacking a 
shared identity, probably because they stem from different backgrounds (former peasants 
or so-called ‗self-made men‘ alongside former state officials and other long-established 
elites).
1482 It is also important to note that even if entrepreneurs all belong to a class of 
people that in the literature is called the  ‗new rich‘
1483 and thus to an economic elite, they 
do not form a middle class or bourgeoisie in the Western sense. If they have the potential 
to form a strategic group is not yet clear and is viewed differently within the literature.
1484 
Heberer argues that China‘s entrepreneurs are still in ‚status nascendi‗ to form a strategic 
group, whereas Kellee Tsai states that in the past the development of Capitalism has been 
associated with a parallel tendency towards democracy as only in a democratic state mar-
ket forces can thrive. This has been justified by the argument that with the rise of a civil 
society the increase in individual liberties and related changes in economy and society a 
so-called ‗middle class‘
1485 would develop that with increasing wealth also sought political 
influence. Middle classes also serve as buffer between upper and lower classes which leads 
to political stability. They tend on average to be conservative and less radical and they are 
also oriented toward consumption. Indeed this has been the case for example with the 
                                                 
1479 Heberer, 2002b, p. 10. 
1480 The term ‗democracy‘ has been highly ideologically indoctrinated by the CCP. For many people democ-
racy is defined as ―minority that complies the majority‖ and ―officials bear responsibility for the people‖ and 
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German bourgeoisie and can be summarized with the slogan ―No bourgeoisie, no democ-
racy,‖ coined by Barrington Moore in his book Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democ-
racy: Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world of 1966. It has also been argued 
that paying taxes will result in the incentive to gain greater access to the political system 
(in a Western sense), as in the American notion of ‗no taxation without representation‘. It 
has been expected that the late developing countries would follow this ‗concept‘, in line 
with modernization theory that associates economic growth with political liberalization 
which led to the breakdown of many authoritarian regimes. However, as already outlined 
in chapter 4, the concept of middle class is a problematic one as it is not clear if it is de-
fined by a certain ‗median‘ income level or if it is related to a certain lifestyle. Especially 
in the Chinese case it has been shown that the ‗new rich‘ are indeed no social group that 
shares an identity and also does not express the wish for political reforms. As private en-
trepreneurs do not belong to one class, they are not inclined to collectively engage for sys-
tem change, although they are very actively involved with local governments. This again 
reveals the degree of fragmentation between central and local political entities.
1486 Also 
Dickson claims that ―[s]o far, China‘s private entrepreneurs have not asserted themselves 
as an organized or coherent interest group‖.
1487 
     However, maintaining Guanxi connections to the local government is conceived as es-
sential to overcome administrative obstacles and even more so, gain the support of local 
cadres for business. Having these bonds meant access to resources, information and other 
advantages but also avoiding excessive extra fees and taxes. It also enhanced doing busi-
ness with collective and state enterprises. ―This kind of support was of course not openly 
available. It required particularistic links with officials for favorable decisions and access. 
In fact, the more successful entrepreneurs seemed to spend as much if not more time de-
veloping these ties than credit relations with suppliers and customers of commodities‖.
1488 
In general, entrepreneurs have several methods for influencing the local government. They 
either make ―financial or other contributions (in the form of gifts or privileges granted), 
offering real or fictional employment in their companies in high-salaried positions as con-
sultants or managers‖.
1489 Entrepreneurs are not against the idea of the rule of law as it is 
considered as protection from arbitrary government treatment, but they are skeptical to-
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wards democratic ideas such as free election and majority rule.
1490 Although in an authori-
tarian regime, local officials still have enough liberties to support economic transactions, 
even if they are illegal, without lobbying pressure or democratization tendencies, as long 
those activities generate profits.
1491  
     To prevent the diffusion of informal links between private entrepreneurs and local gov-
ernments and to gain control of the political participation of entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs 
were allowed to become official members of the CCP since 2001 and were strongly e n-
couraged to join. In his speech in early 2000, Jiang Zemin - in a manipulation of party ide-
ology – justified that because of the ―requirements of the three representations‖. These are 
the need to represent ―the development trend of China‘s advanced productive forces‖, ―the 
orientation of China‘s advanced culture‖ and ―the fundamental interests of the overwhel-
mingly majority of the people of China‖. This emphasis on the ―productive forces‖ is a 
shift away from Marxist-Leninist terminology. The term ―relations of production‖ usually 
is associated with the contradictions between classes that determine if an economic system 
is regarded as capitalist and thus exploitative. However, interpreting it differently, made 
this notion irrelevant.
1492 The expression ―majority of people‖ additionally hints to the in-
clusion of all social classes (or rather strata). However, a hierarchy of ‗worthy‘ entrepre-
neurs has been created. At the top are ―entrepreneurs and technical personnel employed by 
scientific and technical enterprises of the non-public sector‖, next are ―managerial and 
technical staff employed by foreign-funded enterprises‖ and at the end of the hierarchy 
there are the self-made type of individual entrepreneurs. This emphasis on science and 
technology is reminiscent of the ‗mystifying power‘ associated with the import of Western 
science and technology 100 years earlier that was supposed to lead to modernization (see 
also chapter 5.1.5.).
1493   
     The invitation of private entrepreneurs into the party is widely received as the ―ex-post 
legitimization of a long-standing fact‖. Unofficially, private entrepreneurs were for quite a 
long time already allowed to join the CCP.
1494 It is thus a decision that can be interpreted 
as being merely symbolic in nature as private entrepreneurs are still confronted with the 
same difficulties concerning access to loans, supplies and  information. Regulations and 
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their legal enforcement, including the incorporation of private property rights in to the con-
stitution, remain precarious and unstable. Still, what McNally calls the ―Leninist principles 
of political organization‖ influence policy decisions, even though the private sector gained 
some momentum within the Chinese economic system.  However, the ―moves towards 
creating effective constitutional constraints on the party-state have been highly circum-
scribed‖.
1495 Also, the possibility to join the CCP for many ‗new rich‘ entrepreneurs means 
not more than just having one more honorable ornament without any implication for politi-
cal participation.
1496 By 2004, 35 percent of entrepreneurs had joined the party – compared 
to 6 percent of the entire population, which shows the growing integration of economic 
elites into the CCP. It has to be kept in mind that many of those entrepreneurs were former 
managers of SOEs that were privatized by the Chinese government, so-called xiàhăi (下海, 
‗plunge into the sea‘). As those, they already were members of the CCP. In contrast, a 
2004 party survey claims that of 2.42 million new members only 894 were private entre-
preneurs. One reason of this might be that with the growing commitment of the party to the 
private sector, membership was not seen as necessary or desirable anymore. On the other 
hand, the Hu-Wen government might want to downplay the role entrepreneurs play for the 
CCP, fitting to their ‗harmonious society‘ policies (see chapter 5).
1497 
     Additionally, since 1991, business associations and trade chambers are increasingly 
influential in the process of policy formulations in representing the interests of their mem-
bers. Their importance lies also in the fact that a ―leading role…is given to former cadres 
from high levels of the economic bureaucracy in these organizations‖.
1498 The central gov-
ernment carefully evaluates the types of associations sanctioned and the individuals, who 
are selected for political posts of which some can even bee entrepreneurs. Therefore, the 
party ―controls leadership selection and interest articulation, and retains ultimate authori-
ty‖.
1499 In turn, party officials are encouraged to become xiàhăi entrepreneurs, so there are 
surely mutually dependent causalities to consider. Thus, many rural entrepreneurs are not 
only local residents but former local officials, even village heads, of which many were 
members of the CCP.
1500 This is not a very positive picture for the development of a civil 
society in China. Civil society associations are another element that in theory is expected 
to lead to democratization tendencies, as they are usually a means for the middle class to 
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gain political influence, for following their interests and participating in decisions in mat-
ters of public concern. Also, voluntary membership in associations is regarded as the be-
ginning of civil society structures that organizes people outside state organizations. As 
outlined above, in the Chinese case associations play a different role, because they are go-
verned by either the party or the state and also because the main actors of the middle class, 
which first and foremost are the entrepreneurs, are not interested in engaging for a ‗greater 
cause‘. However, in the civil society strand of literature, the emergence of civil associa-
tions is regarded as being highly correlated with Guanxi to represent group interests.
1501  
     In 2002, 83.4 percent of private entrepreneurs were members of the various organiz a-
tions of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) (which itself focus-
es more on political and ideological work), 35.1 percent in the Political Consultative Con-
ferences (PCC), 17.4 percent in the People's Congresses (PC), and 48  percent in the two 
associations for self-employed laborers (SELA) and private enterprises (PEA).
1502  The 
latter two are often not differentiated and treated as one. Both are often under the guidance 
of the local Industrial and Commercial Bureaus (ICB), which are the organs  of local gov-
ernments for registering and administer associations.
1503  
     The membership within these associations gives the party the opportunity to develop 
tighter relations to an important economic power and also prevents entrepreneurs to engage 
in other, opponent organizations. Moreover, this can also be understood as a means to avert 
the emergence of a bourgeois middle class. Membership or positions in busines s associa-
tions are thus another way to integrate private entrepreneurs in the local state. However, as 
already mentioned, leading positions are on the one hand given to private entrepreneurs, 
but there are always also officials involved. Business associati ons were on the one hand 
established to monitor, control and educate private entrepreneurs since their resurgence in 
the 1980s. On the other hand, they serve as tools to communicate the demands and expe c-
tations of private entrepreneurs to (local) officials.
1504 This feedback mechanism of associ-
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ations is supposed to foster ―harmonious relations‖ among private firms and foster stabili-
zation.
1505 In giving entrepreneurs the feeling they can influence policy outcomes, the cen-
tral party tries to get rid of a societal force that could possible endanger their own pos i-
tion.
1506 ―China‘s entrepreneurs remain willing to be co-opted by the CCP and support the 
formation of corporatist links between business associations and state organs, both to gain 
political recognition and to better access state resources‖.
1507 Although private entrepre-
neurs could act independently from local government agencies in starting a business, they 
were forced to co-operate with local cadres once their business started to grow and produce 
profits. Often they were expected to take on local official positions or to share their profits 
with local officials in order to be allowed to pursue. For that reason, it is extremely helpful 
for entrepreneurs when at least family members join the CCP and thus are part of the party-
state.
1508 However, often the entrepreneur at the same time functions as party secretary, 
which seems not to be conceived as contradictory but rather as a useful management tool 
for guaranteeing stability within the firm. For the party in turn this me ans to be able to 
reach out to ‗basic workers‘ within private firms that were otherwise outside the control of 
party organs.
1509 
     Some entrepreneurs were not permitted to join the party, although they were extremely 
successful and party branches have been established within their companies. These e ntre-
preneurs function as model entrepreneurs and thus have representative duties rather than 
real power and in a more unofficial way they are also members of the party.
1510 Although 
especially in Wenzhou (one of experimental provinces, where the private sector accounts 
for 90 percent of output already as early as  in 1994 (in comparison with 2.3 percent in 
Songjiang and mere 0.9 percent in Wuxi, see also chapter 7.2.), trade chambers and busi-
ness associations became relatively independent organizations well suited for the market 
economy, their impact on political participation remains unsure.
1511 Besides that, the Chi-
nese government also tried to r egain some control over the private sector in employing 
mandatory membership in those associations. Although these organizations performed 
some services for the entrepreneurs, they are more ―an arm of the local tax and industrial-
commercial bureaus‖ and ―assist local governments  in  combating  tax evasion‖.
1512 For 
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sure, they gained influence over the local private sector, but local officials themselves 
doubt the ability of these associations to implement policies, whereas, depending on re-
search studies in different localities, more optimistic private entrepreneurs do believe they 
can have an impact on policy making through their membership.
1513 Other studies have 
opposite results. They found that entrepreneurs evaluate business associations as rather 
ineffective and believing that their only function is to extract fees and contributions. In one 
study, private entrepreneurs are interpreted as being as realistic as  the local officials de-
scribed above.
1514  
     Being part of the political system, and thus enhancing their social status, is considered 
as contributing to the success, growth and reputation of their companies by facilitating the 
access to bank loans and obtaining vital information. Membership in these associations is 
also seen as a mean to improve Guanxi with local officials.
1515 In turn, local governments 
hope ―to improve the tax discipline of the new economic elites. […] Although private en-
terprises and individually owned enterprises together account for more than 20 percent of 
GDP, they are reported to contribute less than 10 percent (in some places less than 5 per-
cent) to the local coffers‖. The same rationale can be found in the party‘s move to allow 
private entrepreneurs to join the party as one prerequisite for them is not to be guilty of tax 
evasion.
1516 
    It is thus doubtful if membership rates of entrepreneurs in associations are able to tell us 
something about the degree of (in a Western sense) institutionalizing, organizing and there-
fore democratizing tendencies of entrepreneurs or other straightforward causalities. Ho w-
ever, associations for sure act as ―bridges‖ between government and business circles.
1517 
     One other factor is that ―local state officials are first and foremost political, not econom-
ic, actors‖ and thus, although participating actively in local economies, ―they do so in high-
ly politicized ways‖.
1518 As there is no such thing as a free lunch, there is also a negative 
side to the co-operation between local authorities and private entrepreneurs. Local cadres 
discriminate against entrepreneurs in putting pressure on them to obtain shares of their 
firms and to partake in their profits as ―backstage bosses‖.
1519 In return, officials would 
provide information on supplies and resources or enable access to state bank loans. Close 
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connections to local administration not only facilitated to start-up businesses, they also 
caused the entrepreneurs to anticipate the influence of the local government on their enter-
prise and structure the production in a way so to secure profits to their families and net-
works and also to minimize the impact of politicians on business.  Depending on their 
length of service, local cadres are more inclined to support the private sector and hence, 
economic growth, or more interested in extracting as much as possible without considering 
the long-term consequences for the private sector.
1520 Only well-established Guanxi to an 
official will help entrepreneurs to influence ―what are considered costs and what are consi-
dered profits‖.
1521 Ole Bruun notes that ―the utterly impenetrable principles for tax collec-
tion, if principled at all, were a constant source of conflict. There were no consistent me-
thods for assessing turnover and computing taxes, and the tax bureau‘s statement that it 
was without the ―scientific means‖ to determine turnover in many cases appeared to be an 
excuse for maintaining serious discrimination‖.
1522 If an entrepreneur refuses to cooperate, 
she is at risk to lose the support of the local authorities. A way to solve that problem is to 
register as collective business but in reality running it as privately-owned firm or as so-
called ‗red hat enterprise‘ which is often tolerated by local officials (see also chapter 7). In 
these companies, managers are not always managers but owners and thus ownership struc-
tures can be often more blurred than the differentiation between state, collective and pri-
vate sector suggests. ―Indeed, ownership and management are probably less important sig-
nifiers of activity than entrepreneurship‖.
1523  
    Regardless of the type of registration, the risk of ―ad-hoc taxation‖ or confiscation of 
profits and physical assets by local cadres remains. As a result, it encouraged entrepreneurs 
to diversify their product portfolio and invest in multiply sectors.
1524 Private entrepreneurs 
had no control over the amount and level of ―management fees‖ and hardly any possibility 
to protest against them.
1525 This and other not ex ante anticipated changes in the political 
climate favors flexibility in production. Already during the mid -1980s, entrepreneurs 
reacted in creating a whole set of different production options, or producing in  diverse in-
dustrial sectors or different localities. Also, they do not let their company grow over a cer-
tain size – they rather set up a new business that produces different products or in a differ-
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ent province. Another feature of this is to lease out part of the enterprise to subcontractors, 
which further confuses the ownership of an enterprise and its subunits.
1526 
 
     This issue becomes even more pressing once the private firm grows in size, as with in-
creasing profits officials seek to get more influence on the enterprise and obtain part of the 
surplus.
1527 Therefore, entrepreneurs do not let their company grow over a certain size  – 
they rather set up a new business that produces different products or in a different prov-
ince. Another feature of this is to lease out part of the enterprise to subcontractors, which 
further confuses the ownership of an enterprise and its subunits.
1528 This produces organi-
zationally fuzzy business groups of small firms connected by kinship ties based on rec i-
procity and mutuality (qǐyè jituan 企业集团) ―that embody sizeable investments and consi-
derable economies of scale even though the size of any unit of those clusters is small‖.
1529 
They help ―to pool information, finances and technological know-how‖.
1530 The property 
rights of these arrangements are very ambiguous and remain diffuse, and thus help to by-
pass discrimination against legally private firms and give more security to the entrepreneur 
to reinvest.
1531 This also demonstrates the mistrust of entrepreneurs in more formal ar-
rangements on one hand, on the other hand the dense networks protect from overly greedy 
cadres.
 1532 Entrepreneurs will focus their investment on transferable assets, of which their 
network is the most valuable one. These assets cannot be confiscated by local cadres but 
can be applied to as many different business opportunities as necessary to be successful. 
The close connections to local administration are for the mutual benefit of both cadres and 
entrepreneurs, but the latter also need to secure profits for their families and networks and 
thus are forced to be extremely flexible.
 1533 
    This contradicts the Western belief that personal relations are less efficient and more 
costly than contracts, leading to an "undercapitalization" and to firms being unable to grow 
over a certain size. Chinese entrepreneurs have a tendency to extend their networks rather 
than following Western corporate strategies, creating a whole set of different production 
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options.
1534 Apart from the reasons already given, setting up new businesses gives also 
family members or other members of one‘s network the chance to be manager of their own 
firm. Entrepreneurs formed ―informal cooperatives among relatives and friends engaged in 
small-scale industry‖, allowing ―individual entrepreneurs to pool capital and skills‖ and 
attenuating the exposure to   discrimination and other limitations on private investment.
1535 
 
     Chinese entrepreneurs invest in diverse sectors and products to be able to move re-
sources to activities and locations promising the most profit. This enables them to leverage 
gains and losses and to discover new markets and investments.
1536 This is facilitated by the 
fact that they have no formalized bureaucratic system, but are connected over networks. As 
highly flexible, low-cost producers they thrive in markets that require fast reactions to d e-
mand changes.  
     As a consequence, the notion of core competence, one of the most important features of 
the Western understanding of conducting business ―turned out to be irrelevant to respon-
dents in deciding which activities to engage in. For the most part, a firm is known, not by 
what is produces, but by who stands behind it, and that individual will seize on any profit-
able [...] opportunity which presents itself, with scant regard for any core competence the 
firm may, or may not, have‖.
1537 The flexibility to move quickly from on sector or location 
to another derived from the small units of production turns out to be a valuable asset during 
economic reforms (and, for that matter, has also been a major fact in the recent global cri-
sis, see the example of Wenzhou outlined in chapter 7.2.).  
     To this day, the Chinese cultural tradition of Guanxi is related to a private economy 
which success depends mainly on small family firms based on paternal authority and per-
sonal trust rather than a legal system. Also, inside those enterprises, individual rights stand 
back behind the significance of personal networks and kinship relations which can be a 
competitive advantage in today‘s global economy.
1538 Hence, ―‗[n]etwork capitalism‘ is 
built from the ground up and does not tend to overly rely on legal contracts and the super-
visory role of the state. It rather depends on a myriad of small-scale businesses. In compar-
ison to ‗coordinated capitalism‘, these businesses do not tend to expand into large bureau-
cratic  structures,  but  rather  achieve  wealth  accumulation  through  the  multiplication  of 
small ventures. To overcome the disadvantage of small size, large numbers of firms coa-
lesce into clusters of businesses that can display enormous flexibility in adjusting to chang-
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ing circumstances. These clusters are linked through horizontal networks of particularistic 
ties based on trust (Guanxi), which ―provide the underpinning basis for a complex net-
work-based organizational structure‖‖.
1539 
 
8.2.2. Role of jurisdiction in China 
 
“Like the moon, the Center‟s policies differ  
between the beginning and the middle of the month”  
[zhongyang de zhengche xiang yueliang, chuyi shiwu bu yirang].
1540 
 
     As a result of the close and interdependent relations of local government and private 
entrepreneurs, the Chinese legal system ―has been characterized by policy experimentation, 
leading to informal and spontaneous legal developments, which then are legally clarified 
and codified‖.
1541 This meant in practice that ―business involves not so much doing what is 
explicitly legal but rather doing what is not expressly forbidden‖.
1542 
     Although impartial courts were established by the central government, legal actions are 
rarely taken and if so, only for supra-regional or international issues or for suing a person 
that is not part of one‘s network.
1543 Courts are still viewed as easily to manipulate and 
therefore corrupt and the concept of universal rights and individual jurisdiction are per-
ceived as alien and imported from the West, therefore solving problems within ones net-
works based on mutual obligations is considered far more effective.
1544 Networks are not 
only able to support their members but also to enforce sanctions upon them. This incorp o-
rates the fear of losing ‗face‘ and evokes the feeling of shame and loss of reputation. Not 
only are networks considered more effective, the recourse to the formal courts are often 
also viewed as failure to solve the problem through the network and at the same time not 
be able to follow the etiquette of society. The only exception for this is if the court is geo-
graphically distant to the place where ones business is located and if the person taken to 
court is not part of one‘s network.
1545 
     This mistrust towards courts can be traced back to China‘s history. Over the most part, 
China was ruled by an emperor and his laws had to be implemented by local officials, of 
whom many were prone to corruption. This exposed people to official exploitation and 
                                                 
1539 McNally, 2007a, p. 190. Quote within from Robison and Beeson, 2000, p. 13. 
1540 Zhu, 2007, p. 1510. 
1541 McNally, 2006, p. 27ff. 
1542 Wank, 1999, p. 252. 
1543 Wank, 1999, p. 264ff. 
1544 Peng, 2004, p. 1050: ―A noble man would sacrifice self-interest to honor his obligations, whereas a 
commoner would forsake his obligation to serve his self-interest.‖ 
1545 Wank, 1999, p. 264ff. 276 
 
caused them to distrust official institutions.
1546 Still, as Bourdieu argues, the state sought to 
concentrate ―juridical capital‖, which in his terms is ―an objectified and codified form of 
symbolic capital […], delegated and guaranteed by the state, in a word bureaucratized‖. It 
is the foundation of the ―specific authority of the holder of state power‖.
1547 
     A legal culture is defined as consisting of a ―pattern of reciprocal influences between 
parallel phenomena of law and society‖. In China, the societal reaction to legal reforms, 
which not only are perceived as being imported from the West, but to a large part actually 
are, represent indeed responses to the latter fact. These laws have been designed to fit the 
economic and political conditions of their originating culture, whereas the reactions on the 
Chinese side are influenced by local culture.
1548 Usually, legal norms develop gradually in 
accordance to local history and traditional norms. In interaction with the economic and 
political development, hitherto unwritten rules are transformed into formal laws. Thus, 
imported law needs to be altered in accordance to local traditions. ―This local acceptance 
of imported law norms may depend on a process by which traditional norms that are un-
responsive to new realities are discarded (‗delegitimization‘) and replaced by new norms as 
part of evolving belief system (‗transvaluation‘)‖.
1549 
     Corresponding Chinese custom, personal interactions are carried out based on relations 
and the unwritten rules of Guanxi which are considered far more effective for solving any 
kind of problem.
1550 This impedes the assertion of a bourgeois concept of freedom and a 
juridification of relationships in a Western sense, as personal connections are valued over 
contracts and law. Legal rights are not conceived as individual entitlement (in terms of 
being entitled to something) rather in the sense of dispensing justice (punish malfeasance), 
which is consistent with the Chinese notion t hat individuals can only exist embedded in 
their social environment. The Western ideals of democratic principles, civil liberty, equali-
ty and independent justice, all universal values coming from the age of enlightenment, 
have no corresponding tradition in China.
1551  
     The significance of Guanxi is often seen in its coexistence with law and legal instit u-
tions, only together providing a complete legal system.
1552 In contrast to courts, Guanxi is 
conceived to provide security and predictability for legal issues as formal legal institutional 
are still conceived as too weak to manage business relations and allocate resources, imply-
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ing  that  once  the  formal  legal  system  is  complete,  Guanxi  will  not  be  necessary  any 
more.
1553 In contrast, other authors argue that because ―China‘s legal system is increasingly 
influenced by common law rather than codified civil law traditions, the role for Guanxi is 
likely to increase, pending the development of a body of law on which interpretations of 
general principles and norms might be based‖.
1554 In this view, Guanxi is interpreted as 
coping mechanism. An elaborate legal system can thus diminish but never totally erase the 
role of Guanxi because it has little influence if not complemented by informal Guanxi rela-
tions. Potter argues that the dominant role of the state apparatus and the limited formal 
constraints of its actions are in favor of the persistence of Guanxi. This notion justifies the 
parallel existence of Guanxi and a formal legal system. As contracts are conceived as a 
means to deal with people who are not trusted, laws are only necessary when a relationship 
is not based on mutual trust. However, it might be misleading to regard Guanxi as exact 
opposite of a formal legal system as it is rather part of the legal system in completing and 
complementing the Chinese legal culture.
1555 
     During the last 30 years the central government created a virtually complete set of laws, 
covering most aspects necessary for an elaborate legal framework equal to that of a fully 
developed economy, including the protection of property rights and the establishment of 
impartial courts. As a very recent example, a document issued on 13 May 2010 by the Chi-
na's State Council named Several Opinions of the State Council on Encouraging and Guid-
ing the Healthy Development of Private Investment promotes the private sector. It states 
that private capital is allowed to establish financial institutions and encourages investments 
in infrastructure and basic industries. Also, it ―require[s] the competent governmental de-
partments across the nation to pay enough attention to the work on encouraging and guid-
ing the healthy development of private capital, spare no time to work out specific measures 
and build favorable policy environment and public opinion atmosphere for the sound de-
velopment of private investment‖.
1556 As often the case with legal documents issued by the 
central government, it includes few specifics. The exact meaning for example of ―healthy 
development‖ and how the financial institutions are supposed to be designed is not expli-
                                                 
1553 Xin and Pearce, 1996. 
1554 Potter, 2008, p. 194f. 
1555 Potter, 2008, p. 180. Potter adds: ―The traditional Guanxi system retains its importance, but must operate 
alongside an increasingly formal set of largely imported rules and processes made necessary by the increased 
complexity of social, economic, and political relations…As an expression of social capital, Guanxi operates 
along with other mechanisms of economic or symbolic capital for regulating social, economic and political 
relationships‖, p. 183. 
1556 A document issued on May, 13 2010 by the China's State Council online  (http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/ 
news/government/654035.shtml).  In  Chinese  available  under  http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010 -05/13/  con-
tent_1605218.htm, both accessed 8 June 2010. 278 
 
cated. This leaves room for local deviations and interpretations and thus the degree to 
which those laws are implemented on the local level again strongly depends on the charac-
ter of local cadres.
1557  
     As another example for the mutual influence bet ween central state and local develop-
ments is the problem of private property rights. To sidestep the problem of ownership in a 
time when private property was still not officially sanctioned, villages were authorized to 
decide on the ownership of former state domains. The local bureaucracy of imperial China 
was revived to deal with the question of property rights. The village councils gave land use 
rights to peasant families or private entrepreneurs to enable the establishment of small 
businesses. For this,  contracts were used, enforced by local arbitral courts, which were 
already known during the Ming Dynasty
1558 as ‗harvest splitting contracts‘.
1559 The entre-
preneur got a fixed wage plus a certain percentage of the profits as incentive. Within the 
villages,  kinship  networks  helped  to  protect  private  property  and  thus  facilitated 
growth.
1560 As in the past, family ties served as a buffer against social insecurity, fulfilling 
duties like acting as juridical authority and lending money, thus creating enforceable trust. 
The clan again filled an institutional gap in Chinese social and polit ical structure, serving 
as ―monitoring and sanctioning power‖.
1561 This scheme was finally officially legalized 
with the Household Responsibility System (HRS) in 1981, one example of the Chinese 
central government ex post legitimizing actual procedures which from then were to be un-
iformly followed in entire China.
1562 Other restrictions for private enterprises were finally 
removed by settling the question of inheritance, rent and transfers.  However, especially 
during the 1980s, the private sector was still officially illicit in accordance to central go v-
                                                 
1557 Krug and Mehta, 2004, p. 54f. 
1558 The Ming Dynasty was the ruling dynasty of China from 1368 to 1644. 
1559 Krug, 2002b, p. 137f. During the Ming and Qing dynasties it was common to use written contracts for the 
transfer of property. However, as the Chinese law code was primarily a criminal code, enforcement of these 
contracts could not be enforced by law. Cont racts were thus dependent on mutual trust, which also means 
that contracts were not much more than „statements of intent―. No penalty clauses were included as there 
were no independent means to enforce the contract. Dispute would be solved over the network.  Faure, 2006, 
p. 34f., 89f. 
1560 Peng, 2004, p. 1048. 
1561 Goode, 1970, p. 297f., Peng, 2004, p. 1051f. Please refer to chapter 7.2 for the example of Wenzhou. 
1562 ―[Toward] the end of 1978, a small number of production teams, first secretly and later with the blessing 
of local authorities, began to try out the system of contracting land, other resources, and output quotas to 
individual households. A year later, these teams brought in yields far larger than those of other teams. The 
central authorities later conceded the existence of this new form of farming but required that it be restricted to 
poor regions. However, most teams ignored this restriction. Full official acceptance of the HRS was eventual-
ly given in late 1981, when 45 percent of the production teams in China had already been dismantled. By the 
end of 1983, 98 percent of production teams had adopted HRS‖. It is also argued that the HRS revived the 
customs of traditional written contracts, so-called ―bao‖. The usage of this term in economic relationships 
indicates that it is a well-known institution from the past. Lin, 1992, p. 37, Faure, 2006, p. 73-75, Kelliher, 
1992, p. 57. 279 
 
ernment regulations which meant that private property rights were still not officially enfor-
ceable. From 1984 an official law secured the use of the land for fifteen year tenure. In 
1988, private enterprises with more than seven employees (sīy￭ng qǐyè, see also chapter 
7.1.) reached an official legal status, but still regarded the private sector as subordinate to 
the state sector and were kept that way for example by harsh credit constraints. On the 
NPC annual meeting in Beijing on 14 March 1999, it was decided to amend the constitu-
tion to protect private property rights, again being revised in 2004, at the Second Session 
of the 10
th NPC.
1563 The Property Law of the PRC (wùquán fǎ 物权法) has been approved 
on the 5
th meeting of 10
th NPC on 16 March 2007, coming into effect on 1 October that 
year.
1564 
     A similar example can be found in the enactment of the ‗Unified Contract Law‖ of 1999 
which includes all basic law principles for contract law such as ―offer and acceptance and 
good faith in the process of forming contracts‖. It replaced the bureaucratic process of ob-
taining approvals that determined the validity of contracts in use before but still leaves a lot 
of room for (local) interpretation. However significant the enactment of the law was, at this 
point Guanxi was still ‗officially‘ needed to fill the gap of contract security.
1565 Neverthe-
less, it meant progress in that contracts are effective when they are concluded, not when 
the process of approval by the local government is completed. It is counterbalanced by the 
fact that contracts always have to be in accordance with other administrative regulations, 
―respect public morality, and avoid disruption of economic order and harm to the public 
interest of society‖. Additionally, without the procedure of government approvals no set 
interpretation of the requirements of the law exists which leaves room for local deviations 
and will result in the need to use Guanxi to secure contracts.
1566 
     A more problematic example would be the case of insider trading regulations, which, 
considering the importance of Guanxi, seem to be nearly impossible to enforce. However, 
the first regulation was already enacted in 1990, when the Chinese stock market just devel-
oped. The Chinese term for ‗insider trading‘ (n￨imù jiāoy￬, 内幕交易) has been first used in 
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Provisional  Measures  for  Regulating  Securities  Companies  of  1990.  It  comprised  not 
many specific regulations and is thus received as being merely of symbolic and political 
value. It was changed again in 1993 in two separate regulations (namely the Provisional 
Regulations  on  the  Administration  of  Stock  Issuance  and  Trading  and  the  Provisional 
Measures for the Prohibition of Securities Fraud), adding details on insider trading. Addi-
tionally, the NPC changed the criminal law so that it included insider trading in 1997. In 
1999, finally the Securities Law of the People‟s Republic of China came into effect which 
was designed after the example of US insider trading regulations. It was hoped that togeth-
er with highly developed laws, also the stock market would work effectively like in devel-
oped countries as the US. However, although insider trading seems to be a severe problem 
in China only very few cases are reported.
1567 Most articles on the topic criticize details of 
the regulation, but only in the sense that it does not imitate the US law perfectly, without 
giving any consideration on cultural or social issues connected with the topic. Loopholes 
are only seen in misspecifications of details within the law: "There are, however, some 
serious problems with the Chinese law, due to the uncritical implantation of overseas expe-
rience. This is strikingly illustrated by the loopholes found in the definition of insider 
which are inherently related to the confusion around the underlying theory of insider trad-
ing liability‖.
1568 
     Taking Guanxi relations into account and the affinity of Chinese businessmen to solve 
problems in an unofficial way, it seems doubtful that a reliable reporting will ever be estab-
lished. More than that, insider trading might be a major and persistent problem of the Chi-
nese stock market. Bearing in mind that the norms of Guanxi make a huge difference be-
tween people in- and outside one‘s circle, insider information can be seen as part of the 
Guanxi system of favors. Unsurprisingly, empirical research found that Chinese students 
are far more acceptant towards insider trade than US and even Taiwanese students.
1569  
     These few examples of changes to the legal system can also serve as a perspicuous illu-
stration of institutional change. It can be argued that this process is a composition of layer-
ing and conversion of institutions. Both  are types of change that do not exploit gaps b e-
tween rules and their enforcement  but leave it intact. However, by adding new amen d-
ments and additions to its laws, the Chinese central government gradually transformed its 
legal system to better fit the new economic circumstances without giving up its political 
principles, although also foreign practices were imported in the process. It is thus difficult 
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to regard this process as one that follows a certain trajectory, although ex-post it certainly 
does. In that, it is rather a process of cumulative causation than a path-dependent develop-
ment. 
     These few examples show very vividly, how the Chinese legal system is not only heavi-
ly fragmented between central and local level, but that it remains also very problematic to 
import foreign legal arrangements (and thus foreign customs), like also the experience of 
post-soviet countries proved in a very obvious way. However, China manages to combine 
the new laws with old traditions and in accepting local differentiations; it constructed a 
legal system that not to a small part relies on Guanxi to be effective. 
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9. Concluding remarks and main findings 
 
“The capitalist state, though, needs to be constitutionally constrained, 
since a relatively autonomous economic realm can only occur with  
the recognition of clear „constitutional‟ constraints on the power  
of the state to violate private space of the individual or to  
commandeer his or her property”.
1570 
 
9.1. China’s development process and institutional change 
     As has been outlined throughout this work, China‘s development has been very impres-
sive, but also very unequal in different regions and sectors - in terms of progress, but also 
in terms of the importance of the private sector and hence, Guanxi. Among other factors 
such as proximity to Hong Kong, this rather geographical pattern of growth can be ex-
plained by the uneven distribution of personal networks. Especially in the beginning of 
reforms, investments in the private sector often came from Overseas Chinese, and were 
typically directed towards their own families and thus specific communities, which mostly 
were in coastal regions. These investment decisions were thus often not made according to 
Western conceptions of industrial location that emphasize first and foremost the proximity 
to markets and demand, low-priced production factors and a favorable political climate.
1571 
Nevertheless, it was especially the last which was influential for China‘s development, as 
the example of Wenzhou demonstrates. It has been argued that regions and sectors that are 
more influenced by the state sector are less influenced by Guanxi than privately organized 
sectors, but this work does not argue for the existence of different varieties of Capitalism 
within China.
1572  
     Although there is a ―patchwork of local political economies‖, as different sectors and 
regions show different patterns of Guanxi capitalism, it is possible to carve out some un-
derlying fundamentals that permeate all areas. This dissertation aimed at presenting a ho-
listic picture of the development path of post-reform China, focusing only on a few specif-
ic characteristics to discover the basic principles of the process. It has been proved that 
Guanxi Capitalism combines elements of state-led, network and global Capitalism that 
interact on the local level of both the political and the economic sphere.
1573 It has to be 
emphasized again that this work does not claim to present an exhaustive picture of the 
Chinese economic system; although it provides a synthesis of a large body of knowledge, it 
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is limited to certain societal and cultural aspects. Nevertheless, it seeks to provide some 
meaningful insights into the workings of a Chinese Capitalism that uses Guanxi as one 
main factor for its success, even with the risk of appearing overly simplistic. To put it dif-
ferently, this work has tried to get one step closer by stepping back: so that the forest and 
not only the trees can be seen. 
     This dissertation has discovered that the essentials that characterize the Chinese eco-
nomic system are defined by a network or Guanxi Capitalism and the driving force of de-
velopment can thus be attributed to the private sector and its entrepreneurs. It has been 
found that since the VoC-approach does not incorporate the political and economic dynam-
ics of a post-socialist country in transition and takes a democratic polity as given, it is less 
capable than other approaches of describing the type of Capitalism developing in Chi-
na.
1574 The political structure of China and its developmental and transitional economy is 
still far from having an established institutional framework. By contrast, its institutions are 
still constantly changing and  thus defy the possibility of being described in a ‗snapshot‘ 
analysis like that of the VoC, or of even being compared to already existing ‗snapshots‘. 
However, VoC and similar modern comparative approaches share the search for insights to 
the ―dynamics and contradictions‖ of Capitalism.
1575 
     Other approaches for describing a specific type of Capitalism are  the concepts of eco-
nomic order and style, which also can be interpreted as geographical variations of a partic-
ular economic spirit. The method of spatially comparing different economic systems is not 
new, but has already been tried in previous centuries  when different nations were com-
pared according to the mode of economic activity, the structure of society and the form of 
government.
1576  In general, economic systems are influenced by  their cultural norms, 
which can also explain non -economic factors in their composition.
1577 In particular, the 
economic style approach describes cultural transformation over time and its causall link to 
economic transformation, not just how specific cultures transform an economic system in a 
particular way.
1578  
In contrast, Eucken argued that analysis of Capitalism is necessarily imprecise and v a-
gue since Capitalism is itself a formless concept. However, Eucken‘s proposition of eco-
nomic orders is only able to describe static systems and not the transformation from plan to 
market. It also fails to explain the emergence and development of institutions. Although 
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Eucken‘s dichotomous concept of economic orders has been expanded and refined, nor do 
these more recent approaches succeed in describing institutional change. Yet Eucken and 
the theory of orders, and his conception of ideal-types, paved the way for more modern 
approaches to comparative analyses of economic systems. In this regard it is not so far 
away from the VoC-approach, except that the types of this theoretical framework are de-
fined according to a different set of characteristics.
1579 
     Economic styles are instead  not static, but dynamic in nature, which also means that 
style changes can be analyzed. Whereas the system approach is better suited for broad de-
scription of epochs, but less suited to describe the qualitative change of an economy, since 
it is more abstract and general, seeking the unvarying element of a basic structure; the style 
concept by contrast can be applied to specific variations of the system.  Defining a new 
economic style requires the interaction of various disciplines,  such as sociology, political 
studies, history and economics.
1580 This concept enables the analysis of an economic sy s-
tem more holistically. However, implying that a certain era is connected to a certain ec o-
nomic spirit does not mean that the economic actors were  necessarily aware of their own 
orientation. An economic style indicates the transformation of an economy by describing 
the change of economic thought, it does so, however, more from a long-term perspective. 
On the other hand, a style can also aim at different eras and indicates various systems with-
in them. It is a concept that is both highly subjective and  employs relativism in creating a 
painting, rather than a photograph, of an economic era.
1581 
     Following Arthur Spiethoff an economic style can be characterized by economic spirit, 
natural endowment and technology, economic and soci al constitution and  economic dy-
namism. It has been made clear throughout this work that China commands a very distinct 
set of all of these characteristics. However, this dissertation attributes the most weight to 
economic spirit, since it has a strong influence on the structure of an economic system and 
thus on creating a specific type of Capitalism. This dissertation is hesitant to claim that this 
type can serve as an ideal-type, but that it is sufficient in describing the real -type of Chi-
nese Capitalism.  According to Salin, the difficulty of distinguishing between real and 
ideal-types can be overcome by calling a type a ‗model‘ instead.
1582 Streeck also argues 
that although ―Capitalism as a social order…may be an ‗ideal type‘,… it cannot be an 
ideal‖. He adds that ―[s]trictly speaking, it is a utopia, since it cannot exist outside of non-
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capitalist modes of social organization even though it continuously strives to emancipate 
itself from them and in fact is destructive of them. While the reality of Capitalism is al-
ways mixed, the mix is far from stable and indeed always explosive. Although its internal 
logic of growth makes Capitalism attempt to reorganize all social relations in its image – 
‗subsume‘ them under the ‗laws of capitalist accumulation‘ – it can do so only at its own 
peril. ‗Really existing Capitalism‘ depends on its being embedded in two kinds of non-
capitalist social orders which it nevertheless permanently erodes: remnants of cultural tra-
ditionalism that are being undermined by institutionalized cynicism, and modern institu-
tions of social regulation and reconstruction created by political countermovements against 
the marketization of society‖. He calls that the contradiction of Capitalism.
1583 
     However, in creating types, the concept of the economic style can be said to be method-
ically not far away from the notion of the holistic pattern model. Whereas the first concen-
trates more on past and present, searching for underlying fundamentals th at often can be 
better detected with (spatio)temporal distance, the pattern models focuses more on cont i-
nuous updates, therefore on the immediate present, and seeks maximal closeness to its sub-
ject of analysis. Of course they differ conceptually and methodologically, but both concen-
trate rather on qualitative rather than quantitative elements, and so can nevertheless reveal 
a rather accurate painting of the Chinese economic system in taking also social, political 
and cultural influences in account  – without neglecting its development and transforma-
tion.  These  theoretical  approaches  can  be  enhanced  by  the  instruments  of  institutional 
change that argue that ―the institutionalized order of Capitalism…is a historical order, i.e. 
one that is continuously changing because it is inherently unstable and precarious‖.
1584  
     Hence, even if scholars like Eucken dismissed the economic style as incapable of d e-
scribing the reality of economic activities and processes and sought to construct real-types 
instead of ideal-types, this dissertation regards the notion of economic styles to be particu-
larly appealing for constructing types of Capitalism because of its capacity to describe the 
character, and therefore the reality, of an economy.  
     For some time now China-related research has used the concept of path-dependent and 
path-defining processes of institutional change and development. In the case of China, this 
is neither a gradual nor a radical procedure, but rather a very pragmatic one. It does not 
aim to replace one institutional setting by another; it rather initiates a process of inst itu-
tional change by layering and converting of institutions, as in the development of legisl a-
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tion for the private sector in China. The Chinese transformation is not founded upon the 
remnants of socialist institutions; instead the party-state uses the legacy of the bureaucratic 
planned economy to produce a capitalist system with Chinese characteristics.
1585 China‘s 
fragmented authoritarianism in which ―the vertical bureaucratic entities are structurally 
prone to conflict with horizontal levels of territorial-based governmental administration‖ 
employed a ―protracted, disjointed, and incremental‖ approach to transformation.
1586 
     In contrast to the mainstream view that informal institutions explain the gap between 
intended and unintended institutional outcomes, and are thus responsible for the malfunc-
tioning of formal institutions, the approach to institutional change originating with Thelen 
claims that adaptive informal institutions merely extend the boundaries of formal institu-
tions, and explore new patterns of behavior that ex ante have not been foreseen. They thus 
manage to survive for some time, although mainly in semi-legal gray areas. As the case of 
China has shown, this process of gradual institutional change, often consisting of responses 
by the central government to local developments, can also take place in an authoritarian 
regime where reactions of this kind are rather unexpected. In China, adaptive institutions 
are particularly prominent ―where some local political and economic actors face incentives 
to promote private sector development but where formal institutions at the national level 
lag in adjusting to new businesses and their associated externalities‖.
1587 It also emphasizes 
the specific role of the central state in its interaction with local actors, hence the local gov-
ernment and in turn of local officials with private entrepreneurs. However, when the CCP 
regards informal practices as endangering social stability, or as questioning the political 
system at large, it officially censors those institutions. Still, adaptive informal institutions 
eased developments that led to a gradual legalization of the private sector. The case of ‗red 
capitalists‘ and the use of Guanxi helped to integrate private entrepreneurs into the party, 
and hence towards political and societal acceptance. Informal practices were also a way for 
political actors to allow for changes without having to abandon ideological issues entirely, 
but enabled them to bend the meaning of formal rules pragmatically.
1588 
     Some scholars also conceive the Chinese transformation and development process as 
displacement, whereas others argue convincingly for a process of layering and conversion. 
All these concepts seem to fit to the Chinese transition towards Capitalism and hence indi-
cate the complexity and multi-causality of the process. It also proves that even the most 
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extreme and remarkable changes in institutions and incentive structures may happen grad-
ually by the interaction of complementary institutions.
1589 
     Also the notion of Ellerman‘s parallel experimentation can explain this process of insti-
tutional change.
1590 Ellerman defines parallel experimentation as a ―process of multiple 
experiments  running  concurrently  with  some  form  of  common  goal,  with  some  semi-
isolation  between  the  experiments,  with  benchmarking  comparisons  made  between  the 
experiments, and with the ‗migration‘ of discoveries between experiments wherever possi-
ble to ratchet up the performance of the group. The thesis is that parallel experimentation is 
a fundamental dynamic efficiency scheme to enhance and accelerate variation, innovation, 
and learning in contexts of genuine uncertainty or known ignorance‖.
1591 
     This describes the pragmatic, although mostly implicit, policies and policy changes of 
the central government, most clearly visible in the development of laws concerning the 
private sector, accompanied by amendments of the constitution and finally the admission 
of private entrepreneurs into the CCP. As has been outlined in the chapters on Wenzhou 
and jurisdiction, many regulations were actually ex-post approvals of local facts. The ex-
ample of the ‗red hat‘ entrepreneurs reveals that adaptive informal institutions added to the 
conversion of a formal regulation, namely the collective registration status. The red hat 
practice added a new form of collective enterprise and by that extended the institutional 
space of private firms. It led to the advancement of more market-oriented institutions that 
competed against the existing state-controlled institutional system which, over time, dis-
solved in favor of the new institutional arrangement.
1592 It can thus be interpreted as a new 
institutional layer of corporate organizational type that did not displace the collective sec-
tor. It generated a politically acceptable justification for  establishing a more transparent 
registration status for private enterprises. The informal interaction of local economic and 
political actors created a new institutional reality that forced the central party to adjust the 
existing formal regulations to incorporate those  informal, but successful, practices. This 
dynamic process accumulated in revisions of the Chinese constitution and legislative sys-
tem that, over time, resulted in an increasingly beneficial environment for the private sec-
tor.
1593  
     As has also been emphasized throughout this work, the private sector, and hence private 
entrepreneurs together with their networks , are the driving force of (capitalist) develo p-
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ment in China. (Institutional) changes of this sector (including falsely registered enterpris-
es) have repercussions upon the state sector and hence upon the system as a whole. Guanxi 
networks are the most important instrument for private entrepreneurs and hence for the 
private sector, but it also exists in all other spheres and sectors throughout China. The de-
velopment of Guanxi Capitalism is thus driven by the private sector and is virtually inde-
pendent of the institutional framework built up by the central government. Although the 
legal environment especially is more and more equal to Western institutional structures, it 
is still only complementary to specific Chinese institutions. Informal practices in the form 
of layers and conversion amalgamate more Western-oriented institutions to fit a unique 
Chinese economic system. 
     This theoretical approach towards institutional change, especially the case of drift, is 
similar to Veblen‘s notion of evolutionary change. In general, American Institutionalism 
argues ―what survives organizationally may not be most efficient or effective, but it sur-
vives anyway because it has come to be instilled with value in that specific institutional 
context‖.
1594 As has been shown with the example of China, institutions are not conscious-
ly adapted because they are most efficient, rather because they also have a political dimen-
sion.
1595 It has also been made clear that explaining Chinese economic development is im-
possible without taking cultural and historical issues, as well as the embeddedness of indi-
viduals within the institutional structure into account, since individuals define themselves 
in relation to others. The holistic perspective of American
 Institutionalism offered a critical 
insight into the dynamics of social change and human behavior within China. Its narrative 
approach enables the description of an economy that is still in flux without claiming to be 
applicable on a general level. Within this structure the Chinese type of capitalist economy 
was analyzed and defined as a distinct form of economic system. Thus, the definition of a 
Chinese type of Capitalism can in this sense be interpreted as a pattern model but also as a 
real-type, following the terminology of the economic style approach. 
     It has been shown that even without employing the VoC-approach it is still possible to 
construct a distinct Chinese variety of Capitalism that accounts for its transformational 
nature. It also overcame Weber‘s notion that  Capitalism shapes a uniform institutional 
framework. I will come back to that below, but it has to be emphasized that an alternate 
embodiment of Capitalism in different regions with diverse cultures and history can exist. 
―However, as already Durkheim knew, and clearly Weber knew as well, an order of this 
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kind is inevitably unstable, since interests can easily and unpredictably change at any time, 
especially in rapidly fluctuating self-regulating market‖.
1596 It is important to keep in mind 
that institutions ―are staffed, rather than being merely a collective representation‖ and con-
sequently the behavior of institutional authorities in enforcing regulations varies. In differ-
ent Chinese localities different party officials with differing value systems are in power, 
who hence produce differing results in terms of institutional settings by bending formal, 
central laws. However, institutions and rituals will be particularly tenacious when they are 
endowed with value and deeply entrenched in the social structure, such as in the case of 
Guanxi.
1597  
 
9.2. The Chinese notion of development: future and perspectives 
 
“The difference between Chinese and westerners is not that one is relational and the  
other rational. Both are rational and relational. The difference is that western ratio-
nality is more based on universalistic principles and individual rights (jurisdiction)  
the Chinese rationality is based on particularistic principles and obligations  
and patron-clientelism (the opposite of clearly defined individual rights).
1598 
 
9.2.1. The role of family and networks 
     Mainstream discourse, and particularly NIE, treats liberal, contractual institutions that 
present strong protection of private property rights and business freedom as the best option 
for economic development. The arguments of these approaches are backed by econometric 
studies which, however, fail to measure institutional quality, and ignore the limitations of 
cross-section  regressions  for  highly  heterogeneous  samples.
1599  The mainstream argues 
―that economic development requires a rapid, radical, extensive (and even exhaustive) re-
placement of the current institutions, habits, and routines of the former centrally planned 
economies by an entirely new set of institutions and mentalities".
1600 By contrast, in the 
Chinese case of transformation, the process of development during the 1980s has been a s-
sociated with the term ‗songbang‘, which means ‗to untie‘. The radical process of decol-
lectivization has been conceived as an untying of the peasants from former constraints, 
allowing them to work as individual laborers.
1601 
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     It can thus be argued that a complex socio-economic system cannot be planned on a 
drawing board, and institutional frameworks cannot be replaced by newer, ‗better‘ ones. 
Hence, the notion of some sort of ―cookbook capitalism‖ does not exist.
1602 China‘s central 
government probably intuitively, but in any case pragmatically, objected to the ‗conven-
tional wisdom‘ of how to develop a country correctly. By ‗crossing the river by feeling the 
stones‘ and by taking into account ideological issues, it gradually transformed not only 
China‘s economy but – intentionally or not – also the attitude of its population towards 
Capitalism. It can also be argued that the government merely revived an already existing 
‗capitalist spirit‘ that, however, incorporated the idiosyncratic elements of the traditional 
Chinese culture mixed with remnants of the planned economy.  
     Employing Guanxi for the purpose of transforming the existing economy and designing 
a successful capitalist system was however not a deliberate decision of the central govern-
ment. It was rather a local or grassroots development that gradually changed the economy 
and the legislative environment in favor of private sector activities. The concept of ‗red 
hat‘ enterprises would not have been possible without the help of Guanxi. Guanxi as an 
institution adapted to the new circumstances rather than being actively transformed. One of 
its main features was and still is that ―Chinese people continue to treat each other different-
ly depending on family background, place of origin, shared experiences, educational affili-
ation, and other dimensions, with the nature of these affiliations determining the treatment 
received‖.
1603 This is often attributed to the prevalence of Confucian values.  
     However, Guanxi networks are different to those in Western societies, which are rather 
one-dimensional in the sense that they concentrate on one particular sphere and one type of 
connection - for example business contacts in the case of corporate networks. This implies 
a separation of business and private domains, and thus a separate set of behavior in each 
sphere. By contrast, Guanxi networks are multiplex constructs, since they include social 
relationships of different character and thus merge different spheres of life. The Chinese 
tolerance of ambiguity and a high level of pragmatism imply that one particular person can 
play a different role in different situations. Guanxi networks are also more reliant on gene-
ralized reciprocity instead of a balanced reciprocity, because it is never balanced but al-
ways entails the expectation that a favor given now will be repaid at an unknown time in 
the future.  
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     All kinds of networks are long-term constructs with trust as an important component, 
but they differ in the form of trust they incorporate. Typically, Western networks are more 
based on system than on personal trust, and also more grounded on formal than on infor-
mal social capital, which means that associations and political bodies play a bigger role 
within networks. Thus differences in culture can result in different network structures, as 
has been shown in chapter 6 with the examples of German, Russian and Italian types of 
networks. Guanxi networks not only work within the ―small islands of prosperity within 
the sea of misery‖ as the European (regional and strategic) networks do.
1604 
     Generally, networks function as a safety net in that they provide mutual assistance and 
support; in the Chinese case it is also a survival kit for hardship, since they provide support 
in case of bankruptcy by postponing or even preventing them. The reciprocal mechanism 
of Guanxi networks is aimed towards the other, not the self, which  implies that empathy 
and knowledge for the needs of the other are necessary. Guanxi always consists of unequal 
exchange, which presumes that anything reciprocated has to be of great value to the r e-
ceiver, and has to be of greater value than that received , so as to ensure the gratitude and 
further indebtedness of the recipient. This makes Guanxi networks a  dynamic and lasting 
instrument. Guanxi is necessarily highly individual, not a public good, and cannot be a c-
cumulated by collectives, such as firms, as is social capital according to Coleman. This is a 
leading difference with the concept of social capital. 
     However, Guanxi is still often compared to the concept of social capital.  Guanxi in-
cludes mutual obligations, indebtedness in a reciprocal relation. It is more than being social 
embedded, since it is a system of gifts and favors that do not need to be reciprocated at a 
particular time. It probably is most similar to Bourdieu‘s concept of social capital because 
it needs continuous efforts to be maintained. It is however not oriented towards immediate 
utility in the present or future. It further differs from Putnam‘s definition, who claims that 
social capital is manifested in civil engagement and membership in clubs, parties or other 
associations and thus is rather formal in nature. Guanxi in contrast consists purely of in-
formal relations. Guanxi differs most starkly from the more economic interpretations of 
social capital by Coleman, Burt and Dasgupta. However, Guanxi is a form of social capital 
in the sense that is a moral resource and a sum of social relations and informal rules that 
facilitate co-operation within society. Guanxi is also not equal to what Granovetter terms 
‗strong ties‘. Although Rénqíng is an important component, ‗loose affiliations‘ can also 
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share an identity and belong to the ‗inner circle‘ of Guanxi, since a high frequency of inte-
raction or spatial or emotional closeness are not necessarily obligatory.  
     The typical argument of NIE that a network is an organizational unit that is as another 
way of reducing transaction costs and enhancing efficiency, also traces cultural differences 
back to the Western rationality argument, which in the end leads to the all-encompassing 
criterion of efficiency as the sole objective of a rational enterprise. This argues again fol-
lows Weber. History is deterministic, so that rational Capitalism in the Western sense is the 
epiphany of modernity, which denies a possible difference between cultures. Western dis-
course has great difficulty in considering social systems as open or emotional and in this 
sense ‗irrational‘, which includes the absence of clear-cut boundaries between society, pol-
itics and the economy.
1605 In contrast, the flexible production of Chinese networks is based 
on trust, and is determined by its institutional environment.
1606 
 
9.2.2. The private sector and the state 
     German entrepreneurs of the 19
th century were in Weber‘s view „men who had grown 
up in the hard school of life, calculating and daring at the same time, above all temperate 
and reliable, shrewd and completely devoted to their business with strictly bourgeois opi-
nions and principles‖, leaving behind traditional lifestyle and principles.
1607 Weber consi-
dered entrepreneurs were essential for the development of Capitalism. A bourgeois was 
also a political man, feeling a responsibility for society, using his power to build up a legal 
and political environment helpful for a capitalist economy.  
     The typical entrepreneur portrayed like that retreated to relative insignificance with the 
upcoming bureaucratization and rationalization process. Personal connections were largely 
replaced by contractual relations that were regarded as more efficient. This trend was re-
versed with a changing global economy that put corporations under world-wide competi-
tion and the pressure of flexible production. Small firms complemented large corporations, 
serving as subcontractors, and in selected areas formed even very successful local industri-
al districts. Traditions from the preindustrial past helped these entrepreneurs to face global 
business. Especially the industrial districts of the Third Italy are clusters of small-scale 
businesses  connected  over networks.
1608 Networks however differ considerably in their 
significance for economic activity, and in the degree of state intervention, but in  general 
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the global economic system experienced an increasing importance of so-called flexible 
production and hence small firms, often organized in cluster or networks. Although Chi-
nese networks differ from networks found elsewhere in the world, there is of course also 
some common ground. Although particularly in these Italian districts links between entre-
preneurs are often based on informal agreements, these are only isolated phenomena. The 
density of relations within this milieu results in economies of scale that are similar to that 
of a  larger corporation, but  with  the  advantage  that  firms remain  much  more flexible. 
However, even if an individual entrepreneur dominates her own firm, the relevance and 
quality of the cluster networks differ from their Chinese counterparts not least because they 
are based on more formal, contractual relations and social capital, such as membership in 
business associations, and often also written contracts. This is even more true for the artifi-
cially built-up clusters heavily subsidized by the (German) government. However, even 
where they were not initialized by the state, European industrial districts needed a certain 
cultural tradition to thrive and often only those are also successful and sustainable in the 
longer run. Networks require a certain level of mutual trust, reciprocity, altruism, shared 
values and goals. This often contradicts economic objectives and thus endangers the dura-
bility of networks.
 The relationship of autonomy and dependence in co-operations is some-
times considered to be ‗paradoxical‘. It also means that networks are only viable in a cer-
tain context under specific conditions.
1609 Some authors even claim that networks are noth-
ing more than huge corporations ―dressed in new costumes and armed with new technolo-
gy‖.
1610 Nevertheless, the success particularly of the Italian districts lies not insignificantly 
on their high level of innovativeness and the high quality of their products.  
     By contrast, China still lags behind in the innovativeness of its firms. Even private firms 
are organized around one patriarch who views the workforce not as potential co ntributors 
to the firm‘s innovative capacity but rather as rule followers, complying with established 
routines. It is a tightly controlled system that gives the individual worker little room to con-
tribute something other than physical work. As a result, China registered only 144 ‗triadic‘ 
patents that are simultaneously registered in Europe, Japan, United States and which can 
thus be assumed to be innovative. Additionally, China‘s share of patents registered with 
the World Intellectual Property Organization in 2000 was merely 1.4 percent. By contrast, 
Austria, with a population of 8.3 million, registered 282 patents. By 2005, 50 percent of 
Chinese patent applications came from foreign-owned enterprises and merely one percent 
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of Chinese firms had ever registered a patent at all.
1611 Simultaneously, the Chinese gov-
ernment encourages plagiarism as an innovation strategy. Recently, the vice minister of the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology has called for the protection of the intel-
lectual property value of fake products (shanzhai), claiming that they also require a degree 
of innovativeness.
1612 In addition to the problem of lack of innovativeness, Chinese society 
faces the additional difficulties of an aging society, together with the consequences of the 
one-child policy. Some authors therefore claim that Chinas is ―growing old before growing 
rich‖.
1613 
     However, in Imperial China the family and traditional structures of society did not yet 
support the emergence of a Western-type Capitalism guided by a certain spirit. More than a 
century later, after Western-type Capitalism had taken over most of the world's countries 
and shaped a global economy dependent on flexible production, exactly those structures 
proved to be fertile soil for economic development. With globalization, markets and the 
production system altered; beside large-scale multi-national corporations also small firms 
are extremely successfully in this environment of rapid changes in demands and niche 
products. The success of the Chinese economic system can in no small part be attributed to 
global tendencies that favored subcontracting to small firms. The Chinese private sector 
fits perfectly into this institutional framework, since its firms are able to change products 
and the mode of production very quickly. They gain access to markets and supplies with 
the help of personal relationships. The networks of privately-owned firms revived social 
techniques and institutions known from the past. Capable of connecting through Guanxi 
networks, these firms are both highly flexible and extremely successful low-cost produc-
ers. This fits with the Chinese tendency to only do business with people they know or to 
whom they are related. If entrepreneurs in the same business are in a dense network to-
gether,  rather  than  competing  each  other  they  will  support  each  other,  exchanging  re-
sources and know-how. The unique Chinese culture and history enabled individuals to be-
come entrepreneurs, and in spite of a very difficult domestic political environment they 
were immensely successful, first and foremost in labor-intensive sectors such as textiles or 
toys. Traditional institutions such as Guanxi and the accompanying social rules and restric-
tions added to their accomplishments. Guanxi is "a historically evolved regime of kinship 
and ethnic power" that has been formed during the process of change of the economic sys-
tem in the Chinese society. Its dense networks allowed it to react flexibly and take on mas-
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sive risks, which were buffered by the supporting and sanctioning mechanism of the net-
works.
1614 Kinship networks not only serve as shelter to protect private property, but addi-
tionally provide information on supplies or business opportunities. All in all, networks 
―lower entry barriers and raise the survival and success rates of private entrepreneurs‖.
1615 
It complements Western institutions and thus forms a specific type of Capitalism based on 
Guanxi. The reality of an increasingly flexible global economy favors not only mass pr o-
duction, but even more so subcontracting and small -business production, which is most 
effectively done in cities that create clusters of production for certain products, as for ex-
ample in Wenzhou for shoes or lighters. 
     In contrast to their German counterparts, Chinese entrepreneurs do not form a class, or 
bourgeoisie. Besides being rich, they do not build a shared identity and hence, formal s o-
cial capital (like membership in business associations) is far less important than informal 
social capital, not least because they come from extremely  diverse backgrounds. Informal 
social capital manifests itself in bilateral connections to local officials, one of the most 
important factors for the private sector in China. This relationship is shaped by shared mo-
tivation and aims which are mutually intertwined and result in a partnership in which both 
sides gain. Although entrepreneurs are often seriously discriminated against by the (local) 
government, they still do not seem to seek political change in general. By contrast, intellec-
tual, economic and political elites increasingly merged since the 1990s, led by the thought 
that market economy and a totalitarian state actually are an advantageous combination, and 
all that matters is economic development. Authoritarian control can thus at the same time 
obey the global convention of ‗rule of law‘ and the logic of Guanxi. It is a means of linking 
the demands of the market with that of political control.
1616  
     The ‗new rich‘ found various coping strategies to evade disadvantages and thus a way 
to be successful in business while also achieving a reputation in their network and commu-
nity. Hence, like their European equivalents, they follow a strict cultural code, in their case 
the rules of Guanxi. As Guanxi is not a business but societal phenomenon, this might also 
explain their hesitant attitude towards more formal co-operation with other entrepreneurs. 
     This proves again that the importance of kinship relations for individuals was not dimi-
nished  by  the  Chinese  transformation  towards  Capitalism.  Still,  individuals  ―find  their 
place between a succession of ancestors and future generations‖. Guanxi extended to in-
corporate also quasi-kinship and became thus a ―more general an open-ended structure of 
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Guanxi networks‖, organized around the individual.
1617 It has been argued that  five core 
elements of the Chinese culture constitute the Chinese individual. These are the signific-
ance of the relationship between father and son, strong gender segregation, having a large 
family, a specific education system and powerful parental authority.  
     Although individuals are still embedded in their personal relationships and view the m-
selves only in relations to others, be it family or the more extend social network, there is 
also a process of individualization within the Chinese society. The Chinese individual is 
divided into a small self and a great self, the first concerned with personal interest, the 
second directed towards national interest. Chinese individual actors define themselves not 
as autonomous, but in relation to a social group. In contrast to a similar pro cess in  the 
Western world, it is process that is led by the party -state and is not necessarily aimed to-
wards a democracy, political lib eralism, or a more advanced welfare state .
1618 Still, the 
changes to the socio-economic system in China led towards an ‗enterprising self‘ who is 
more calculating and pro-active, an attitude mostly found among the younger generation. 
They are autonomous and responsible individual actors who at the same time can also be 
patriotic  or  even  nationalistic,  and  identify  with  the  party-state.  They  are  also  self-
controlled in the sense that for example the owners of Internet cafés support the control 
and censorship of the Internet users in order to stay in business, although these businesses 
are already privatized. Individualization in China is more equal to a re-defining of the rela-
tionship between the individual and the party-state without contesting the political system, 
rather than to a change in the relationship between individual and society as in Western 
Europe.
1619 
     However, the strong emphasis on the family is an obstacle for the development of a  
civil society in the Western sense. China seems also not to  head towards a middle-class, 
bourgeois society, but is highly polarized, which also means that it is  potentially also a 
‗high-risk society‘.
1620 The articulation of legitimate interests in China was traditionally 
very difficult, since Chinese rulers mostly believed that different regions should not have 
different interests. All regions within China, no matter how diversified, were supposed to 
follow the same goals and have the same interests and trust their leader to act in their best 
interest. China in that sense did not develop a mature political economy and hence no 
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strong civil society. Despite recent economic development, very few interest groups exist. 
The existing associations and organizations are part of the party-state and are not in oppo-
sition to it. This form of state corporatism is however a political culture with some tradition 
in China.
1621 
     Although the CCP opened up towards private entrepreneu rs, and also enacted private 
sector-friendly legislation which allowed some pluralization and institutionalization to take 
place, it still keeps its rules and laws opaque, giving a lot of power to local state officials. 
Autonomous institutions outside the party -state, such as  an independent judiciary, still 
hardly exist. This forces private entrepreneurs to navigate semi-legal gray areas if they are 
to be successful in business, which in turn gives the state the opportunity to accuse a busi-
nessman of infringement at its will. This protects the state from  political opposition by 
economic elites.  
     Additionally, Guanxi networks are a tool to facilitate interaction with  a bureaucratic 
state. It is also complementary to the formal legal system established by the central gov-
ernment and is still better suited to guarantee the enforcement of contracts,  because moral 
principles are regarded as more influential than legality . In China, networks are seen as 
long-term reciprocal alliances to access information and resources, like bank loans or sup-
plies. They are especially a means to navigate in unstable political and economic surround-
ings, supporting the flexibility of small firms. 
 
9.3. A new type of Capitalism? Towards a definition of Guanxi Capitalism 
 
”All things are in motion and nothing remains still.” 
Heraclitus of Ephesus 
 
     This dissertation argued that Chinese economic system is network-based and thus dif-
fers qualitatively from Western Capitalism.
1622 This work therefore focused on the private 
sector and the relevance of Guanxi within it. However, it was emphasized that although 
Guanxi is employed in the entire Chinese economic system, it is most significant for pr i-
vate enterprises. The private sector itself is also not homogenous, but works differently 
from region to region and/or sectors. Even taking this into account, some common tenden-
cies can be found in the entire economy. Rather than being bifurcated into a st ate-
controlled economy and a private economy, each adhering to their own set of rules, the 
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Chinese economic system is more a continuum of varieties that together result in a specific 
Chinese type of Capitalism. However, economic data shows that the private sector is the 
driving force behind the development process.  
     Although the Chinese transformation towards Capitalism has gone a long way, it re-
mains incomplete, and the Chinese type of Capitalism still undergoes constant change. It is 
a very complex, multifaceted process that works differently in China than in other capital-
ist countries. Its institutional framework is influenced not only by strong local cultural tra-
ditions, but also by the size and the correlating regional disparities of the country. Howev-
er, Guanxi plays an important role in regulating the relations between the economy and the 
political system. It results in a certain pattern of ‗Chinese‘ entrepreneurial practices that 
include the important role of the family firms, especially wives in internal management 
functions, and support by business networks, facilitating informal financing.
1623 Entrepre-
neurs are driven by the desire to not only provide for their family, but to enhance its rep u-
tation by money accumulation. This enabled SMEs to become very specialized producers 
that at the same time have access to economies of scale over flexible Guanxi networks, 
principally not much different than in the industrial districts of the Third Italy and in some 
other locations in Europe, as already mentioned above.  
     Although the private sector relies on one part of the ‗standard‘ instruments of a capital-
ist economy, which are first and foremost contracts and certain corporate forms, they are 
more dependent on Guanxi strategies to overcome this institutional uncertainty and volatile 
government policies for the Chinese private sector. Rather than depending on the supervi-
sory role of the state and on large-scale bureaucratic enterprises, private entrepreneurs rely 
on the multiplication of small businesses that are arranged in clusters and thus achieve 
maximal flexibility. Within these clusters, not the state but Guanxi is essential for econom-
ic success.
1624 Guanxi Capitalism relies on dynamics that are at the same time complemen-
tary and contradictory and which have their root in Chinese culture and history.
1625  
     Consequently, Guanxi supports a system of network capitalism, that rather than being 
dependent on trust in formal institutions such as the law; it hinges more on trust that is 
based on interpersonal liabilities. Some authors claim that personal networks by definition 
have to be quite small-scale, since individual capacities to build up and maintain social 
connections are limited.
 1626 However, as connections can have varying degrees of intensity 
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and importance and also are spatially and chronologically distributed, Guanxi networks in 
general are of larger scale than other types of networks. This work therefore argues for the 
great significance that Guanxi has for Chinese Capitalism. Guanxi capitalism represents ―a 
distinct form of business practice derived primarily from the Chinese kinship system‖.
1627 
     This work has also analyzed the link between a capitalist economy and a democratic 
political system, since Capitalism relies to a large part on the relationship between the 
economy and the state.
1628 In theory entrepreneurs will with increasing wealth seek politi-
cal influence in practice they interact with the local government, but are rather passive on a 
central level. They are not interested in system change, at least as long business is good 
and the economy grows. To that effect they seek to build up Guanxi with local government 
officials to achieve some embeddedness with the party -state. The Western-style legal 
framework, which over the course of reforms has been introduced by the central gover n-
ment, is neglected in favor of more powerful Guanxi relations. In turn ambiguous  Guanxi 
relations enabled the central government to support private economic activity without hav-
ing to surrender its ideology entirely. On the contrary, it allowed the government to mai n-
tain political power through economic success. Guanxi C apitalism  achieves  distinctive 
advantages for Chinese privately-owned firms by translating wealth into power, and thus 
manages to combine traditional with capitalist institutions.
1629 These connections between 
local economic and political actors are sometimes also called ‗clan capitalism‘ and are a 
distinct feature of Guanxi Capitalism.
1630 
     It has been shown that there is no Chinese bourgeois class in the making, and entrepr e-
neurs do not conceive themselves as having something in common, except maybe concrete 
business plans. The continuous importance of the Chinese entrepreneur  contradicts We-
ber‘s ideal-type notion of Capitalism and the role of entrepreneurs therein. In contrast to 
Weber‘s and Sombart‘s expectations concerning growing rationalization and bureaucrati-
zation, instead of entrepreneurs losing significance in the Chinese economic system they 
are still essential for the economic success of an enterprise. Entrepreneurs possess the ne-
cessary flexibility, the right instinct for profitable investments and the ability to mobilize 
connections and create alliances - valuable assets for the global production environment. 
Weber‘s ideal-type framework has thus been contrasted with the reality of China, particu-
larly the role of the private sector, entrepreneurs and their networks with a particular em-
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phasis of how their co-operation (and interaction with the state) works. Weberian ideal-
types of relationship are either purposive- or value-rational, hence either highly purposive 
and 'commodified' or more sentimental in nature. The 'bureaucratism' of modern China that 
many people and especially entrepreneurs conceive to be obstacles for business, falls out-
side this dichotomous categorization. Guanxi, however, has both value-rational and pur-
pose-rational elements and is able to use connections ―cultivated for their intrinsic value as 
an instrument to achieve other ends, or even cultivates 'connections' with material gains in 
mind‖.
1631 
     Different institutional frameworks in Europe did not lead to significantly different eco-
nomic developments. So it might be fair to say that Capitalism itself is grounded upon 
some fundamental mechanism or spirit. The difference in style can be traced back to dif-
ferent policy decisions or to cultural aspects, forming specific types of Capitalism.
1632 This 
would also accommodate the fact that Capitalism  is obviously able to function under di-
verse political systems. 
     It is a standard argument within mainstream economics that  growing global involve-
ment and the pressure of liberalization, particularly in finance, will even out the differences 
between countries and of different forms of Capitalism, and will lead to the convergence of 
institutions. In the same line of thought researchers like Markus Taube argue that although 
for example China is increasingly important for the shape of the global ec onomy, it still 
needs to follow the basic rules of a market economy and therefore a  ‗sinicization‘ of the 
economy will not occur.
1633 However, diverging structural conditions result in a variety of 
Capitalism that is based on a different set of institutions. As has been recognized by inter-
national development agencies, there is not one ‗best practice‘ for a country to follow the 
dynamics and regulations of a market economy, but depending on the specifics of its insti-
tutional background, there are diverse ways to efficiently implement Capitalism.
1634 
     It can also be assumed that Capitalism is a very robust mechanism. Despite the gloomy 
predictions of many economists that Capitalism is doomed and will be replaced by another 
system such as Imperialism (Lenin) or Socialism (Marx, Schumpeter) or else is anticipated 
to reach the end of the accumulation process (Smith, Keynes), today it is more influential 
than ever.
1635 However, as the example of Wenzhou and its survival of the financial crisis 
of 2008 have shown, also Guanxi Capitalism has a stable character.  It was demonstrated 
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that entrepreneurs employ their contacts to local officials to facilitate their embeddedness 
in dense networks and thereby maintain their business or starting afresh if failing in one 
specific sector. The connections to politicians proved to be extremely helpful. People uti-
lized their ties to local cadres, which in turn due to their local embeddedness were inclined 
to support private enterprises. The extreme flexibility, the forgiveness and experiences of 
their networks, investing in a whole portfolio of products and the usage of underground 
banking facilities - these together help entrepreneurs survive. This is not equal to the sur-
vival of a specific enterprise whose dissolution would be tolerable, because the failure of 
one business is not considered to be a personal failure. It is rather the existence of networks 
that gives the necessary stability and security, especially in times of economic crises. With-
in China different strategies are at work to cope with the impact of capitalist transforma-
tion, especially in regions with a large collective sector. In the latter case, mainstream ma-
cro policies, such as the stimulus package, were also of significance for the recovery of the 
Chinese economy. However, this dissertation stresses the importance of the private sector 
and hence the influence of informal connections, and also that Guanxi is an indispensable 
and vital factors for the successful restoration of the Chinese economy. Although Wenzhou 
serves as an illuminating example and similar ones can be found throughout China, it is 
very important to keep in mind that ―China is a continental system which contains a large 
number of different social and cultural practices. Its 34 provincial-level jurisdictions are 
most usually country-sized by the standards of the rest of the world‖.
1636 Still, industrial 
clusters in rural China developed spontaneously in various places depending on local tradi-
tional culture, local resources and also ―local capable persons‖.
1637  
     Chinese Capitalism based on networks and small private businesses thus proves to be an 
alternative embodiment of Capitalism that is also sustainable. Personal relations are not 
separated into a private and a business sphere or exchanged for other, in Western thinking 
more rational, means of doing business, since they include factors like reputation and long-
term benefits for their family. Guanxi is a permanent part of Chinese society and wields a 
strong  influence  on  the  economic  system,  while  maintaining  its  core  identity.  Guanxi 
proved to be a powerful tool in its ability to adapt. Despite all the assumptions of main-
stream economics, the Chinese economy is extremely successful and its economic system 
works quite efficiently, even though Western-style institutions do not (yet) exist or are not 
put to use. It does not merely react to changes within society, with traditional forms forced 
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to subordinate to market forces. It complements Western institutions to meet economic 
demands, and thus forms a specific type of Capitalism based on Guanxi. Guanxi is not an 
irrational mode of economic activity that is inferior to rational-legal institutions. Chinese 
Capitalism uses unique Chinese elements combined with Western institutions, its history 
and culture forming a distinctive type of doing business, and also shapes a specific capita-
listic society. Both modes will coexist in a newly defined institutional and cultural style of 
modernity.  
     In contrast, personal relations expose comparative efficiency as they are chosen as the 
most capable instrument for the private sector in China, with the result that ―the growth of 
export production has taken place outside of the state sector of industry, within foreign 
funded, rural and township, and privately owned enterprises‖.
1638 The Chinese form of 
rational Capitalism does not destroy long-existing culturally and historically embedded 
institutions, yet it still disadvantages individuals, especially women and bases its success in 
part on social inequalities. Hence, there are mainly two institutional changes to the Chinese 
economy: the introduction of a legal-rational regime by the state and the "increasing class 
and gendered nature or Guanxi".
1639 Part of Guanxi is that it "traps women and the poor 
while benefiting fraternal business associations".
1640  
     It is however important to emphasize that there are also sectors and enterprises that do 
business the Western way ,  but  still  with a Chinese turn . Western-style institutions  are 
adapted and although contracts are used, especially in sectors with a lot of FDI and in for-
mer SOEs, personal relations are of greater importance in China than in the West since the 
individual is seen as part of a bigger whole (family or networks). Those features are imma-
nent to Chinese culture and although changed and adapted, they will not wither away. By 
contrast, contracts have a very long tradition in the West in the regulation of relationships 
between individuals, whereas in China obligations to other people are derived from morali-
ty and propriety. A juridification of personal relations in this tradition is difficult to env i-
sion. In a particularistic culture such as the Chinese one, justice and rights are not under s-
tood to be an individual entitlement.  
     On the other hand,  because  Chinese family firms operate most efficiently in  labor-
intensive low- and medium-technology industries producing for export, their success might 
merely be temporary. If unable to provide the necessary  capital and sufficiently highly 
skilled workers needed to develop capital-intensive high-technology industries, Guanxi and 
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family ties might become an obstacle again. Indeed, small-scale enterprises will certainly 
not play an important role in every sector of the economy. Even within the private sector 
small privately owned firms concentrate on branches where they can exercise their com-
parative advantage of fast reactions to changes in demand and thus complement the more 
Western-style institutions of other sectors. 
     By contrast, following Weber, modern Capitalism is assuming the same form globally, 
wherever and whenever it arises, destroying the traditional structures of societies and un-
ifying the cultural diversity required for its success. By contrast, in China specific cultural 
idiosyncrasies seem to exist which are able to produce a harmonious symbiosis with capi-
talistic structures, mutually assisting and enhancing the given opportunities. The Chinese 
economic system seems to prove that Capitalism need not override traditional social for-
mations. It also overcomes the notion of efficiency as the most defining attribute of a suc-
cessful economy. Cultures are able deal with the reality of a global capitalist system in 
different  ways.  Chinese  Capitalism  is  based  on  long-lasting  traditions  and  defines  the 
boundaries of society and economy, of business and politics in a new way and thus rises 
above Weber‘s distinction of traditional and rational.  
     Additionally,  personal  networks  proved  to  be  extremely  successful  in  dealing  with 
(economic) crises in the past, and contributed to the fast recover after the 2008 financial 
crises. Also, by obtaining not only material but also symbolic capital, Chinese Capitalism 
shows that ―personal trust possesses more than just a functional [economic] value. This 
implies that Chinese Capitalism may in fact be more sustainable than is often assumed. 
Instead of being destroyed, the Chinese family-based economy adapted to a capitalistic 
environment. The common view that Capitalism necessarily has to impoverish large frac-
tions of the population and destroy traditional institutions to prosper might yet been proven 
wrong.  
    It might also be the case that the Chinese way of doing business will not only be sus-
tainable, it might also be the case that the West will need to adapt its style towards one 
where the person of the entrepreneur and personal connection be of more importance. In 
contrast to the belief that only Chinese business practices need to move towards the West-
ern style of doing business, it might be also the case that the West has to move in the di-
rection of Guanxi-type systems. Increasingly, also in the West informal institutions devel-
op, for example for giving loans ‗from private to private‘ as so called P2P-loans. Also, the 
development  of  ‗relationship  marketing‘  is  discovered  as  a  way  to  reduce  transaction 304 
 
costs, facilitate future marketing efforts and retain customers through specific and con-
tinuing relationships. To accomplish these goals trust and commitment is needed.  
From Weber‘s point of view a specific Chinese Capitalism can only be a temporary phe-
nomenon, since in the long-run it will converge to the usual contractual relations within 
large-scale enterprises. This is also believed by some Chinese authors who claim that ―the 
personalized transactional pattern […] will continually and expediently be transformed into 
the non-personalized transactional pattern‖.
1641 However, Weber‘s thesis of an inevitable 
bureaucratization cannot be uphold. The flexible accumulation of 21
st century Capitalism 
hinges not only on huge multinational corporations but has also ―achieve[d] a new compet-
itive edge by abandoning hierarchical, capital-intensive bureaucratic enterprises for flexi-
ble smaller subcontracting firms‖, and thus family businesses.
1642 For those reasons, this 
work, instead of constructing ―Capitalism as a monolithic, all-encompassing, penetrating, 
seamless, and integrated total system with a predetermined and knowable teleology‖
1643 in 
line with Weber‘s thinking, identified a different type of Capitalism that consists of its own 
characteristic institutions. 
     However, family structures and economic change mutually influence each other. Eco-
nomic development changes the nature of the family, but so too does the structure of the 
family influence the modalities of industrialization. China did not just copy the Western 
form of Capitalism, but has found its own way of coping with the demands of the world 
market. Institutions from the past were remodeled to adapt to the conditions of the modern 
global economy as  efficiently  as  possible, instrumentalizing cultural and social institu-
tions.
1644 It has to be emphasized that this fa mily-based system strongly depends on the 
exploitation of cheap labor, especially of women. Although very successful economically, 
Guanxi-type Capitalism is also a male dominated, patriarchal structure without being more 
humane or providing equality. 
     Guanxi-Capitalism revived authoritarian traditional institutions and made China a com-
petitive force in the global market. Instead of regarding small family businesses as an out-
dated mode of production, Chinese economic success relies on the flexibility and personal 
networks of privately-owned firms. Thus, the rationality of Guanxi-Capitalism is based on 
the unique framework of China‘s culture and history. Personal relations were always of 
importance throughout the Chinese history and are deeply ingrained in the Chinese culture. 
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So even though from a Western thinking this might be deemed inefficient, from a Chinese 
point of view it is not because Guanxi include not only economic considerations but also 
factors like reputation and long-term benefits for their family.  
     Market forces do not necessarily override the existing traditional features. One can ar-
gue that the Chinese type of Capitalism can be considered as a ‗hybrid Capitalism‘ that has 
elements of both Western and Chinese Capitalism. Institutional arrangements, the histori-
cal development and cultural elements have formed different ways of doing business. It is 
important to recognize that ―indigenous economies are not always plowed under with the 
introduction of Capitalism but may even experience renewal and pose a challenge to capi-
talist principles, stimulating us to rethink existing critiques of capitalism‖.
1645 
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